THE ARMIES AND WARS OF THE SUN KING 1643-1715

VOLUME 4: THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, ARTILLERY, ENGINEERS AND MILITIAS

RENÉ CHARTRAND

Century of the Soldier
1618-1721
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THE ARMIES AND WARS OF THE SUN KING 1643–1715

Volume 4: The War of the Spanish Succession, Artillery, Engineers and Militias

René Chartrand

‘This is the Century of the Soldier’, Fulvio Testi, Poet, 1641

Helion & Company

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Cover: Jean, Marquis de Gassion, charging with his Navarre infantry brigade at the battle of Denain, 24 July 1712. Although this image was created in 1839, it captures admirably the charge of the French infantry on the allied defences, which were overcome. The tremendous strategic impact of Marshal Villars' victory eventually led to the end of the war. Old lithograph after Jean Alaux's painting. (Private collection. Author's photo)

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When they poured across the border,
I was cautioned to surrender,
This I could not do,
I took my gun and I vanished.

Leonard Cohen
The Partisan

Contents

Preface vi

1. The Outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession 8
2. Italy and the Camisards 1701–1704 17
3. Blenheim and Ramillies 27
4. The Italian Front 1705–1706 38
5. The Flanders Front 1707–1711 45
6. The Spanish Front or the First Peninsular War 1704–1707 51
7. Victory in Spain and Provence 69
8. Defeat and Triumph in the Peninsula 76
9. Hardships Everywhere for Everyone 87
10. The 1712 Climax 97
11. The German Front and the End of the War of the Spanish Succession 111
12. The Economic Tremors of War 121
13. Gunners and Guns 129
14. Engineers and Fortifications 147
15. Territorial Command Staff, Gentlemen-Cadets and Light Troops 166
16. Armed Constabulary Troops 174
17. Local Reserve Troops 191
18. Caring for Souls and Bodies 199
19. In the Wake of the Sun King's Armies 210
20. Recruiting and National Conscription 218
21. The Enigmatic and Numerous Local Militia of France 226

Appendix I: The Allied Spanish Bourbon Army of King Felipe V 261
Appendix II: Order of Battle of the French and Spanish Army, 1706 268
Appendix III: The Portuguese Army 270

Colour Plate Commentaries 274
Select Annotated Bibliography 278

Preface

If the author was to seek a music score to accompany a narrative of the first 15 years of eighteenth-century Europe, it would likely be Dmitri Shostakovich's 4th symphony with its harrowing, desperate, sombre and yet sparkling notes. A fitting score for a new century that started with Europe and the world generally at peace. Then, the passing away of the King of Spain plunged European nations into the worst conflict seen since the Thirty Years' War and of a scale not to be seen again until the Napoleonic Wars a century later. At the very centre of what became known as the War of the Spanish Succession was the Sun King and his armies.

Like the previous volumes, this fourth tome is packed with a deluge of topics. As before, we present a pan-European strategic view which allows us to consider rather different outlooks than has usually been the case in studies that concentrated on celebrating a particular nation's army and heroes. In this volume's narrative of the War of the Spanish Succession, we of course acknowledge the excellent previous works on the allied campaigns in Flanders, Germany and Italy with lauded generals such as Marlborough whose praise could fill libraries.[1]

While not ignoring these, our emphasis is clearly to the nearly ignored Spanish front where the Hispano-French armies of the amazing King Felipe V with Marshal Berwick and the Duc de Vendôme triumphed while the equally decisive 1712 campaign by Marshal Villars, by sheer daring at

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[1] Author's note – Some readers of previous volumes, while acknowledging the obvious space limitations, wish there could have been orders of battle of regiments for engagements mentioned in our books and that some battles were not listed in the regimental lists that are necessarily very short. There are, however, some relatively easily available sources that can be accessed with some of that information. Orders of battle listing regiments for many engagements are often given, sometimes with names of officers that were casualties, in the seven Vol.s of Charles Sevin, Marquis de Quincy, *Histoire militaire du règne de Louis le Grand, roi de France* (Paris, 1726). Notices for regiments that include their engagements and stations are given in Louis Susane, *Histoire de la cavalerie française* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1874) in Vol. 3 and his *Histoire de l'infanterie française* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1876) in Vol. five. The first edition of this work was titled *Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française* (Paris: J. Corréard, 1849–1854) which has the notices in its Vol. 8. For the War of the Spanish Succession, we also recommend the 11 Vol.s of *Mémoires militaires relatifs à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV*, generals de Vault and Pelet, eds (Paris, 1835–1862). The online sites Gallica and Google have some or all of these works. We add that, at this period, the strength of armies is often given by numbers of infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons. An infantry battalion is generally taken to have 500 men, and a cavalry squadron 120 men.

Denain, reversed much of the previous allied gains and thus the strategic course of the war. This later battle is often conveniently ignored in British histories because Britain opted out of the war in 1711–1712. Yet, reality must be faced: Britain abandoned its allies while they were still at war fighting hard against the Sun King's army, still the largest in Europe. In the financial section, whilst we agree with all histories written since the eighteenth century including the French ones that France was indeed in difficulties with debt; we point out those high levels were even higher in the allied camp, Britain's in particular, and that the 1709 climatic disaster did not hit France alone; there are limits to blaming the Sun King for everything.

After presenting the technical and support corps of the French army such as the artillery and its ordnance, engineering and its techniques, we glance at the medical care, the then revolutionary new Invalides hospital for the maimed, the soldiers' families', the amazing women soldiers, the armed constabulary and the military justice system, and the first serious conscription system in modern Europe under the guise of a provincial "militia". This led the author to explore if there was in France a substantial reserve of real organised local militia units that were armed and even uniformly clothed, much as the present Army Reserve in Britain, the Militia in Canada or the National Guard in the United States. A few units were known here and there and we now present our findings from relatively limited research: thousands of companies throughout France in seemingly every town including small ones as well as coastal areas; our somewhat conservative estimate suggests up to 700,000 local militiamen. As can be seen in our final chapter, vast numbers were well armed, well equipped and often uniformed as well as having their own colours. Furthermore, most put up a determined fight when attacked according to what we found.

And so, in all their complexities, trials and splendours, such were the Sun King's armies.

RC

1

The Outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession

The Succession to the Throne of Spain and "the Indies"

The end of the Nine Years' War in 1698 had brought peace in western Europe, and the battle of Zenta won by Prince Eugene over the Turks in 1697 had been disastrous for Ottoman domination in eastern Europe. Peace had been signed in 1699 with the Ottoman Turks ceding Transylvania (northern Romania) to Austria, part of Greece to Venice, Kaminiec to Poland and Azov to Russia. Thus as the year 1700 dawned, introducing a new century, peace reigned everywhere in Europe and, apparently, also overseas. But northern clouds soon darkened prospects as soldier-kings Charles XII of Sweden and Peter I of Russia undertook the Great Northern War. Other European nations hoped for peace, but a worse and almost unpredictable tragedy was already evolving.

The tragedy about to unfold upon Europe had its origin in Spain. Carlos II, King of Spain "and the Indies" was a sickly man who, as he advanced in his thirties, sensed that he did not have many years left. He had no heirs to succeed him to the throne. He was related to both the French Bourbon and the Austrian Habsburg royal families; both claimed one of their princes should succeed him. In his November 1698 will, Carlos designated six-year-old Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria, but that prince died the following year leaving Louis XIV's son, the Grand Dauphin, heir to the throne of France, as the senior legitimate candidate. While France, Britain and the Netherlands had secretly agreed to a partition of the Spanish Empire, in 1700 Carlos II now designated 15-year-old Archduke Charles of Austria. A substantial part of Spain's nobility, as well as most of its population, seemingly disliked the Austrian Habsburg rulers and preferred a French candidate, so Carlos II altered his will again, and this time it favoured the second son of the Grand Dauphin, 17-year-old Philippe, Duc d'Anjou, who was chosen in late September. This, predictably, was not accepted in Vienna.

On 1 November 1700,the sickly Carlos II passed away in Madrid, six days from his 39th birthday. As soon as his death became known, it was clear that neither France nor Austria could back down from supporting


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R. Douro
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Vigo
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Previous page: Map of northern, central and eastern Europe, *c.*1700–1720. The battle lines were set for the War of the Spanish Succession and the Great Northern War that would exhaust all participants. At left, the Sun King's France and its allies: Bavaria, part of northern Italy (Milan, Naples) and Spain; the opposing Grand Alliance had Austria, Brandenburg/Prussia, most of the Holy Roman Empire, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Piémont (Savoy) and Portugal. Poland had become a weak state dominated largely by its neighbours. Sweden dominated the north-east, challenged by Peter the Great's Russia. The Ottoman Empire tried to hold its own against Austria and Russia, but with increasing difficulty. (Private collection. Author's photo)

their candidates. Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I claimed the succession, supporting his youngest son to become King Charles III (or Carl in German, Carlos in Spanish) of Spain. In Versailles, Louis XIV felt the same way about his grandson.

On 16 November 1700, the Sun King greeted the Marquis de Los Rios, Spain's ambassador to France, for a private meeting at Versailles. The King was accompanied by young Philippe d'Anjou and the Spanish ambassador was told by Louis XIV that he beheld the new King of Spain at which the Marquis knelt before his monarch, henceforth King Felipe V, while the Sun King let his many courtiers join them and said to all, pointing to his grandson: "Gentlemen, here is the King of Spain" and later added that there were "no Pyrenees" between France and Spain. The die was cast.[1]

Louis XIV had already provoked three wars of expansion during his reign. Therefore most European nations were not especially reassured by the promise that the crowns of France and Spain might not be united at some point. Even if not, it was terrifying for the Sun King's former opponents to think that French influence would become decisive not only in Spain and its vast overseas dominions, but in half of Italy and in Flanders. Would Spanish Flanders suddenly become a satellite state, as would Naples and the Milanese? All these questions created geostrategic nightmares in Vienna, The Hague and London.

This vision was soon partly realised by an unexpected ally of Louis XIV: Maximilian-Emmanuel II, Elector and Duke of Bavaria, who was then also governor general of Spanish Flanders residing in Brussels, who declared for King Felipe V of Spain. Bavaria was one of the larger German states and a former ally of the Austrian, Dutch and British. French diplomats were also securing Italy's Spanish dominions. Piémont was also toying with the idea of a Bourbon alliance, and on 11 September 1701 Marie-Louise-Gabrielle, second daughter of Vittorio Amadeo II Duke of Savoy, married the new King of Spain. A secret dowry clause specified that Vittorio Amadeo was to be senior commander of the Spanish and French troops in northern Italy, which was really an alliance of Piémont with France. Negotiations in Lisbon had also secured an agreement of non-aggression between France, Spain and Portugal, thus neutralising a military threat from "Britain's oldest ally" in case of war, at least in the short term. On 4 December, Felipe V left Versailles for Madrid.

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[1] Quoted from: Gustave Toudouze, *Le Roy Soleil* (Paris: Boivin, 1908), pp.64–66.



Louis XIV, King of France, c.1702. The Sun King was now 64 years old and embarking on the most trying decade of his life. In this portrait, he is shown as commander-in-chief and holds his marshal's baton. His sky-blue shoulder scarf of the Order of the Holy Spirit lies over his black and gilt cuirass, a protective item that he ordered staff and cavalry officers to wear; the white scarf of France is around his waist and his all-scarlet coat is decorated with gold embroidery and buttons. Print after a portrait by Hyacinthe Rigaud given by the King to the Duc de Vendôme and placed in his chateau of Chenonceaux. (Author's photo)


C. Heiss Pinx.

Right: Carlos II, King of Spain and the Indies, late seventeenth century. Born in 1661, he was a sickly person and destined to be the last of the Spanish Habsburg kings. After his death in 1700 his will caused the diplomatic crisis which eventually started the War of the Spanish Succession. Print after E.C. Heiss. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Left: Leopold I, Holy Roman Emperor from 1648 to 1705. His son Charles was the Habsburg candidate to be the King of Spain and its empire, and Leopold disregarded the will of Carlos II which favoured the Sun King's grandson. War ensued. Prince Eugene recalled that he "detested the French to such a degree that he forbade a single word of that language to be spoken at his court." He died on 6 May 1705. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)


DON PHELIPPE V. POR LA GRACIA DE DIOS REY DE LAS ESPAÑAS

Left: Felipe V, King of Spain and the Indies, *c.*1700. Born in 1683, he was Louis XIV's grandson and only 17 when he was designated by Carlos II to be the king of Spain. He wears a Spanish-style jacket with a collar of the Spanish Order of the Golden Fleece, and his cape bears the badge of the French Order of Saint-Esprit. Print after H. Rigaud. (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. The Charles Deering Collection)



Right: King Carlos III of Spain, *c.*1706. This Austrian archduke was the allied Habsburg pretender to the Spanish throne, and in this portrait by Frans van Stampart he points to the allied fleet that captured Barcelona in 1705. Portrait by Frans van Stampart. (Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna. Author's photo)



Right: Maximilian II Emanuel, Elector of Bavaria, *c.*1705–1706. An able soldier, Maximilian Emanuel (1662–1726) first campaigned against the Turks with the Austrians. He sided against the French during the League of Augsburg War and became the ally of Louis XIV during the War of the Spanish Succession. His 1703 campaign in the Tyrol was ably resisted by the Austrians. During 1704 he was second in command of the Franco-Bavarian army led by Marshal Villeroi, and was forced to flee after the battle of Ramillies on 23 May won by Marshal Marlborough's Anglo-Dutch army. His later activities were more involved in strategic planning than in battle leadership. Print after J.G. Seiller. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)



Left: King William III of Great Britain and Stadtholder of Holland, late seventeenth century. Unsigned print. (Private collection. Author's photo)

The other chanceries of Europe had been very busy too during the summer of 1701. In Britain, King William III was certainly not about to accept the Sun King's candidate, neither was the Netherlands and both supported the Habsburg candidate. On 7 September Great Britain, the Holy Roman Empire and the Netherlands signed a military alliance whose aim was to conquer Spanish Flanders and Spain's domains in Italy as well as oust Felipe V. Although war was not as yet declared, everybody was mobilising. The Emperor promised to field an army of 90,000 men besides the contingents of the Holy Roman Empire that would join him, the Netherlands 100,000 men including many mercenaries and Britain 40,000 men and more the following years, besides subsidies to allies henceforth including payments to Vienna. Britain and the Netherlands were further arming fleets greater than the Sun King's.[2]

On 16 September James II, King of Great Britain in exile, passed away, posing the possibility of a break with the British government in London if he recognised his son, the Prince of Wales, as legitimate heir. The Sun King's council was against recognition, hoping to prevent war with Britain; meanwhile Mary of Modena, James II's widow, and Madame de Maintenon argued for it. The loyalty and faith in the Sun King by the large Irish diaspora in France would have been an important factor too. Probably thinking as he often did that he would be blamed no matter what he decided, Louis XIV recognised the Prince of Wales as James III on the basis that the rights of a legitimate king should not be negated by an adventurous usurper such as William of Orange.

Meanwhile, in late January 1701, French troops appeared at certain Spanish Flanders fortresses that had been garrisoned by 22 battalions of Dutch troops who now had to leave Ath, Charleroi, Luxembourg, Namur, Nieuport, Mons and Oudenarde. This was due to a previous agreement between Spain and the Netherlands that allowed the latter to post garrison troops, and was seen as a considerable irritant in France. The Sun King reasoned that if the Dutch could do this under Carlos II, he could do it as well under Felipe V, especially since he had Maximilian-Emmanuel's support. It is routinely affirmed by British historians that Louis XIV was most imperious in these actions; perhaps so, but would William III have just kept quietly drinking his tea in London if 22 French battalions had been posted in, say, forts in Ireland or Scotland? Of course not. He would have done the same as his opponent, the Sun King. That year a combined Hispano-French fleet sailed from Cadiz to the West Indies announcing Felipe V, and territorial viceroys and governors readily rallied to his candidacy. This was an important event for the Bourbons since they could expect silver and gold from American domains if they adequately protected the treasure fleets.

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[2] Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* (Berlin, 1751), p.291; Britain did not subsidise the Austrian emperor previously, as per Lucien Bély, Jean Bérenger and André Corvisier, *Guerre et paix dans l'Europe du XVIIe siècle* (Paris: SEDES, 1991), p.263.

The Strength of the Regular Army

Following the Treaty of Ryswick, the French army's strength went as low as 140,000 men in 1699 and then rose to 185,000. By 1702, it stood at 185,000 foot troops and 35,000 horse for a total of 222,000. This was about the same level as the allied forces. With troops simultaneously deploying in Italy, Germany Flanders and Spain, the demand for troops was enormous. While there were some Spanish troops that had rallied to Felipe V's standard on all fronts, their numbers were then largely unknown, but surely modest, and they needed to be reorganised and rearmed.[3]

It was estimated by historian André Corvisier, after a huge study of muster rolls, that during the years 1700 to 1715 some 655,000 soldiers were enlisted in the French army. As seen below in the section on Provincial militia, some of these men were not volunteers, but were conscripted for national service. Corvisier further calculated that the actual strength of the regular army would have been 350,000 men in about 1706 and 300,000 in 1710. Grimoard felt it might have had a peak of 392,000 men during the war, but this would have varied.

This was the level reached by the ever numerous figures calculated by Belhomme for 1704 and then surpassed to 408,281 in 1706, this just for the infantry! Adding the mounted and specialist troops would surely have put it to over half a million. He was calculating from establishment figures rather than estimating what the actual number of men in the field might have been. On the whole, we feel Professor Corvisier's figures are the closest to reality. There were mass disbandments from the end of 1714 and, two years later only about 134,000 remained in the army.[4]

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[3] Musée de l'Armée, Paris, Ms Y1722; Archives Nationales de France (ANF), G7/1774 Extraordinaire des Guerres 1683–1699, État des Troupes que le Roy à eu sur pied et leur depense.

[4] André Corvisier, *Le soldat, de Louvois à Choiseul* (Paris: PUF, 1964), 2 Vol.s; Philippe Henri de Grimoard, *Recherches sur la force de l'armée Française* (Paris, 1806). See our Vol. 2, p.100, for Belhomme's infantry figures from 1672 to 1711.

2

Italy and the Camisards 1701–1704

The Italian Front

War was not yet declared and the summer of 1701 was arriving in Italy. The Kingdom of Naples was being secured by Felipe V's viceroy the Duke of Medina, while Spanish and French troops in northern Italy came under the command of Marshal Catinat who had about 25,000 men. He was under orders from Versailles not to attack Austrian Imperial troops and to simply defend the Milanese. Meanwhile, Emperor Leopold I sent Prince Eugene with an army of 30,000 "good veteran troops" by his own account to occupy northern Italy for Carlos III. To do so, Prince Eugene moved his troops through a part of theoretically neutral Venetian territory to reach the Milanese. If Catinat had entered Venetian territory, he could have blocked the Austrians by securing the Trentino mountain passes, but he was to strictly respect Venetian neutrality. The result was that Prince Eugene, who had no restraining orders from Leopold I, attacked part of the French army led by General Saint-Frémond on unfavourable ground at Carpi on 9 July 1701 and also routed a relief force there under General Tessé.

The Prince, who effectively started the war months before its official declaration, "received a severe wound from a musket-shot" in his left knee during the pursuit stopping near Marshal Catinat's main force at Ostiglia. Catinat was now weakened, and as Eugene put it, "the Duke of Savoy, who began his old tricks, had not thought fit to send him his troops" so the French had to withdraw leaving the Austrians masters of the countryside between the Adige and the Addax rivers. Prince Eugene nevertheless thought that Catinat was "one of the best generals that France ever had" and that Louis XIV had made him a "great favour" by putting in command the "ignorant and presumptuous Villeroi", who immediately quarrelled with the Duke of


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Fenestrelles
Pignerolle
TURIN
Verrua
Casale
Verceil
Novare
Carmagnola
Asti
Alexandrie
Tortone
Nizza
Alba Pompea
Cherasco
Acqui
Novi
Coni
Mondovi
Ceva
Savone
GÊNES
Como
Lecco
Bergame
MILAN
Cassano
Chiari
Brescia
Salo
Lodi
Crema
Pavie
Pizzighettone
CREMONE
Plaisance
Castiglione
MANTOUE
Guastalla
PARME
Reggio
MODÈNE
L O M B A R D I E
DUCHÉ DE PARME
DUCHÉ DE MODÈNE

Map of northern Italy. The main location of the engagements between 1702 and 1706 are circled. Map from Hugo's *France Militaire*. (Author's photo)

Savoy over who was in command of the army. Marshal Villeroi then decided to attack Prince Eugene's camp at Chari.[1]

Catinat suspected Prince Eugene's position to be very strong at Chiari and told Villeroi to be cautious, in spite of reports that there were only about 600 Austrians there. Ignoring that advice, Villeroi and the Duke of Savoy opted to attack the entrenchments that could be seen. On 1 September the French infantry advanced and quickly overcame the Austrian entrenchments, but then came upon Prince Eugene's actual and very strong positions where many French soldiers were mowed down. Catinat went to the front and an officer asked him: "Do you want us to go to our death ?" to which the marshal answered: "Truly, death is before us, but shame is behind us." They charged the positions, but in spite of great bravery could not overcome the Austrian defences, and having at least 1,300 casualties Villeroi ordered the retreat. Catinat was not wouned during this attack, but in mid November he was seriously wounded in a skirmish, evacuated to France and eventually retired to his estate.[2]

Concerning this battle, Prince Eugene commented that he saw the Duke of Savoy "everywhere; he exposed himself like the most determined of soldiers, and had a horse killed under him. What a singular character! This time he wished to lose the battle." This last remark foretold the future because the Prince was already in discreet contact with the Duke, who was fed up with Villeroi's "presumption and lofty tone".

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[1] *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy* (London: Henry Colburn, 1811), pp.61–65; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, pp.467–472.

[2] J.B.P. de Courcelles, *Dictionnaire historique et biographique des généraux français* (Paris: Author and Bertrand, 1820–1823), Vol. 4, pp.54–55; *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy*, pp.65–67; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, pp.474–477; Toudouze, *Le Roy Soleil*, p.92.

Villeroi Taken at Cremona

Villeroi retreated to Cremona with part of his troops and the front stabilised for the rest of the year. On 6 January 1702, Prince Eugene first occupied the Duke of Modena's fortress of Burelo (Bersello to the French) and Guastalla in the Duchy of Parma, mainly to quarter his troops. Then, on the night of 31 January to 1 February, he attempted to surprise Cremona by stealth; an Austrian commando-style forward party disguised as French troops entered the city via a sewer, and in silence overcame a dozen soldiers guarding the gate of St. Margret and let in Eugene with some 4,000 Imperial troops. Villeroi had obviously neglected to ensure a strong watch. Everyone was asleep except for a French regiment that had risen very early to drill when it found itself face to face with Austrian troops. Fighting broke out and Villeroi was woken by musketry fire like everyone else; confusion initially reigned amongst the 5,000 French garrison, but Dillon's and Burke's Irish regiments managed to repulse Austrian cuirassiers and destroy the bridge by which Eugene planned his army would join the troops already in the city. Villeroi meanwhile had mounted his horse, but was caught by Austrian soldiers who threw him "down from his horse, without hat, without wig, and without sword" seemingly wearing his nightclothes. Recognised at length, he was brought to Prince Eugene. By then a good part of the French garrison was regrouping in the citadel, so Prince Eugene asked Villeroi to surrender, to which he had "the good sense to reply: Who would obey a prisoner?" Eugene sent him off to Innsbruck. A relieving French army under Marshal



Marshal Villeroi captured at Cremona, Italy, by Prince Eugene's Austrian troops at dawn on 1 February 1702. In a brilliantly executed surprise attack, Prince Eugene totally surprised the city's French garrison, some of it asleep. Marshal Villeroi, shown in his nightclothes, had obviously been off his guard. He attempted to get away with a servant, but as shown in this plate by Maurice Leloir he was intercepted by a party of Austrian troops. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Above: Queen Anne I of Great Britain, c.1705. She continued the policies of the late King William III which aimed at the moderation of France's power over Europe. Print after G. Kneller. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-9210)

de Créqui now approached Cremona, and Prince Eugene, also faced with stiff resistance from the citadel, wisely withdrew. Because Villeroi – one of Louis XIV's favourites – had been taken it was seen as a French defeat, which it was not. There were no strategic gains or losses.[3]

Naturally, Villeroi's capture rejoiced a good many courtiers even at Versailles and throughout the kingdom while the King commented that people detested him because he was his favourite. The Sun King had thus lost a marshal early in the war, which proved to be a bad omen for future years. In the meantime he chose the Duc de Vendôme, grandson of Henry IV who, like his grandfather, was "the intrepid, the good, the amiable, the generous, the dexterous discoverer of his enemies' projects" in the opinion of no less than Prince Eugene. Vendôme arrived at Cremona on 1 March 1702 and things immediately took a different turn: Prince Eugene's army had not been reinforced and his "highly brilliant" opponent in a series of movements soon "took all my small towns and all my communication. I entrenched myself wherever I went." Vendôme had a stronger force and was as good a tactician as Prince Eugene, so the weaker Austrians were pushed back at Vittoria on 26 July and at Luzara (or Lazzara) on 15 August where Felipe V of Spain was present; both sides claimed victory, but as Vendôme expected, the Austrians then had to surrender Luzara and Guastalla eventually retaining only Ostiglia. It was an even draw except that the Duke of Savoy was not especially happy in the Bourbon camp … Prince Eugene was called back by Emperor Leopold I to Vienna to assume the mantle of minister at war, a post he did not particularly enjoy. General Guido von Starhemberg replaced him to command in Italy.[4]

Meanwhile, on 16 March 1702 King William III died aged 52. He had been the Sun King's most persistent rival since 1672, and while a decent general in many battles he had often been beaten, but never utterly defeated. The British Crown was now assumed by his sister-in-law who became Queen Anne. Like the British Parliament, she confirmed her support for the Grand Alliance against France. On 15 May, the Grand Alliance officially declared war on France and its allies.

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[3] *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy*, pp.69–71; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, pp.488, 612–627; *Mémoires de M. le Marquis de Feuquières* (London and Paris, 1710), Vol. 3, pp.18–33; Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, p.30 mentions that at court and in the army, people sang: *Français, rendez grâce à Bellone, Votre bonheur est sans égal; Vous avez conservé Crémone, Et perdu votre général*, translated in Prince Eugene's memoirs (p.70) as "[Frenchmen,] By the favour of Bellona, And Fortune's smiles most liberal, We again have found Cremona, And have lost our general."

[4] Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, p.301 uses almost the same words to convey Vendôme's qualities as Prince Eugene's memoirs, p.72.

Opposing Dukes: Savoy and Vendôme

As seen above, the Duke of Savoy seemed discontented, and on 5 January 1703 changed sides to ally himself with Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, which was a considerable boost to the Grand Alliance since the army of Piémont was now aligned with the Austrian army to fight the French. This was certainly disappointing in Versailles, but had much more impact in northern Italy and southern Bavaria. Elector Maximilian-Emmanuel of Bavaria was invading the Austrian Tyrol with his Bavarian army and secured Innsbruck on 26 June 1703. In July Vendôme's French army meanwhile sought to block the Austrians from entering the Duchy of Milan by blocking the mountain passes to the east, but General Starhemberg had foreseen such a move and had sent General Vaubecourt with a strong force to defend the mountain passes and forts. This obstacle, with Piémont now in the Grand Alliance, endangered both Vendôme's and Maximilian-Emmanuel's armies who now faced a geostrategic nightmare. The Bavarians evacuated Innsbruck to regroup in Bavaria, while Vendôme was trying to hang on to the Milanese even as the Austrians took Bersello on 27 July. His situation somewhat improved thereafter because Marshal La Feuillade arrived with another French army further west and invaded the Savoy part of Piémont during the autumn. On 19 August Vendôme ordered the disarmament and internment of any Piémontese troops encountered. Although part of the Piémontese army managed to rally the allies, this was something that the Duke of Savoy had not sufficiently expected when switching sides because only Montmélian remained under his flag by year's end.

In early 1704 Vendôme occupied the Duchy of Modena, its duke having been in contact with the Austrians while they, in return, occupied the Duchy of Mirandola for its secret contacts with Versailles. The opposing armies were now mostly deployed in Mantua, and its despairing duke finally went to Paris to escape the fighting. Fighting there was and Vendôme's brother, the Grand Prior, took Revere on 10 April 1704. On 20 July, it was Verceil that fell to Vendôme followed by the fortress city of Yvrée besieged from 17 to



Above: Vittorio Amadeo II, Duke of Savoy, *c.*1705. He went into the war as an ally of the Sun King and then switched sides in January 1703. (Private Collection. Author's photo)

Below: the Duc de Vendôme, *c.*1703. (Private collection. Author's photo)





The battle of Luzara, 15 August 1702, print after Jan van Huchtenburg. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-1904-1084)

28 September. In Piémont the army of General Louis d'Aubusson, duc de La Feuillade, marched on and took the forces of Susa on 12 June followed by the city of Pignerol. The year's Italian campaign ended with the Grand Prior's capture of Sensano on 25 November. The situation on the Italian front was thus positive for the Sun King's armies. Part of Piémont was occupied and the Milanese were secured. But, this was not the only theatre of war ...

The War of the Camisards

Not all Huguenots had left France in the 1680s. Voltaire estimated that some 400,000 were in the country and many had remained secretly Protestant while submitting to Roman Catholic practices due to severe penalties, although in some remote areas this was much resented. The mountainous Cévennes area in south-eastern France's Massif Central had many Huguenots living in rugged conditions, most being humble commoners working the land or sheep's wool. There was then reckoned to be about 81,000 Huguenots and 71,000 Catholics in the area. There were "prophets" in the Huguenots' midst who, in face of persecution, might preach visions of a war of liberation where the defenders of God's real faith would be invincible. Royal authorities were less present in these remote areas of mountain men, but in 1701 some arrested preachers were liberated from Catholic priests by angry groups of Huguenots. Repression followed, leading to the murder of two priests on 24 July 1702. This time the authorities arrested one Esprit Séguier in reprisal and burned him at the stake on 12 August. That is when the exasperated Huguenots rose and the war of the Camisards broke out, Camisards being the name of the revolted Huguenots.

It started with a few small battles between them and bourgeois militiamen during the autumn of 1702, as well as killings, looting and rampage that multiplied in the whole area of eastern Languedoc. Lieutenant General Maurice Comte de Broglie was sent to restore order with some troops. By December, sizeable groups of Camisards had formed spontaneously under competent leaders such as Rolland, Nicolas Jouanny, Abraham Mazel and especially Jean Cavalier (or Cavelier) who revealed really remarkable military leadership in what was raid and guerrilla warfare. Their organisation mirrored the army's with captains and companies, especially in Cavalier's large band that hovered between about 700 and 2,000 men with many mounted; weapons were mostly those they took from the troops they often defeated; for artillery, Cavalier's men seized 18 brass bells in various Catholic churches to make light-calibre culverins. They had no uniforms, but "Cavalier was magnificent and had 12 bodyguards dressed in red" which always escorted him. Rolland took the gold-laced coat of Captain du Pompidou of the bourgeois militia while Cavalier took his red waistcoat and breeches, which shows that they could come together for certain raids. In early 1702, Cavalier detached an officer and 50 men to capture the town of Sauve wearing white ribbons on their hats so as to pass for militiamen. On another occasion the following year, he dressed many of his men with uniform coats of the King's soldiers to make the royal troops think that they were a detachment of bourgeois militia. These disguises did not always have the desired effect. Camisard leader Bonbonnoux related that in 1703 "we lost two of our men" because one wore



Horrors committed by the troops and also the revolted Camisards, c.1704–1705. The captions mention Incendies (burnings), Sacrilèges (sacrileges), Cruautés (cruelties) and Meurtres (murders). Print after Davidin. (Private collection. Author's photo)

a laced hat and the other had a plume in his hat, so that in a confused hand-to-hand fight they were taken for soldiers and killed by their own comrades.[5]

At first the royal government did not pay much attention to these revolts. By the early winter of 1703, it became clear that it was a major outbreak: there may have been 7,000–10,000 Camisards in arms. Many of them were vengeful and massacred hapless Catholic villagers and peasants; at Sauve, they burned down the church and three priests; many of their parishioners sought safety in towns, notably in Nîmes. Its bourgeois militia went out against the Camisards, but were defeated, losing a captain and 15 militiamen. The King appointed Marshal de Montrevel to lead more troops into Languedoc consisting of four infantry regiments, two of dragoons, one of cavalry, and three battalions of marines with about 3,000 Roussillon miquelet light infantry joining detachments of troops and embodied bourgeois militia companies. Montrevel had a frankly cruel repression policy, exemplified on Palm Sunday when about 20 Huguenot women and children were apprehended during a religious service and were all later burned at the stake in Nîmes. There were later Camisard retributions, notably for over 70 Catholic inhabitants of two villages. Some two or three thousand Catholics organised themselves into

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[5] *Mémoires sur la guerre des Camisards* (Paris: Payot, 1970), pp.79, 150; *Journaux Camisards 1700–1715* (Paris, 1965), pp.57, 60, 133; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 4, p.460; Joseph Dizier, *Étude sur Jean Cavalier* (Nîmes: Roger & Laporte, 1870), pp.58–60; Henry Martin Byrd, *The Uprising of the French Protestants* (New York: Knickerbocker, 1890), pp.20, 27–28.



Death of Camisard leader Rolland at Castelneau-Valence on 13 August 1704. Print after A. de Neuville. (Private collection. Author's photo)

units and groups of armed volunteers often called "florentins" or "Camisards blancs" (white Camisards from their cockades and ribbons) which were scarcely distinguishable from brigands. There were now about 20,000 regular troops in Languedoc plus thousands of embodied militias and volunteers. Montrevel instated executions on the spot for any Camisards taken carrying arms, and in the autumn of 1703 proceeded to forcibly evacuate over 20,000 inhabitants of 31 parishes in villages and small towns, which were all razed, and some murders and pillage by "Camisards blancs" also took place.[6]

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[6] Louis-François du Bouchet, Marquis de Sourches, *Mémoires du Marquis de Sourches sur le règne de Louis XIV*, G-J de Cosnac, ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1882–1892), Vol. 8, pp.5, 322.



Camisard leader Jean Cavalier with some of his men, c.1702–1704. Exiled with about 1,200 of his men, in Spain Cavalier formed a regiment in English pay that was largely destroyed at the 1707 battle of Almanza. Print after A. de Neuville. (Private collection. Author's photo)

This probably worsened an already deplorable situation. On 14 March 1704 some 1,100 Camisards defeated 500 marines and 60 dragoons at Martignargues killing about half of them while receiving only about 20 casualties. Learning of this, Louis XIV replaced Montrevel with Marshal Villars, bearing a royal amnesty for all Camisards laying down their arms and with instructions to be humane and negotiate a truce. On 19 April, two days before Villars' arrival in Nîmes, Montrevel defeated and scattered some of Cavalier's men. On 16 May, Cavalier met with Villars and agreed to a truce, amnesty and freedom to leave France. The request to freely exercise their faith was not granted and other leaders, notably Rolland and his 1,200 men, vowed to fight on, but he was killed at Château-Valence on 13 August with the last pockets of resistance overcome by Villars in December. Thousands of regular troops had to be posted in the province thereafter. The Camisards always asked for military assistance from Protestant allied nations, notably England, but none came.

3

Blenheim and Ramillies

The German Front 1702–1704

Elector Frederick of Brandenburg was proclaimed the King in Prussia on 15 January 1701 and Brandenburg would henceforth be known as Prussia, which had previously joined the Grand Alliance and was thus at war with France. The following year, the allies went on the offensive and besieged the French garrison of Kaiservert in the Electorate of Cologne for 59 days until its surrender on 15 June 1702. The Prussians besieged the fortress of Landau for four months until it finally capitulated on 8 September after a stubborn defence led by General de Mélac. However, the Elector of Bavaria took Ulm on 8 September, and on 14 October General Villars defeated an Imperial army under Prince Louis of Baden at Fredelingen, which foiled allied hopes of invading Alsace and earned him the baton of Marshal of France. General Tallard captured Trier (Treves) at the end of the month and French troops occupied Nancy in Lorraine on 3 December, thus securing that province.[1]

The Duke of Savoy's joining the allies on 5 January 1703 caused a substantial change in strategic outlook, and the allies now went on the offensive in western Germany. They took Rhimberg on 9 February, but in the spring of 1703 Marshal Villars invaded Baden taking Kehl (or Kell) just east of Strasbourg on 9 March, occupied Offenburg and Rasttat, and linked with Bavarian troops across the Black Forest (Schwarzwald). Meanwhile the Elector of Bavaria defeated allied troops near Passau on 11 March and took Ratisbonne on 8 April, linking with Marshal Villars at Tuttlingen on 12 May. Both armies marched east and the Bavarians now invaded the Austrian Tyrol, but the full effect of the Duke of Savoy's change of allegiance became more apparent and they withdrew in July while Villars and his troops withdrew west towards the Black Forest area, to counter allied troop movements. Even so, the allies entered Bavaria and took Augsburg on 5 September, but the Bavarians, now reinforced by Villars, prevented the junction of Louis of Baden's and Count Styrum's armies. The Franco-Bavarians then marched to meet Styrum's army and defeated him at

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[1] After Villars, Chamilly, Estrées, Château-Renaud, Vauban, Rosen, Huxelles, Tessé, Montrevel, Tallard, and Harcourt were promoted to marshal on 14 January 1703.



Above: Assault of the fortress of Landau by the Brandenburg-Prussia Leibgarde Regiment, 1702. Its uniform was blue with red collar, cuffs, lining and aiguillettes, white metal buttons and white lace. Officers had silver buttons and lace, red hat plumes and red, silver and blue sashes. Print after Carl Rochling. (Author's photo)

Facing page: Map of Marlborough's march, 1704. The arrowed line shows its progress to Blenheim during its amazing 400 km journey, meticulously planned for food and supplies so that the troops arrived on the Danube fresher than the day they started. Some of the towns that underwent sieges or battles are circled. Detail of map from Fortescue. (Author's digital addition and photo)

Hochstat (or 1st Blenheim) on 20 September. Meanwhile, Marshal Tallard had come out of Alsace with his troops in September and took Old Brisach on the upper Rhine, defeated the Prince of Hesse-Cassel at Spores and retook the fortress of Landau. The campaigns on the German front had been, so far, generally positive for the French armies, but the Elector was frustrated and had feuds with Marshal Villars so the Sun King replaced him with Marshal Marchin (frequently also spelled Marsin).

Now in senior command of the Bavarian and French troops, the Elector was anxious to go on the offensive to secure Bavaria's south-eastern border with Austria, and on 9 January 1704 he took the fortress of Passau on the shore of the Danube River. This put much pressure on Austria's western border, its eastern areas were also somewhat uncertain due to a revolt in Hungary and a French army occupied northern Italy. Marshal Villeroi was commanding the French army in Flanders that neutralised allied troops there. The Sun King and the Elector saw a fine opportunity to renew a 1703 plan for a successful offensive into Austria that would take Vienna and lead to the defeat of the Grand Alliance.

This state of affairs was known to the allied senior commanders. John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, who had commanded the British and Dutch troops in Flanders since 1702, realised that the superior Franco-Bavarian forces had a real chance of defeating the Austrians and other allied troops. He therefore decided to march down into Bavaria with part of his army. This was accomplished by some deceit, telling the Dutch allies


Coblenz
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Friedburg
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Seligenstadt
Darmstadt
Oppenheim
Worms
Mannheim
Spires
Ladenburg
Heidelberg
Philipsburg
Landau
Lauter
Neckar
Lauffen
Heilbronn
Mondelheim
Stuttgart
Stollhofen
Bühl
Haguenau
Motter
Strasburg
Kehl
Hornberg
Old Brisach
New Brisach
Freiburg
Villingen
Donauesringen
Rhine
Danube
Geisingen
Ursprung
Giengen
Ulm
Iller
Blenheim
Amerdingen
Nördlingen
Dinkelsbühl
Donauwörth
Schellenberg
Merxheim
Rain
Neuburg
Ingolstadt
Aicha
Friedberg
Augsburg
Lech
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

John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, early eighteenth century. "Calm and serene he drives the furious blast; And pleased the Almighty's orders to perform, Rides in the whirlwind, and directs the storm." So wrote British poet Joseph Addison, (1672–1719) in his famed *Blenheim*. That extraordinary victory brought forth Marlborough's tactical genius. Print after G. Kneller. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

that he would return if Villeroi attacked in Flanders. He set out on 21 May from Bedburg near Cologne leading 21,000 men (including 16,000 British). French scouts soon reported Marlborough and his troops moving south, and Villeroi, following instructions from Versailles, shadowed him with 30,000 men further west until he reached Landau on 9 June. This extraordinary and genial move by Marlborough occasioned many manoeuvres by both the Franco-Bavarian and allied armies.

On the way southwards, Marlborough's forces were gradually reinforced by more German troops, notably with the Prince of Baden, and turned eastwards above the left bank of the Danube River. Marshal Tallard's French army of about 35,000 men in the Black Forest also marched eastwards to reinforce the Elector's and Marchin's army of about 40,000 men, reaching Ulm in June. The Elector's and Marchin's army was in the Augsburg area and detached Bavarian Marshal d'Arco with an advance force of about 12,000 consisting of 11 Bavarian and five French battalions to secure Donauwörth,



Frederick I, King in Prussia, *c.*1710. He succeeded the Great Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William in 1688, becoming Elector Frederick III, and was made King in Prussia as Frederick I in January 1701. He passed away in 1713 and it could be said that his reign from 1688 was nearly all taken up by wars against the Sun King's France. Print after C. Wiegel. (Private collection. Author's photo)

north of Augsburg. Marlborough's and Baden's forward elements also reached that area on the same day, 2 July, and Marlborough launched a frontal assault hoping to secure the position before the Franco-Bavarian main force appeared. The engagement lasted less than two hours, the allies broke through and scattered d'Arco's men, but it was a very bloody engagement with about 1,400 killed and 3,800 wounded for the allies while the Franco-Bavarians lost about 9,000 men as casualties, prisoners or absent.

With Donauwörth taken, Marlborough had secured his supply line north of the Danube which he then crossed to lure the Elector into a full-scale battle by sending parties to destroy and pillage the countryside as far as the suburbs of Munich, but the Elector did not take the bait and stayed secure in Augsburg. In early August, Tallard linked with the Elector and their army numbered about 56,000 men. Prince Eugene with an allied corps was now in the area north of the Danube west of Donauwörth. The Prince of Baden was sent east with 15,000 men and the rest of Marlborough's force, united with Prince Eugene's, came to about 52,000 men on 12 August as they advanced eastwards.



The last phase of the Battle of Blenheim, 13 July 1704. At centre, the Duke of Marlborough and his men capture Marshal Tallard (to the right) while (at left) the remnants of the Franco-Bavarian army attempts to cross the Danube. Print after Louis Laguerre. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

Blenheim 13 August 1704

The Franco-Bavarian army was marching east, and the clash occurred at the village of Blenheim, on 13 August 1704 (see battle plan). It was a resounding and utter defeat for the Franco-Bavarian troops and the French army in particular, the likes of which had not been seen in recent memory. Feats of valour were supreme on both sides and frustration great amongst some of the French, the Navarre Regiment burning its colours when surrendering while Marshal Tallard was captured. Estimates vary but perhaps as many as 40,000 mostly French soldiers were lost or taken prisoner that day. The Elector and Marchin managed to withdraw the remainder. The allies had 4,500 killed and 7,500 wounded for a total of some 12,000 (of which 2,700 were British).[2]

In one stroke, the strategic table was turned from a Franco-Bavarian march on Vienna to Bavaria being all but knocked out of the war by Marlborough's march. France now assumed defensive positions. Marlborough occupied Trier on 29 October and Louis of Baden recaptured Landau on 23 November. The German Front moved to France's borders along the lower Rhine and Moselle.

The battle of Blenheim was a hard blow to the French army's prestige; it had seen defeats, but never such a crushing one. Yet, its organisation, weaponry, logistics and the bravery of its members were not really at stake.

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[2] The casualties, orders of battle and accounts of Blenheim vary in many sources. Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 4, pp.284–286 has a questionable Franco-Bavarian loss of 4,000 to 5,000 killed, 7,000 to 8,000 wounded and 16,000 made prisoners for a total of some 27,000 to 29,000, adding that the allies had more casualties. Prince Eugene put the Franco-Bavarian loss at 12,800 killed, 20,800 made prisoner and no wounded mentioned against 9,000 allied (p.83). We take ours from *Memoirs of John Duke of Marlborough, with his original correspondence*, William Coxe, ed. (London: Longman, 2nd edition, 1820), Vol. 1, pp.289–308 and John W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army* (London: Macmillan, 1899), Vol. 1, pp.433–443 as our favourite account.



Plan of the battle of Blenheim, 13 July 1704. The allied lines were led by Cutts at left (C), Marlborough at centre (B) and Prince Eugene at right (A); a stream flowing through marshy ground separated them from the Franco-Bavarian lines whose right were led by Tallard at its right (F), Marchin at centre (E) and the Elector at left (D). Marlborough and Eugene took the initiative and attacked; although counter-attacked, they pressed on until Marlborough got across the marsh (b) with 8,000 cavalry followed by a general charge that broke the French line, which retreated (H), and outflanked Tallard (c) who was captured while thousands of the French were driven into the Danube, many drowning. Marchin and the Elector retreated pursued by Prince Eugene (G). (Print from Weaver's 1915 *History of the Royal Scots*. Author's photo)

The Flanders Front 1702–1706

Just as previously, Flanders was the main key that opened the gate for an invasion of France or of the Netherlands and northern Germany. Both France and its opponents maintained there the most extensive web of fortresses in Europe with supporting field armies. Both sides would try to break through to invade their opponent in wartime. Operations started in 1702 on that front when the young Duc de Bourgogne with the elderly Marshal Boufflers to instruct him marched their 60,000 troops north as far as Nijmegen and threatened Cleves, a Prussian territory, in mid June. The invasion of the southern Netherlands seemed imminent. The Duke of Marlborough, appointed commander of the allied forces in Flanders, arrived in early July and soon comprised a 60,000-man army whose quick and skilful manoeuvres impressed Boufflers enough for him to withdraw, thanks to Dutch General Opdam's inaction. Marlborough had the initiative, laid siege on 29 August to Venlo which surrendered on 23 September, to Roermond on 7 October, and on 12 October occupied the city of Liège and took its citadel on 23 October. He clearly outmanoeuvred Boufflers, who was smart enough to realise that Marlborough was an exceptional commander.

In early 1705, the French general staff worried that the allies, after their success in Germany, would make a sustained and powerful effort to drive out the French army in at least a part of Flanders. The Elector Maximilian of Bavaria was now in command of the Franco-Spanish forces there and there


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Right: Plan of the attack by the allied army on the fortress of Ath, September 1706. After a manuscript of Vauban's fortification treatise. Fortress Louisbourg National Historic Site, Parcs Canada. (Author's photo)

Below: the allied siege and naval blockade of Ostend, 1706. An allied force with a British naval squadron besieged this port city from 19 June until its capitulation on 6 July 1706. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-AO-18-55)


De Engelsche Vloot
Bombardeer Galioten
Bombardeer Galioten
Het Strandt
Albertus
Mariakerke
Artillerie
Gardes
Orange
Oxenstern
Rantzau
Delupesch
Scholten
Meredith
Farington
St. Catarina
St. Elisabeth
De Kaey Kreecke
Laags
Scherre
S. Michiel
Forts Philippe
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
La Ville de Menin
de Kleyne Inondatie van de Leye
de Groote Inondatie
le chemin

Above: the siege of Menin by the allies, 1706. Print after Pieter van Call. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.242)

Below: the battle of Ramillies, 23 May 1706. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence RI, USA)


Ramillies
Offus
Autre Eglise

were some doubts as to his ability after his lacklustre performance during Marlborough's amazing march to Blenheim. The Sun King's solution to correct this was to appoint Marshal Villeroi to be second in command. The allies, however, chose instead to put more troops in the Moselle River area under Marlborough so that the allied army in Flanders under Field Marshal Overkirk was weakened. Seeing this, Villeroi moved on the fortress of Huy, the city surrendering on 31 May and its citadel on 10 June. But the allies were not idle and recaptured Huy on 8 July and its citadel on 11 July. By mid July Marlborough was back in Flanders, broke through the line between Heylissem (Elixheim) and Léau on 18 July and occupied the fort at Wange and Heylissem, some of his detachments getting as far as Waterloo, south of Brussels. His plan was to provoke an engagement with the Franco-Spanish army, but the Dutch were opposed to this and he had to comply. Nevertheless, he captured Léau west of Maastricht on 5 September and Santvliet on 29 October before going into winter quarters.

In 1706 the Elector and Villeroi were instructed to retake the cities lost, starting with Léau. Their army was in a strong position at the Dyle River; in May, having heard that Marlborough's army at Maastricht had not yet been joined by its Prussian and Hanoverian contingents, the French marched out towards Léau hoping to meet and destroy the weaker allied army. Marlborough was delighted when he was told that his opponents were approachingm because his army of 75 battalions and 117 squadrons was now at about 60,000 men due to the arrival of the Danish contingent, which was only slightly weaker than the Elector's and Villeroi's 74 battalions and 128 squadrons, making about 65,000 men. Both commanders and armies were in fine spirits and eager to fight it out.

Ramillies 23 May 1706

Both armies met at the small hamlet of Ramillies, the French lining up on one side and the allies on the other side of the hamlet and the Little Geete (or Gheet) River (see plan). As the engagement progressed, Marlborough brilliantly outflanked Villeroi's army; the French line broke and near panic ensued. Villeroi's army was utterly beaten and retreated in utter disorder. His army had about 4,000 casualties and another 3,000 were made prisoners including some 200 officers. Marlborough's army reported 1,066 officers and soldiers killed, 2,567 wounded. Villeroi further lost 54 of the 60 guns he had as well as a multitude of colours and standards with large numbers of wagons full of ammunition, baggage and all types of supplies. It was a disaster of first magnitude.[3]

Marlborough's victory at Ramillies had a tremendous strategic impact on the Flanders front. Villeroi's battered army could no longer hold northern and central Flanders and its scattered units were heading south to regroup nearer to the French border. The allied troops followed them to pick the harvest of their triumph. Louvain opened its gates on 25 May; Vilvorde, Malines, Lières

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[3] Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, p.38 puts French losses at 2,000 which is unrealistic. Gachard, *Histoire de la Belgique*, p.132 quotes 4,000 from a contemporary account in the *Mercure Historique*, Vol. 40, p.680.



Plan of the battle of Ramillies, 23 May 1706. The first positions of the French (C) and the allies (A) lined up on the opposite sides of the hamlet of Ramillies and the Little Geete River's swampy shores. The ground was uneven rising near Taviere (left of plan) and Autre Église (right). The Mehaigne River was at the flanks of both armies (left). As the engagement progressed, Marlborough ascertained that Villeroi's left flank was less engaged being safely covered by the swampy Geete. Leaving part of his right and centre facing the Geete (B), Marlborough shifted most of his right and centre troops to his left flank to exploit Villeroi's faulty disposition. His now very powerful left flank charged Villeroi's right. The succession of charging allied battalions was too much for Villeroi's right flank, and despite much gallantry, broke and thus outflanked the French army. Print from Weaver's 1915 *History of the Royal Scots*. (Author's photo)

and Brussels, the capital, followed suit the next day; Marlborough entered Ghent on 1 June followed by Oudenarde, Bruges, Ostend, Menin, Ath and Dendermonde. Antwerp and its citadel capitulated to the allied army on 6 June. This victory also had a political impact. On 5 June the state council of Brabant gathered in Brussels recognised the Austrian pretender "Charles III as their sovereign, lord and duke", and the state council of Flanders gathered at Ghent did the same as "his good and faithful subjects", who were thus lost to the French pretender.[4]

The Sun King of course recalled Villeroi, who had lost the esteem of his soldiers, and unwittingly compounding the year's disasters recalled the Duc de Vendôme from Italy to pick up the pieces in Flanders.

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[4] Gachard, *Histoire de la Belgique*, p.133–134.

4

The Italian Front 1705–1706

Whilst the news from Germany was not encouraging, the armies in Italy were bringing some cheer at Versailles thanks to a two-pronged offensive. General de La Feuillade's army proceeded down to the Côte d'Azur, took the city of Villefranche on 7 March 1705 and besieged its citadel until its capitulation of 3 April followed by the surrender of Nice on the 9th, but not its citadel. These were the main ports of Piémont and the Duke of Savoy in Torino, who had to cope with La Feuillade's army in the west, and Vendôme's eastwards now could not reasonably hope for any seaborne help from the British or Dutch in his rather uncomfortable position. Another bad news for him was the siege of the fortress of Verrua, which had started on 22 October 1704 and ended with surrender to Vendôme's army on 10 April 1705. This was followed by the capture of Mirandola on 11 May and Chivas on 28 July by French troops.

In Vienna, Emperor Leopold I had realised that Prince Eugene would be more useful leading troops than being war minister – a job he loathed. The Prince was therefore sent back to northern Italy and he now marched towards Piémont heading some 28,000 men. In May 1705 he was in Italy and there heard of the death of Leopold I who was succeeded by Joseph I. He worried somewhat that the new emperor would not support the upcoming campaign, fears that proved groundless. Joseph I wrote him "to continue, and immediately sent me one hundred thousand florins for the payment of the troops." To reinforce the Duke of Savoy in Torino, who was practically surrounded by the French, Prince Eugene needed to cross the Adda River near Milan, but he was stopped by Vendôme at Cassano on 16 August 1705, a bloody battle in which Prince Eugene was wounded and Vendôme had a horse shot from under him. Both sides claimed victory. But the French had won because the Austrians could not proceed any further and retreated to the east of Lake Garda. On the Côte d'Azur, the citadel of Nice was still in allied hands and the Sun King tasked Marshal Berwick with its capture. The siege started on 16 November 1705 and it surrendered on 4 January 1706. The casualties had been relatively light at 600 men in each camp. This citadel was considered one of the strongest in Europe and the King wanted to be



Left: François d'Aubusson, Duc de La Feuillade, early eighteenth century. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Below: the fortress of Verrua, *c.*1704–1705. Called "Vérue" by the French, its intricate fortifications were built on a height that made it very difficult to assault. From 22 October 1704, the fortress was besieged by a French army led by the Duc de Vendôme and stubbornly defended by its garrison. It finally capitulated on 10 April 1705. Scale model at the Citadel Museum, Torino. (Author's photo)





Right: Prince Eugene of Savoy, commander of the Austrian and German armies of the Holy Roman Empire, early eighteenth century. One of the very best generals of the era. Unsigned portrait. St Florient Monastery, Austria. (Author's photo)



Left: Joseph I, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, *c.*1705. Born in Vienna in 1678, he was the eldest son of Emperor Leopold I and succeeded him as Holy Roman Emperor from 6 May 1705 to his death in 1711. He was not a military type of ruler and his reforms for a less autocratic government helped placate revolts in Hungary and elsewhere. He was a staunch opponent to Louis XIV, thus increasing Austria's position in Europe as one of its main powers. Unsigned portrait. St Florient Monastery, Austria. (Author's photo)



Philippe, Duc d'Orléans, 1716. Print after Jean-Baptiste Santerre. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-1906-208)

rid of it, so he reordered its total destruction, which was duly accomplished. Berwick was then called back to Spain.[1]

In north-eastern Italy, an Austrian force under General Christian Detlev von Reventlow tried to march west, but Vendôme defeated him at Calcinato (or Cabsinato) on 19 April 1706. In Versailles it seemed that Torino, the last important city still held by the Duke of Savoy, was ripe for a capture that would secure northern Italy.

The Sun King now transferred the Duc de Vendôme to command with Villars in Flanders and sent the Duc d'Orléans with Marshal Marchin as his military second in command to take Torino, which had already been "imperfectly invested" from 13 May 1706 by General de La Feuillade. Siege operations started on 9 June. Further east, Prince Eugene was now in command and playing a cat-and-mouse game with Vendôme to cross the Adige River east of Lake Garda. Then, Prince Eugene perceived:

> that Vendôme was no longer with the [French] army, having gone to Milan to resign the command to the Duke of Orléans, I first returned thanks to God for it, and without giving myself much trouble, I deluded the French who were guarding three posts, and crossed the Adige, where they least expected it … I crossed the Tanaro and the Pô [rivers]. Vendôme had carried with him the love, the heart, and the spirit of the French.

The Duc d'Orléans' covering army tried to stop the allied army, but Prince Eugene easily outmanoeuvred him. In late August Prince Eugene with 30,000 men joined the Duke of Savoy leading a field force of 6,000 men south of Torino, and "our soldiers, when they saw us embrace, threw their hats into the air shouting: 'Long Live Joseph I and Victor Amadeus I' and … 'Long live Eugene!'" At that point, the French army numbered about 44,000 men surrounding the Torino and covering its outer areas; the allies had about 45,000 including some 8,000 (half being city militias) defending Torino under General Wirich Philipp von Daun and 6,000 with the Duke of Savoy on the outskirts.[2]

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[1] *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy*, pp.85–86; James Fitz-James, Duc de Berwick, *Mémoires du maréchal de Berwick* (Paris: Hachette, 1872), pp.191–193.

[2] *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy*, pp.96–97.



Plan of the siege of Torino, 9 June to 7 September 1706. The city had been powerfully fortified since the 1690s and its citadel considered very difficult to take. The garrison put up a tremendous resistance to the point that a Piémontese soldier, Pierro Micca, sacrificed himself when blowing up a countermine, which stopped a French assault. He has since become an Italian national hero. Original watercolour. Citadel Museum, Torino. (Author's photo)

Disaster at Torino and the End of the Italian Front

General de La Feuillade knew he had to take Torino soon and made two assaults on 27 August and 3 September, but both failed and caused heavy French losses. At a general's war council, the Duc d'Orléans, who was the commander-in-chief, and his generals pressed to attack Prince Eugene's army to destroy it, which would cause the fall of the city and triumph in Italy. Marshal Marchin, certainly the best tactician on the French side, brought out instructions from Louis XIV in Versailles which advised caution and concentration on the siege. Marchin, who simply relayed the royal wish, was overruled. On 7 September, the French army attacked the allies in a somewhat disorganised way; looking at them from a height with the Duke of Savoy, Prince Eugene told him "those people are already half beaten, cousin." The battle was fierce and most obstinately contested with the Duc d'Orléans being wounded, Marshal Marchin also, but fatally; at a critical moment General Daun made a sortie from the city, pushing through La Feuillade's troops, and this decided the allies' victory while General François d'Albergotti's French reserve of some 40 battalions across the Pô River did not intervene. The many



Marshal de Marchin mortally wounded at the battle of Torino, 7 September 1706. Print after Rouel. (Private collection. Author's photo)

that fought had over 28,000 French casualties and prisoners, half during the siege, 7,000 in the battle (including 3,200 prisoners) and about 8,500 after the battle; the allies had about 8,200 casualties including 5,000 during the siege. The utter French defeat was even made worse by the retreat of the Duc d'Orléans to Pignerol and France rather than unite his maimed army with the French and Spanish troops in Milan.

Marshal Marchin, who had conveniently not survived this heroic battle, was blamed for everything for well over a century. But then, from the island of St. Helena came a solid analysis of these events by a soldier who knew northern Italy very well as a battlefield: the exiled Emperor Napoleon. His first question and answer was who was the general commanding the French side? It was the Duc d'Orléans. He then correctly summed up several basic tactical moves that, had they been made, notably ordering General Albergotti's French reserve to cross the river and join the main force, these would have likely totally changed the battlefield results. The Duc d'Orléans as supreme commander was "responsible for everything that happened" summed up Napoleon.[3]

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[3] *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy*, pp.97–101; Napoléon I, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon*, Comte de Montholon, ed. (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1824), Vol. 4, pp.218–221. As late as 1841, no less an authority as Antoine-Henri Jomini still blamed Marchin in his *Précis de l'art de la guerre* (Brussels: Petit, 1841), Vol. 2, p.43, thus proving that "old legends" die hard.

End of the Italian Front

The battle of Torino led to the collapse of the entire Italian front. French General Médavi defeated another allied corps under the Prince of Hesse further east at Castiglione on 9 September, but news of the Torino disaster plus the Duc d'Orléans' withdrawal towards France rather than Milan utterly negated that victory. Indeed, it was as if d'Orléans, in his haste to save his hide, turned that success into a defeat.

Thus, French troops everywhere retreated, and within weeks the whole of the Bourbon Spanish dominions and allies were lost and it would be only a matter of time before the Kingdom of Naples, now very isolated, fell as well. For the French army, it was possibly the war's greatest disaster because its geostrategic and political impacts were immense.

5

The Flanders Front 1707–1711

Minimal Strategic Influence and Flawed Command System

This front featured many sieges punctuated by large battles which mobilised very numerous armies on both sides. Even the greatest battles, however, rarely had great strategic impacts on the war at large. Indeed, during 1707, there were no great movements in Flanders, the French army remaining on the defensive following the withdrawal from Spanish Flanders while the allies did not stage attacks. In the spring of 1708 the French army was reinforced to about 100,000 men and the Duc de Bourgogne, grandson of the Sun King, was put in supreme command with the Duc de Vendôme as his senior advising officer. It was like mixing fire and water, so great were the opposing views on military operations. Nevertheless, the King still insisted on this type of command system, seemingly to ensure glory for his grandsons. The campaign's objective was simple: chase the allies out of Spanish Flanders. The main French army under Bourgogne marched north and on 5 July captured Ghent, while another French corps under the Comte de la Mothe took Bruges and Passchendaele.[1]

Oudenarde, 11 July 1708

However, an allied army of some 80,000 men led by Marlborough and Prince Eugene was marching to counter Bourgogne's troops from besieging the fortress of Oudenarde. By a daring manoeuvre on 11 July, Marlborough and Eugene crossed the Scheldt River and suddenly showed up in front of the French army which, surprised, had not yet properly deployed. Vendôme saw that the allies had only partly crossed their army across the river and ordered French battalions to position themselves parallel to the river and attack. Bourgogne disagreed, wanting to line up further west, so the allied army had crossed the

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[1] L. Dussieux, *Les grand généraux de Louis XIV* (Paris: Lecoffre, 1888), pp.352. Vendôme was much maligned by the jealous Duc de Saint-Simon; historian Dussieux gives a much better assessment of his personality with several illuminating anecdotes of how he behaved with his officers and soldiers (pp.359–361).


Dunkirk
Ostend
Bergues
Furnes
Nieuport
Leffinghe
Oudenburgh
Wynendale
Ichtegem
Thourout
Dixmuyde
Ft. Knock
Roulers
Damme
Bruges
Bruges Canal
F L A N D E R S
Aire
St. Venant
R. Lys
Bethune
la Bassée
Lens
Arras
Ypres
Comminés
Quesnoy
Lille
Bouvines
Orchies
Menin
Courtrai
R. Lys
Deynse
Ghent
R. Scheldt
Helchin
Espierre
Tournay
Leuse
Fontenoy
Anthoing
Oudenarde
Lessines
Gramont
Ath
R. Dender
Douay
Arleux
Aubigny
Oisy
Sensée
Bouchain
R. Scarpe
R. Escaut
Cambray
Valencienne
Condé
Denain
R. Sambre
Malplaquet
Maubeuge
Montreuil
Attiche
Quévy
St. Ghislain
St. Guilain
Jemappes
Mons
Obourg
Camboron
Maulbay
Steenkirk
Braine le Comte
Enghien
Hoves
Tubise
Ninove
Herfelingen
Anderlecht
Alost
Brussels
Asch
Grimberg
Dendermond
Hal
R. Senne
Nivelles
Charleroi
Genappe
Waterloo
La Hulpe
Braine l'Alleud
Overyssche
Diegem
Vilvorde
Mechlin
Malines
R. Nethe
Antwerp
Lierre
Herenthout
Gt. Nethe
Lt. Nethe
Rymenant
R. Dyle
Park
Corbeck
Neer Ysche
Bethlehem
Louvain
Wavre
Meldert
Judoigne
Elixheim
Meerdorp
Gembloux
Mas
Ramillies
Taviers
Tirlemont
Lt. Geete
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Demer
Diest
Aerschott
Leau
Landen
Neerwinden
Lens les Beguines
St. Trond
Borchloen
Tongres
Hasselt
Demer
Bilsen
Maestricht
Lauffeld
Roucoux
Ance
Haneff
Tourine
Vignamont
Huy
Meffle
R. Mehaigne
Meuse
Namur
Dinant
Philipville
Marienburg
B R A B A N T
N A M U R
H A I N A U L T
A R T O I S
BISHOPRIC OF LIEGE
Peer
Hochtel
Helchteren
Cambray
R. Sambre

Map of Flanders, early eighteenth century. Most of the sieges and battles in this major war zone are circled. (Private collection. Author's photo and digital additions) river by mid afternoon and was forming up when, at about four, Bourgogne again changed his mind and decided on a cavalry charge; it was followed by infantry that were repulsed at great cost by the allies, although the Prussians greatly suffered when charged by the French guard cavalry. By sunset the French right had been outflanked, but the French troops still held on to much of the field. Vendôme wanted the army to secure its positions for the night, regroup, reform and counter-attack the next day, but Bourgogne with officers favourable to his views ordered the retreat, which was disorderly and led to more losses. The French casualties came to 6,000 dead and 9,000 prisoners mostly during the withdrawal. The allies had about 3,000 casualties. Once again the French senior command system had hampered even as fine a tactician as Vendôme, while his opponents were free to make daring manoeuvres.

As with the Duc d'Orléans blaming Marshal Marchin for the Torino disaster, the Duc de Bourgogne bitterly wrote to the Sun King two days later that he now knew from serving with Vendôme that he "was no general" adding that he did not foresee, did not plan, did not fully know what the enemy – which he always scorned – was doing, "but I thought him to be very much different than what I saw the day before yesterday." Thus was a genial general treated by an ignorant prince who did not reach his boot tops in the French army.[2]



Panckoucke, 1825), vol. 6, p.478.

Plan of the battle of Oudenarde, 11 July 1708. (A) Marlborough with the left; (B) Eugene and Cadogan with the right; (C) English cavalry holding the French in check; (D) Overkirk and the Prince of Orange marching round Oycke to attack the French rear; (E) First Position of Cadogan; (F) French right enveloped in the valley. Print from Weaver's 1915 *History of the Royal Scots*. (Author's photo)

Right: Louis, Duc de Bourgogne, *c.*1705. Print after Rigaud. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Below: the battle of Oudenarde, 11 July 1708. Print after James Hulett. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)





The siege of Lille, 1708. Marshal Boufflers led one of the most epic defences of the war, resisting from 13 August to 9 December 1708, with his heroic garrison, the huge allied army led by Prince Eugene and Marlborough. Print after Antoine Benoist. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

Lille 1708

The initiative was now on the allies' side,and ultimately they decided to besiege Lille, the capital of French Flanders. It was invested on 13 August 1708 by the 84,000 men allied army, led by Marlborough and Prince Eugene. The garrison amounted to 15,000 men under Marshal Boufflers and its fortifications had been much improved by Vauban. There were two field armies much farther away, one under Vendôme and the other led by Marshal Berwick, that together came to about 110,000 men. They approached Lille and linked, but Marlborough's excellent positions and manoeuvres made them realise that the outer perimeter of the allied army was much too strong, not to mention the respect these French marshals had for Marlborough's extraordinary ability on a battlefield. So they withdrew and the siege went on. The city fell on 23 October, but Boufflers and his men continued to offer tremendous resistance in its citadel. Finally, on 9 December, after nearly five months:

> the galant old marshal and his heroic garrison marched out with the honours of war. So ended the memorable siege of Lille. It had cost the garrison eight thousand men … and the allies no fewer than 14,000 men. The honours of the siege rested with Boufflers, and were paid to him by none more ungrudgingly than Marlborough and Eugene.[3]

Within the next couple of weeks, Ghent and Bruges were retaken by the allies. The strategic situation was basically back to where it had been a year earlier.

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[3] Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, p.510.

6

The Spanish Front or the First Peninsular War 1704–1707

One Kingdom, Two Kings

The death and will of King Carlos II in 1700 marked a major turn in the history of Spain and this concerned most of all the Spanish people. Choosing one of the pretenders to the throne of their country, be it an Austrian Habsburg or French Bourbon, was not necessarily a joyful choice to make for an ordinary Spaniard. The Habsburgs had been on the throne for two centuries, presiding over the sixteenth-century "Golden Age" followed by the long and difficult decline of Spanish power and riches in the next century. Whilst there had been a modest economic recovery in the second half of the seventeenth century, the government, from the kings downwards, had mirrored the decay with no solutions in sight.

Louis XIV knew the challenges that awaited his young grandson as Felipe V, King of Spain, when he left for Madrid. He wrote him the following lines of advice: "Love the Spaniards and all your subjects attached to your crowns and your person; do not prefer those who flatter you the most; esteem those who, for goodness, risk displeasing you: they are your real friends."[1]

Felipe may have been a teenager, but he took seriously the experienced wisdom of his loving royal grandfather. To secure the throne of Spain, he had to win the esteem of the Spanish people. Fortunately, having a French prince as King was a popular choice in much of Spain. True, France was a Roman Catholic nation, yet it was also one of Spain's most powerful enemies since the Middle Ages. It had administered the official demise of Spanish power at the battle of Rocroi in 1643; the conflicts of the rest of that century had only placed France where Spain had once been in the European stage. The Austrian Habsburgs were from a Roman Catholic nation too, but being ruled for the past century by degenerate Spanish Habsburg kings who, many believed, had squandered the riches from "the Indies", left mixed feelings and a desire for change. Furthermore, the Austrians were allied with both Protestant Great

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[1] Louis XIV quoted in Bernard de Champigneule, *Le règne de Louis XIV* (Paris, 1943), p.15.


SPAIN AND PORTUGAL
English Miles
0 100 200 300
Names and Boundaries of the Spanish Kingdoms in the time of the Black Prince are printed in red.
Roads
Fortified Towns
PORTUGAL
KINGDOM OF CASTILE
KINGDOM OF ARAGON
KINGDOM OF NAVARRE
KINGDOM OF CATALONIA
KINGD.M OF GRANADA
GALICIA
MURCIA
VALENCIA
FRANCE
Roussillon
Pyrenees Mountains
Sierra Morena
Sierra Nevada
Sierra de Guadarrama
Lisbon
Oporto
Corunna
Vigo
Cape St Vincent
C. Trafalgar
Cadiz
Gibraltar
Seville
Cordova
Granada
Badajoz
Albuquerque
Valencia
Campo Mayor
Elvas
Portalegre
Castello Branco
Estremoz
Alcantara
Ciudad Rodrigo
Salamanca
Almeida
Valença
Plasencia
Talavera
Toledo
Madrid
Alcala
Segovia
Aranda
Burgos
Villaviciosa
Brihuega
Cuenca
Almanza
Requena
Montalegre
Ontiniente
Villena
Alicante
Cartagena
Denia
Valencia
Murviedro
Nules
Villa Real
Castellon de la Plana
Oropesa
San Mateo
Vinaroz
Tortosa
Tarragona
Lerida
Balaguer
Barcelona
Gerona
Figueras
Perpignan
Saragossa
Pamplona
Roncesvalles
Vittoria
Logroño
Najera
Navarrete
Miranda
Haro
Bayonne
Iviça
Majorca
Minorca
Mahon
R. Minho
R. Douro
R. Tagus
R. Guadiana
R. Guadalquivir
R. Ebro
R. Tormes
R. Tajuña

Britain and the Netherlands, who had been bitter enemies for centuries. To this day, Francis Drake is a national hero in Britain and a despised pirate in Spain. Adding Portugal to the Grand Alliance in December 1703 was certainly not a trump card that seduced most Spaniards. Portugal may have been as ardently Roman Catholic as Spain, but since the Middle Ages the Spaniards and Portuguese could barely stand each other, and on top of that Portugal was "England's Oldest Ally" and thus despised by almost everyone in Spain.

Facing page: map of Spain and Portugal, early eighteenth century. The sites of the war's main battles and sieges in the peninsula are circled in black. (Map after Fortescue, digital alterations and photo by author)

Seducing the Spaniards

In the jockeying up to seduce the Spaniards, the Habsburg pretender Carlos III managed to rally most of the old Kingdom of Aragon, which included Catalonia and Valencia. It can be said however that Bourbon pretender Felipe V won the popularity contest to woo most of the seven million Spaniards by the support gained in the old Kingdom of Castile, which included Andalucía, Estramadura, Murcia, Leon and Galicia as well as the old Kingdom of Grenada. This was utterly vital: it meant that there would be a much larger pool of men favourable to enlist in the Bourbon Spanish army who served with the French army contingents.[2]

Another aspect was that there had hardly been any major fighting within Spain in the last two centuries except for in Catalonia and on the Portuguese border. This was to change, and armies marched across the country bringing with them pillage and atrocities just as elsewhere. The Iberian peninsula proved to be a different type of battlefield for the allied forces made up of Austrian, British, Dutch and Portuguese troops united with modest contingents of Spaniards favourable to having Austria's prince as their King Carlos III. The allies operated mostly in Aragon with forays into Castile and along the borders of Portugal.

French troops in Spain were ably commanded and also proceeded to a thorough modernisation and sizeable expansion of the Spanish Bourbon army that fought for King Felipe V. The young grandson of the Sun King also proved to have many qualities that made him more acceptable to most Spaniards than his rival. He was also a good field commander who knew his limits and appreciated how fortunate he was to have the talented Marshal Berwick and later the Duc de Vendôme as commanders-in-chief of his Hispano-French armies. Overall, command disputes were much less acute in Felipe V's Hispano-French army than in his allied opponent's forces.[3]

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[2] J.-P. Almaric, B. Bennassar et al., *Histoire des Espagnols Vie - XXe siècle* (Paris: Laffont, 1992), chapter 15.

[3] Our sections on the Spanish front are largely based on Berwick's memoirs; *An Account of the Earl of Galway's conduct in Spain and Portugal* (London: J. Baker, 1711); *Remarks upon the account lately published, of the Earl of Galway's conduct in Spain and Portugal* (London, n.d.); Gayot Depitaval, *Histoire des combats d'Almenar et de Pennalva, des batailles de Sarragosse, de Villaviciosa et du siège de Gironne* (Paris: Jombert, 1712); Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3 to 6; Conde de Clonard, *Historia organica de la infanteria y caballeria españolia* (Madrid, *c.*1853), Vol. 5; Carlos Selvagem, *Portugal Militar* (Lisbon: Impresa Nacional, 1931); Nicholas Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army The British Army and the Campaigns of the First Peninsular War* 1702–1712 (Warwick: Helion, 2019); David


PHILIPPUS V. HISPANIARUM REX
Et ipse nominatus inter tres robustus.

Felipe V, King of Spain and the Indies, early eighteenth century. Whilst he became an effective field commander, his greatest strengths were political and diplomatic; he rallied a large majority of Spaniards to support him as king. Print after Jean-François de Troy. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-BI-7578)

In 1702, beside providing financial and naval assistance to Felipe V, the Sun King sent a French army corps to assist his Spanish forces. It consisted of 17 infantry battalions,19 cavalry and dragoon squadrons with artillery. Two battalions of the newly raised Gardes Wallones were also sent to join the Spanish royal guard. Over the next years, many more French contingents would follow.[4]

Before 1704, there were no major military land operations in Spain, but in 1702 British and Dutch naval squadrons staged two major raids on Spanish naval bases. The raid on Cadiz during August resulted in the loss of some ships, but the city and its base were not taken. The most important raid was the Duke of Ormonde's attack on the treasure fleet arriving from Mexico at Vigo on 22 October; most of the ships were sunk, burned or taken, but only after most of the gold and silver had been secured ashore for Felipe V's treasury.

Raid into Portugal 1704

Portugal has been popularly known as "Britain's Oldest Ally" yet it did not enter into the alliances against the Sun King's France during the seventeenth century. Indeed, in the last phase of its war with Spain to reassert its independence during the 1660s, it appealed for French help, which came in the form of volunteers that included the excellent future Marshal Schomberg (see Volume 1, chapter 3). As the eighteenth century dawned, western Europe's traditional geostrategic positions utterly changed with the chance that the throne of Spain could pass from the Imperial Habsburgs to the French Bourbons, which might weaken Portugal's long-term independence. No Portuguese wished to have Spaniards as tutors after the failure of the 1580–1660s merger. Another factor was that Portugal had overseas territories in Brazil, Africa and Asia that would surely be subject to attacks by the powerful British and Dutch navies. Instead, Britain promised support in money and troops if Portugal joined them. In December 1703, Pedro II signed a treaty with the allies whose terms included that Portugal would fight until Carlos III, the Habsburg Austrian candidate, secured the throne. Indeed Lisbon would soon greet the Austrian pretender at the head of some 12,000 British and Dutch troops. When the

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Francis, *The First Peninsular War 1702-1713* (London: E. Benn, 1975); Arthur Parnell, *The War of Succession in Spain during the reign of Queen Anne 1702-1711* (London: Bell, 1888).

[4] Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, pp.699–700; Henri-Louis-Gustave Guillaume, *Histoire des Gardes Wallones au service d'Espagne* (Brussels: Parent, 1858), pp.22–23.


Idanha a Nova
Salvaterra do Extremo
Zibreira
CORIA
CASTELLO BRANCO
Segura
Penafiel
Ol
ra Formosa
Ladoeiro
Nova
Rosmaninhal
Barcos
Rodão
R. Tejo
ALCANTARA
S. Thiago
ontalvão
Membria
Povoa das Meadas
Aroj
Castello de Vide
alhão
Valencia d'Alcantara
Marvão
Jamella
Chão
PORTALEGRE
S. Vicente
Alegrete
Codeceira
ALBUQUERQ
Arronches

Map of the Hispano-French raids into Portugal, May 1704. The main raid led by Lieutenant General Berwick left Alcantara and took Castelo Branco and Portalegre, where it was joined by another corps to take Castelo de Vide. (Map after Luz Soriano, digital alterations and photo by author)

news reached France in early 1704, obviously it meant war with Portugal.[5]

Learning of this, the Sun King sent a French army corps of 18 infantry battalions and 19 cavalry squadrons under the command of Lieutenant General Berwick to reinforce Felipe V's army. Major General Puységur, destined later to become a famous military author, was sent ahead to Madrid to prepare "all matters regarding war" as Berwick put it, and he arrived in the Spanish capital on 15 February with his troops. Felipe V immediately appointed him a captain general in the Spanish army and also granted him the status of "Grandee of Spain" which included a ceremony confirming that, as a grandee, he did not have to remove his hat in the presence of the king, according to Spain's ancient protocol. Puységur needed all the royal and official support he could get, because his mandate was to totally reorganise the Spanish army along French lines and this would not be achieved easily, requiring a great deal of diplomacy even with the many Spanish officers supporting Felipe V. A lot of money, military supplies of all types and many military advisors were steadily furnished by France, which, over several years, transformed and greatly expanded the Spanish army making it a redoubtable force.

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[5] On the service of British units in Spain, see R.E. Scouller, 'The Peninsula in the War of the Spanish Succession', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research* (henceforth *JSAHR*), LIV (1976), pp.231–245 and LV (1977), pp.35–53; C.T. Atkinson, 'Sidelight on a "side show", Spain and Portugal in the War of the Spanish Succession', *JSAHR*, XXV (1947), pp.11–21.



Marshal James FitzJames, Duc de Berwick, c.1705. Print after Boilly. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

In 1704 however, this was not yet the case and the Bourbon Spanish army was still very much organised as in the seventeenth century (see Vol. 1, Appendix III). As Felipe V wished to command the army facing the Portuguese border, he left Madrid with Berwick on 4 March. At that time, the allied army in Portugal numbered about 21,000 men of whom some 15,000 were Portuguese. Felipe V's force mustered some 28,000 men of whom about half were French. The Spanish portion of his army may have been enthusiastic, but it was not as yet fully trained and often lacked effective weapons, clothing and supplies. Its most dependable battalions were those of the Spanish and Walloon guards (see Appendix I). Thus, at that time, the French troops were the only sizeable body of troops that was really redoubtable. Some 14,000 of these Hispano-French troops served directly under Berwick and Felipe V, who wanted to raid into Portugal at once while they had the advantage.[6]

The plan was to have the Hispano-French troops assemble in Alcantara and its vicinity and have a two-pronged raid into Portugal in early May. The main column would be under Berwick, aiming to capture Castelo Branco, and a secondary force under the command of Prince Tserclaes of the Spanish army would take Portalegre. On 3 May Berwick's troops crossed the border, took Salvatera do Estremos on 8 May, Idanha a Nova, Segura and on to Castelo Branco that was taken after resisting four days. All these places had weak Portuguese garrisons. Two Dutch battalions posted further west were surprised by Lieutenant General the Marquis de Thouy leading eight battalions sent by Berwick, and nearly all the enemy troops were made prisoners. There were no other substantial allied troops sighted in the area so prospects seem quite good.

Meanwhile, Prince Tserclaes did not move his 12 battalions (including four French) and 30 cavalry companies. Instead, this over-cautious general from Spanish Flanders simply sat on the border because there was a supposedly huge British force in Portugal that would cut him off. Repeated orders by King Felipe V would not budge him; an infuriated Berwick, whose scouts confirmed there was no enemy threat, marched part of his troops southwards from Castelo Branco to Portalegre, which was captured as well as "other places without meeting the smallest resistance", reported Halliday, although Dorrell mentions it fell on 26 June after a five day siege defended by two Portuguese battalions and one British, but even before Prince Tserclaes finally arrived there. His hesitation largely ruined hopes of penetrating deeper into Portugal up to Abrantes, which, depending on the state of the allied defences, could have threatened Lisbon itself. All these prospects were now redundant, the hot summer weather was becoming intolerable and so, in early July, the raid ended and the Hispano-French troops went back into Spain. All the same, some 30 towns and fortresses had been taken during the raid, and at Castelo Branco that had been "captured sword in hand and sacked" the booty included great quantities of flour, powder, cannonballs, saddles, a few mortars, 300,000 silver piastres and even the tents of the King of Portugal. Felipe V went back to central Spain with part of the troops and Berwick remained with the rest near the border in Estramadura.[7]

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[6] The French units included, for infantry, two battalions each of Bresse, Miromesnil. Bigorre, Mérode, Maine, La Couronne, Médoc, Du Guast, and one battalion each of Barrois and Sillery; for cavalry, 15 squadrons detached from Berry, Fiennes, Villiers, Pelleport, Parabere; dragoons from Bouville, Courtebonne and Montmain. There was also an artillery train of 20 guns. Leopoldo Stampa Piniero and Juan L. Sanchez Martin, 'La primera campagna de Portugal en la Guerra de Succesion 1704' (1), *Researching & Dragona*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1996), pp.62–63.

In September British and Dutch reinforcements arrived in Portugal, and a field force of some 20,000 men under the command of the Marquis das Minas and Lord Galway was assembled at the fortress of Almeida to enter Spain and take Ciudad Rodrigo 50 km eastwards. Marshal Berwick was waiting for them with his army strongly disposed on the eastern shore of the Agueda River that flowed between Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. As a diversion, the Marquis de Bay with a few units headed north past Almeida then followed the Douro River west as far as Valenza and came back to Ciudad Rodrigo. On 2 October the allied army reached the Agueda, and after reconnoitring the well-entrenched French and Spanish troops for five days, went back to Portugal. It was a victory without a battle. Thereafter Berwick asked to go back to France, to which the King agreed and sent Marshal Tessé to replace him.

Gibraltar 1704–1705

The Spanish front was not all victories in 1704. At the end of July a large Anglo-Dutch fleet appeared at the straits of Gibraltar whose object was to take the fortress at the foot of its scenic and famous Rock. Gibraltar's garrison under the Marquis Diego de Salinas was about 100 regular soldiers and less than 400 militiamen. The fleet had over 1,400 cannons within its warships to bombard the relatively modest shore batteries. On 3 August the fleet proceeded to a great five-hour bombardment of some 15,000 shots that badly damaged the Spanish fortifications. This was followed by landing an assault force of some 1,400 British and Dutch troops with many sailors in support, led by Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt. The tiny garrison, although driven from its shore batteries, gave a stout resistance when hundreds of soldiers and sailors charged into the fortified mole that was the key to the fortress. The Spanish troops then sprang a mine which killed two officers and

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[7] Andrew Halliday, *The Present State of Portugal and of the Portuguese Army with an Epitome of the Ancient History of that Kingdom* (Edinburgh: Clarke, 1812), p.85; *Mémoires du Marquis de Sourches*, Vol. 8, pp.361–362, 370–371; Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army*, p.47; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, pp.412–414. A misprint gives 1705 instead of 1704 in this Vol..



Above: model of Gibraltar, *c.*1704. Museo Naval, Madrid. (Author's photo)

Right: British and Dutch soldiers and sailors attack Gibraltar, 3 August 1704. Print from *Gibraltar and its sieges*. (Private collection. Author's photo)





Facing page: the surrender of Gibraltar, 6 August 1704. At left, British and Dutch troops under Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt accept the surrender of Governor Diego de Salinas and his small garrison. "The Rock" fills the background. Print after R. Caton Woodville. (Private collection. Author's photo)

40 men while wounding 60 others. The assault force nevertheless pressed on and overtook a small redoubt. The few defenders could not resist such a large force and most withdrew to fortified areas further behind; de Salines agreed to surrender in three days if relief did not come for them. None came. On 6 August Gibraltar was surrendered to the allies with the honours of war. The "intrinsic value of the Rock in those days was small, and its value as a military position was little understood in England; but it was at any rate a capture and very soon it became a centre of sentiment," Fortescue rightly concluded.[8]

It was, however, seen as a dangerous allied foothold by Felipe V's government in Madrid that could lead to an invasion of southern Spain and possibly erode the support it enjoyed in that part of the country. During August and September 1704, 8,000 Spanish troops under the Marquis de Villadarias were seen arriving in sight of the Rock, now defended by about 2,000 British soldiers. In October the Spanish were reinforced by six French battalions of Compagnies franches de la Marine totalling 3,000 men detached from the Duc de Toulouse's fleet after its mildly successful battle against the British and Dutch fleet off Malaga. Gibraltar's fortifications were strengthened thanks to British engineer Captain Joseph Bennett, so that the place was becoming ever more formidable. Siege operations went on for months, both sides receiving reinforcements; a large Hispano-French assault was repulsed in October 1704; Marshal Tessé was sent to join Villadarias, but had no better luck when another assault was attempted, which included eight French grenadier companies, but was repulsed again on 7 February 1705. Finally, a strong British naval squadron appeared and beat the besieger's supporting French squadron on 21 March, which convinced Tessé to raise the siege. A blockade manned by 6,000 Spanish Andalusian troops remained for years under Villadarias.[9]

Badajos and Barcelona 1705

By early 1705 substantial allied reinforcements had landed in Portugal, raising the allied army to some 27,000 men so that an attack on the Spanish border fortress of Badajos could be attempted. Marshal Tessé's Hispano-French force in the area was much weaker, having only about 20 infantry battalions (about 10,000 men) against 39 allied, and 45 cavalry squadrons (about 5,400 troopers) facing 50. One aspect Tessé enjoyed was that he had supreme command whereas Galway, who wanted to march on Badajos at once, had to consider Dutch General Fagel and Portuguese senior officers and King Pedro II who wished to attack other secondary targets first. So, at the end of April, the allied army crossed into Spain and besieged Valencia south of Alcantara from 2 May until it was taken by assault on 8 May. The allies then moved on Albuquerque which fell after four days of siege on 20 May. The allied

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[8] *Gibraltar and its Sieges* (London: Nelson, c.1895), pp.10–13; Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, p.448. He mentions the assaulting force as "a handful of marines" and gives no data on the very weak defending force, given here as per Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, p.54.

[9] *Gibraltar and its Sieges*, pp.16–20; Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, pp.448–450; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, pp.439, 451, 454.



Siege of Albuquerque by the allied army in June 1705. The town capitulated after artillery bombardments on 20 June to Lord Galway's allied army. Print after P. Schrenck. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

army finally marched towards Badajos, reaching its outskirts by 4 June, but it was shadowed by Tessé's smaller, but quite potent troops; the hot summer was now upon all and the allied army marched back into Portugal to take summer quarters. Meanwhile the Marquis das Minas moved south from Almeida and took the small town of Sarca, north of Alcantara, but was soon countered by a detachment of about 6,000 troops under General Thouy sent up by Tessé, so again das Minas withdrew to Almeida.

With the cooler autumn weather, the allies under das Minas marched from nearby Elvas to Badajos again with 21,000 men reaching the fortress on 2 October. It was a large city and they did not have enough soldiers to invest it completely, an enormous disadvantage in siege warfare. Tessé with his 11,000 men thus harassed the allied outworks and sneaked in reinforcements to the fortress. Das Minas thought attacking Tessé was too risky and the allies finally withdrew back to Portugal on 16 October.

Large military operations in 1705 mainly moved to the north-east. There were many in the old kingdom of Aragon, which included Valencia and Catalonia, whose "proud nationalist spirit" as Clonard put it, made them suspicious of French ambitions and more centralised type of government, which they felt would forfeit their long-standing agreements with the Spanish Crown, giving them a certain independence. Austrian emissaries discreetly made "magnificent promises" that "altered the vacillating fidelity" of the population which now preferred to have Carlos III as King. Valencia rallied to his standard and much of Aragon and Catalonia led by the Miquelet mountaineers. Felipe V had only about 4,700 troops in north-eastern Spain including Barcelona, the second largest city in Spain. Knowing that if they took it, the allies would have a solid base of operations and support in that part of Spain, a strong Anglo-Dutch fleet arrived within sight of Barcelona


La Nouvelle Ville
La Vieille Ville
La Porte de St. Antoine
Porte des Anges
Couvent des Capucins
Sauvage a Cornes de St. Pierre
Sauvage a Cornes devant la Nouvelle Porte
La grande Eglise de St. Eulalie
L'Inquisition
Les Grands Carmes
St.te Marie de la Mer
Bastion Ifroy
Bastion de St. Ramon
Porte de la Mouille
Pallissade
La Porte de St. Daniel
Bastion Detache
Bastion de St. François
Le Bastion de St. Eulalie
la Porte de St. Bertrand
La Tour des Damians
Fort du Mont Joui
Le Bastion de St. Madronne
La Mouille
La Tour de la Mouille
La Mer Mediterranée

Plan of the siege and capture of Barcelona, 14 September to 19 October 1705. A mixed allied force led by the Earl of Peterborough overcame the garrison loyal to King Felipe V in Spain's second largest city. Peterborough's troops first secured Fort Montjuich and bombarded the city's Montjuich Gate (lower left). (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.230)

in late August and some 8,000 troops under Lord Peterborough and Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt landed to besiege the city. Viceroy Velasco and the Duke of Popoli, who was the military governor, had a garrison of about 2,500 men with most inhabitants of the city favourable to the allies. Nevertheless, the troops put on a brave resistance against what became overwhelming forces when Miquelets joined the besiegers.

The key to Barcelona was its citadel of Monjuich on top of the cliff dominating the city's southern side. On the early evening of 13 September a force of 1,000 men, mostly grenadiers led by Prince George, attacked Monjuich whose defenders repulsed three assaults. When Prince George was killed, the attackers broke and ran down. Lord Peterborough rallied them, and with more troops finally captured Monjuich. More allied batteries were built in the following week while Viceroy Velasco had most women and children evacuated from the city to spare them bombardments, which became very heavy thereafter. A truce was agreed on 8 October and the garrison was to march out on 14 October. An insurrection by city inhabitants then broke out threatening the lives of the surrendered troops; fearing anarchy, Lord Peterborough and General Stanhope deployed their troops against the maddened crowds, notably saving Viceroy Velasco, the Duke of



The rescue of the Duchess of Popoli in Barcelona, 8 October 1705. Print after W.J. Palmer. (Author's photo)

Popoli and his duchess from certain death.[10] Many soldiers of the garrison deserted to the allied camp, but 1,200 faithful to Felipe V were safely shipped out to Malaga.[11]

Meanwhile, Gerona had rallied to Carlos III followed by Tarragona when encouraged to do so by a Royal Navy squadron; in effect, the whole ancient kingdom of Aragon was now under the allied flag at the end of 1705. Of these, however, probably only a majority of Catalans were actually ready to fight for Carlos III. Those in Aragon (west of Catalonia) and Valencia were seemingly not as bellicose and might well be taking a neutral stance while cheering for whoever was strong enough to control their province.

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[10] While Barcelona's capitulation was being negotiated by the generals, hordes of allied Catalan Miquelets furtively went into the city, looted rich residences, murdered people and raped some ladies. Women's terrified shrieks were heard as many ran pursued by Miquelets. Accused of treachery by Viceroy Velasco and the Duke of Popoli, the Earl of Peterborough denied any such action and immediately entered the city with British troops to restore order. Captain Carleton related that "they saw a lady of apparent quality and of indisputable beauty flying from the fury of the Miquelets". She was the young Duchess of Popoli who ran for protection to a party of British officers with soldiers, who turned out to be Lord Peterborough with grenadiers of Hamilton's Regiment (later the 34th Foot). He gallantly had her escorted to her husband, and after the troops had scoured the streets and retaken the plunder from the Miquelets, the British went out as promised for a truce after which the formal surrender took place on 14 October.

[11] Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.57–58; Francis, *The First Peninsular War*, pp.178, 187–191.



Charles Mordaunt, 3rd Earl of Peterborough, c.1705. Appointed commander-in-chief of British and Dutch troops in Spain during April 1705, he conducted the successful siege of Barcelona from August to 14 October. He was thereafter somewhat inefficient during the next year and recalled to England. Accused of incompetence in March 1707, he was cleared of guilt by the House of Lords. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Allied Invasion 1706

In January the Count of Las Torres, leading 2,500 men, entered Valencia, took Villa Real and blockaded the city of Valencia. Lord Peterborough assembled some 3,100 regulars and 3,500 Valencian militias and marched to the city of Valencia; Las Torres was now considerably outnumbered and withdrew. The fall of Barcelona to the allies had given Carlos III a residence in Spain as well as a strong base. This was intolerable in Madrid and Versailles, which resolved to retake the city as well as occupy Catalonia and Valencia. In the spring, Felipe V marched with his 12,000-man army led by Marshal Tessé from Castile into Catalonia, some 9,000 men from Roussillon entered northern Spain, the Duc de Toulouse sailed from Toulon with a strong fleet and all met outside Barcelona by 3 April. The city, which was now invested, only had about 1,800 regulars, 1,500 Miquelets and 5,000 militiamen. The Hispano-French army under Marshal Tessé made several attacks during the month, but Toulouse's fleet sailed away on 7 May and the next day a strong allied fleet appeared off the city that would cut Tessé's supply route besides bringing reinforcements. The Hispano-French army withdrew on 12 May. It was a serious blow to Felipe V in trying to hold on to the throne of Spain, and even worse was to come.

The allied campaign plans for 1706 were very ambitious. In Portugal, allied troops were massing for an invasion of Spain, and reinforcements were arriving in Barcelona. The object was to link in the centre with troops from Barcelona and take Madrid. Reinforcements would also come up from Valencia. This would involve up to 30,000 men. Should the allies succeed, and crucially be able to hold Madrid and maintain their standard from Alcantara to Barcelona, they would dominate most of the country for Carlos III with only the south and the north-west remaining for Felipe V; the very reason for the war would be won for the allies and lost for the Bourbon dynasty. Spain would remain a Habsburg kingdom.

Lord Galway, leading an army of 13,700 Portuguese, 2,200 British and 2,000 Dutch troops thus marched into Portugal. Marshal Berwick had arrived in the area, but only had about 9,000 men, nearly all in newly organised Spanish units including 5,000 cavalry, which turned out to be especially useful because, with such a weak force, the best he could do was to shadow and skirmish the allied army. The allied troops under das Minas moved forward and laid siege to Alcantara from 10 April after its scenic Roman bridge had been secured. Das Minas immediately had the English Blood's Regiment (later the 17th Foot) attack the outlying convent of San Francisco, seat of the Knights of Alcantara, which was stoutly defended for a while by about 50 men, most of whom withdrew safely. Siege batteries were built meanwhile


Aranda
R. Douro
Guadarrama
Saragossa
Alfaraz
Almenara
Agramont
Lerida
Barcelona
ARAGON
Tarragona
Tortosa
R. Ebro
Vinaroz
San Mateo
Oropesa
Castallon de la Plana
Villa Real
Nules
Murviedro
Valencia
R. Guadalaviar
Valenza
Almeida
R. Tormes
Salamanca
OF
Ciudad Rodrigo
Fuentes d'Onoro
Sierra de
Villaviciosa
Brihuega
Cifuentes
Guadalaxara
Madrid
Alcala
Plascencia
Talavera
Almaraz
Toledo
R. Tagus
Cuenca
a Velha
Alcantara
Valencia de Alacantara
Albuquerque
R. Caya
Campo Mayor
Elvas
Badajoz
R. Guadiana
CASTILE
Requena
Almanza
Montalegre
Ontiniente
Villena
Denia
Alicante
Sierra Morena
MURCIA
Major
Iviça

Map of the triple invasion of central Spain by the allied armies, 1706. The target was Madrid and its area. The two main armies came from Portugal (at left) and Barcelona (upper right). The third force came up came up from Valencia. Madrid was effectively occupied, but not for long. Detail of map from Fortescue. (Author's digital additions and photo) and began shooting into the city. The place was defended by about 4,500 troops and the town's militia with no hope of relief, because Berwick could not risk his much weaker army whose seasoned French battalions had all been sent to reinforce Marshal Tessé's siege of Barcelona. After four days of bombardment and a sortie attempt, Alcantara capitulated with the honours of war for its garrison, some of whose members had managed to abscond.

In the following weeks, the allied army advanced towards central Spain still shadowed by Berwick's smaller army reinforced by 10 battalions from Badajos, which was now not likely to be attacked. Lord Galway wanted to march directly to Madrid, but das Minas and his officers first wanted to secure the province of Estramadura and Ciudad Rodrigo to cover their flank. On 21 May, the allied army invested Ciudad Rodrigo, which only had one battalion of regulars, 2,000 militiamen and no hope of relief. After five days of bombardment, it capitulated. Das Minas now wished for the army to take its quarters for the hot summer and resume the campaign in the autumn, as was the fashion in Iberia, but he received express orders from King Pedro II to stick to the plan and be led by Lord Galway to Madrid.

There was sudden urgency in the allied camp brought about by Marshal Tessé's raising the siege of Barcelona. His army included a lot of veteran French troops that would soon be campaigning with Berwick. In Madrid, young Queen Marie-Louise-Gabrielle made an outstanding appeal to the Spanish people and its nobility, warning all of the consequences of an Austrian government with Portuguese troops to occupy the nation and execute the Habsburgs' will. Of this, the Portuguese spectre had a tremendous effect as it went to the very grain of any Spaniard's heart. In more practical terms, the Queen also sent four battalions of the guards to reinforce Berwick, since Madrid did not really matter any more because it had no strategic value. The Hispano-French tactic was to withdraw and surrender cities so as to extend the allied lines of communication. The "Queen's Speech" had produced a favourable effect in the countryside. Most of the nation was rallying to Felipe V's standard to save Spain.

Lord Galway, always shadowed by Berwick, arrived at Salamanca on 7 June, which was occupied without a fight by Portuguese troops; he marched on eastward in two columns securing Placencia Talavera, Toledo, Avila, Segovia and the Escurial. Felipe V had meanwhile arrived in Madrid, which had no fortifications worthy of note. On 19 June the royal family, government officials, most courtiers and many others evacuated the city with the royal treasury escorted by Marshal Berwick and 9,000 troops and went to Burgos. Felipe V went on to rally Spaniards in Navarra. On 25 June Galway arrived in Madrid, accepted the keys of the city and rode into its empty streets. A few days later Galway officially proclaimed Carlos III as King of Spain. Charles was not in Madrid. He had to leave a lot of troops in Catalonia in case of French raids from Roussillon and finally left Barcelona on 24 July heading for Madrid with only about 2,500 men. When he met Galway at Guadalajara on 6 August, he was advised not to go further. General Peterborough had arrived there with even fewer troops because he had to secure Valencia. The allied army, much reduced by illness, in central Spain now had about 14,000 men.

The royal castle of Segovia was taken by Portuguese troops during the summer of 1706. It was the residence of the legendary "Kings": Queen Isabella of Castile and King Ferdinand of Aragon who, in the late fifteenth century, united their crowns to form modern Spain and thus a hallmark of the nation's history. In early August 1706, the city's population rose in arms and forced the Portuguese garrison in the castle to capitulate with the honours of war. (Author's photo)

Meanwhile, Spaniards were joining King Felipe V's army, which rose to about 25,000 men and Marshal Berwick's troops would further be reinforced by 30 French infantry battalions with 20 cavalry squadrons (about 17,400 men) sent by the Sun King at this critical time. Furthermore, the populations of some Spanish cities rose in revolt. Valladolid's citizens overpowered its allied garrison, there were uncontainable uprisings in Toledo, and at Segovia where the 450-man Portuguese garrison had taken refuge in its castle before finally surrendering to its revolted populace. Madrid was deemed unsafe and the Austrian pretender reluctantly gave up going there. Sure enough, on 3 August, over 400 Spanish cavalry entered the city followed by more troops; some 370 Miquelets and Valencia militiamen resisted in the treasury building, surrendering two days later. The population joyously greeted the Spanish troops to the cries of *Viva Felipe V el Rey!* Peterborough wanted to march on Madrid to retake it, but Galway and das Minas thought this was too risky so he went back to Valencia. By 12 August allied supplies had run out and none could be obtained from the countryside now controlled by the Spanish. Galway and das Minas led their troops southwards to Valencia, shadowed by Berwick, while Carlos III went back to Barcelona. All the cities they had taken were reoccupied by Felipe V's army including Alcantara on 14 December. A British naval squadron had taken the port of Cartagena on 13 June, captured Alicante on 8 August and its citadel on 4 September. The islands of Iviça, Majorca and Minorca were also taken in September. Hispano-



The Roman bridge at Alcantara has spanned the Tagus River since the first century AD. It was the scene of many battles including two sieges during the War of the Spanish Succession. (Author's photo)

French forces now appeared and recaptured Cartagena on 18 November and Minorca on 5 January 1707. Thus ended the great invasion of 1706.[12]

The enlistment of Spaniards into Carlos III's own Spanish army was obviously much smaller than for Felipe's V's army. In 1706–1707, the composition of the army of Felipe V compared to the army of Carlos II revealed a considerable difference. A 1706 list (see Appendix I) of the French and Spanish army led by Marshal Berwick showed that, of 76 cavalry and dragoon squadrons, 64 were Spanish and 12 were French while, of the 52 infantry battalions, half were Spanish and half were French. Squadrons had 120 men each thus totalling 9,120 troopers, battalions had 500 men each making 26,000 infantrymen for a total of 35,120. This also had an impact on the high command. Below Berwick were seven lieutenant generals, two of whom were Spanish while three out of seven major generals were Spanish. By contrast, a 1707 list of the allied army at Almanza showed only four pro-Carlos III Spanish squadrons out of 61 and only two pro-Carlos III Spanish battalions in the 46 listed. Other pro-Carlos III Spanish units appear to have mostly recruited and posted in Catalonia and its capital. Senior commanders in the allied camp were all foreign.[13]

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[12] The British recaptured Minorca, as per R.G. Thurburn, 'The Capture of Minorca 1708', *JSAHR*, LV (1977), pp.65–72.

[13] Order of battle of the French and Spanish armies 1706 and Order of battle of the Allied army at Almanza, 1707, both by Gabriel Delahaye, Royal Collection Trust, London. With thanks to curator Yolande Hodson. 1707 allied army 61 squadrons: 7,320 troopers; 46 battalions: 23,000 men at the standard 500 per battalion and 120 men per squadron. Quincy, *Histoire militaire,* Vol. 4, p.401 gives allies at Almanza 70 squadrons at 7,000; 51 battalions at 26,000 men. On the pro-Carlos III army, see Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army*, pp.68–72, 185–186 and plate iv.

7

Victory in Spain and Provence

Almanza 1707

Marshal Berwick wintered his field army of about 15,000 men on Valencia's border and intended to drive the allies out of that part of the country in the spring. Lord Galway, in Valencia, received unexpected reinforcements from Britain totalling 7,000 men in January 1707. In the French camp, the Sun King at Versailles had granted overall nominal command to another of his grandsons, the Duc d'Orléans, sent to Spain with 24 infantry battalions and 24 cavalry squadrons (about 12,000 infantry and 2,880 cavalry). Perhaps fearing that Orléans could repeat the Torino fiasco, Berwick asked the Sun King that he should join him with the main army. On 10 April, Galway and das Minas crossed their army of about 15,000 to 16,000 men into Murcia and destroyed a few magazines of Berwick's Hispano-French army, with which they hoped to battle before French reinforcements arrived. Apprised of this, Berwick immediately marched his army northwards to make the junction with 8,000 French troops marching south. The allied army came up to Villena on 18 April and besieged it while the French reinforcements reached Berwick; he now marched south. Learning that Berwick marched south, the allies raised the siege and marched north. Unfortunately for them, their intelligence did not detect that Berwick's army had become larger. On 25 April the armies faced each other and Berwick had a marked advantage with about 25,000 men. The engagement started mid afternoon.[1]

According to Berwick, the Hispano-French cavalry charged the allied right held by the Portuguese and cut through the Portuguese cavalry, but was repulsed by "so great a fire" from the Portuguese infantry, reformed, charged again and was repulsed again. By then, according to Quincy, some of the Portuguese infantry had formed squares to repel cavalry. Berwick now ordered the infantry brigade under General Bulkeley to charge the Portuguese

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[1] The 1707 allied list has eight battalions and six squadrons that are Dutch, 17 battalions and 12 squadrons that are British while 19 battalions and 39 squadrons are Portuguese thus making up to half of the army. This would total 30,320 at the standard 500 per battalion and 120 men per squadron. Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 4, p.401 gives the allies 70 squadrons at 7,000; 51 battalions at 26,000 men for a total of 33,000.



The battle of Almanza, 25 July 1707. This battle, decisively won by the Duc de Berwick's Hispano-French army over Lord Galway's allied force, had tremendous strategic consequences; it was the turning point of the War of the Spanish Succession in Iberia. In the foreground, white-coated French infantry grenadiers are moving into line while blue-coated infantrymen are evacuating a wounded officer. Berwick with his senior and staff officers are at left. The background shows the battle lines with the allies retreating. This iconic 1862 painting by Ricardo Balaca y Canseco has some inaccurate material culture details because they were then unknown, but remains a fine depiction of the event. (Courtesy of the Museo del Prado, Madrid)



Left: Henri de Massue, Marquis de Ruvigny,1st Earl of Galway, *c*.1705. He was a French Huguenot general who entered British service in 1690 and fought with distinction in Ireland, Flanders and Italy. Appointed commander-in-chief of the allied armies in Spain, he lost an arm at Badajos in 1705, took Alcantara and occupied Madrid in 1706, but was crushed by Berwick's Hispano-French army at Almanza in 1707, being wounded there with two sabre cuts on the face. Print from Agnew's 1864 biography of Galway. (Author's photo)

Below: Plan of the siege of the great fortress of Lérida by the Duc d'Orléans' army in the autumn of 1707. The city fell on 14 October and its citadel on 12 November. Print from Quincy's *Histoire militaire*. (Private collection. Author's photo)


T.5.p.427.
PLAN
du Siege de LERIDA,
formé par les Armées des deux Couronnes commandées par S.A.R. M.gr le Duc d'Orleans qui se rendit Maitre de la Ville le 14. Octobre; et du Château le 12 Novembre 1707.
Echelle de 200. Toiſes
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Fort de Gardin

infantry, which this time was overwhelmed. The Hispano-French cavalry charged again with Bulkeley, and the allied right finally broke. According to British dragoon Captain Hawley, "during this, most of the Portuguese regiments upon our right did not advance nor fire, but stood still and threw down their arms and asked for quarter, as we heard after … The right wing of [the Portuguese] Horse run clear away, which we in the centre, knew nothing of either, but thought the day our own." The allied left was charged several times by the Hispano-French troops and withdrew slightly, but did not break. At the allied centre, the British and Dutch battalions had charged successfully the Hispano-French centre, two battalions breaking through both lines and reaching the walls of Almanza, but driven back by Spanish cavalry and infantry that had regrouped with more behind not yet engaged joining in. The allied infantry at the centre, seeing the right flank overwhelmed and the left flank wavering and about to break, now started to withdraw, but much was caught up by a general charge of Berwick's army. According to Fortescue, the allied guns were saved, but the army was practically destroyed losing about 4,000 killed or wounded and another 3,000 made prisoners. According to Berwick the allies lost 5,000 men, 10, 000 became prisoners, "120 colours and standards, and all their artillery" were taken while his army lost 2,000 men. Lord Galway was wounded but managed to escape.[2]

Whatever the numbers, it was an allied disaster. The Duc d'Orléans arrived the day after the battle and is said to have been much disappointed to have missed the opportunity partake the glory of this victory. He then proceeded with part of the army to take Requena on 3 May, the city of Valencia on 8 May, headed north then turned eastwards, moved into Aragon and entered Zaragoza on 25 May. Berwick with the rest of the army continued to secure the province and captured the city of Valencia. The fortress of Denia put up strong resistance from 15 June, so wisely not wishing to waste time and soldiers there, he left some troops to seal it and marched north, linking with the Duc d'Orléans' army in the area of the great fortress of Lérida in southern Catalonia during mid July. As it was then too warm to campaign in the Peninsula, the armies of both sides went into the customary summer quarters until early September when Lérida was invested by the Hispano-French army of about 23,000 men; it stubbornly held out until its capitulation on 14 November, a major loss for the allies.

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[2] Our relation of Almanza is based on the *Mémoires du maréchal de Berwick*, pp.253–255; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 4, pp.401–405; 'The Battle of Almanza, An Eyewitness Account by General Hawley', Percy Sumner, ed., *JSAHR*, XXV (1947), p.29; C.T. Atkinson, 'More light on Almanza from the Hawley Papers', *JSAHR*, XXV (1947), pp.144–161; Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, pp.486–487. That great historian opined that the "simple fact was that, as the bulk of the Portuguese would not fight … and the defeat, though decisive, was in no sense disgraceful except to the Portuguese", inferring that only the British and Dutch fought. This is rather different to Berwick's and Quincy's view of the Portuguese performance in this battle. It seems Fortescue followed *An Account of the Earl of Galway's conduct*, p.85 even if it mentioned the Portuguese also fighting and perhaps Hawley's or other accounts like it. This contradiction did not go unnoticed in its own time as seen in the critical account *Remarks upon the account lately published, of the Earl of Galway's conduct*, pp.32–35. In our view, the Portuguese did fight and their role in the war should be much further researched, especially in Portuguese archives.



Fort Carré and the fortress of Antibes, early eighteenth century. In July and August 1707 the allied army and the Anglo-Dutch fleet of over 50 ships attempted to bombard and take Antibes, but failed. Its sixteenth-century citadel, Fort Carré (foreground) armed with large calibre guns, and Vauban's line of landward fortifications (top centre) discouraged the attackers. (Scale model at the Musée des plans-reliefs, Paris. Author's photo)

Nevertheless, Catalonia was solidly behind Carlos III and there were enough allied troops left to hold on to it. It was clear that Almanza was a great strategic gain because it considerably secured the Spanish throne for Felipe V by putting nearly all of Spain, except for Catalonia, in his realm. That, after all, was the central object of the War of the Spanish Succession.

A Year in Provence 1707

After their great victory at Torino followed by the eviction of anything Bourbon in northern Italy, the main allied objective for 1707 was to invade Provence to take and destroy the large French naval base at Toulon to utterly ruin French naval power in the Mediterranean. The occupation of Provence would also provide an opportunity to attack Roussillon and link with Catalonia and Carlos III's troops there. For the purpose, according to French spies, some 55,000 troops were to form the invasion force supported by a fleet of British and Dutch warships with many transports. Another target was added when Austrian troops marched into the Kingdom of Naples during the spring of 1707 without encountering much resistance.[3]

In early July a combined Austro-Piémont-Prussian army of 40,000 men led by Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy secured Nice (on the Côte d'Azur),

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[3] *Mémoires militaires*, p.87, 108–183; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 5; *Memoirs of Prince Eugene*; Jean-Marie Martin, 'La guerre de Succession d'Espagne : l'armée des Alpes et le siege de Toulon', *Revue historique des armées*, No. 258 (2010).


STAD TOULON
TOULON
Chateau de Malbousquet
Notre Dame de Bonrencontre
Kruyt Toorn
Tour, ou Magasin a Poudre
Slick grond
Banc
RADE DE TOULON
3 Vaam diep
3 Brasses
Tour de l'Eguillette
Tour des Vignettes
Fort S. Louis
Boscage
Lazaret
Infirmerie
Marguerite
Cap de Toulon
Hollandse Schepen
Engelse Schepen
MEDITERRANÉE
Armee navale des Alliez

The siege of Toulon, 29 July to 21 August 1707. A 35,000 men allied army led by Prince Eugene of Austria and King Vittorio Amadeo of Savoy surrounded the port city while an Anglo-Dutch fleet blockaded the harbour. The 15,000 defenders were vigorously led by Marshal René de Froulay de Tessé while more French troops were assembling to relieve the city. Anxious not to be trapped, the allies withdrew to Italy. (Courtesy Library of Congress, Washington)

crossed the Var River on 16 July and came up to Antibes, a well-fortified seaport with Fort Carré as its small but powerful citadel with its great guns. Antibes' garrison and militia offered a determined resistance, so the allied army left some troops to blockade it and marched westward. The Duke of Savoy encouraged the utter devastation the countryside it passed through, reaching the vicinity of Toulon in late July after many massacres, outrages and even the cutting down of olive trees. It was joined there by an allied fleet of 47 warships and 57 transports.

In early July the port city's fortifications were very strong facing the sea and utterly weak landwards. The militia of Provence had been mobilised and the population of the city was building fortifications including a large entrenched camp in record time. By late July Toulon was a well-fortified city landwards too with 236 guns, most of them being naval 24-pdrs and 26 of the heaviest calibre in the service being 36-pdrs. Besides its new curtain walls there were the older outlying forts Sainte-Marguerite and Saint-Louis, as well as three large towers covering the harbour's entrance. The allied army arrived on the outskirts of Toulon on 26 July and secured the Sainte-Catherine heights north of the city. However, Marshal Tessé had arrived from Dauphiné on 23 July leading 59 battalions (about 30,000 men), joining the garrison and militia in the city, and also at the large entrenched camp to its north on the height of Sainte-Anne. There were also thousands of militiamen of all sorts: some served with the city garrisons, 4,500 in Toulon for instance, and other unknown but substantial groups were in the hills harassing enemy columns.

Allied Failure at Toulon

All allied attempts to take the city or the camp by assault thereafter failed, as did the fleet's bombardments. They did capture outlying forts Sainte-Marguerite and Saint-Louis, but, as Prince Eugene pondered: "Of what use will this be to us? Tessé had made excellent arrangements in the city, and I shrewdly suspected that the expedition to Naples, which had retarded the arrival of the English and Dutch flee before Toulon, had frustrated our attempt." Indeed, Tessé attacked and took the Sainte-Catherine heights from the allies on 15 August. Prince Eugene also knew that more troops were coming to reinforce Toulon. On 22 August the allied army left and marched eastwards, being often shot at in the hills and losing many stragglers. On 26 August it crossed the Var River. The allies reported losing 10,000 to 12,000 men in battle and through sickness, exposure or desertion; the loss of one soldier to every four is very serious in any army and goes a long way to explain the invasion's failure and the allied retreat.[4]

The invasion of Provence was a huge setback for the allies. Not only had they failed to vanquish regular forces that were half the number of their army, but the common people had everywhere rallied to resist the invaders in every possible manner. It was somewhat like what had happened to the allies when they had raided Dauphiné in 1692, but now on a much larger scale. The message was clear: invading any part of the Sun King's France was a very costly and risky venture.

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[4] *Memoirs of Prince Eugene*, p.105.

8

Defeat and Triumph in the Peninsula

Spain 1708–1712

The birth of the Prince of the Asturias, the heir to the throne in Spain, rallied even more Spaniards to the throne of Felipe V and his popular Queen and could only boost morale of the Hispano-French armies. The weakened allies were essentially redoubtable in Catalonia, so Felipe V's army sought to expel them from Valencia where they still held a few strongholds.

An Hispano-French army of about 14,000 men led by the Chevalier d'Asfeld took Denia in November 1708, and besieged Alicante from 30 November. It had a garrison of 800 British troops under Major General John Richards. D'Asfeld's train of siege artillery soon bombarded Alicante intensely; by the night of 2 December, the town was considered no longer defensible. Richards surrendered it and retreated with his men to its eagle's nest, Castillo de Santa Barbara, overlooking Alicante. It was rightly considered to be next to impregnable and its modest garrison stubbornly defended it for months. By early 1709 D'Asfeld had miners dig a mine underneath its "Torre de Homenaje", the ultimate stronghold crowning the citadel. This mine was said to be "one of the most powerful ever made". On 2 March 1709, d'Asfeld summoned the surrender within three days, revealing there was a huge mine beneath the citadel and inviting a few British officers to see it. Nevertheless, many officers of the garrison did not take it seriously and were certainly not about to surrender. Sure enough, on 7 March 1709, the mine exploded under the castle killing Richards and 53 men, but still the place continued to resist until it capitulated on 17 April having run out of food and ammunition. The next day its 600 survivors proudly came out with the honours of war. The Spanish and French soldiers, admiring their courage, presented arms as they marched past towards the longboats of a British naval squadron that had arrived too late. It was one of the war's most heroic defences during a siege.[1]

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[1] Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, pp.528–529; James Grant, *British Battles on Land and Sea* (London: Cassell, *c*.1890), Vol. 1, pp.525–528; Miguel Castillo Villena, *El Castillo de Santa Barbara de Alicante* (Ayuntamiento de Alicante, 1962); Victor Echarri Iribarren, 'El sitio



The Castillo Santa Barbara, the citadel of Alicante. An early fortification was erected by Carthaginians overlooking the city of Alicante and its crowning "Torre de Homenaje" was built by the Arabs during the Middle Ages. Part of it was destroyed by the mine set off on 7 March 1709; It exploded in the area at the upper left of the illustration. Nevertheless, the remnants of the British garrison continued to resist until 17 April. Detail from a print after Miguel Castello Villena. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Meanwhile, Berwick had been called to other duties elsewhere; the Duc d'Orléans captured Tortona on 11 July 1708, General d'Asfeld took Denia on 12 November. In early 1709 Felipe V's two armies consisted of: a) the main army currently under Marshal de Besons, composed of Spanish and French units in central and eastern Spain that faced Catalonia; b) the smaller army under the Marquis de Bay which was composed solely of Spanish units in Estramadura facing Portugal. There was a third French force in Roussillon consisting solely of French troops under the Duc de Noailles, which faced northern Catalonia. The allies were thus confined in Catalonia and relief could only come from Portugal.

In April 1709 Lord Galway was now in Portugal, and with the Marquis de Fronteria entered Spain near Campo Mayor and marched east towards Xeres, leading an army of 10,000 Portuguese and 5,000 British. They were met on 7 May by a Spanish army of the same strength led by the Marquis de Bay on the banks of the Caya River. According to Fortescue and Clonard, the Portuguese cavalry broke and ran "before the Spanish cavalry could reach them" and this, after a stout resistance by four British infantry regiments, resulted in the allied army fleeing in panic. Clonard mentions allied losses at about 3,000 and their train of artillery while the Portuguese acknowledged it was "a remnant of the army" that went back to the Portuguese frontier.[2]

In 1708 Emperor Joseph I appointed Austrian Field Marshal Starhemberg, one of the best Austrian generals, commander of a reinforcement of some 3,300

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de Alicante y la mina due hicieron las tropas hispano-francesas bajo el castillo en 1708–1709', *Tiempos Modernos*, 28 (2014/1).

[2] Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, pp.529–530; Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.74–75; Salvagem, *Portugal Militar*, pp.461–462.



Field Marshal Guido von Starhemberg, early eighteenth century. He was a veteran of many campaigns with Prince Eugene against the Ottoman Turks during the 1680s and 1690s. He served in Italy in the early 1700s, and in 1708 was appointed commander-in-chief of Imperial troops in Spain. In 1710 he won the battles of Almenar and Zaragoza, but was crushed at Villaviciosa by Vendôme. Following the Treaty of Utrecht, he evacuated Barcelona with his troops. Print after Alfred Arneth's 1853 *Das Lebendes kaiserlichen Feldmarschall Guido von Starhemberg 1657–1737*. (Author's photo)

Austrian troops in Spain to restore the situation in favour of Carlos III. Starhemberg had taken Balaguer, but on 4 December 1709 failed to recapture Tortosa. Meanwhile, the Duc de Noailles in Roussillon raided successfully into northern Catalonia in August and September 1709. On 2 September Noailles' raiders ambushed, wounded and captured allied General Frankenberg and looted his camp within view of Gerona. Noailles' troops generally controlled the countryside just south of the Pyrenees.[3]

On the whole, the situation in Spain was quite good, but successive defeats of the French army in other fronts were taking their toll. The strain on the army at home was great, and the Sun King now had to withdraw 24 battalions and 27 squadrons from Spain to reinforce Roussillon and Dauphiné, which were threatened with allied invasions. The reorganised Spanish army would have to fill the gap. Felipe V raised 22 new Spanish regiments.

Although weakened, Felipe V's army maintained its positions until July 1710 when 4,200 British troops under Major General James Stanhope, Earl of

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[3] Alfred Arneth, *Das Lebendes kaiserlichen Feldmarschall Guido von Starhemberg 1657–1737* (Vienna, 1853), chapters 14 to 18.



The charge of Pepper's British Dragoons at Almenara, 27 July 1710. The British cavalry was a worthy opponent to the Bourbon Spanish and French regiments and this regiment, as shown, scattered the Spanish cavalry at Almenara and had success at Zaragoza. However, its surviving troopers became prisoners of war following Vendôme's decisive victories. The regiment wore a red coat with yellow metal buttons and probably yellow cuffs and lining. Pepper's Dragoons later became the 8th Hussars. Print after D.M. Anderson. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

Stanhope, landed in Catalonia. Starhemberg thus had 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry to take the offensive at once, and invaded Aragon; Felipe V marched with his army to defend it. In the vicinity of Almenara, 26 squadrons of cavalry led by Stanhope ran into 42 squadrons of Spanish cavalry with some infantry under Lieutenant General de Sello on 27 July and defeated them. According to Quincy, the allied squadrons were eventually contained by Spanish infantry and dragoons, which permitted an orderly retreat. Felipe V called on the Marquis de Bay to take command of the Hispano-French army in Aragon, which was weaker and pursued by Marshal Starhemberg. On 15 August there was sharp fight at Penalva between detachments of both armies as they headed for Zaragoza.[4]

Zaragoza and Madrid

On 20 August 1710 a much more serious Spanish defeat occurred outside the walls of Zaragoza, where Felipe V's Spanish army of 17,000 men led by the Marquis de Bay, said to be exhausted from marches and badly supplied, was met by Field Marshal Starhemberg leading about 24,000 Portuguese, Imperial, British and Catalonian troops. It was a hard-fought affair which

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[4] Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, p.531 mentions 1,300 Spanish casualties at Almenara while Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, pp.418–419 claimed 600 allied casualties, all of which seem exaggerated.



The battle of Zaragoza, 20 August 1710. This victory by the allied army of Carlos III over the Hispano-French army of Felipe V could have been the opportunity to secure a sizeable part of north-eastern Spain. But General Stanhope and the other generals wanted to occupy Madrid instead, which later proved to be the wrong strategic option because the Hispano-French army was not destroyed and quickly became even stronger. Print after Romeyn de Hooghe. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.430) the allied army eventually won, in spite of the somewhat unexpected valour of many units of the Spanish army, that captured five allied colours. Besides having a weaker army, the Marquis de Bay was not as experienced with disposing his troops as his opponent and this was a factor in the defeat. De Bay thus withdrew to Tudela with 8,000 men and all his baggage and part of his artillery, while 5,000 other men under Prince Tserclaes retreated to Grana before regrouping with de Bay and several smaller corps. In the battles of 27 July, and 15 and 20 August, Quincy reported that casualties may have been about 5,000 for the allies and 7,000 for the Spanish. De Bay's army was in no condition to face another battle and retreated into the interior to regroup further and be reinforced.[5]

This left the road to Madrid open, and the allies marched towards the capital. Once again Felipe V and his court evacuated the city, and allied troops led by the Habsburg Carlos III entered it from 21 September though greeted with little enthusiasm by its citizens. The plan was now for the weakened allied army to be reinforced by a 14,000-man Portuguese field army, which would connect with an allied detachment under Stanhope that would secure Toledo and the vital bridge for the Portuguese to pass over the Tagus River at Almaraz, which was accordingly done insofar as Stanhope securing Toledo and Almaraz.

In Versailles, the Sun King received news of the defeat with an appeal for assistance by the Duke de Osana representing the "Grandees" of Spain, stating that most of the nation wished Felipe V as King. Louis XIV too made plans swiftly to send in the Duc de Vendôme to immediately take command of the Spanish army now gathered at Aranda, and go after Starhemberg's allied army in Madrid before the Portuguese arrived in central Spain. Simultaneously, the Duc de Noailles in Roussillon was reinforced by 14,000 men to pressure Catalonia from the north by staging raids and besieging Gerona with his army.

In Madrid, British cavalry troopers burst into churches and convents on 22 September to take the captured allied colours and standards that had been deposited by Felipe V, which they took to their camp, while some 2,500 "Miquelets or bandits" made "great disorders" looting as far as the Pardo outside the city as well as churches within. The bells at some churches did not ring because British soldiers had even taken the ropes when they could not find anything else of value! Starhemberg replied to complaining city leaders that he had no money to pay his troops and followed this with many repressive measures; he issued a legalised looting decree ordering all currency, domestic or foreign, be surrendered to the authorities. From 5 October bread became scarcer in Madrid.[6]

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[5] Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, pp.424–428 has an unusual four pages on Zaragoza describing the battle at length, which seems to indicate he had good informants on it; Atkinson, 'Sidelight on a "side show"', *JSAHR*, XXV (1947), p.16 quotes some questionable data from British newspapers such as the capture of 200 Spanish colours and standards, 16 guns, all the baggage, etc. The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom (henceforth cited as: TNA), T27/20, Memorial of 30 October 1711 mentions that the trophies taken at Zaragoza had been taken to England.

[6] *Mercure Galant*, May 1711, pp.108–111.



Louis-Joseph, Duc de Vendôme (1654–1712), c.1710. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Meanwhile, Vendôme had arrived in Spain with a suite of many French army officers to serve in the Spanish army, who were somewhat akin to the "military advisors" sent to allied countries nowadays. Vendôme detached the Marquis de Bay with 12,000 men to Estramadura, which forced the Portuguese army to turn north instead of heading for Almaraz. This left Vendôme to reach that city and destroy the bridge, then turn east, marching towards Madrid. Many volunteers were enlisting in Felipe V's armies and the French officers present were incorporated into Spanish units to assist with training. Money and supplies also came from many cities. By 8 November the Spanish field army led by Vendôme had 27,500 men including 11,000 cavalry on good Andalusian horses. Three days later the allied army evacuated Madrid and went to Toledo while Carlos III returned to safety in Barcelona. Vendôme, accompanied by Felipe V, was now in Talavera with his army. They stayed there a few days ready to block the allied army in case it tried to reach Portugal. Meanwhile, allied army detachments were increasingly harassed by what became later known as guerrillas when they ventured out, and popular uprisings now occurred in Toledo and the surrounding area; Starhemberg realised that he had to withdraw from central Spain before Vendôme's superior army caught up with his smaller force. On 29 November the allied army hurriedly left Toledo after failing to burn its castle, and headed north towards Aragon while Felipe V led a Spanish detachment that entered Madrid in triumph on 3 December. He was quickly back with Vendôme and the main field army that had left Talavera with about 22,000 men in pursuit of Starhemberg.[7]

Brihuega and Villaviciosa 1710

Reaching Brihuega, Starhemberg left about 4,500 of his troops under General Stanhope there as a rearguard with the rest of his army being nearby. Separating his forces was a huge mistake. On the morning of 7 December

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[7] There seems to be little known regarding French military advisers or seconded officers, which were numerous throughout Felipe V's army. We have found writings left by Depitaval, Bellerive and Franclieu who was a colonel and related that "a great many French officers with Vendôme in 1710 sought employment with the King of Spain". When two special French regiments were mooted to be raised, some 60 of these officers immediately volunteered; there would have been many more, but the Marquis de Castelar, intendant of the army, disapproved, preferring no doubt to spread these experienced officers as cadres within many units. *Mémoires militaires*, pp.65–66.


Sierra de Miledo
Sierra
Somosierra
Buitrago
Segovie
Ildefonse
S. Augustin
Villaviciosa
Guadalaxara
Brihuega
Manzanares
Alcala
Henares R.
MADRID
R.
Tage Fl.
Aranjuez
Ocaña
Tolède
Riansares
C A S T

The roads to Villaviciosa, 1710. The solid arrow shows the march of Vendôme's Hispano-French army; the speckled arrow is the march of Stanhope's and Starhemberg's allied army. (Detail of a map after Hugo, digital alterations and photo by author)

1710, Vendôme's advance guard was already in sight of Brihuega and, by sunset, the place had been invested and the first batteries started firing on the town. It was sited "on a rocky descent, walled about but in no way strong and the gate very indifferent: it hath a large castle in it but of no use" later recalled a British dragoon within. The next day, the Spanish troops stormed the place, took most of the town defended with *perseverancia heroica* (heroic perseverance) according to Clonard, in a bloody struggle and the defenders took refuge behind a breastwork. Finally, four British cavalry regiments, seven infantry regiments, a battalion of the Scot's Guards and a Portuguese regiment surrendered so the whole garrison became prisoners. The allies had about 500 casualties and the Spanish 1,000.

Starhemberg with 14,000 men meanwhile marched to the relief of Stanhope in Brihuega while Vendôme's army of about 20,000 men marched to intercept him, and the armies faced each other at Villaviciosa on



The battle of Villaciosa, 9 December 1710. The Hispano-French cavalry breaks through the allied line. (Private collection. Author's photo)

10 December. It turned out to be a hard, desperate fight for both sides who perhaps knew that its outcome could well decide who would be king of Spain. The allies' left was initially badly mauled by great cavalry charges followed by ferocious attacks and counterattacks. According to Captain Bellerive, who was present, Portuguese troops under the command of Count Tajela at the centre of the allied line repulsed Spanish assaults until Vendôme personally brought reinforcements which finally overwhelmed them. The fighting was fierce, but with no clear outcome by sunset, and in spite of the good dispositions of his troops, Starhemberg's army was simply too weak to resist further and left the field to Vendôme. Quincy put the Spanish casualties at 2,500, which seems low. They took 10 pairs of kettledrums, 14 standards, 54 colours, 22 guns and all the supplies. The allied casualties came to about 3,000 and some prisoners. The rest retreated and numbered about 5,000 when they reached Zaragoza, finally arriving at Barcelona on 6 January 1711. Brihuega and Villaviciosa had a decisive and tremendous strategic impact, indeed, far more than the great battles in Flanders because it confirmed that the purpose




ADRIEN MAURICE DUC DE NOAILLES, PAIR DE FRANCE MARECHAL DES CAMPS ET ARMEES DU ROY, ET CHEVALIER DE L'ORDRE DE LA TOISON D'OR

Above: King Felipe V sleeping on a bed of captured colours, 9 December 1710. It is said that, after the battle of Villaciosa, the Duc de Vendôme told an exhausted Felipe 'V: "I will have prepared for you the finest bed a King ever slept on", and led him to a bed made up of captured colours and standards. When he woke in the morning Felipe told Vendôme "I owe you my crown". Print after Philippoteaux. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Right: Adrien-Maurice, Comte d'Ayen and third Duc de Noailles, *c.*1705. Born in September 1678, he was quickly revealed to be a fine officer, promoted major general in 1702 and lieutenant general in 1706. During the War of the Spanish Succession he took part in seven campaigns in Spain, initially under his father Marshal Anne-Jules, 2nd Duc de Noailles (who passed away in 1708) and as an army commander. After the war his administrative talent in government finances was called upon, but he remained a soldier, promoted marshal in 1734, and died in 1766. This print by P. Drevet after a *c.*1705 portrait by F. de Troy was published in 1721. (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. Bequest of Martha S. Hill) of the War of the Spanish Succession: that Spain and its vast overseas empire would henceforth be ruled by the Sun King's grandson.[8]

Vendôme's army also marched north to secure the countryside in Aragon and recaptured Zaragoza on 2 January 1711. Another corps of about 12,000 French troops led by the Marquis de Rosel entered north-western Aragon and took Olite, Huesca and Balbastro. The Duc de Noailles entered north-eastern Catalonia with 22,000 French troops and took Gerona on 25 January 1711. There no major operations for a while thereafter. In June 1712, the Duc de Vendôme passed away. In the later part of the year, Starhemberg came out of Barcelona and laid siege to Gerona. Fearing that this important fortress might fall, Marshal Berwick was rushed to Catalonia, managing to amply supply the garrison of Gerona so that the allies gave up the siege. There would be some minor actions in Catalonia later on with a final great siege of Barcelona, but it was really the end of the great campaigns on the Spanish Front. Felipe V was secure as King of Spain with the great majority of Spaniards behind him. Nevertheless, this triumph would have been impossible without the officers and men of the Sun King's army who had reorganised the Spanish army into a lethal force led by the great commanders that were Berwick and Vendôme.[9]

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[8] *Histoire populaire de la France* (Paris: Germer Baillière, 1882), Vol. 3, pp.333–334; Dussieux, *Les grand généraux de Louis XIV*, pp.356–358.

[9] 'A Royal Dragoon in the War of the Spanish Succession, a contemporary narrative', C.T. Atkinson, ed., *JSAHR*, Special Number 5 (1938), pp.48–50; Depitaval, *Histoire des combats*, pp.63, 69 (puts 11,500 prisoners at Villaviciosa which is too high); Bellerive, *Histoire des dernières campagnes de S.A.R. Mgr le duc de Vendôme* (Paris: Plault, 1715), pp.133–183; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, pp.424–428; Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, p.87; Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army*, pp.136–160; Courcy, *La coalition de 1701 contre la France* (Paris: Plon, 1886), Vol. 1, p.99.

9

Hardships Everywhere for Everyone

The Great Frost of 1709 and Peace Negotiations

The year 1709 opened with a climate change over northern Europe when winter temperatures dropped to previously unseen levels, punctuated by warm periods. It was the coldest winter in 500 years. France was hit especially hard, and as the chronicler of Dieppe related, an effect of the great winter was that it hit townspeople as well as rural areas because the harvest froze and want of food resulted everywhere; in some areas, famine reigned. Even movement was compromised with great amounts of snow blocking streets and roads. Temperatures went down to −17° Celsius in January to the point that wine froze in bottles at Versailles and no doubt elsewhere. Authorities distributed grain from reserves, but bread became scarce. The army had shortages too and ration distributions might be irregular, but something would come and troops did not die of starvation. Some desperate men enlisted in the army just for its bread ration while there were far fewer soldiers deserting their colours.[1]

In France, as elsewhere, many people were becoming weary of the war and this climatic event spurred the various parties to explore ways to stop the conflict. During the spring of 1709 Louis XIV sent the Marquis de Torcy to The Hague; the allies, full of confidence from their victories in Italy and Flanders and from their faulty vision of a France seen as ruined, on the brink of collapse, its armies fatally weakened and the nation's morale at its lowest, retorted with an outlandish draft treaty. They thought their time had come to totally bring down the Sun King by forcing upon him many territorial concessions, including some in France, while giving up Spain amongst its myriad of humiliating conditions in return for peace. On 12 June the King sent out a letter to the nation which was read in every church pulpit, explaining his refusal to agree to these unacceptable demands and concluding that "while my tenderness for my peoples is no less ardent than that which I have for my own children … I am convinced they would oppose having [a peace] so contrary to the justice and the honour of the French people."[2]

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[1] Stéphanie Pain, '1709: The year that Europe froze', *New Scientist*, 4 February 2009; *Mémoires chronologiques pour servir à l'histoire de Dieppe, et à celle de la navigation françoise* (Paris: J. Dubuc, 1785), Vol. 1, p.458.

The country's response was an enormous cry of indignation and vengeance towards the allies. The people understood that it was not just the King that was threatened, but the whole nation. Up until then, the war had been an international political struggle, but now it became a national crusade bringing forth passion and resolve as yet untapped in the heart of every Frenchman and Frenchwoman.



The Duke of Marlborough, early eighteenth century. By 1709, he had revealed himself as undoubtedly the greatest allied tactician and battle commander of the War of the Spanish Succession. At Malplaquet however, he was faced with far better French commanders than those he had previously defeated, which resulted in a tremendously costly victory for his allied army. (Unsigned portrait. St Florient Monastery, Austria. Author's photo).

Senior Command Crisis

The terrible defeats of the French army brought out that its outstanding fault was the high command, both with some of those men who held command in the field and within its centralised pyramidal system nested in Versailles. Decision-making was bogged down by processes that took away responsibility and slowed down and bypassed senior commanders for tactical moves in the field. The French senior generals were now faced with gifted allied tacticians in the persons of Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough. They were certainly not immune from political power and jealousies, as Fortescue ably describes, but they obviously had more freedom in their tactical choices. Perhaps this was due to the fact that their crowned masters were far away in London and Vienna. Although hindered at times, their tactical visions were usually carried out efficiently, and if crowned with success, became geopolitical gains. Yet the armies they led were no better nor worse than the French armies.

Another aspect was that, in previous wars, the French army had a premium of truly remarkable field commanders such as Turenne, Condé, Luxembourg and Catinat, this last giving up his command in 1703 to read philosophy, a sign of the cancer in the command system. The 1675 *Ordre du Tableau* process to regulate and select general officer promotions, imagined by Louvois and Chamlay, had its limits; it could not create nor recognise military genius. And now, the allies had what they never enjoyed before: two generals whose excellence is still lauded.

The autocratic Sun King was the problem and also the solution. For most of his reign, he had selected fine commanders for his armies; now he seemed to have lost that ability, choosing instead to control his generals closely with myriads of instructions while making them ask permission even on minor matters. For some army commanders, this was possibly a good way to keep them from making bad mistakes, but certainly not foolproof as seen by Villeroi's and the Duc d'Orléans' catastrophic performances. There was also a certain favouritism from the King to old childhood friends like Villeroi and to princes of the royal blood who were his grandchildren. He had known his cousin the "Grand Condé" as one of the best generals of his era so he appears to have believed one of his grandchildren would emerge as a great tactician. But the mould had been broken. Although King Felipe V was a good general, he wisely knew his limits. This humility was not to be seen with the dukes of Orléans and of Bourgogne. Nevertheless, they were always assisted by a marshal, as a sort of guardian angel, whose advice they were to seriously consider; those marshals too reported to Versailles. So, on campaign, an army really had two commanders, three when counting the King. The result was that no single commander had real command; this was a recipe for bitter rivalries besides defeats. For instance, Vendôme and the Duc de Bourgogne could not stand each other, neither could Marchin the Duc d'Orléans.

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[2] Quincy, *Histoire militare*, Vol. 6, pp.142–145.

However, Berwick and Vendôme had won notable victories in Spain and Italy, which were too far from Versailles for day-to-day correspondence, so they were somewhat freer to find their own innovative solutions which could be applied rapidly. The other marshal of note was Villars who was proving to be a first class tactician when given the chance. Marshal Boufflers, who had his share of misfortunes, was also a fine soldier who had a heroic streak, but was not quite as talented as Villars, Vendôme and Berwick. After Oudenarde the Sun King loosened up somewhat. For the 1709 campaign he had first thought of putting the Flanders army under his son the Dauphin with Marshal Villars, placing the Duc de Bourgogne with Marshal Harcourt on the Rhine and sending the Duc d'Orléans back to Spain. But none of this actually happened, the royal princes remaining in Versailles. It did not mean that the Sun King stopped sending his advice from Versailles, but this shift produced the right conditions for talented commanders, Villars in particular, to prevail.[3]

Malplaquet 1709: Costly Allied Victory

In June 1709 the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene led an army of about 110,000 men in Flanders, wishing to enter northern France. To counter them the Sun King had departed from his practice of entrusting supreme command to a grandson and had appointed Marshal Villars with Marshal Boufflers as second in command. Their army in Flanders stood at about 90,000 men who, especially in the late spring, suffered serious shortages of bread due to the Great Frost as well as arrears in pay due to a shortage of funds. The allies appear to have been better supplied at that time and were

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[3] Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, p.145 mentions that the princes were not sent to command due to lack of money; we doubt that was the real reason.


Provence
Bretagne
Saintonge
5 pièces
Le Roi
Sparre
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Charost
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Guyenne
Luxembourg
Greder allemand
Gondrin
Tourville
Perrin
Croy
Batterie
Béarn
Champagne
Batterie
Louvigny
Isenghien
Lee
Donington
O'Donnell
O'Brien
Galmoy
Gardes de Cologne et de Bavière
20 pièces
Gardes Suisses
Gardes Françaises
Deslandes
Royal-Roussillon
Picardie
Lannoy
Alsace
Piémont
20 pièces
Royal
Bourgogne
Royal-Italien
Boulonnais
Brendlé
May
Greder Suisse
Piquets
Bourbonnais
6 pièces
Mortemart
Lorraine
Navarre
Nice
Grenadiers
Châteauneuf
La Marck
Foix
Santerre
Perche
Touraine
La Fère
Montroux
Agénois
Malplaquée

Positions of French army units at the outset of the battle of Malplaquet, 11 September 1709. (Map from Sautai's 1904 *La bataille de Malplaquet*. Author's photo)


MALPLAQUET
1709
Armée française
Armée des Alliés
Retranchem.ts français
Echelle
0 1 2 K.
Sars-la-Bruyère
v. Mons
Rieux-de-Bury
Bois de Sars
Blaregnies
Cense de Contournant
la Folie
la Chaussée du Bois
la Louvière
Aulnois
Cense de Blairon
Ch.lle
la Grosse Haie
Camp perdu
M.lin de Taisnières
Malplaquet
Taisnières
Bois de Lanières
l'Hongnau

Plan of the battle of Malplaquet, 11 September 1709. The stronger allied army attacked the French army and eventually overcame its field fortifications, but at a terrible cost. (Private collection. Author's photo)



French and British cavalry battling at Malplaquet, 11 September 1711. This print after R. Caton Woodville gives an idea of the ferocity of cavalry engagements for men and horses, which were especially desperate in this battle. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

eager to take advantage of their superior force. By August the supplies for the French armies, if not perfect, had improved somewhat. In spite of all that, the army's morale was high and it was confident of being well-led by two respected marshals, and the men wanted to avenge past defeats.

Villars had disposed his army on the Lens plain in entrenched positions, to block the allies from besieging Arras or Douai. His main force was hovering in the Béthune and La Bassée area, ready to intercept any allied advance. It has been said that all that Marlborough and Prince Eugene had to do, and sometimes did, was to march between the French lines of fortresses in Flanders to emerge into northern France. That risky manoeuvre might be successful in local movements, but ignoring the neighbouring fortresses on a major and far reaching advance could lead the attacking army to utter disaster and perhaps even annihilation. As it advances, an attacking army is exposed to being outflanked or followed by the defending army; if it penetrates further, it is likely to be intercepted and overwhelmed by increasingly stronger forces closing in on all sides. A good example, although in a different context, is the fate of the British army at Saratoga in 1777. Commanders such as Marlborough and Prince Eugene were most unlikely to fall into such a trap and sought instead to besiege Tournai east of Lille. The defence by the Marquis de Surville and his 6,000 men garrison was vigorous; it took 21 days for the allies to take the city on 29 July, but the troops in its citadel continued to resist until 5 September when the final defenders of Tournai finally capitulated.

The allies then marched further east to lay siege to Mons, but Villars shadowed them moving further south, so Marlborough and Prince Eugene turned southwards and by 9 September, were in the vicinity of each other near the village of Malplaquet. Both sides then regrouped their forces. The allies had about 110,000 men with 120 guns and the French some 75,000 to 80,000 men with 80 guns. At eight in the morning of 11 September the allied troops attacked the French lines, and as is recounted in detail in many histories, the day was spent in heroic charges and countercharges. At about one in the afternoon Marshal Villars was seriously wounded in a knee and had to be evacuated unconscious, Marshal Boufflers taking command. Prince Eugene's head was grazed by a bullet, but he was not seriously affected and remained in the field. The weaker French army was slowly pushed back, but the allies had to fight furiously for every inch of the highly contested field. By mid afternoon both sides were nearly exhausted, and stopped launching assaults on each other; Marshal Boufflers decided to leave the field to avert further casualties and to preserve the army. The retreat, supervised by Boufflers, was very orderly with minimal losses. The allies had suffered grievous losses and did not pursue. The French casualties came to about 11,000, estimates for the allies vary from at least 20,000 casualties. In his report to the King, Villars summed up: "If God has the grace to make us lose a battle such as this one, Your Majesty can be assured that all his enemies will be destroyed."[4]

After this bloodbath, which was the costliest battle of the war, the French army went to Le Quesnois less than 20 km south while the allied army finally took Mons on 20 September. The allies hailed Malplaquet as another triumph by the invincible Marlborough and Prince Eugene, but it had been an expensive victory. Although the French army had been "defeated", its morale was still quite high and confident. It was indeed a turning point. The so-called defeat had hardly been one at all; the allies had been stopped and seriously mauled. Their only gain was the bloodstained battlefield and a couple of fortresses – a far cry from invading France. Victory would yet come. Perhaps, but the mood in the country was also for putting an end to the war.

The King, adopting an attitude that he would, as he put it, "forget glory and submit to the will of God", sent the Abbé de Polignac and Marshal d'Uxelles to the Netherlands in order to negotiate an end to the war. If anything, the inflexibility of the allies had increased with the repeated victories although Malplaquet was actually a moot point. The allied negotiators were now falling in the trap of believing their own propaganda, which made them haughty and intolerant. True, their armies had prevailed over French armies on most fronts although the military situation in Spain was less clear and Felipe V held his own.

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[4] *Mémoires du Maréchal de Villars*, Vol. 3, pp.68–73; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, pp.192–207, according to after battle inspections by Marshal Boufflers, the French has 8,137 casualties, but more would be known later. He also sent 29 colours and three standards to the King; Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, pp.510–525 mentions Villars' army at 95,000 with 12,000 French casualties, 16 guns and 50 colours and standards taken with 500 prisoners. We have relied mainly on the outstanding study with a wealth of supporting documents by Maurice Sautai, *La bataille de Malplaquet* (Paris: Chapelot, 1904) and André Corvisier, 'Le moral des combattants, panique et enthousiasme: Malplaquet, 11 septembre 1709', *Revue Historique des Armées*, 1977, No. 3, pp.7–32; Voltaire, *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, p.360 has the strength of the armies as 70,000 French and 80,000 allies.



The siege of Bouchain, 1711. The allied army led by the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene detached a strong corps under General Fagel which invested the fortress on 7 August. It capitulated on 12 September, the garrison coming out with the honours of war two days later. Print after Jacobus Harrewijn. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. BI-B-FM-075-57)

The allies opted to negotiate his departure from Spain, which would then leave that throne to the Austrian pretender. Swallowing his pride, Louis XIV agreed, as long as Felipe would be granted instead the much smaller Italian kingdom of Naples. The negotiations eventually failed because the allies became overly arrogant. They now sought especially to deeply humiliate the Sun King, and therefore his nation, by demanding not only that his grandson Felipe V be driven out of Spain, but that the French army be employed to carry this out. This excessive demand led de Polignac to end the meetings while responding: "It can be seen, gentlemen, that you are not accustomed to victories." When the Sun King received the dispatches containing these proposals, he made a comment that rallied the whole nation: "Since there must be war, I would rather fight my enemies than my children."[5]

Flanders during 1710–1711

On this front, the allies cherished one objective: invade France. To do so, they had to cross the barrier of fortresses created as an integrated system by Vauban. The best road with the least obstacles from nature was the one that went from Mons to Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, Landrecies and Guise. Mons was already captured, but all the others had to be taken one by one representing an enormous effort, especially Valenciennes reputed to be one of the mightiest fortresses anywhere. Furthermore, allied spies reported that the French army was in a very bad state, even its leather shoes having been taken away and replaced with wooden shoes for the winter, before being given back to the men in the spring of 1710 concluding it to be "in extreme want." Therefore, for the 1710 campaign, the allies concentrated on fortresses further west and captured Douai (25 June), Béthune (29 August), Saint-Venant (29 September) and Aire (9 November). During that time, Villars' army shadowed and harassed the allies, but neither side wished to risk a general engagement. In 1711 the campaigns were interrupted by truces and the only allied gain was Bouchain (13 September). After two years of effort, the allies had only gained a few dozen kilometres in some areas. The French army still held many fortresses and while its field army was less numerous than the allied army, its logistic problems were being solved and it remained quite redoubtable.[6]

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[5] Quoted in Henri Bordier and Édouard Charton, *Histoire depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Magasin Pittoresque, 1888), Vol. 2, p.304.

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[6] 'The Manuscripts of the Marquess Townshend', *Historical Manuscripts Commission*, Eleventh Report, Appendix, Part IV (London, 1887), p.62. The wooden shoes are surprising, but might have been issued to save the leather shoes for the mild seasons. In winter the populace in rural areas wore them because they were solid and thus waterproof and warm. Many soldiers would have been familiar with them, coming from rural communities.

10

The 1712 Climax

Mourning in Versailles

The Sun King's son, the Grand Dauphin, had passed away on 14 April 1711 at age 50, but the succession to the throne was assured by his eldest son (the King's grandson), the Duc de Bourgogne, who now became the Dauphin. Then on 12 February 1712 his wife, the very popular Marie-Adelaïde de Savoie, died in her 26th year and was followed by the 30-year-old Dauphin a few days later. They had two young sons and the eldest, aged five, passed away on 8 March. A smallpox epidemic had hit the royal residences, and the question of succession became very worrying. The boy's two-year-old younger brother came close to death, but survived and would become Louis XV. Needless to add that the Sun King was crushed with obvious grief while maintaining admirable stoicism. The mood of the nation was sombre.

All these royal tragedies coupled with the hardship of many people made the most pessimistic wonder if the end of the reign might not see the armies suffer more calamities than all the grandeur and glory won under the Sun King. Indeed, news that the Duc de Vendôme had passed away on 11 June 1712 in Spain was yet another dark shadow; he had been one of the nation's finest military commanders. But through it all, Louis XIV stood confidently, firm as rock.

Britain Leaves Continental Europe

Since the 1670s, and especially from 1688–1689 when the Prince of Orange had become King William III of Great Britain, the island nation had been linked with those nations of Continental Europe that waged a near-crusade against the Sun King's France. Whilst the size of the British expeditionary corps was respectable, it could have never operated alone without the troops contributed by its allies, in particular those of the Holy Roman Empire. The British Royal Navy further mobilised many men who manned the Grand Alliance's largest fleet followed by the Dutch navy, but both these naval forces could not be said to largely dominate the still very powerful French navy whose squadrons spread havoc as far as the British West Indies and even Brazil. And navies were of little use in land operations on various fronts. Britain's other large contribution was not in soldiers, but in



Charles VI, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Hungary, early eighteenth century. In 1711 he was the Habsburg King Carlos III of Spain until his older brother died on 17 April. He thus became Holy Roman Emperor in Vienna, which must have come as a relief because the allied forces were being defeated by the Hispano-French armies of Felipe V, who was becoming the real king of Spain. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

money, lots of it. London was the outstanding money market of the alliance and its subsidies were critical for many Continental states to keep troops on a war footing. In 1706 for instance, the King of Denmark would receive £37,500, "the King of Portugal for … 13,000 men £150,000", the Duke of Savoy £160,000, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel £5,952 7s 6d, the Elector of Treves £5,952 7s 6d, the Elector Palatin £4,761 18s 6d and the King of Prussia £50,000. Total: £414,166 13s 6d. And this is only a partial list, for there were other hefty sums paid to, notably, the Austrian emperor as well as the Grand Alliance's Spanish pretender amongst others.[1]

Politically, Scotland had been merged with England by the 1707 Act of Union which secured complete free trade. Perhaps, even as Marlborough's victories were piling up on the Continent, this with other matters going on locally encouraged a gradual change of mood from Queen Anne which increasingly privileged matters seen as urgent at home rather than abroad. Britain was, by then, a nascent but effective parliamentary democracy with two political parties, the Tories and the Whigs. The Duchess of Marlborough had been for some years the Queen's most intimate friend and counsellor while the Earl of Godolphin was in charge of affairs at home, which included the Treasury. The Duchess's husband, the Duke of Marlborough, had even said that he would not command the army unless Lord Godolphin controlled the Treasury to keep money flowing for the war. The October 1710 elections changed all that. The Tories, who wanted Britain to withdraw from the war, were now in power with a great majority and the Whigs now sat as the opposition. There had been increasing concern about the nation's seemingly huge spending on the war; now the new Chancellor of the Exchequer saw ominous Treasury figures. He could not then know what we know now: Britain's enormous debt was, in proportion, greater than that of France. Another factor was the death of Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I on 17 April 1711; he was succeeded by his brother Charles (Carlos), heretofore pretender to the Spanish throne, who vowed to go on fighting. But realistically, the main reasons for Britain to be in the war thus vanished, especially after the utter defeats at Brihuega and Villaviciosa.

In the royal palace, Queen Anne had seen the mood of her people, who now agreed with her own; she had become weary of her politicking best friend, along with her battlefield husband, and both were dismissed in December 1711. The Duke of Marlborough was replaced by the Duke of Ormonde as commander-in-chief, "a thoroughly mediocre officer" according to Fortescue, while Marshal Villars in 1712 thought he was "a man of great courage". It must be remembered that Lord Ormonde was sent to Flanders in March 1712, but not to fight on; his thankless task was to suspend hostilities with the French armies and evacuate the British army while telling the allies that no more subsidies would be paid to maintain some of the Grand Alliance troops in the field. Lord Ormonde may have been mediocre, but who would rejoice at such a task? Certainly, the British troops in Flanders did not.[2]

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[1] TNA, T1/100, An account of Her Majesties Proportion of Subsidies payable to the Allies pursuant to the Treaties for the year 1706; C.T. Atkinson, "The Cost of Queen Anne's War", *JSAHR*, XXXIII (1955), pp. 174–183.

In Flanders, Prince Eugene had been appraised that Queen Anne's government was now in serious negotiation with Versailles, whose representatives were meeting in Utrecht to agree to a truce. He thus wanted to attack the French army at once with British troops; if a decisive victory was gained, it could likely put a stop to the negotiations. The Duke of Ormonde flatly refused such a project since it was contrary to his government's wishes to get out of the war. This frustrated the grand dream of the allies, a chance to occupy northern France and even reach for the unthinkable prize: Paris.

Instead the Grand Alliance was nearly shattered by the departure of one of its most powerful nations. Portugal found itself marooned to face its now more powerful Spanish neighbour and would eventually negotiate a truce. So, in Flanders, Austrian and German troops would go on fighting. The other Germanic auxiliaries previously paid by Britain did not depart and joined the Austrians and Dutch. During July, British troops on various fronts left their comrades of many battles. Fortescue poignantly described the departure of the 18,000-man British contingent:

> The parting was one of the most remarkable scenes ever witnessed. The British fell in, silent, shamefaced, and miserable; the [allied] auxiliaries gathered in knots opposite to them, and both parties gazed at each other mournfully without saying a word. The drums beat the march and regiment after regiment tramped away with full hearts and downcast eyes, till at length the whole column was under way, and the mass of scarlet grew slowly less and less till it vanished out of sight.[3]

The Fighting Goes On

By early 1712 France was nearly exhausted, but so were her remaining enemies. The King and his ministers with just about anyone in the military managed to muster and finance yet another large army to face the remaining allied foes in Flanders. Nor was Flanders the only worry. The French army needed support and money was found not only for that force, but also to reinforce and subsidise the Spanish army. The issue depended on not only mustering more men and finding yet more riches, but on whether the French nation remained united as a people and had the spirit and will to fight on under the leadership of the Sun King. The answer was still a resounding yes! No Frenchman, from the King to the poorest peasant, could bear the thought of defeat and foreign occupation. Louis XIV was not always popular, but who could deny that he had raised France to be the leading nation in Europe in all matters, not only military, and had brought it what its inhabitants yearned for: pride and *la gloire*.

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[2] *Mémoires du maréchal de Villars*, Vol. 3, p.142; Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, p.551.

[3] Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, Vol. 1, p.550.

The army knew that all was not lost just yet, no matter what naysayers might utter. It had suffered terrible defeats, but new commanders were gaining ground. The richest nation in Europe could certainly still muster the means to finance war efforts, which was clearly less the case with its enemies. Perhaps most of all, the country still had an untapped military force: its bourgeois and coast guard militias, a body of troops numbering hundreds of thousands of men that was already organised, armed and often uniformed. This reserve was and remains perhaps one of the least-known topics of the Sun King's armies, yet we are certain its very existence weighed in the minds of military planners on both sides.

The Flanders Front

The first moves were made by Dutch army General Arnold Joost van Keppel, 1st Earl Albemarle on the allied side. Two years earlier Aire, Saint-Venant, Béthune and Douai had been captured by the allies and this last made a fine base to attack Arras. However, Lord Albemarle knew that Arras had extensive fortifications and that some French relief would come, so a major siege was not sought. The French defences were too strong, but a raid to destroy magazines at Arras by bombarding the town would hinder considerably the reserve of supplies for the French field army in Flanders. As it was, Arras had a very large quantity of hay and foodstuff for the whole French cavalry. Destroying these would fatally affect the campaign operations of the French army for 1712.

On 1 March 1712 Lord Albemarle left Douai at the head of about 25,000 men, was within sight of Arras the next day and immediately built two batteries, one of cannons and the other for mortars. The city's governor, Marshal Pierre de Montesquieu, Comte d'Artagnan, mobilised the garrison and the town's militia. He correctly believed that the enemy might be more interested in the destruction of supplies so he mustered everyone to immediately carry especially the very flammable hay to safer places while having water buckets everywhere to extinguish fires. He simultaneously sent out some elite detachments to hinder the allied troops, who after a sharp skirmish withdrew from a forward position. From about five in the afternoon, the allied artillery fired red-hot shot and mortar bombs. That evening, Albemarle and his men could see fires in the city. The next morning the allies departed believing that they had destroyed all the hay after firing 250 bombs and 100 fire pots. In fact, only about a quarter of the hay was destroyed, which was certainly not disastrous. Otherwise, just seven or eight houses were damaged.[4]

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[4] Achmet Héricourt, *Les sieges d'Arras* (Arras: Topino, 1844), pp.305–311.



The bombardment of Arras, 2 and 3 March 1712. Print after Pieter van Vall. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-AO-19-7)


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Plan of the fortress of Le Quesnoy, 1712. This fortress was taken by an allied army under Prince Eugene on 4 July 1712, and after his victory at Denain Marshal Villars recaptured Le Quesnoy on 4 October. Print after Pieter Schenk. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.353)



A downcast Sun King entrust France's last large army to Marshal Villars in 1712. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Denain: the War's Decisive Battle

Marshal Villars was given command of this "last army" and, before the marshal left to join it, Louis XIV spoke to Villars in such a way that the rays of the old Sun King were again as ardent as they had been half a century earlier:

> I do not expect that the enemy army will come near Paris, which it could possibly do, if mine was beaten. I know, marshal, that such large armies are never so utterly defeated that the greatest part of mine could not retreat to the Somme [River]. I know that river; it is very difficult to cross. There are places [there] that can be rendered good [with defences] and I would go to Peronne or to Saint-Quentin to gather all troops that I have, make a last effort with you, and perish together or save the nation; because I will never consent that the enemy approach my capital.[5]

Villars then went to join his army of about 95,000 to 100,000 men in late April. On 25 May he received a secret dispatch from the King advising him that British troops had been instructed to remain neutral against the French army. The allied army still had "over one hundred thousand men" according to Prince Eugene. It may have been as many as 120,000 and 120

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[5] *Mémoires du maréchal de Villars*, Vol. 3, pp.138–139. This has also been reported as: "If you should be unfortunate [as to be defeated], write this news to only myself. I will mount my horse, pass by Paris, your dispatch in my hand. I know Frenchmen: I will bring to you 200,000 men and we will either all perish together, or we will save France."


Marchiennes
la Scarpe
FORÊT DE VICOIGNE
Escaut
DOUAI
Somain
VALENCIENNES
Escaudain
Denain
Camp retranché
Prouvy
Neuville
Douchy
Thiant
Bouchain
Noyelles
la Rhonelle
Quérenaing
Arleux
l'Écaillon
Etrun
Haspres
Bermerain
la Sensée
Avesnes-le-Sec
le Quesnoy
Marche des Français sur Denain
Villers
la Selle
Poix
FORÊT DE MORMAL
Escaut
Solesmes
CAMBRAI
Landrecies
Beaumont
Cateau-Cambrésis
Fémy
Catillon
Mazinghien

Plan of the French army's march to the area of Denain in July 1712. (Private collection. Author's photo)

guns. Villars disposed his troops in a line to cover Arras and Cambrai. With Marlborough being recalled followed by Ormonde's refusal to commit British troops further, Prince Eugene had to temporarily give up his plan to invade northern France; instead, he resorted again to siege operations and besieged Le Quesnoy which capitulated on 4 July. Two weeks later his army invested Landrecies and that fortress was unlikely to resist many weeks. If it fell, a breach in the line of fortresses would be made wide enough to allow Prince Eugene to advance into northern France. Villars knew that, as did the King in Versailles; yet engaging his inferior army against Prince Eugene's could result in an utter defeat, allowing the allies to pour into France. So Villars had to battle Prince Eugene and win; the question was how.

Prince Eugene's army supplies for the siege of Landrecies were at Marchiennes. To secure the road, with had been nicknamed the "Paris Road" by the confident allied soldiers, he had a large entrenched camp built at the hamlet of Denain situated about halfway between the two fortresses; the road was flanked by a double line of field entrenchments between Denain and Landrecies. This camp was immediately spotted by French scouts and revealed as a possible flaw by


Bois de St Amand
Fenain
Hornaing
Aubry
Herin
Erre
Helesme
Haveluy
Somain
Chemin de Paris
Valenciennes 10K
Wavrechain
Rouvigny
Abscon
Escaudin
DENAIN
Prouvy
Lourches
Mastaing
Neuville
Rœulx
Douchy
Thiant
Escaut
Valenciennes
Noyelle
Monchaux
Bouchain
Sensée
Cambrai
DENAIN
1712
Français
Alliés
Retranchemts alliés
Echelle
0 1 2 3K.

Plan of Denain and its immediate vicinity, 24 July 1712. Villars and his army seemed to be marching to Marchiennes when having crossed the Scheldt (Escaut) River, they suddenly turned around completely and assaulted Denain (see also the colour print). (Private collection. Author's photo)

planners in Versailles, who saw it as a way to save Landrecies by cutting off Prince Eugene from his supplies. But naturally he had left a fairly strong force of 10 mostly Dutch infantry battalions and 23 cavalry squadrons to keep Denain secure. Prince Eugene confidently thought the French would march against his main army to engage him; with superior numbers, he would crush the French army. Villars had correctly perceived this to be the hope of the allies, and to lure them had his troops build bridges across the Sambre River and staged movements there. Prince Eugene took the bait and now moved most of his army to the Sambre, confident that Villars was falling into his trap.

Instead, Villars marched his troops as fast as possible past Cateau-Cambrésis, going towards Marchiennes in the late night and early morning of 24 July. Rather than marching to the relief of Landrecies, Villars was speedily moving away from it. Apprised of this, Prince Eugene observed the French army somewhat dumbfounded at what Villars was up to until 11 in the morning. He then gave up guessing and retired for lunch with his staff officers. They had hardly sat down when word came from Lord Albemarle commanding at Denain that the French were crossing the narrow Scheldt







Left: The capture of Douai by Marshal Villars, 8 September 1712. Villars, shown at the centre, is with Marshal de Montesquieu (right) and, in the background looking through a spyglass, Chief Engineer de Valory. The uniforms worn by the infantrymen at right show the changes in fashion. There were far fewer buttons and queues with hair bags now also seen. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Facing page, top: French infantry storm the allied field works at Denain, 24 July 1712. Print after Philippoteaux. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Facing page, bottom: Jean, Marquis de Gassion charging with his Navarre infantry brigade at the battle of Denain, 24 July 1712. Print after Jean Alaux 1839 painting. (Private collection. Author's photo)

(Escaut) River and seemed to prepare to attack. This was critical because the 10 battalions were thinly disposed to cover the extensive field fortifications at Denain. Prince Eugene gave orders for seven battalions at nearby Thiant to reinforce the battalions at Denain, and repositioning the 23 cavalry squadrons as a reserve on the right bank of the Scheldt. He then mounted and galloped towards Denain. His army followed, leaving its trenches at Landrecies, but it was at least 12 km from Denain.

At first Villars' army seemed to march past Denain, but forming into an assault formation it veered right and made a "u-turn", charging into the allied entrenchments. The assault force's first line consisted of 40 battalions divided into 14 columns (or brigades, of which 12 had three battalions and two had two battalions) each at intervals of 25 feet from each other, grenadiers at the head of each column. These were followed by a second line of two brigades of six battalions, each for a total of 52 battalions or about 26,000 men. Villars and his officers charged with their men. At 50 paces the allies fired a volley and again at 20 paces, but the French never wavered, "went into the ditch and took the entrenchment with great valour". The assault was furious and determined, the French broke through and ran into the camp shooting and slashing at now panicked enemy soldiers. Villars charged in too and came up to "the Duke of Albemarle with six or seven of the emperor's lieutenant generals at the hooves of my horse. I apologised because pressing matters did not permit me to have all the politeness I owed them, but the first [matter] was to ensure the safety of



Left: Dutch army General Arnold Joost van Keppel, 1st Earl Albemarle (1670–1718). He was the unfortunate officer in command at Denain where he was captured. A favourite of King William III, he held commands in both the Dutch and British armies and was made Earl Albemarle in 1697. He served in the Dutch army after William's death and was present at the battles of Ramillies and Oudenarde, and the sieges of Lille and Aire. Copy after a *c.*1697 portrait by G. Kneller. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. SK-A-1493)

Right: Marshal Louis Hector, Duc de Villars, *c.*1710. Print after H. Rigaud. (Private collection. Author's photo)



their persons." Villars and his men followed the fleeing allies. They ran out of the camp onto the rickety wooden bridges over the Scheldt which, commented Villars, "unfortunately for them" collapsed plunging many into its waters while others, crazed with fear, tried to swim across.[6]

At that point, forward elements of Prince Eugene's army were at last approaching and tried several times to cross the Scheldt, but were always repulsed suffering some 700 casualties. A note by Denain's parish priest, Father Pelletier, mentioned that "the allies had lost 15 battalions [7,000 men] or about, of which the largest number drowned in the river with Count Do[h] nat, crossing the enemy bridges; and My lord Albemarle was taken prisoner by a private soldier and taken to Valenciennes by order of M. de Villars, general of the French army." The French army had about 2,000 casualties. Over 60 colours were taken.[7]

It was an amazing manoeuvre that Marshal de Saxe, the greatest commander of Louis XV's reign, later commented: "Villars would have lost if Prince Eugene had marched to him when he exposed his flank while crossing the river; [but] he [Prince Eugene]could never imagine that such a manoeuvre would be made under his nose." For his part, Prince Eugene admitted he had been "deceived by the manoeuvre of Villars" and that putting 20 battalions more in Denain would not have changed the French army's success. He blamed the "cowardice of the Dutch" for not "maintaining themselves half an hour in the post of Denain" which would have given him time to arrive with his army. Most of all, the "two faults which I committed were" to have chosen Denain because of Dutch insistence to keep the magazines at Marchiennes rather than Le Quesnoy, which was closer, and to garrison Denain with Dutch battalions for "a post of such importance" when the "flower" of the Dutch army had "perished at Malplaquet."[8]

Villars rapidly followed up the disarray of the allied army. French troops in Valenciennes and other garrisons westwards joined his army. Insofar as local strategy was concerned, the allies were totally taken off balance by Villars' unexpected triumph. And now he was coming after them with a reinforced army. On 26 July, all the allied posts along the Scarpe River were taken, as was Marchiennes on 30 July. Prince Eugene gave up the siege of Landrecies on 2 August. Nearby Saint-Amand fell also. In a succession of sieges, Villars presided over the capitulations of Douai on 8 September, Le Quesnoy on 4 October and Bouchain on 19 October.

The battle of Denain gained an importance far beyond the scope of the actual engagement. It struck the allies like a thunderbolt. For all their previous victories and all the rumours that Louis XIV's nation was collapsing, they now had to face reality: France was still a very potent and great power that – and this was demoralising to the allies – rose from its imagined ashes, that is, imagined by their propaganda, to continue the struggle.

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[6] Maurice Sautai, *La Manoeuvre de Denain* (Lille: Lefebvre-Ducrocq, 1902); *Mémoires du maréchal de Villars*, Vol. 3, pp.156–158

[7] 'Note du régiststre des naissances de Denain', *Archives historiques et littéraires de nord de la France et du Midi de la Belgique* (Valenciennes: Bureau des Archives, 1852), Vol. 3, pp.217–218. This note was inserted in the birth register and also mentioned that the allied troops had arrived in the village 'on 24 May, during the siege of Le Quesnoy and remained until beaten by the French, which happened on 24 July at 11 in the morning.' Count Dohnat was the allied governor of Mons.

[8] Saxe quoted in Paul Lacroix, *L'Armée depuis le Moyen-Age jusqu'à la Revolution* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, *c.*1890), pp.278–279; *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy*, pp.149, 152, 154.

In France, the nation's morale shot up, and as other victories enhanced that of Denain it was clear that the French army was still a very lethal fighting force with, at last, fine commanders. Most of all the French soldier, that feisty individual, was, thanks to suddenly excellent morale not seen for years in the French army, more than willing to fight like the very devil to gain a *Victoire!* It looked within reach, especially since *les Anglais* – the hereditary enemy that had even burned Saint Joan of Arc – were already out of the war thanks to its greedy political schemes.

11

The German Front and the End of the War of the Spanish Succession

Following the battle of Blenheim the French strategy was to contain the allies from invading Alsace and Lorraine, which if successful would lead them into central France. In May 1706 Marshal Villars and General Peri took Drusenheim, Hagenau and Spire, and in May 1707 Villars crossed the allied lines at the Black Forest, beat an allied army at Stollhofen taking 166 guns, went on to Rastatt (often spelt Radstadt) and part of Württemberg. But allied troops under George, Elector of Hannover (the future George I of Great Britain) beat French General de Vivant, which compelled Villars to withdraw across the Rhine. In 1709, an allied army under Count Merci entered Alsace but was defeated with heavy losses on 26 August at Rumersheim by the Comte du Bourg. Thereafter, the region was generally quiet.

The treaties signed at Utrecht from 29 January 1713 officially ended hostilities with Great Britain, the Netherlands, Prussia, Portugal and Piémont. By the summer only the Holy Roman Empire was still at war with France. The French army first secured its territories in Flanders and then, led by Marshal Villars, marched into the German Rhineland taking Spire, Worms, the fortress of Landau after a gallant defence by Prince Alexander of Württemberg, the Breisgau lines and the city and citadel of Fribourg. Prince Eugene was now convinced that, without Great Britain, Prussia and the Netherlands, Austria and the small German states could never prevail and win the war against France. Emperor Charles VI reluctantly agreed and asked Prince Eugene to meet Villars to negotiate a truce. They met on 26 November 1713 at Rastatt. The formal peace treaty was finally signed there on 6 March 1714.[1]

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[1] Voltaire, *Le siècle de Louis XIV*, p.384.



Marshal Villars and Prince Eugene meet at Rastatt to negotiate peace on 26 November 1713. When they met, according to what a witness told Voltaire, Villars opened the dialogue with Prince Eugene saying: "Sir, we are not enemies; your enemies are in Vienna and mine are in Versailles." The formal peace treaty was finally signed on 6 March 1714. Print after Philippoteaux. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Portugal and Catalonia 1711–1714

Oddly enough, the struggle for Spanish Succession went on *after* the withdrawal of Britain from the Grand Alliance and the Treaties of Utrecht. This left Portugal still at war with Spain in 1711. The British troops in that country were repatriated too and the subsidies dried up. In a dubious move to gain some advantages for future peace negotiations, a Spanish army under the Marquis de Bay in Estramadura crossed the border in September 1711 to besiege the fortress of Campo Mayor, which had a modest garrison of about 1,000 men. Certainly too confident about the outcome, the Spanish did not even complete their lines of circumvolution around the fortress – this being a "disgraceful" omission in Clonard's correct opinion – and built batteries to batter down the curtain walls in the wrong places, so that when a breach was made it was next to impossible to assault by the Spanish troops who, although very brave, were repulsed by the Portuguese. The siege was raised in October, finally ending the war in that part of Iberia.[2]

Barcelona 1714

Catalonia was the only part of Spain remaining loyal to the Great Alliance's Carlos III as King. But he had become Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI following the death of his brother in 1711. The peace treaty of Utrecht in 1713 provided for the evacuation of Catalonia by allied troops. Felipe V's government wishing to assert its authority over Catalonia ran into some armed resistance in 1713. Meanwhile Field Marshal Starhemberg gave up his title of viceroy and evacuated the remaining allied troops and dependents from Barcelona, as instructed by Vienna, during June and early July 1713. The countryside bowed to the inevitable, but in heavily fortified Barcelona the whole population was determined to resist. What was really sought was an independent status for Catalonia. Having a newly independent and rather hostile Catalan nation which would surely be an entry point to enemy armies in a future conflict was of course out of the question for Felipe V's government, as well as for most Spaniards and also the French government. The allied nations did not wish to continue the war, and remained neutral. By

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[2] Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.104–105; Selvagem, *Portugal militar*, p.463.



Troops assault two bastions of Barcelona's fortifications that have been successfully breached by mines on 11 September 1714. The French and Spanish soldiers broke into the city, and after some street fighting the defenders surrendered. This was the final episode of the siege, which from July 1714 was led by Marshal Berwick with 40,000 Spanish and French troops. Print after Jacques Rigaud. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

25 July 1713, Barcelona was surrounded by a 20,000-man Spanish army, but it became clear that it could not take the city by force of arms. All negotiations failed between the Spanish government and the Catalan government in Barcelona; by the spring of 1714 it was clear to both the Spanish and French governments that the only recourse left was military action.[3]

In 1714, French army reinforcements were sent to join the Spanish surrounding Barcelona, and Marshal Berwick took over the command of siege operations. He arrived on 7 July to join some 50 French army battalions, 20 Spanish and 51 cavalry squadrons amounting to about 40,000 men, half of them French. There were also 30 battalions and 38 squadrons posted at Gerona, Tarragona and other places in Catalonia "to contain the Miquelets". The artillery train of the Hispano-French army surrounding Barcelona consisted of 87 heavy calibre cannons (including 20 36-pdrs) and 33 mortars. The garrison of Barcelona consisted of about 16,000 men according to Berwick. The trench was opened on 12 July followed by a repulsed sortie the next day. On 25 July the batteries started bombarding night and day. An assault failed on 30 August but succeeded on 11 September, during which General Villarroel, commander of the garrison, was wounded and the city surrendered. It was a bloody siege: 10,000 French and Spanish soldiers and 6,000 defenders were casualties according to Berwick. The ancient local Catalan government was abolished with all its laws and replaced by a new government which ruled under the laws of Castile. We add that, to this day, 11 September is commemorated as the National Day of Catalonia.[4]

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[3] Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.105–107; Arneth, *Das Lebendes kaiserlichen Feldmarschall Guido von* Starhemberg, pp.753–754. The Imperial regiments Battée Dragoon, Baubonne Dragoon, and several infantry regiments are mentioned as also Dutch, Spanish and Italian soldiers on 26 June 1713. Starhemberg had also mentioned in 1712 some 400 invalid soldiers in Barcelona. Allied troops were also evacuated from Tarragona and the islands of Iviça and Majorca. Minorca and Gibraltar remained British as per the Treaty of Utrecht.

[4] *Mémoires du maréchal de Berwick*, chapter VI; Tricaud de Belmont, *Histoire de la dernière révolte des Catalans et du siège de Barcelonne* (Lyon: T. Amaurly, 1714) is an essential detailed account of


Christiana
Nystadt
Abo
Aland Is.
Helsingfors
Viborg
Carelia
Lake Onega
Lake Ladoga
Upsala
Stockholm
Fredrickshald
Venern
Gulf of Finland
Narva
Petrograd
Ingria
Reval
Esthonia
Dago
Oesel
Baltic Sea
Dorpat
Peipus L.
Pskov
Novgorod
Volga R.
Kalmar
Gotland
Öland
Latvia
Riga
Courland
Tver
Nizhni
Halland
Skane
Lund
Bornholm
Copenhagen
Duna R.
Moscow
Russ
Danzig
Pomerania
Wismar
Stettin
Königsberg
West Prussia
Vilna
Grodno
Smolensk
Ryazan
Mohilev
Brandenburg
Berlin
Thorn
Kingdom of Poland
Lithuania
Posen
Pultusk
Warsaw
Brest-Litovsk
Breslau
Silesia
Oder R.
Saxony
Roman Empire
Prague
Bohemia
Klissow
Lublin
Chernigov
Voronesh
Cracow
Kiev
Lemberg
Dniester
Podolia
Bug
Dnieper
Poltowa
Don
Austria
Vienna
Possessions
Hungary
Budapest
Austrian 1699
Transylvania
Turkish Dominion
Moldavia
Bessarabia
Pruth
Bender
Cherkask
Azov
Banat
Belgrade
Wallachia
Crimea
Black Sea
Greenwich
15°
20°
30°
35°
40°

Map of eastern Europe, early eighteenth century. The Great Northern War was fought over wide expanses of Poland, the then Swedish Baltic coast and western Russia. The turning point came with the 1709 Russian victory at Poltava followed by the invasion and annexation of the Baltic coast. In the south, the Russians were humbled by Ottoman Turks in 1711, who in turn were defeated by Austrian armies at Belgrade and in Transylvania in 1717. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Eastern Consequences

While western European nations tore each other apart both at home and in their respective overseas empires, northern European nations were also at war. The most intense struggle was the Great Northern War, which raged from 1700.

On the emergence of Russia, which occurred in the later part of the Sun King's reign, the French historian Pierre Daniel Huet (1630–1721) wrote: "If there rises amongst them one day a wise prince that, recognising their faulty policies, would correct them … this nation would become formidable to all its neighbours." The advent of Tsar Peter I certainly fulfilled that prophecy. His reign catapulted Russia into becoming a major European power within a quarter century, as is universally known, and his instrument was creating a very numerous 220,000 men state-of-the-art modern army by very largely

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the siege; Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.107–113.



Peter the Great and his staff at the battle of Poltava, 8 July (27 June Old Style) 1709. Tsar Peter the Great's Russian army of 75,000 men won a decisive victory over Swedish King Charles XII force of 30,000 men, which confirmed Russia as a major European power. Green was selected as the basic colour of uniforms for the modernised Russian army, its arms and organisation largely copied from the Sun King's army. (Ceiling fresco at the Hermitage State Museum, St Petersburg. Author's photo)

adopting countless features that had been brought into Louis XIV's army. The Tsar's army went to war against Sweden, the predominant power in the Baltic and large areas of eastern Europe whose army also had French-inspired features, but could not depend on as a large population as its opponent. Its army rose to about 110,000 men, an unsustainable proportion. King Charles XII was certainly a worthy opponent to Peter "the Great" until the Russians crushed his army at Poltava on 11 July 1709. In the following years, Russian armies occupied and eventually annexed the Swedish territories on the south-eastern shores of the Baltic Sea up to Finland.[5]

The Ottoman Equation, which had not been very effective since the 1690s, made a short comeback when Turkey declared war on Russia in 1710 and a Russian army was defeated at Prut causing the Ottoman Turks to retake Azov. In 1714 they had eyes on Malta, but changed their mind when the Sun King made it known that he was opposed to such a project. They then went to war against

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[5] Huet quoted in *Nouvel abrégé chronologique de l'histoire de France* (Paris, 1749), p.597; André Corvisier, *Armées et sociétés en Europe de 1494 à 1789* (Paris: PUF, 1976), p.126, the Russian ratio for its 14 million population was one to 64 while Sweden only had 1,400,000 souls. Interested readers will wish to consult the fine recent studies *The Swedish Army in the Great Northern War 1700–21* and *The Russian Army in the Great Northern War 1700–21*, both published by Helion & Company in 2018.



Left: the castle of Viborg. In the early eighteenth century, this Swedish eastern bastion was only some 90 miles (145 km) west of Peter the Great's new Russian imperial capital of St. Petersburg. Viborg's impressive mid-sixteenth-century tower accommodated artillery. After the Swedish army was crushed at Poltava it was besieged by the Russian army and surrendered on 13 June 1710, ending over half a millennium of Swedish rule in what was called "Old Finland". (Author's photo)

Right: the Ottoman Turks surrender Belgrade to Prince Eugene's Austrian army, 1717. The Austrian officer in the foreground is likely to be Prince Eugene. He is shown wearing a white coat with blue cuffs, lining, waistcoat, breeches and stockings, gold lace and buttons, red plume edging the hat. The Ottoman officers are depicted in typical oriental dress. Officers behind Prince Eugene have a red coat with blue cuffs and lining and a grey coat with red lining and waistcoat. (Mural at the St Florient Monastery, Austria. Author's photo)




NORTH SEA
ENG.
DUTCH NETHERLANDS
SP. NETHERLANDS
Rhine R.
Meuse R.
VERDUN (1552, 1648)
METZ (1552, 1648)
TOUL (1552, 1648)
ALSACE (1648)
Paris
Seine R.
Loire R.
FRANCE
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
Lyons
Rhone R.
Marseilles
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SPAIN
MILES
0
50
100
5°
50°
45°
NORTH SEA
ENG.
DUTCH NETHERLANDS
AUS. NETHERLANDS
(1659-1678)
Rhine R.
Meuse R.
Paris
Seine R.
LORRAINE
(1766)
ALSACE (1697)
FRANCHE COMTE (1678)
SWITZ.
Loire R.
FRANCE
Lyons
Rhone R.
Marseilles
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SPAIN
MILES
0
50
100
5°
50°
45°

1648 **1789**

Maps of eastern France from 1648 to 1789. As can be seen, territorial expansion occurred nearly entirely between 1659 and 1687. The Duchy of Lorraine was already a French satellite state until annexed in 1766. (Private collection. Author's photo)




Maurice Leloir

Facing page:

Top: the Sun King looking at the sun's eclipse on the morning of Friday 3 May 1715. For the event, Louis XIV with some courtiers was at the country palace of Marly. It was watched with the guidance of astronomer Jacques Casini, shown holding the Sun King's hand telescope. It was later named Halley's Eclipse in homage to British astronomer Edmund Halley, who had scientifically predicted its advent. For the increasingly sickly Sun King, it was also seen as a foreboding of his passing. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Bottom: Louis XIV blesses the future Louis XV, 1715. Shortly before his death, on 26 August, the Sun King asked to see five-year-old Prince Louis, the Dauphin and heir to the throne. After speaking to him he embraced the young prince, and raising his arms to Heaven, blessed him. Only Madame de Maintenon and a few personal servants were present. The Sun King passed away on 1 September. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Venice and Turkish troops invaded and occupied the Venetian-held territories of the Morea in Greece in 1715. By then, the wars had ended in western Europe. Austria was now more powerful with a large, well-led and battle-tested army that could now be fully deployed to protect and expand the empire's eastern frontiers. In early 1716, invoking an alliance with Venice, Austria declared war on Turkey. Prince Eugene at the head of an Austrian army crushed an Ottoman army at Varadin and took Belgrade in August 1717 while Austrian troops further secured Transylvania and Wallachia. The 1718 peace treaty definitely ended the Ottoman Equation which, since the 1660s, had always been a factor in French military strategic planning. Never again could the Ottoman Turks penetrate so far into Austrian dominions to threaten its capital.[6]

The Last Years of the Sun King

Thanks to Britain's withdrawal and especially to the battle of Denain, France was coming out rather well from the War of the Spanish Succession. The Sun King's main objective, Felipe V as King of Spain and the Indies, had been secured. During his reign, the provinces of Alsace, Artois, Roussillon, Flanders and Franche-Comté had been added as well as Lorraine. Fledgling overseas territories were expanding. The regiments were largely disbanding or reducing their strength, but not completely; the French army's peacetime strength came to 133,000 men in 1715. On the morning of Friday 3 May 1715, the Sun King watched the sun's eclipse, which plunged northern Europe into several hours of darkness. The sun's rays appeared again, but to many, it could be seen as an omen to the passing of the increasingly sickly Louis XIV.

On 26 August, after dining in bed, the Sun King appointed Marshal Villeroi as governor of the Dauphin. Madame de Ventadour, his governess, then brought the five-year-old child to him in the presence of Madame de Maintenon and a few privileged servants. He then spoke to the Dauphin:

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[6] Virginia H. Aksan, *Ottoman Wars 1700–1870 An Empire Besieged* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2007), pp.89–102; *Histoire de la guerre de Hongrie pendant les campagnes de 1716, 1717 et 1718* (Vienna: Graeffer, 1788).

> My dear child, you will soon be King of a great kingdom. Never forget the obligations you have before God; remember that you owe him everything that you are. Try to remain at peace with your neighbours. I have loved making war too much; do not imitate me in that regard, nor in the great spending that I made. Seek council on all matters. Relieve the burdens of your people as soon as you can, and do what I had the misfortune not to be able to accomplish myself.[7]

On 1 September 1715, at eight fifteen in the morning, Louis XIV passed away at 77 years of age less four days. He had reigned for 72 years.

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[7] Louis XIV quoted in Toudouze, *Le Roy Soleil*, p.85.



Artillery Units
(L–R): Officer, Royal-Bombardiers Regiment, 1690s; Staff officer, Corps Royal de l'Artillerie, 1690s; Officer, Fusiliers du Roi Regiment, 1670s

(Illustration by Ed Dovey © Helion & Company)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information.



Armed Constabulary and Local Troops
(L–R): Exempt of the Paris Guet Royal, 1689–1714; Sergeant, Auch Guards of the City, late 17th century; Private, Toulouse Compagnie du Guet, early 18th century

(Illustration by Ed Dovey © Helion & Company)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information.

Plate 3



Provincial Militia Regiments
(L–R): Sergeant, Alsace Provincial Militia, 1690s; Private soldier, Soissonais Provincial Militia, 1690s; Private soldier, Béarn Provincial Militia Regiment, 1690s

(Illustration by Ed Dovey © Helion & Company)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information.



Bourgeois Militia
(L–R): Chevalier officer, Chevaliers de l'Arquebuse Company of Mâcon (Burgundy), late 17th and early 18th centuries; Sergeant, Boulogne Milice Bourgeoise, 1689; Private, Nantes Milice Bourgeoise, late 17th century

(Illustration by Ed Dovey © Helion & Company)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information.

Plate 5



Bourgeois and Coast Guard Militia
(L–R): Officer, Toulouse Milice Bourgeoise, Merchant's Companies, 1701; Archer, Amiens Archers Privileged Company, early 18th century; Coast Guard Militiaman, 1690s

(Illustration by Ed Dovey © Helion & Company)

See Colour Plate Commentaries for further information.

Plate 6


LE ROY LOVIS XIV
PROCLAME LE DVC D'ANJOV
ROY D'ESPAGNE
LE 16 NOVEMBRE 1700
Maurice Leloir

The Sun King proclaims his grandson Philippe, Duke d'Anjou, as Felipe V, King of Spain and of "The Indies" on 16 November 1700. The Spanish ambassador kneels before him while Louis XIV welcomes the Dauphin, followed by courtiers, in his office. The new royal arms of Spain, which now feature the Bourbon gold lilies on a blue field are seen at the top. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)


Garnisoen van Valencien
Try
Hurtebise
Prouvy
Main
Weg van St. Amand
Weg van Valencien
Troupen vant Garnisoen van Valencien
Oude Linie der Franschen
Schelde Fluv.
Wauvrechin
Herchin
Thian
Escaillon
Escaillon Fluv.
Nieuw Gemaakte Linie van Communicatie
Beaurepaire
Weg na Douay
Weg na Bouchain
Louche
DENAIN
Rovine
Cense
Chateau
De Weg na Landresy
Selle Fluv.
Douche
Novelle
na Cameryk
Gerumeerde Molen van Helemes
PATIO ULTIMA PACIS
MDCCXII
A. Quartier van de Hr. Albemarle.
B. ----van de Prins van Holsteyn Beek.
C. Aankomst vant Fransche Leger by Nojelles.
D. Marsch der Fran: om de Linie aan te tasten.
E. Onse Ruytery zich onder het naderen der Vyanden by †. posterende
F. Aanval der Vyand: met 20 Battal:
G. 30 Battal: om te onder steunen.
H. Vyandl: Ruytery.
I. Ons Kanon.
K. Aftogt van d'infantery in de Ponte.
L. Battal: tot dekking der zelve.
M. Aantogt van ons Leger
N. Park van d'Artill
O. 't Geretrenceert Campement.

Plan of the battle of Denain, 24 July 1712. Allied HQ (A, B) The first position of the French army (C) at upper right. The attack positions of the French army (F, G, H). The allied artillery (I), allied retreat by the bridge (K), a few allied battalions at the bridge (L), allied cavalry (E). (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. BI-B-FM-090-156)

Plate 8


sseau de Bratelle
Redoute
Prerie
Mont de Douay
Porte d'Esquerchin
Porte doere
d'Arras
Porte d'Arras
Scarpe Riviere
Rivage
Porte d'Eau Comunicati
Maison
Porte Morel
la Gatt
Redoute
la Place
Porte S. Ferin
Chemin de Cambray
Prerie
Porte Notre Dame



Plate 9



Above: A brass field gun of the 1670s. The carriage seems to be of varnished wood with iron fixtures. This detail of the battle of Seneffe (1674) is part of a large mural by Jacques Friquet de Vauroze made in 1677–1678 over the doorway of the dining hall at Les Invalides in Paris. (Authors photo)

Facing page, top: Plan of the fortress of Douai, 1710. As can be seen, the city was fully enclosed by a wet moat and had a hornwork. Its outlying Fort de L'Escarpe (not visible) was further to the north-east (at right). Douai was taken by the allies in 1710 and retaken by the French in 1712. This print shows the artistic talents of the plan colourists. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.427)

Facing page, bottom: Artillery on the march, last third of the seventeenth century. Print after Molzheim. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

Plate 10



Above: Gunners serving a field artillery cannon, mid seventeenth century. Print after Molzheim. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

Below; Artillerymen serving a field gun, early 1670s. From the 1670s, gunners were serving in companies that were an integral part of the army. Uniform varied in the early years, being grey-white, blue or red. The officer is a Commissaire (commissioner) of the artillery and wears the blue and red royal livery. Print after Molzheim. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)



Plate 11


a, Giſte de la Plate forme.
b, Madriers.
c, Heurtoir.
c
b
a
Plan d'une Batterie telle qu'elle doit eſtre Conſtruite
< 8 . a . 9 . pi. >
Embraſure Biaise
Embraſure Droite.
c
c
c
a
a
b
a,a, Plate formes achevées.
b, Plate forme qui fait voir de quelle façon les Giſtes doivent eſtre diſposez.

"Plan of a battery as it should be built" as recommended by Vauban, late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. From a manuscript copy of Vauban's Traité des Sièges de l'Attaque et Défence des Places made for the Duc de Bourgogne. (MS 1,852 in the collection of the Fort Ticonderoga Library, Ticonderoga, NY, USA. Author's photo)

Plate 12




·FVLMINA·TERROR
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·ALTER·POST·FVLMINA·TEROR·

Plate 13



Above: Artillerymen of the 1670s and 1680s. From left, officer and ensign wearing the uniform and bearing the colours of the Fusiliers du Roi Regiment. The unit was raised to protect the artillery, and its members soon became artillerymen themselves; it was officially renamed the Royal-Artillerie in 1693. The gunner at right belongs to one of the independent artillery companies. Print after Moltzheim. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA.Author's photo)

Facing page, top: Two artillerymen, *c.*1678. Both are dressed in blue coats, which indicates they belong to an independent artillery company. One holds a port fire stick while the other, sitting, smokes a pipe. with powder barrels nearby. The contemporary caption below the painting mentions the capture of the town of Condé on 27 April 1676 and that of Valenciennes on 17 March 1677. Small mural painting by Jacques Friquet de Vauroze in the dining hall at Les Invalides in Paris. (Author's photo)

Facing page, bottom: Design of a mitre cap for a bombardier, late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The many artillery attributes including a mortar with bombs identify this cap design as most likely meant for bombardiers. The unit is unknown. From the colour arrangements, it is assumed its coat would have been blue, given by the colour of the cap, lined with red as shown by the turned-up lining and the front. It has been suggested that this might have been for naval bombardiers, but what has been found on their headdress points to fur caps. Print from original period watercolour in Depréaux's ***Les Uniformes des troupes de la Marine***... (1931). (Author's photo)

Plate 14



Left: Gunner of the Royal-Artillerie Regiment, early eighteenth century. Watercolour by R. Marrion. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Below: Gunner of the Royal-Bombardiers Regiment, early eighteenth century. Watercolour by R. Marrion. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Plate 15



Marine and coast artillery gunners, early eighteenth century. In red coats with blue cuffs, waistcoat, breeches, stockings and white metal buttons, gunners of the Bombardiers de la Marine. At left, a bombardier of the company at Brest and just behind, a sergeant holding a halberd belonging to the company at Rochefort. The blue-coated gunners belong to the Canonniers des Côtes de l'Océan (gunners of the seacoast). They had red cuffs, waistcoats, breeches and stockings with red loops on the coats for gunners and gold lace for officers; an ensign holding the unit's colour sits on the gun and a gunner is next to him. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)

Plate 16



Above: Plans of a copper boat for pontoon bridges, late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From "Recueil Abrégé des Memoires d'Artillerie . . ." by Henry-Joseph de Caignart. National Historic Sites, Parks Canada. (Author's photo)

Below: Engineers supervising troops building a pontoon bridge, 1690s. Unsigned painting. (Musée Condé, Chantilly. Author's photo)



Plate 17



Left: Lieutenant General Abraham de Fabert at the siege of Stenay, 1654. Fabert was an engineer as well as a field commander (Marshal in 1658) and, notably at the siege of Stenay, near the border of Spanish Flanders, he introduced new methods of siegecraft that somewhat anticipated the great improvements later brought by Vauban. It was also the first siege for young Vauban, who was twice wounded during the 32 days it lasted until Stenay's capitulation on 28 June. Print after JOB. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Right: The engineer's armour worn by Vauban in many of his campaigns during the reign of the Sun King. It has some small dents which are said to have been made by enemy bullets. This armour has been an iconic object to French military engineers since the beginning of the eighteenth century. Chateau de Bazoches-du-Morvan, Burgundy. (Author's photo)

Plate 18



Above: Louis XIV and his suite visit the trenches at the siege of Lille during August 1667. He is attended by an engineer officer and the Sun King wears the iron helmet and cuirass as recommended for engineers when close to the enemy's fire. The trenches are lined with protective gabions to solidify the earthen embankments. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Facing page, top: A senior officer in a siege battery, late seventeenth century. He wears a blue coat and plumed hat and gives directions to another officer. Behind is a guard or a servant wearing a yellow or buff and red livery coat. An engineer sapper wearing helmet and cuirass is nearby. Cannons served by gunners are at each side. Painting in the Musée de Condé, Chantilly. (Author's photo)

Facing page, bottom: Plan of Châlon-sur-Soâne, late seventeenth century. This is a good example of modern upgrades to older fortresses. The fortifications of the lower half were built from the 1520s by order of King François I. The large citadel above was built from 1561 (note the Italian style bastions), its outer works and glacis during the mid seventeenth century. Being in southern Burgundy, Châlon-sur-Soâne could be attacked by enemy troops from neighbouring Spanish Franche-Comté before it was annexed to France in 1678. Detail from a watercolour in the 1693 atlas of fortifications. (Courtesy Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris)

Plate 19




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Plate 20



Above: A theoretical model of some of Vauban's fortifications features, *c.*1703. Such models were conceived by Vauban from the 1660s to clearly instruct the Sun King and Louvois on the principles he was proposing to adopt. This led to some 60 scale models of actual fortresses being made during the reign of Louis XIV. Chateau de Bazoches-du-Morvan, Burgundy. (Author's photo)

Facing page: Scale model of Neuf-Brisach, *c.*1700. The fortifications of Neuf-Brisach were of Vauban's Third System; it is the only major town whose defences, built from 1698, were of that system. Chateau de Bazoches-du-Morvan, Burgundy. (Author's photo)

Plate 21



Plate 22



Fusiliers des Montagnes, early eighteenth century. Also called Arquebusier des Montagnes, these French mountain troops in the Pyrenees were raised in Roussillon and organised into a regiment. The Chevalier de Guignard who served with them described their unique regional uniform as a red vest tucked into sailor style short trousers with cord sandals called spardilles, a blue wool cap called barette and a steel grey "antique-style" coat with blue cuffs and lining. "Their weapons consisted of two pistols on the left of the waist belt, a dagger at right and a flintlock musket called escopette, which they use so expertly that they rarely miss their shot." Print after Philippoteaux. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

Plate 23

Right: Troops of the city of Paris, 1660s. From left: trooper of the Guard of the Governor of Paris (the Duc de Bournonville in 1660) wearing a yellow cassock lined green with white crosses; mounted archer of the city in a blue cassock with the city's white ship's badge; archer of the "Guet" or watch of Paris in full ceremonial dress featuring a blue surcoat embroidered with silver stars and lace. The stars were symbolic of the night watch they kept. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)



Below: Archer of the Prevost of Isle de France and archer of the Prevost of the Lieutenant de Robe Courte, 1660s. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)



Plate 24



Left: Gardes de la Connétablie, early eighteenth century. Archer wearing his luxurious cassock over his coat for a dress occasion. Rear view of an officer. Officers did not wear cassocks and their coats had silver buttonholes. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)



Left: Constabulary troops of the city of Paris, c.1690s–1715. From left: a sergeant archer of the city's foot Guet or watch wearing the distinctive blue bandolier decorated with gold lilies and silver stars over a grey coat with silver buttons and lace; a city archer in ceremonial dress wearing the blue cassock with the badge of Paris (a sailing ship); a city archer in service dress wearing the blue uniform introduced in 1714. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)

Plate 25

Right: Archer of the Ile de France Maréchaussée, early eighteenth century. This unit's origin went back to the eleventh century, making it one of the most senior military corps in France. In the early eighteenth century, its uniforms was in the colours of the royal livery enhanced by gold lace ending at the cuffs, hat and housings. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)



Below: Prévôt General of the Gardes de la Connétablie and archer of the Prévôté Générale des Monnaies, early eighteenth century. The Prévôt General of the Gardes de la Connétablie had an elaborately laced and embroidered blue coat in silver. The Prévôté Générale des Monnaies wore red. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo).



Plate 26


LE ROY
LOVIS QVATORZE
VISITE
L'HOTEL ROYAL
DES INVALIDES
ETABLI PAR EDIT
DV MOIS D'AVRIL
M.DC.LXX.IV.
Maurice Leloir
BRVANT
ARCH.
MANSART
ARCH.
MDCC-LXXI

Plate 27



Above: A royal militia officer with an invalid soldier, 1688. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)

Facing page: Louis XIV pays a visit to the Invalides, late 1670s. The Invalides were ordered established by the Sun King in April 1674. The pensioners were issued a blue coat with red lining and cuffs. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Plate 28



Plate 29



Left: Private soldier of the Lyonnais Regiment, early eighteenth century. A company of this unit was permanently posted in the city of Lyon and was part of its own regular troops while keeping the link with the regiment. It wore that regiment's uniform: grey-white coat and breeches, red cuffs and stockings, green waistcoat, brass buttons and false gold hat lace. Print after Delaître. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Right: A Roussillon soumetan militiaman, early eighteenth century. These militiamen were often deployed in the Pyrenees. They dressed in traditional clothing suitable for mountains and armed with sturdy escopette (or escopetta in Spanish) muskets. Print after Alfred de Marbot. Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. (Author's photo)

Facing page: Soldiers taking a wounded officer lying on a stretcher away from the trenches during a late-seventeenth century siege. Another is hit nearby and falling next to officers. Painting in the Musée de Condé, Chantilly. (Author's photo)

Plate 30



The Canonniers de Lille (gunners of Lille), early eighteenth century. This militia unit gave good services during the 1708 siege of the city. The commander had a scarlet uniform with gold buttons and lace. Other officers and sergeants had an all blue uniform with silver buttons and lace, the drummers having all red with gold lace. The gunners wore civilian clothing. The colour had a white field with a red cross of Burgundy, Saint Barbara in the centre, a field gun below and bordered with black triangles on yellow edged with red. Print after the 1892 Histoire des Canonniers de Lille. (Author's photo)

Plate 31



Left: Colour of the Royal-Artillerie Regiment, early eighteenth century. White cross with gold lilies. The quarters were of a type of silk whose hues changed when they fluttered in the wind, the red and the green quarters showing yellow streaks sheens. Watercolour. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)



Right: Colour of the Royal-Bombardier Regiment, early eighteenth century. Red and blue quarters, white cross with gold lilies. Watercolour. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

Plate 32



Left: Colour of the Boulonnois Provincial Militia Infantry Regiment, 1715. White cross on blue field. Du Vivier Manuscript copy. Brunon Collection, Aix-en-Provence. (Author's photo)



Right: Colour of the Amiens Grand Archers Company, early eighteenth century. White cross with gold lilies, a sun badge and the royal coat of arms at the centre. Blue quarters strewn with gold lilies and gold bows and arrows. The date 1733 indicates when the previous colour, which was identical, was replaced. This also shows that it was carried as a vexillum style hanging rather than by a pole. Print after Notices sur les anciennes corporations…d'Amiens. (Author's photo)

12

The Economic Tremors of War

The Economic Weight of Armies

We have seen in previous volumes that France's economy had a strong manufacturing and trade sector, capable of raising enormous sums in capital to finance wars and armies at levels unseen since the Roman Empire. France was, however, basically an agricultural country. At least four Frenchmen in five tilled what was arguably the lushest land in western Europe. Nearly the whole country had agricultural activity that created much wealth for those who owned land. These were mainly noblemen and churchmen who were largely exempt from paying taxes. A duchy's agriculture could produce very substantial revenues to its duke and its nobility, and some of these were the courtiers at the royal court currying for favours such as appointments in the army or the navy; it must be recalled they could not be seen disgracing themselves performing manual labour, so the status of royal guardsman and officer was essential. The Sun King was aware of the inequitable tax system he inherited and remarked that the nobles indeed gave "their blood for the defence of the Kingdom" while the common people "had few funds and so many mouths to feed, carried alone all the government's spending", and the churchmen "exempt by their profession of the dangers of war" enjoyed abundance without having to contribute anything. Reforming the revenue system proved beyond reach by its complexity, the risks of unknown results and the vehement opposition of the nobility and the state. As late as 1707, when Marshal Vauban's proposals for a flat tax *Dîme Royale* was published, there was a storm of protest from all privileged groups and it was laid aside.[1]

However, it was the humbler young Frenchmen who volunteered by hundreds of thousands to get away from the farm; they formed the bulk of French armies for a life of adventures, dangers and sufferings as well as to seek self-enrichment. In 1688 provincial "militiamen" drafted from villages were added. By the early 1700s, if the army stood at a strength of say, 400,000 men, this equated to about one person in 50 of France's population wearing

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[1] Louis XIV quoted in Champigneule, *Le règne de Louis XIV*, p.37; Arnault Skornicki, *L'économiste, la cour et la patrie* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 3011), pp.48–49.


Plus on a de moyens, plus on en veut auoi
Ce pauure apporte tout, bled, fruit, argent, ſalad
Ce gros Milord assis, prest a tout receuoir
Ne luy veut pas donner la douceur dvne euilla
de
a la mouche qui volle il ne faut point dais
Il faut paier ou agreer.
A tous Seigneurs tous honneurs.
Maigre comme vn leurier datache
Plus a le Diable, plus il en veut auoir.
I. lagniet ex
Le Noble est l'airaignée et
45 le Paisan la mouche .

A peasant paying taxes to a "Milord" nobleman, second half of the seventeenth century. This satirical print, whilst purporting to show Englishmen, is also a picture of peasants and nobles in France where the print was produced. Of the various captions, perhaps the most telling was "the nobleman is the spider and the peasant is the fly" shown trapped in the spider's web and about to be devoured (upper left). Its true meaning and target was France's inequitable tax system. (Private collection. Author's photo) a uniform, and very likely one in 40 came from a rural area. It was probably something of a limitation to have enough men in the armies without deeply affecting agricultural activities; this was vital for the nation's economy and nourishment. Roughly the same levels were seen in Russia and Austria, both of which had very important agricultural sectors. At that time, Sweden surely "crossed the line" with one soldier for 13 persons and such a level could not be sustained for long.[2]

During the War of the League of Augsburg, the credit of the main nations involved in the conflict had been tapped and extended to the point where some allied subsidies to smaller nations might not be honoured, while briefly causing a sharp interest rise in France (see Volume 3). Levying more taxes to fund armies and wars was attempted in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries with mitigated results, since it was really aimed to tap the wealth of the least prosperous part of France's population.

Safe at Home Secreting Wealth

One difference between France and some of its Continental neighbours was that French armies were nearly always campaigning on enemy territory. This meant that French peasants were safe compared to their neighbours and probably managed to secrete more safely what few riches they had. There would still be some marauding French soldiers looting people they were supposed to protect, but on the whole this would have been considerably less severe than for, say, peasants in western Germany. Prince Eugene's comments on the successful looting by his cuirassiers in Dauphiné (see Volume 3, chapter 7) certainly reflect such a situation. The secreting of gold and silver coins that escaped the scrutiny of tax collectors was also done by artisans and town merchants. So there was actually additional secreted wealth in France apart from what official accounts might estimate. This could be a factor, necessarily undocumented, related to the remarkable financial French stamina to obtain more credit to sustain the vast amounts needed to carry on during the War of the Spanish Succession. Overall, the known production in France in 1700–1707 has been computed at nearly half (about 75 percent of revenue) produced by agriculture, about one twentieth (five to seven percent) from rents and the rest from interior capital (there was no noteworthy foreign capital).[3]

As seen in Volume 2, currency value in France remained remarkably stable at 11 livres for one Louis d'or from 1656 to 1686 and with some sols added until 1703. That year it rose to over 13 livres until 1708, going down slightly

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[2] Corvisier, *Armées et sociétés*, p.126.

[3] Thomas Piketty, *Le capital au XXIe siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 2013), pp.187–192; House of Commons, *The Public Finances: an Historical View* (London: House of Commons Library, Briefing Paper, No. 8265, 22 March 2018), pp.4, 6–8; Ron Harris, 'Government and the Economy 1688–1850', in *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain*, R. Floud and P. Johnson, ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 2004), Vol. 1 Chapter 8, offers some comparisons with other nations. Britain's public budgeting seems clearer than France's in separating military from civil expenditures. In Britain, agriculture was producing about 65%, rents 20% and capital the rest as per Piketty.


LVDOVIC·XIIII·D·G·FRAN·ET·NAV·REX
A
DOMINE·ELEGISTI·LILIVM·TIBI
1656

A golden *Louis d'or* coin minted in 1656. It was worth 11 livres when minted and remained generally stable during the reign except for 1709, when it briefly rose to 20 livres. Print after Bordier and Charton's *Histoire de France* (1888), Vol. 2. (Author's photo)


LVD·XIIII·D·G·FR·ET·NAV·REX
SIT·NOMEN·DOMINI·BENEDICTVM·1711
A

A silver *écu* coin minted in 1711. The silver écu was worth six livres, 12 sols. Print after Bordier and Charton's *Histoire de France* (1888), Vol. 2. (Author's photo) by 10 sols and jumping at 20 livres the following year. There could be several explanations for these sudden fluctuations. The most favoured opinion in nations such as Britain and the Netherlands, whose economies substantially rested on foreign trade and international finance, was that fiscal pressure led to inflation on the French currency. In France this is harder to substantiate because much more of the economic activity, including its capital and financial operations, was overwhelmingly within France. Its basic wealth was produced within the nation. If two livres a day was spent by every Frenchman on services and products made in France, this could amount to some hundreds of million livres a year. These figures can vary and be presented in other ways, but the basic economic notion that an interior economy creates considerable employment and national wealth would somewhat explain the country's resilience. France's finances were more centrally overseen by the royal government than in Britain and Holland. Therefore, another option it could and would take over a short period was for the government to devalue the livre against the Louis d'or reference. Nevertheless, the currency remained relatively stable until the terrible climatic effects of 1709 when it took 20 livres to have a Louis d'or, until 1713 when it came back down to 14 livres. For France, it was likely the best fiscal solution because it produced and consumed within its borders the great majority of its goods and services, the prices of most would remain stable except in exceptional periods of, say, shortages due to climatic fluctuations. The enormous sums needed for military expenditures would not be crucially affected and remained stable. The soldier's pay thus remained the same (see Volume 2, pp.95–96).



Marshal Boufflers calming the people of Paris in 1709. The difficulties of the war and the terribly hard winter followed by a famine drove some in Paris to despair; a riot broke out near St. Martin's gate. The constabulary had difficulty controlling the crowd; Marshal Boufflers heard the commotion and immediately went to the spot on foot and unescorted, and managed to contain the desperate men and women by listening to their complaints. After promising bread, he took their complaints to the King. The Marshal thus defused a popular revolt that could have spread throughout France. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Another aspect was that in pre-industrial Europe France was the largest producer of wrought iron, computed at 27 percent, while Britain only had 8.1 percent in 1725. This shows there was a much stronger manufacturing production capacity in France although it has always been seen as an overwhelmingly agricultural country before the industrial revolution. If anything, these figures – which do not seem to be known for earlier periods – would have been very robust in wartime and a strong stimulus in a war economy. It also was important in that iron was available in quantity in the country and was thus obtained more quickly with less risk than having to import it.[4]

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[4] *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe*, S. Broadberry and K.H. O'Rourke, ed. (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), p.181. Sweden was the next highest producer at 25.4; this then fell to 8.7 for the Holy Roman Empire and 8.0 for Spain.

A Ruinous Period ... for All

It has often been said in histories and memoirs that France went through a ruinous period during the War of the Spanish Succession. This is not contested here, but the situation does not appear to have been much better for the Sun King's opponents. Louis XIV had a fiscal advantage over his main financial opponents, Britain and the Netherlands, because he led an absolutely autocratic government. In these two nascent democracies, political and fiscal powers were largely the realm of elected assemblies that a sovereign could not bypass, notably when it came to the enormous sums required to fund armies. In 1685 the French ambassador in the Netherlands reported a discussion between Dutch government officials and Amsterdam bankers to the effect that the country's economic slowdown had not been due to money spent on the militia, but because of arrears in paying for capital borrowed since 1672. The Austrian emperor was more autocratic, but not to the level enjoyed by Louis XIV. The Sun King ruled over the largest war economy in Europe without really needing a state bank, such as the Bank of England, as an independent buffer; everything decisive came from the King and his few financial officials at Versailles: he presided and they implemented. Public discussions about the way revenue would be spent were unknown, the only real issues being whether there was enough to cover the cost. The ability to foresee the breaking point of the economy was central, and in this, the Sun King was certainly something of a master autocratic banker.[5]

He certainly had to be at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In 1700, public spending came to 116 million livres, but war raised this figure sharply to 264 million by 1711. The public debt was at about 50 percent of national revenue from 1700 to 1720. During the century's first 15 years, this spending spree very largely went to the military. To alleviate deficits, all manner of new taxes or increases in those existing were created in the already extremely inequitable French revenue system, with the poorest still bearing the brunt while nobles and the church paid very few if any taxes. To eschew more cash out of moneyed non-noble individuals, all manner of commissions, especially in the militia, were introduced from 1694, but exemptions and privileges eventually annulled much of these revenues for which payments had to be made; it was like a cash sum paid to an insurance company in return for modest, but long-term interest payments. There were also frequent financial mutations of currency. By 1706 there was a shortage of gold and silver currency and Minister of Finance Chamillard then resorted to paper money to fill the void. This had been tried by Intendant Demeules in Canada for the same reasons as early as 1685 to pay the garrison and public spending, raising protest, but it basically worked. Now it was all of France, and the protests were great because no interest was paid in what was really a government bond, so much like the twentieth century war bonds, an interest of 7.5 percent was added. On 26 October 1710 a temporary tax on a tenth of revenues was imposed.[6]

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[5] Jean-Antoine Comte d'Avaux, *Négociations du Comte d'Avaux en Hollande depuis 1679 jusqu'en 1688* (Paris, 1754), Vol. 4, p.128; John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle. The French Army 1610–1715* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.24–26. Lynn mentions that the 'absolutism of Louis XIV may itself have made a strong state bank impossible' which is, we feel, certainly correct. The only type of bank the Sun King would have tolerated was one that was controlled by the government, which is what has since happened in autocratic regimes such as Communist China, to name an important world economy of our own times.

Many in France thought the national economy might collapse. Its enemies keenly hoped so and thought it was on the brink of default. There were shortages in money in terms of "cashflow" and thus supplies to French armies at times. Yet, the Sun King and his officials managed to keep the national economy afloat during the whole duration of the War of the Spanish Succession. Through it all, enough money, supplies and subsidies to allies were somehow always found in France to carry on. This would indicate that the Sun King's France could sustain fiscal stress more easily than its opponents, if easily is the right word, to keep up to half a million regular troops mobilised as well as a still quite redoubtable navy and meet the myriad of other expenses related to fortifications, arms production and militias without forgetting considerable subsidies to allies, especially to the Spanish troops of Felipe V.

Wars, national finances and armies have always been affected by major shifts in climate patterns. During the reign of the Sun King average temperatures fell by about 1° C from 1685 to 1699, but the worst climatic disturbances occurred in the first three months of 1709. On 6 January temperatures went down to as low as minus 15 to 20° C across much of Europe for three weeks, rose sharply causing some early blooming then plunged again to unseen levels, deep-freezing promising harvests; such fluctuations went on for many weeks. Not only the grain and fruit harvest were ruined, but even olive trees in Provence were fatally stricken. Untold numbers of peasants froze to death or starved and not just France as some accounts seem to imply. Usually little is said about what happened in the Grand Alliance countries, but strangely almost every book about the War of the Spanish Succession features the *Grand hiver* (the "Great Frost" to the British) said to have greatly affected the armies of the Sun King, with little if anything said about other armies. Yet in England, meteorological observer William Derham believed "the Frost was greater than any other within the Memory of Man" and it was indeed the coldest European winter of the past half-millennium, which must have had effects on British and other armies too. Even in the Mediterranean, sailors on board Royal Navy ships froze to death. Climate patterns certainly affect armies and economies, and like pandemics they know no national borders. As for the French army, by 1710 it was fully able to take the field and also be regularly paid, fed and supplied.[7]

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[6] Paul Lacroix, *Le XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1878), pp.194–195; Germain Martin, *Histoire de la nation française; histoire économique et financière* (Paris: Plon, 1927), Vol. 10, pp.237–238. The King granted a "Taille" tax holiday to conscripted veterans for five years in the 1700s which may have reduced the tax rolls by about 200,000 men, and the government ordered recalcitrant treasurers that it be honoured on 28 August 1717 as per *Recueil des déclarations, édits, lettres patentes, et arrêts du roi* (Dijon, 1717), pp.155–156.

[7] Kyle Harper, *Comment l'Empire romain s'est effrondré. Le climat, les maladies et la chute de Rome* (Paris: Ladécouverte, 2019; translation of: *The Fate of Rome*); R.S. Bradley and P. Jones, *Climate since AD 1500* (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.127, 137–139; Pain, '1709: The year that Europe froze',

Britain and the Collapse of the Grand Alliance

The demise of the Duke of Marlborough and Great Britain's withdrawal from the war in 1711–1712 certainly had political causes brought on by the Tories winning a parliamentary election combined with a sort of miniature palace revolution. However, these could not be the only reasons to break alliances with European allies and leaving them to continue, much weakened, the struggle against a still undefeated France. Another reason, and we believe it to be the main one, was borne by the chancellor of the Exchequer and his advisers. During the war the British debt level rose faster than that of France and probably equalled or surpassed it after 1710. This was bad news in a country whose population was about one third of France's. This had a negative effect which increased a worker's misery and could cause social unrest to erupt. On 12 July 1710, thinking the great military expenditures were the cause, some 4,000 workers rioted in London and burned some workshops so that the London Militia had to be mobilised to patrol the city. It was a sign of things to come, if nothing was done. During Queen Anne's reign the British debt rose from 16 to 54 million pounds between 1702 and 1711, the military by the latter year accounting for at least 64 percent of all spending. It was deemed an intolerable level never seen before. Such figures are never bandied about openly, especially in nations heavily dependent on trade, because it could lead to private lenders fearing that the government could default or go bankrupt. The remedy to avoid this fiscal catastrophe was obvious: get out of the war and disband most of the armed forces.[8]

Whilst the economies of France and Imperial Austria managed to finance the armies somehow, this wartime fiscal pressure on Britain would appear to have become untenable and it was obviously one of the main reasons that led to its withdrawal from the hostilities. There is no doubt that British armies did remarkably well when led by the genial Marlborough and all gained lasting glory in battles such as Blenheim. However, wars are fought, lost or won in other places besides battlefields.[9]

New Scientist, 4 February 2009. Indeed, the decline and fall of the Roman Empire has recently been shown to have been not only due to bad governments and doubtful morals making it succumb to barbarian hordes as advanced by Gibbon, but even more by a cooling of the earth's temperature from about 150 AD quickly followed by large-scale deadly epidemics as with the late Antiquity "Little Ice Age" from about 450 to 700 AD. Earthly climate was then balmier until the fourteenth century "Black Death" pandemic, coupled with the Medieval "Little Ice Age", whose climatic effects were felt until the increasing changes of our own "Global Warming" era. There were periods when certain years saw very substantial changes that would cause a major crisis. Bad crops would lead to skyrocketing prices, and ultimately epidemics and starvation amongst the population's humbler classes.

[8] House of Commons, *The Public Finances: an Historical View*, pp.4, 6, 18, 21; *Historical Sketch of the Bank of England* (London: Longman, 1831), pp.17–18, 40; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, p.291; H.T. Dickinson, 'The Recall of Lord Peterborough', *JSAHR*, XLVII (1969), pp.175–187, for instance, shows the pressures from Treasury regarding the alarming army expenses.

[9] Piketty, *Le capital au XXIe siècle*, pp.202–205. The same pressures were apparent with the Dutch, and many German allies. Austria was obviously in a better situation as the Emperor initially wished to continue the war against France, but soon thought rightly that it was profitable to fight the Ottomans.

13

Gunners and Guns

Artillery Personnel and Units

Before 1668 the artillery had a small permanent staff consisting of the grand master and his lieutenant general, a comptroller general with 11 administrative directors, 24 *commissaires ordinaires* who were the senior officers and 200 gunners and bombardiers posted in various fortresses. At the outset of a campaign more men were enlisted to assist the permanent staff. The extra men were released at the end of the campaign. In all European nations at that time, the men performing artillery services were not considered as fighting troops, but as civilian specialists. In France, the artillery trains and batteries on campaign were protected by usually Swiss or German mercenary troops hired for that purpose.

Following the Sun King's assumption of autocratic power and the appointment of Minister of War Louvois in the early 1660s, the artillery was seen as a part of the army needing important reforms, and from 1666 measures were taken starting with the cannons (see below). After the 1667–1668 *Blitzkrieg* campaigns, the extra personnel who had been hired were retained and formed into four companies of gunners and two of bombardiers for permanent military service.

This was followed by the creation of the Fusiliers du Roi Regiment on 4 February 1671. The regiment's original strength of four companies of 100 men each (one of gunners, one of sappers, two of *ouvriers* (artisans)) was boosted by 24 fusilier and two grenadier companies on 20 August 1671 divided into two battalions. The regiment proved so useful during the Dutch War, its members performing either as infantrymen or as gunners, that it was reinforced by four battalions of 15 companies each in November 1677, one being disbanded at the war's end while six more companies of gunners were raised. Another six appeared in 1689. By then, the army's militarised and disciplined gunners had considerably increased a cannon's shooting efficiency at sieges to the point where they amply surpassed petards and mines. Vauban wrote in his *Traité de l'attaque et la défense des places* that "with the cannon, a breach can be made where we want, when we want and how we want." Vauban also perfected ricochet firing to the point where it became a standard practice.

On 15 April 1693 the Fusiliers du Roi were reorganised as the Royal-Artillerie Regiment: three battalions, each with 13 55-man companies. Three more battalions were added during the Nine Years' War, two disbanded in 1698, but another 5th battalion from February 1706 to 1714. The companies were detached on all fronts and served with distinction in a multitude of battles and sieges. It was the first artillery unit organised as a large tactical military corps in European armies, and over the years other nations followed France's example thus acknowledging its superiority.

In 1679 two independent companies of bombardiers to serve mortars were raised, and on 28 August 1684 10 more of 55 men each were created to form the Royal Bombardiers Regiment. It was augmented by two more companies two years later, and in 1706 to two battalions of 14 companies each. They served on all fronts.

An independent company of miners was raised at Tournai in 1673, another in 1679, yet another in 1695 and two more in 1705–1706. They were usually attached to the artillery. The Galiottes raised on 7 February 1689 were three independent companies serving in bomb ketches (*galiottes*) on the Rhine and in Flanders, disbanded 30 March 1698. They were re-raised in 1701 and disbanded in 1715.

The Compagnie franche de Canonniers des Côtes de l'Océan (independent company of gunners of the Ocean's coast) was raised in La Rochelle during 1702. It had 200 gunners led by nine officers, and remarkably with no less than the Duc du Maine as its patron. It "guarded the coast of the Ocean" as a coast artillery unit that, more realistically, comprised the forts and batteries at and in the vicinity of La Rochelle, a major port city. Its captain, Ferrand L'Escossay, was also an artillery general and inventor of light canons that shot just as far as standard guns.

Pontoons for fording rivers were then under the responsibility of the artillery staff. *Équipages* (crews) were occasionally raised and disbanded, but its men were seemingly not trained as soldiers. The boats, made of brass, and the wagons to transport them easily were said to be inventions of General Martinet and first tried out in the Dutch War, somewhat laid aside until the 1690s when they were further needed in the Nine Years' War and into the eighteenth century.

By the 1690s the artillery had become a large and distinct corps (later called the Corps Royal de l'Artillerie) within the army. Below the grand master and the lieutenant general were now hundreds of staff officials of all types such as lawyers, a prevost and archers, medical professionals, accountants, gunpowder specialists, clerks and even printers and engravers in Paris. Furthermore, apart from officers serving in the units cited above were at least 1,000 artillery officers posted in about 240 fortresses with magazine guards and other tradesmen to assist them. To this were added the field regiments and independent companies. Thus, just the fighting officers and men in the 1690s came to at least 6,600 to 7,000.[1]

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[1] Saint-Rémy, *Mémoires d'Artillerie*, Vol. 1, pp.1–40 (1697 edition) and pp. xv–xvii (1741 edition); Louis Susane, *Histoire de l'artillerie française* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1874), pp.131–158; Ernest Picard and Louis Jouan, *L'Artillerie française au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1906), pp.1–6; Voltaire, *Le Siècle de Louis XIV*, p.163.



Above: a cannon battery during a siege, 1702–1703. The cannons on platforms protected by earthworks are: A, being loaded; B, pushed in firing position; C, aimed; D, fired. E, F, G and H are powder magazines. I are sentries. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie*. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.034-15)



A mortar battery during a siege, 1702–1703. A, earthworks; B, the charge with some earth put in the mortar; C, loading the bomb; D, aiming the mortar; E, firing the mortar, F, rods to point the mortars; G, baskets full of earth to serve the mortars, H and I, powder magazines; K, the place where bombs are stored; L, soldiers loading bombs; M, soldiers carrying bombs. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 Mémoires d'Artillerie. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-83.034-14)




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DECENT JOVIS FULMINA PROLEM
C'est ce qui est Sur la Piéce de pouce de chaque fusil des Canonniers de la Comp.e de ferrand de Cossay
Echelle
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1

Above: a French artillery train, mid-seventeenth century. Detail from a print by Romeyn de Hooghe. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-1913-5960)

Left: colours and cannons of the Canonniers des côtes de l'Océan, early eighteenth century. The colour shown has a white field with firing cannon as its centre badge topped by the coat of arms of the Duc du Maine (one of the Sun King's "natural" sons). The brass guns also bore his coat of arms. Print after Saint-Rémy's *Mémoire d'Artillerie*. (Author's photo)


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
Pierre Surirey de Saint Remy
Comm.re Provincial de l'Artil.rie de France et l'un des Cent Officiers Priuilegiez de ce Corps

Above: Louis-Auguste de Bourbon, Duc de Maine, was the master general of artillery between 1694 and 1737. All the brass cannons cast between those dates bore his name, his ducal crown and his coat of arms (the arms of the king with a red slanted bar) such as the 12-pdr cast in 1702 named *Le Courageux*. Fort Ticonderoga, New York. (Author's photo)

Left: Pierre Surirey de Saint Rémy, 1697. Born in about 1650, he joined the artillery and mastered the technical and scientific issues of ordnance and small arms as well as equipment. The results of these studies, published in his 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie*, formed the finest and most complete publication on the topic in that era. At that time he was provincial artillery commissioner, and in 1703 was made lieutenant to the Grand Master of Artillery, which meant he was the actual chief gunner in the Sun King's armies. Saint-Rémy passed away in 1716. Print after Hyacinthe Rigaud. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-1918-1682)

Gunners' Portable Weapons and Uniforms

Before 1671 artillerymen were not formally soldiers enlisted in the army, but it was probably common for them to have swords and daggers with a spike-like blade to clear vents as well as to have some defence against enemy soldiers who might get through their guards. NCOs and officers often had partisans or spontoons doubling as linstocks to fire cannons (see illustrations). Thereafter, artillerymen were definitely soldiers, had the same armament as infantrymen and all carried flintlock muskets. Those of the Canonniers des Côtes de l'Océan had brass furnishings with thumb pieces engraved with the crest of the Duc du Maine.

During the 1660s and until the early 1670s uniforms had not been introduced, although Marbot's research, notably from contemporary battle paintings, suggests that gunners wore mostly grey. Grey with blue cuffs and lining was likely the uniform of the Fusiliers du Roi Regiment from the time it was raised in February 1671, and it was described in some detail in the September 1680 *Mercure Galant* as being, for the soldiers, a "good grey cloth coat lined with blue, red breeches and stockings, laced hat", buff belts with red ribbons for the men (for officers see Plate 1). Drummers would have worn the king's livery. Sergeants were also said to be "very clean", as were the soldiers. The 1692 list mentioned a grey coat with blue cuffs and lining. In September 1698 it was now the Royal-Artillerie and had the same basic uniform when seen at Compiègne, consisting of a white coat lined blue with red waistcoat, breeches and stockings, red cockade on the hat; sergeants had a two "fingers"-wide gold lace edging their coats. This remained the regiment's uniform until 1720. Independent artillery and bombardiers companies usually had blue or red uniforms. Some bombardiers seemingly wore caps that could be highly decorated.[2]

The uniform of the Royal-Bombardiers was a grey coat with blue cuffs and lining according to the 1692 list. Corfey's 1698 notes taken at the Compiègne review specified a white coat with blue cuffs and lining, red waistcoat and stockings to which the *Mercure Galant* added that "their waistcoats were trimmed with silver ... the soldiers have on their shoulder a cord that is half silver ... and the officers have a silver lace two fingers wide." (see Plate 1).

The Compagnie franche de Canonniers des Côtes de l'Océan had, for its officers: blue coats with scarlet cuffs and linings trimmed with gold embroidered buttonholes; sergeants: similar coats with gold lace buttonholes, scarlet waistcoats and breeches: gunners: clothed in blue with half-scarlet cuffs and lining, *aurore* (orange) buttonhole lace and *aurore* aiguillettes; drummers: scarlet coat with blue velvet cuffs and trimmed and edged with gold lace, which was the livery of the Duc de Maine. The colours were given as having a blue ground in 1703 and as white in Saint-Rémy.

For the staff officers of the corps of artillery, apart from the blue lined with red attributed to *commissaires* of the 1660s and 1670s, a scarlet uniform was worn later (see Plate 1) but was said to have been abandoned due to its cost.[3]

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[2] Drum in the collection of the Musée de l'Armée in Paris.

[3] BMG, Manuscrit A1b 1626, État Général des Troupes de France Infanterie, Cavalerie et Dragons 1692; Lambert Friedrich Corfey, 'Reisetagebuch 1698–1700', ed., Helmut Lahrkamp,





Far left: a gunner's stiletto, seventeenth century. This type of Italian-made dagger had a thin blade which was handy to clear the cannon's vent of black powder residue in battle. This example, of good quality, is 32 cm long. (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. George F. Harding Collection)

Left: linstock, seventeenth century. This attractive and superior-quality linstock must have belonged to an artillery officer or senior NCO. The gilded face on its highly polished steel spear suggests that this instrument made in Italy may have been intended for the Sun King's army. (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. George F. Harding Collection)

Below: detail of a silver snake-dragon on lower part of a remarkably fine 1660s officer's partisan-linstock. The silver snake-dragon was to hold the match cord used to fire the cannon. It is now missing from this artefact according to recent photos. Philadelphia Museum of Art. Bequest of Carl Otto Krezschmar von Kienbusch. (Author's photo)



Right: ensign bearing a colour with the figure of Saint Barbara, late seventeenth to early eighteenth century. Since Saint Barbara was the patron of gunners in many Christian countries, this unsigned sketch of French origin most likely portrays the colour of an independent artillery company. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

Below right: a fireworks official, 1648. in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, fireworks displays were usually overseen by a "King's gunner" who, in nearly every town and many forts, was responsible for artillery services. The subject of this print after Abraham Bosse holds a rocket, an item often used during sieges for signals. His sword also shows that he has a military and command status. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 1953. DP818749)

Below: lieutenant general of artillery Laurent-Michel Le Pelletier, c.1710. Born in 1655, he was a young artillery officer in training from age 11 and in action during the Dutch War at Senef, wounded at Valenciennes and his horse killed at Saint-Denis, wounded at Luxembourg and later led the artillery in Marshal Villars' army. Print after portrait in Le Pelletier's Mémoires. (Author's photo)







An *École d'artillerie* (artillery school) was created by a royal order of 1 May 1679 at the Fortress of Douai. It was staffed by 26 commissaires and 34 officers *pointeurs* (pointers) and disbanded on 30 November of the same year. Subsequently, such schools continued to be organised temporarily in various fortresses "so as to always have a sufficient number of trained [artillery] officers" although their organisation and numbers could vary.

Ordnance

In the early seventeenth century a cannon would fire about eight shots an hour, and after 40 shots needed to cool down for another hour. French artillery was not then technically very innovative and at best would copy the ordnance made in Spain, Italy and Germany and indeed would import cannons from other countries. Mortars were used as early as 1588, but it was only at the 1634 siege of La Mothe (Lorraine) that the French army used these weapons, which were introduced by English engineer Malthus then in the service of France. They became really widespread in the army from the 1680s with the creation of the Royal-Bombardiers Regiment. The art of gun founding in France was not especially developed, some being badly proportioned with the front being heavier than the rear, made of poor-quality metal with rugged bores and thus subject to explode or fire prematurely causing terrible accidents for nearby gunners. King Henry IV had attempted some rationalisation of calibre with the 32-pdr cannon, the 16-pdr *grande couleuvrine*, the 7 1/2-pdr *bâtarde*, the 2 1/2-pdr *moyenne*, the 1-pdr *faucon*, and the 3/4-pdr *fauconneau*. During Louis XIII's reign appeared the 33-pdr *canon de France*, the 24-pdr *demi-canon* and the 12-pdr gun which was the most common as well as 4-, 6-, 48- and 60-pdrs. Those, and seemingly others too, made up the French artillery until the Sun King took effective power during the 1660s.

From 1666, Louvois undertook to reorganise the artillery pieces. One of his objectives was to create a more coherent and simpler technical system, notably by rationalising the numerous types of cannons and making them more effective weapons. To achieve these reforms he called upon a number of foundries to come up with proposals that could meet his requirements. Calibre was rationalised to 4-, 8-, 12-, 16-, 24- and 33-pdrs. After its 1667–1668 capture and integration into French Flanders, the fortress of Douai was selected to be one of the strong points of the defence systems, and furthermore as an arsenal to cast artillery. The Keller brothers (Jean-Jacques 1635–1700 and Jean-Balthazar 1638–1702), incumbent master founders at several royal foundries, took up the challenge and established their foundry in 1669; in the following years they created the classic French cannon design which became a signature of the Sun King's reign, and with some later modifications remained until the advent of the Gribeauval system from the

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Quellen und forschungen zur geschichte der stadt Münster, neue folge, Vol. 9 (1977); *Mercure Galant*, May 1703, 132–135; Saint-Rémy, *Mémoires d'Artillerie*, Vol. 1, pp. xvi–xvii (1741 edition). On the colours of the Canonniers des Côtes, perhaps one was the colonel's and the other the ordonnance; *Mémoires de Louis-Auguste Le Pelletier* (Paris: Hachette, 1896), p.36.

1760s. In the course of an intensive and long career, the Keller brothers introduced important innovations in the casting of ordnance as they supervised the creation of thousands of guns. The name KELLER was cast on the barrels. They were later succeeded by the Bérenger brothers. The Douai foundry, according to a 1713 report, had two small furnaces from which "about 30 pieces of 24 or 16, [and] as many pieces of 4 or of mortars" were produced. Before the capture of the city in 1710, it also had a large smelting furnace that had been destroyed by the allies "from which up to 100 large cannons could be cast; there were times when up to 16 pieces of 4" were cast at the same time.[4]





Above: rear view of *L'Enviée* (the envied), a brass 24-pdr cannon cast at Douai by Berenger in 1693. It was a high point in the art of the founders and the designers. (Courtesy of the Virginia Military Institute. Author's photo)

Top right: top view of *L'Enviée* (the envied), a brass 24-pdr cannon cast at Douai by Berenger in 1693. (Courtesy of the Virginia Military Institute)



Left: a seventeenth-century breech-loading *pierrier* (swivel gun). This type of small cannon firing about a pound (say, 500 gr) of ball, stones or other anti-personnel projectiles was found everywhere in forts, batteries and ships. Its wrought iron type shown here was used from the Middle Ages to the mid eighteenth century. It could be made by any master blacksmith anywhere relatively cheaply and could be hand carried by two men (over a short distance). It was loaded by the breech, which was then shut by an iron breech plug (some having a handle that made them look like a beer mug). (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. George F. Harding Collection)

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[4] Michel Decker, 'Louvois, l'artillerie et les sièges', *Histoire, économie et société*, Vol. 15 No. 1 (1996), pp.75–94; *Douai, son histoire militaire – ses fortifications* (Douai: Lechristé, 1892), pp.113, 178–181.



Above: different types of canons of the 1660s. 1: *Canon* of 48 lbs of 10 feet in length; 2: *Grande couleuvrine* extraordinary of 16-pdr 15 feet long; 3: *demi-canon* or *Couleuvrine* of 24 lbs; 4: *Canon léger* or *demi-canon* nicknamed *la moyenne* of 24-pdr mainly used for siege batteries; 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9: all are light field pieces; 5: *Couleuvrine* of 16 lbs; 6: *Couleuvrine bâtarde* of 8-pdr 10 feet long; 7: *Bâtarde légère* of 8 lbs; 8: regimental cannon of 4 lbs; 9: *Pierrier* of 3 lbs; 10: Portuguese cannon imported in France of only 18 inches in length, firing a 54 pound ball with a charge of 10 pounds of powder; 11: mortar. Print after several illustrations in Mallet's *Les Travaux de Mars*. Private collection. (Author's photo)

Below Design of a brass 33-pdr cannon, late seventeenth century. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie*.




De 24. á l'ordinaire d Emery
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De 24 á l'ordinaire de l'Officier
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De 4.L de Faure nouvelle invention
E
Coupe de la piece de 4. de Faure
E
Les Pieces de 24 et de 8 á l'ordinaire d'Emery sont conformes pour le dessein á la Piece de 24 que l'on voit icy, mais cette Piece de 8. qui est a côté, est de la nouvelle invention
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De 4. d'Emery nouvelle invention
D
Coupe de la piece de 4. d'Emery
D
1
2
3
4
5
6. pieds
8

Cannon barrels designed by Emery and Faure, late seventeenth century. Figures A and C are a 24-pdr, B and D are 8- and 4-pdrs "of new invention" all from Emery. E is a 4-pdr by Faure. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie*. (Author's photo)



Right: a brass cannon of the last third of the seventeenth century. This piece of ordnance, possibly a 24-pdr, may have been cast before the imposition of royal insignias, which must have been a gradual process. It has a fairly crude medallion of King Louis "LIIII" after a marble one by Puget, elaborate intertwined dolphins and breech, but no name nor grand master's badge nor, seemingly, date and locality indicating where it was made. The breech ring does have "no I" and "6162". It appears to be a piece captured by the Portuguese in Brazil and is now at the Museu Historico Nacional in Rio de Janeiro. (Author's photo)

Below: a brass mortar, probably cast in the mid seventeenth century. Fort Anne National Historic Site, Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia. (Author's photo)





Left: a 12 inch brass mortar on an iron bed, late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This watercolour by Henry-Joseph de Caignart was taken from a plate in Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Memoires d'Artillerie* and would have been done during his schooling as an artillery officer-cadet. From his "Recueil Abrégé des Memoires d'Artillerie … " National Historic Sites, Parks Canada. (Author's photo)



Right: Jean-Jacques Keller, master ordnance founder, *c.*1690. Jean-Jacques Keller with his brother Jean-Balthazar were master founders who, from the later 1660s, created the classic French cannon design that became a signature of the Sun King's reign. Print after Nicolas de Largillière. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-BI-7526)



The kettle drum of the Royal-Artillerie regiment, late seventeenth century. It was made of highly polished brass and could have been silvered. Kettle drums were with the Hispano-French artillery train at the 1714 siege of Barcelona. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie.* (Author's photo)



Above: a 12-pdr field gun on its carriage, last third of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie*. (Author's photo)

Below: a 24-pdr field gun on its carriage, last third of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Print after Saint-Rémy's 1697 *Mémoires d'Artillerie*. (Author's photo)



Brass 12-pdr cast in 1702. It was named *Le Courageux* – the courageous. Fort Ticonderoga, New York. (Author's photo)

Campaign and siege artillery trains varied according to the size of an army. An example is the 1691 siege of Mons. It had a covering army requiring a campaign train of:

36 8-pdr cannons with 10 spare limbers and 6,000 cannonballs
36 4-pdr cannons with 10 spare limbers and 6,000 cannonballs
150 ammunition wagons and 1,000 horses
2 travelling forges

A siege train itself consisted of:
10 33-pdr cannons with 15 spare limbers and 12,000 cannonballs
36 24-pdr cannons with 50 spare limbers and 44,000 cannonballs
4 16-pdr cannons with 8 spare limbers and 6,000 cannonballs
8 12-pdr cannons with 12 spare limbers and 4,000 cannonballs
2 18-inch mortars with 2 iron beds and 200 bombs
24 12-inch mortars with 28 iron or wooden beds and 5,000 bombs
12 8-inch mortars with 14 iron or wooden beds and 2,000 bombs and 2,000 fire balls
8 stone mortars with 14 beds
40 wagons
3 travelling forges

This train needed 750 horses just for the wagons and many more for the guns as well as about 5,000 civilian drivers and labourers of all types.

Apart from the very attractive brass guns for the army, there were also much less elaborate iron guns cast in Périgord. Their design was very plain but nevertheless had a certain gracious style. They usually armed warships, coastal forts and fortresses in France's overseas territories. Their calibres were 36, 24, 18, 16, 12, 8, 6 and 4, and the guns were usually mounted on the chariot-like naval, also called garrison, carriages. These guns were overwhelmingly ordered by and for the navy for its own corps of artillery. The navy was independent from the army insofar as its own troops of marines and artillery in France and overseas were concerned.[5]

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[5] Saint-Rémy, *Mémoires d'artillerie*, Vol. 1, pp.39–53.

14

Engineers and Fortifications

The Finest Engineers

From the early seventeenth century French engineers had gained pre-eminence from the Italian engineers; they were led by Jean Errard de Bar-le-Duc whose 1600 *La fortification réduite en art et démontrée* became an international classic and he was followed by Antoine, Chevalier de Ville (1596–1674), Blaise-François, Comte de Pagan (1604–1665) and especially Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707), the Sun King's genial engineer whose works dominated military world engineering until the early nineteenth century. Engineers at that time were not confined to military structures and would also be asked to provide plans for housing, canals, windmills, bridges, roads and even churches. In France, those employed by the royal government were termed *Ingénieurs du Roi* (King's engineers). The ones associated primarily with the armed forces tended to be young officers who were recognised for their engineering capacities, and after strict examinations the best would be certified as such while keeping their military rank for substance since the status of engineer did not come with wages.

From the 1660s two parallel types of King's engineers emerged, one for those attached to the navy and large infrastructure work under Colbert and the other for fortifications and sieges under Louvois. In both organisations, engineers could be also called to build "civilian" works. French military engineering became more specialised with the July 1691 creation of the Département des Fortifications. By then, the number of King's engineers came to 164 officers, with Vauban as the lieutenant general overseeing the professional aspects of their duties in the armies and fortresses and 112 officers attached to the navy, serving mainly in the coastal fortresses. Numbers varied over the years, but the organisation remained essentially similar until the mid eighteenth century. It has often been written by French authors and long taken for granted that engineers were largely non-noble *roturiers*, until Professor Anne Blanchard's meticulous work revealed that 52 percent did in fact have blue blood. Nevertheless, 48 percent *roturiers* was a higher proportion than other corps and this study showed that they came from highly educated families.[1]

Siege Engineering



A senior engineer of the early 1690s officer points at a plan held by Mars, the god of war. Print from the 1693 edition of *Les Fonctions d'un Capitaine de Cavalerie et d'Infanterie …* (Private collection. Author's photo)

The siege of a city in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was a highly organised activity. It had to be undertaken when facing a place that was protected by walls with bastions, ditches and moats around it, and often with a citadel as its ultimate strongpoint. There were some cities that did not fall to an enemy force even if the walls had been pierced because their citadels had managed to resist all assaults. To succeed in taking a fortress city, it was estimated that the attacking army had to be much stronger – the military principle of overwhelming force – which would require an army three or four times larger than the number of defenders, with cannons, some of which had to have a large enough calibre to, hopefully, pierce the curtain walls; as well as large mortars to bombard the city with explosive incendiary shells. Experienced engineer officers were essential in both camps during sieges as they would direct day-to-day operations. A large siege would require many engineers. At the 1690 siege of Mons, Vauban was present with engineer lieutenant general Mesgrigny assisted by three engineers as aides de camp and leading 55 engineers for a total of 60. There were also a number of young apprentice engineers present. Besides overseeing miners, engineers also led some 3,000 locally recruited peasants to help dig trenches and build siege batteries.

The most essential early action for the attackers was to "invest" the city, which meant to surround it. The possibility of obtaining further supplies such as food for the city's inhabitants was cut off. Hunger was a besieger's best ally. Once invested, a first trench would be dug around it, its outer side having field fortifications to repulse a relief force or a raid from the outside, while batteries for cannons and mortars would be prepared. Once this was done, another trench was dug closer. The third trench was next to the city's walls close enough to breach with cannon fire or a mine at a selected area that would come under assault. Defenders were just not sitting in the city; they might frequently organise a "sortie" which was a large surprise raid on siege trenches and batteries. It could take weeks and even months to complete siege operations, concluding with the taking of the city, which was the usual outcome, or the withdrawal of the besieging force.

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[1] Anne Blanchard, *Les Ingénieurs du "Roy" de Louis XIV à Louis XVI* (Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry, 1979), pp.51–83, 229–231. See also Professor Blanchard's essential *Dictionnaire des Ingénieurs Militaires 1691–1791* (Montpellier, 1981) which gives a short biography of every engineer.


COURTINE
caponnière
BASTION
COURTINE
POTERNE
TENAILLE
COURTINE
BASTION
DEMI LUNE
BASTION
DIGUE
Batterie de Breche
Cavalier de
FOSSÉ SEC
CHEMIN COUVERT
DEMI-LUNE
GLACIS
TRANCHEE D'APPROCHE
3e PARALLÈLE
Préparation pour nouvel empiacement de batterie
Batterie d'approche
2e PARALLELE
Passage en fascine pour canons
1re PARALLELE
Mantelet
transport des gabions

Siege operations in the era of the Sun King. The basics steps for approaching the ramparts are shown by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd parallel lines of trenches with batteries installed. The defenders resist on top of the outer glacis on the *chemin couvert* (covered way) and will continue to do so on the *demi-lunes* (or ravelins) and finally from the bastions and *courtine* (curtain walls). They could retreat to the curtain wall and bastion via the small *poterne* (narrow corridor) through the wall. The dry ditches (*fossé sec*) may be flooded at the time. From an old lithograph. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Above: Trench lines encircling a besieged fortress, 1650s–1660s. The technique was then to dig straight trenches with many protective small redoubts to the curtain walls. From Antoine de Ville's 1666 *La Fortification*. (Author's photo)

Below: Circumvolution of an army camp with protective field fortifications, second half of the seventeenth century. Print incorporating features in Mallet's *Les Travaux de Mars*. (Private collection. Author's photo)






ALLAIN MANESSON MALLET PARISI. INGENI DES CAMPS ET ARMEES DV ROY DE PORTVGAL



Above: Allain Manesson Mallet, 1683. Although French, he became a senior "Engineer of the camps and armies of the King of Portugal" during the 1660s. After he came back to France he authored *Les Travaux de Mars*, which became one of the best-known military manuals of the time. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

Top left: an incendiary throwing ring, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This item, called a *couette* in French and *quoit* by Austrians and Germans, consisted of pitch-covered material that was set on fire with match and cord and hurled into enemy trenches or over curtain walls, in the hope of starting a conflagration. (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. George F. Harding Collection)

Left: An engineer or a sapper during a siege, second third of the seventeenth century. Engineers and engineering troops such as sappers were in very dangerous post and therefore would be issued with armour during sieges. Print from Hennebon's *Nos Soldats*. (Author's photo)

Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, early 1700s. Born in Burgundy on 4 May 1633, he became one of humanity's greatest military engineers, who for all his accomplishments remained shy of honours. He passed away on 30 March 1707. His remains, crowned by his statue, rest at his mausoleum in the church of the Invalides in Paris. (Author's photo)

Vauban's Works

During his life Vauban devised three systems for the defence of fortresses. All three had in common the basic principle of adapting the fortification to its terrain, because systems had to be adaptable and common sense was encouraged rather than following rigid rules. The **first system** was essentially perfecting the fortification being built to its terrain; there were few novelties except for the tenaille. The **second system** drew on Vauban's siege experience that bastions could not hold for long against the enemy's close-range fire. To solve this, he added a second line of defence, being an outer wall incorporating bastions that were separated from the curtain wall (which allowed to place more artillery) that now had much smaller "tower" bastions. This was the main type built during the Sun King's reign. The **third system** had many features from earlier systems which it perfected, notably enlarging the curtain wall's bastions while refining its tower bastions, separating the demi-lune in two parts making it more difficult to take by assault, replacing stone revetments on the outer scarps with grass and adding a sharply rising ridge that was difficult to climb. This was notably built from 1698 at Neuf Brisach where the terrain was very flat and also seen in plans of Ypres and Lille.

It can be added that the second and third systems favoured defence over a wide area and the works were as independent as possible from each other so that if one feature was overwhelmed, it did not necessarily cause the fall of the others. Cavaliers could be added to command better the terrain to defend.[2]

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[2] Vauban's works were not published for obvious security reasons during his lifetime although some parts would appear in, for instance, *L'ingénieur françois* and Saint-Rémy. As part of their schooling, officers wishing to become King's engineers had to faithfully copy the manuscript originals (now in the library of the French army's Génie). We have seen several exceptionally good contemporary manuscript copies now preserved in the libraries of Fort Ticonderoga



Left: Vauban's instruction model showing the basic system for the attack of a fortress, second half of the seventeenth century. It features the three parallel trench lines with the connecting trenches dug in zigzags, providing additional protection for the attacking soldiers. Etched wood. Chateau de Bazoches-du-Morvan, Burgundy. (Author's photo)



Right: wooden instruction model of Vauban's system for the defence of a fortress, last third of the seventeenth century. This is basically his second system. Five successive features protect the fortress from the outer glacis to the bastioned curtain walls. Chateau de Bazoches-du-Morvan, Burgundy. (Author's photo)



Left: theoretical model of fortifications for a town, c.1705. This model was made from Vauban's instructions. It incorporated various features of his second and third systems. Chateau de Bazoches-du-Morvan, Burgundy. (Author's photo)



Above: the citadel at Entreveaux. Built by Vauban from 1690 to protect upper Provence from invasion, it controlled the upper Var River Valley at the foot of the Alps. Sited on a very steep rocky hill just above the town of Entreveaux, its citadel was accessible only by a narrow path that had around 20 redoubts/gates, a remarkably innovative feature that made enemy ascents next to impossible. (Author's photo)

Below: the small medieval town of Colmars-les-Alpes at the foot of the Alps. This remote hamlet with medieval walls in the Verdon River Valley was attacked by enemy troops in 1690 who were repulsed by French dragoons and militiamen. It had to be better fortified to prevent further incursions, and in 1693 Vauban prescribed two redoubts be erected there. Local topography did not allow for large bastions and other habitual fortifications, so Engineer Niquet opted for two forts outside the walls. The medieval walls and small square towers were also reinforced. It was an excellent example of one of Vauban's main principles: adapting fortifications to terrain. (Author's photo)



Fortress Networks

When the young Sun King asked how much building a citadel would cost, the elderly Chevalier de Ville answered: "Sire, to fortify a place, one must open his purse and close his eyes."[3]

He was not shaken by that answer and proceeded to sponsor the most formidable fortification programme in Europe. Louis XIV knew a good thing when he saw it. He recognised Vauban's genius and gave him the authority and the means to create daunting obstacles for any enemy force wishing to march into France. His mid-1670s pré carré notion was refined in his important 1678 *Mémoire* to fortify the frontiers of Flanders as a series of fortresses placed in two lines, much as an army disposed in orders of battle, which acted as bases for a powerful field army that would rapidly move to the threatened spots or become secure logistical anchor points if that army invaded enemy territory. This not only forced an invader to undertake sieges to clear the way, but it also required a large field force to counter a defending field army.

This strategy threatened the attacking field army with the perpetual danger of being outflanked, which is a situation that the extraordinary Marlborough eventually mastered, but in the case of crushing defeats it still left the lines of fortresses that had to be taken if the heartland, be it Germany or France, was to be invaded. Sieges took time and thus gave the defending nation what it needed the most to raise new armies. The greatest benefit to this fortification strategy was that it kept France's enemies outside of its frontiers, and apart from a few raids the wars were fought within foreign territories. The social and economic benefits to France were and remain incalculable, and certainly well worth the enormous sums spent of fortifications, notably in Flanders.[4]

Elsewhere, one of the more vulnerable and difficult areas to fortify was the Italian border with its Alpine mountains. These were also fairly remote and sparsely populated areas so that just building extensive fortifications was an expensive challenge. From Switzerland to the Mediterranean coast there were six passes that could be crossed by an invading force. The urgency to fortify better came with the allied raid into Dauphiné in 1692 (see Volume 3). Vauban was sent to the spot and improvements were made which secured much of the area. During the major allied raid to take Toulon in 1707, Antibes resisted successfully while the incursion turned into near disaster for the allies. They could not and did not stay for long (see above).[5]

(Ticonderoga, New York, USA) and (Fortress Louisbourg National Historic site, Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, Canada). In English, we recommend Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, *A Manual of Siegecraft and Fortification*, George A. Rostock, translator (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968) from the 1740 Leiden edition.

[3] Quoted in *Douai, son histoire militaire – ses fortifications*, p.182.

[4] We recommend in particular the superbly illustrated overview by Michel Parent and Jacques Verroust, *Vauban* (Paris: Éditions Jacques Fréal, 1971).

[5] Daniel David, 'Les fortifications alpines françaises', *Revue historique des armées*, No. 250 (2008), pp.1–5, <http://rha.revues.org/167>.

On the whole:

> Vauban, wrote Napoleon, organised entire countries as entrenched camps, protected by inundation of rivers, by places of war and by forests; but he never pretended these fortresses alone could close the frontier. He wanted this fortified frontier to give protection to a weaker army against a stronger army; that gave it [the weaker army] a more favourable field of operations and [would] prevent the advance of the enemy army, and give occasions to attack it with advantage; finally, it gave time to allow reinforcements to arrive.

This largely worked during the Sun King's wars, and even a century later saved France from invasion in 1793.[6]


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MONTREUIL-SUR-MER
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DIEPPE
LE QUESNOY
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LONGWY
LANDAU
PORT-EN-BESSIN
VERDUN
METZ
BITCHE
CARANTEC
PARIS
PHALSBOURG
FORT-LOUIS
St-MALO
MARSAL
TOUL
NANCY
STRASBOURG
BREST
CAMARET
Seine
SÉLESTAT
NEUF-BRISACH
BRISACH
GRAY
CONCARNEAU
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SALINS-LES-BAINS
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JOUX
St-MARTIN-DE-RÉ
LA ROCHELLE
ILE D'AIX
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ROCHEFORT
LYON
Rhône
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Isère
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Garonne
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ANTIBES
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ILE Ste-MARGUERITE
NAVARRENX
St-JEAN-PIED-DE-PORT
TOULON
VILLEFRANCHE-DE-CONFLENT
PERPIGNAN
FORT-LES-BAINS
COLLIOURE
MONTLOUIS
PORT-VENDRES
PRATS DE MOLLO
FORT DE BELLEGARDE

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6 Quoted in Lacroix, *L'Armée depuis le Moyen-Age jusqu'à la Revolution*, p.157.


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Oudenarde
Bruxelles
Cassel
Menin
Courtrai
Neer
BRABANT
Tournai
Ath
Steenkerque
Ramillies
Aire
Lille
Nivelles
Soignies
Séclin
Pont-à-Marcq
HAINAUT
Meuse
Béthune
Mons-en-Puelle
Condé
Seneffe
Scarpe
Mons
Namur
Valenciennes
Malplaquet
Charleroi
Douai
Denain
Sambre
Arras
le Quesnoy
Maubeuge
Philippeville
Cambrai
Landrecies
Avesnes
Mariembourg
Givet
FRANCE
Oise
Somme
Guise
Rocroi
Charleville
Mézières
Sedan

Above: map showing Vauban's *Pré Carré* lines of fortresses, last third of the seventeenth century. The first (upper) line started at Dunkirk and went on to Bergues, Fumes, Ypres, Menin, Lille, Tournai, Condé, Valenciennes, Le Quesnoy, Maubeuge, Philipeville, Dinant ending at Givet on the Meuse River. The second (lower) line started at Gravelines and went on to Saint-Omer (not shown), Aire, Béthune, Arras, Douai, Bouchain, Cambrai, Landrecies, Avesnes, Marienbourg, Rocroi ending at Charleville on the Meuse River. (Old map in private collection with digital additions by author)

Facing page: the main fort and fortresses in France and it borders. Although not all are shown, it is impressive testimony of the Sun King's determination to defend his frontiers. All shown and more besides were upgraded or newly built. The greatest concentration was in the north-east, the most constantly threatened area. (Map by the author)

A Short Glossary of Fortification Terms[7]

Abbatis. A defensive barricade or row of obstructions made up of closely spaced felled trees, tops pointed towards the enemy, their branches trimmed to points and interlaced where possible.

Banquette. A continuous step or ledge at the interior base of a *parapet* on which defenders stood to direct musket fire over the top of the wall. A fire step.

Bastion. A projection from the curtain wall, made up of four sides, two faces and two flanks, which better enabled a garrison to defend the ground adjacent to the main or curtain walls.

Barbette. An arrangement for cannons to be fired directly over the top of a low wall instead of through embrasures.

Battery. An emplacement for artillery.

Berm. A line of wooden stakes or logs, 1.8–2.4 m long, planted in the middle of a ditch and pointing vertically.

Breastwork. See: Parapet.

Casemate. A mortar-bomb or shell-proof chamber located within the walls of defensive works; generally pierced with openings for weapons; loopholes for muskets or embrasures for cannon.

Cavalier. A raised artillery platform usually situated within a bastion and rising about four metres above the rest of the walls. Its commanding height allowed its guns to fire at a longer range and aim within enemy trenches.

Chemin couvert. See: Covered way.

Cordon. The coping or top course of a *scarp* or a *rampart*, sometimes of different coloured stone and set proud from the rest of the wall. The point where a *rampart* stops and a *parapet* begins.

Corne. See: Hornwork.

Courtine. See: Curtain.

Counterguard. Defensive work built in a ditch in front of a bastion to give it better protection.

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[7] For more definitions andmore on fortifications of the period, see Paddy Griffith, *The Vauban Fortifications of France* (Oxford: Osprey Fortress 42, 2006) and Jean-Denis G.G. Lepage, *Vauban and the French Military under Louis XIV* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2010).



The Port de l'Embouchure at Toulouse. This was the junction of the Canal du Midi with the canalised Garonne River at Toulouse. This canal system built between 1666 and 1681 linked Sète on the Mediterranean to Bordeaux on the Atlantic, one of the greatest engineering feats of its time thanks to the work of many King's engineers. It had great and positive impacts on France's economy and military strategy. Toulouse was the meeting point of the canals, and the event was commemorated by the white marble monument (at the centre) in 1774. (Author's photo)

Counterscarp. The outer side of a ditch or moat. See: Scarp. *Contre-escarpe* in French.

Covered way. A depression, road or path in the outer edge of a fort's moat or ditch, generally protected from enemy fire by a parapet, at the foot of which might be a *banquette* enabling the coverage of the *glacis* with musketry.

Cunette. A furrow located in the bottom of a dry ditch for draining.

Curtain. The wall of a fort between two bastions.

Demi-bastion. A half-bastion with only one face and one flank.

Demi-lune. Triangular-shaped defensive work built in a ditch in front of a *bastion* or of a curtain wall. Also termed a ravelin.

Ditch. A wide, deep trench around a defensive work. When filled with water it was termed a moat or wet ditch; otherwise a dry ditch or *fossé*.

Embrasure. An opening in a wall or *parapet* allowing cannon to fire through it, the gunners remaining under cover. The sides of the embrasure were called cheeks, the bottom the sole; the narrow part of the opening, the throat, and the wide part, the splay.

Enfilade fire. Fire directed from the flank or side of a body of troops, or along the length of a ditch, parapet or wall. Guns in the flank of a bastion can direct enfilade fire along the face of the curtain wall.



Wicket fascines and other instruments used in sieges in the late seventeenth, and the eighteenth centuries. From "Recueil Abrégé des Memoires d'Artillerie ..." by Henry-Joseph de Caignart. National Historic Sites, Parks Canada. (Author's photo)

Épaulement. A parapet or work protecting against enfilade fire.

Fascines. Long bundles of sticks or small-diameter tree branches bound together for use in revetments, for stabilising earthworks, filling ditches, etc.

Fossé or foss. See: ditch, dry.

Fraise. A defence of closely placed stakes or logs, 1.8–2.4 m long, driven or dug into the ground and sharpened; arranged to point horizontally or obliquely outward from a defensive position.

Gabion. A large, round, woven wicker cylinder intended to be set in place and filled with earth, sand or stones.

Gallery. An interior passageway or corridor that ran along the base of a fort's walls.

Gate. A main entrance of a fortress.

Glacis. A broad, gently sloped earthwork or natural slope in front of a fort, separated from the fort by a ditch and outworks and so arranged as to be swept with musket or cannon fire.

Gorge. The interval or space between the two curtain angles of a bastion. In a ravelin, the area formed by the flanked angle and either left open or enclosed.

Guardhouse. The headquarters for the daily guard.

Guérite. A small lookout watchtower, usually located on the upper outer corner of a bastion.

Halfbastion. See: Demi-bastion.

Hornwork. A work made up of a bastion front; two halfbastions and a curtain


Planche 1
fig. 2.
fig. 3.
fig. 4.
fig. 5
Bastion b a c fig. 2.
Faces du bastion a e, et a f.
Flancs du bastion e b et f c.
Capitale du bastion t u a.
Courtine b g ou h h.
Fossé s, s s s. &c.
Chemin couvert 2 3 2 3 2 3. &c
Places d'armes 2, 2, 2, 2. &c.
Traverses 6, 6, 6, 6 &c.
Glacis 9 9 9 9. &c.
Ouvrage a Corne fig. 4.
Les demi-bastions b o p, et c n m.
La Courtine c b.
Ouvrage a Couronne fig. 5.
Le Bastion entier a.
Les demi-Bastions b, et b.
Rempart 4 4 4 4.

Plan of the main fortifications features largely taken from Vauban's treatises. This one plate has the advantage of showing nearly all the main aspects. The French captions below often denote features that are also known in English. Some, however, were translated by British engineers. *Ouvrage à Corne* is a "Hornwork", *Courtine* is a "curtain" or "curtain wall" and *demi-Bastion* is a "half-bastion". From the *Petit Dictionnaire du tem[p]s* (Paris, 1757). (Author's photo)

and two long sides termed *branches*. A **Crownwork** (*Corne Couronnée*) is a three-pointed extension of a Hornwork.

Loopholes. Small openings in walls or stockades through which muskets were fired.

Machicoulis. Projections in old castles and over gates, left open above to throw stones, etc., on enemies below.

Magazine. A place for the storage of gunpowder, arms or goods generally related to ordnance.

Merlon. The solid feature between embrasures in a parapet.

Moat. See: Ditch.



Facing page: plan and profile of a machicolate redoubt designed by Vauban, last third of the seventeenth century. This design became the basic standard in universal military engineering for some two centuries. It was built of masonry or of wood or a mix of both in a variety of ways, notably as wooden blockhouses found all over the world. Print after Mr. de M …'s 1695 *L'Ingénieur françois*. (Author's photo)

Left: plan of a powder magazine, early eighteenth century. The powder barrels were stacked on timber bases. The openings in the walls were for ventilation and built in a way that could contain the worst effects of an explosion. This design became the standard plan for such buildings in all European armies. After a manuscript of Vauban's fortification treatise. Fortress Louisbourg National Historic Site, Parcs Canada. (Author's photo)



Right: profile views of a powder magazine, early eighteenth century. The roof as well as the walls were very thick and hopefully "bomb proof". After a manuscript of Vauban's fortification treatise. Fortress Louisbourg National Historic Site, Parcs Canada. (Author's photo)


Machecoulis de Mr de Vauban.
Planche. 19.
page. 226.
8 pied
7 pieds
Entré
p. 6
2 pieds
3
2
2
Echelle pour Descendre au Rendechaussé
8 pieds
11 pied
16 pieds
3 P
3 P
4 1/2
2
16 pieds
2



Clockwise from top left:

Seventeenth-century French siege helmet. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, Gift of William H. Riggs, 1913. 14.25.490008AA2015)

French siege helmet, second half of the seventeenth century. This helmet offers good protection for the face and may have been intended for miners. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, DP22441)

French siege helmet, c.1675. This somewhat more elaborate helmet may have been for an engineer officer. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, Gift of William H. Riggs, 1913 14.25.494008AA2015)

French siege helmet of the 1690s. Basically a fairly crude skull cap with visor, side and back plates probably meant for enlisted men. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, Gift of William H. Riggs, 1913 14.25.492003AA2015)

Orgue. See: Portcullis.

Outwork. An outer defence, inside the glacis but outside of the body of the place. A ravelin is an outwork.

Palisade. A high fence made of stakes, poles, palings, or pickets, supported by rails and set endwise in the ground. See: Stockade.

Parallel trench. The trenches that faced a city's fortifications, usually three were dug during a siege. They were connected by *Tranchées d'approche* (approach trenches) that went closer to the walls.

Parapet. A breastwork or protective wall over which defenders, standing on *banquettes*, fired their weapons.

Portcullis. A timber or iron grating that can be lowered to close the gates of a fortress. *Orgue* in French.

Postern. A passage leading from the interior of a fortification to the ditch. *Poterne* in French.

Rampart. The mass of earth, usually faced with masonry, formed to protect an enclosed area.

Ravelin. An outwork consisting of two faces forming a salient angle at the front and a flank angle to the rear that was usually closed at the gorge. Ravelins were separated from the main body of the place by ditches and functioned to protect *curtains.* Usually called a *Demi-lune* in French.

Redoubt. An enclosed fortification without bastions.

Revetment. The sloping wall of stone or brick supporting the outer face of a rampart.

Sally port. A passageway within the rampart, usually vaulted, leading from the interior of a fort to the exterior, primarily to provide for sorties.

Sap. A trench and parapet constructed by besiegers to protect their approaches toward a fortification.

Scarp. The interior side of a ditch or the outer slope of a rampart. *Escarpe* in French. See also counterscarp.

Stockade. A line or enclosure of logs or stakes set upright in the earth with no separation between them, to form a barrier eight or more feet high. Stockades were generally provided with loopholes. The loopholes were reached by banquettes or elevated walks. See also palisades.

Tenaille. A fortified position protecting a postern.

Traverse. A parapet or wall thrown across a covered way, a ditch or other features to prevent enfilade or reverse fire along a work.

Trench. See: Parallel trench. *Tranchée* in French.

15

Territorial Command Staff, Gentlemen-Cadets and Light Troops

Provincial and Garrison Staff

Military presence and administration throughout the realm was represented by many officers that had sedentary functions in large cities that were fortified, some having citadels, or in smaller towns that had a curtain wall as well as more solitary forts. All of these places, called *places de guerre*, had various levels of command and garrison staff. Each province had, as senior commander, a governor general – literally governor and general – who was the senior authority and commander of military forces of all types in the province. The governor general did not directly command regular army troops in his province, but he inspected them. He also had powers to muster, inspect and regulate the various types of militia.

The governor general's subordinates were city, town or fort governors. In the case of a large city, the governor might have the rank of lieutenant or major general, was assisted by a commandant who would be a major or brigadier general. They presided over a garrison staff that included a *lieutenant du roi* (king's lieutenant), a major, one or more *aide-majors* and one or two *capitaine des portes* (captain of the gates). If the city had a citadel, there was a commandant, a major and an *aide-major*. A lesser town would have a commandant, often called a governor, a king's lieutenant (as lieutenant governor) and a major with perhaps an *aide-major* and a *capitaine des portes* depending on the size of the town. The forts would have a commandant with one or more subordinates depending on their importance. All these posts were filled by thousands of older army officers who were still equal to garrison staff duties.[1]

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[1] A quaint and interesting period source is Antoine de Ville, *De la charge du gouverneur des places* (Amsterdam: Abraham Wolfgang, 1674 from previous French editions) whose first chapters concern duties, and later ones fortifications.

These duties generally consisted in providing quarters and substance to the army troops posted there or passing through, which was mainly the work of majors. Security of the area was constant concern and arrangements and accommodations were made for troops to stand guard. No officer or soldier could take leave unless by permission of the governor. A third of a unit was posted everyday for a successive turn day and night. The gates, under their own captain, always had to have squads of soldiers and were subject to opening in the morning and shutting at night, setting daily passwords, and inspecting of the premises. The garrison staff officers were frequently in contact with regimental officers to coordinate duties and also with delegates of the province's intendant regarding financial and legal matters. In cities that had municipal governments, the governors would also liaise with mayors regarding defence issues such as fortifications and the city's bourgeois militia (see below). Garrison staff officers were also to conduct court martials, the town major sometime acting as prosecutor before a jury of at least seven officers. An army administration *commissaire* had to be present, but did not vote on the verdict.[2]

The pay of garrison staff officers was not considerable compared to officers on campaign, but they benefited from various taxes in kind, such as a few logs of firewood from each wagon carrying wood entering the city or a small measure of wine from a wine shipment. Rations and other emoluments generally followed those of their rank in peacetime duties. Finally, these officers did not have assigned uniforms and thus dressed like the gentlemen they were with sword and cane.[3]

Intendants and Commissaires

These were officials rather than officers and not all were solely concerned with the army, but their work was essential for military logistics, finances and judicial matters. There were two types:

Provincial intendants. Their functions concerned with "justice, police and finances" at large and thus the next most important post after that of the governor general. Regarding the army, they were responsible for providing all that was necessary for the troops. From 1688, they also became responsible for the organisation and supply of the conscripted men into the regiments of provincial militia. To achieve all this and more, they had a staff of sub-delegates of which the various types of "commissaires" such as a *commissaire-ordonnateur*, which was usually the next senior level. There were also treasurers and other fiscal officials. As part of their functions supervising justice and police activities, intendants were also in administrative charge of the armed constabulary forces in the province and this included royal Maréchaussée detachments which, as seen below, were under the authority of a marshal of France and considered to be part of the armed forces. Indeed, intendants were escorted by several archers at formal events and when attending mass.

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[2] M. de Chevrière, *Détails militaires* (Paris: Mariette, 1742), Vol. 1, pp.113–116.

[3] Victor Belhomme, *L'Armée française en 1690* (Paris: Baudoin, 1895), pp.143–146; *Dictionnaire d'art et d'histoire militaires* (Paris: PUF, 1988), p.494.

Army intendants. They were the less numerous and commissioned only in wartime. Their responsibilities were fewer than their provincial counterparts and consisted largely of seeing that *munitionnaires* (civilian suppliers of ammunition and other goods) provided supplies for troops at a decent price and would also oversee relations between treasurers and company captains. The *commissaires des guerres* (war commissioners) were actually in charge of administration in peacetime as well as during hostilities. That post was permanent, and from 1664 a venal official charge, which increased its prestige because it was worth around 100,000 livres, more than a line colonel's commission. They ranked as senior officers and became a corps of non-combatant military administrators ordered to consist of 180 *commissaires des guerres* in 1692. Their subordinates were *commissaires-ordonateurs* who in turn had *commissaires ordinaires* to assist them. The army thus had at least 500 non-combatant administrative officials. They had no prescribed uniforms.[4]

Gentlemen-Cadets and their Training

The training of a young man leading to an officer's commission in the seventeenth century occurred when serving as a cadet in a regiment to "learn the ropes" of life in the army. This was done under the guidance and supervision of the regimental officers, some of the sergeants and the chaplain. The cadets might be more or less noble and were likely to be related to one of the more senior officers. Their status and rank was loosely below that of a junior officer. Although cadets were seen in all regiments and every company, they were not listed on the establishment. Some were quite young when they joined and when seen to be a promising officer, the senior officer would recommend that a commission be granted. This form of "on the job" training had the advantage of exposing all the aspects of life in the army, including battles, to the future officer. However, his formal education would be rather evasive although he should have learned from officers and chaplains some basic literature, mathematics and religion as well as social skills such as dancing and good manners as became a gentleman. However, the Chevalier de Guignard, the experienced officer and author of *L'École de Mars*, noted that cadets learned "nothing more than simply drill and stand a few hours guard as a sentry, which are simply the common soldier's duty." On the whole, the cadet's training does not seem to have been rigorous and some wondered if they did not learn more "bad habits" than military sciences.

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[4] Marie-Ève Ouellet, *Le métier d'intendant en France et en Nouvelle-France* (Québec: Septentrion, 2018), pp.13–15, 46, 186, 227, 275; Belhomme, *L'Armée française en 1690*, pp.148–152; *Dictionnaire d'art et d'histoire militaires* (Paris: PUF, 1988), pp.468–469; Guy Rowlands, *The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV* (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), chapter 3; Chevrière, *Détails militaires*, Vol. 1, pp.113.

Opportunities for more formal and extensive studies and specialised subjects such as engineering and ordnance were not then considered strictly military occupations, and might be somewhat snubbed by the nobility. This situation, which was common to all western armies, began to erode slightly in France during the reign of Louis XIII, when prime minister Cardinal Richelieu perceived the need for a more structured education for army officers. In 1629 he created an *Académie Royale* for the education for 20 young gentlemen destined to become officers, and an *Académie royale des exercises de guerre* that appears to have concentrated on drill and tactics. Both academies were, however, short-lived. Instead, for the more noble young gentlemen, the King's Musketeers of the royal guard in particular became an unofficial military academy (see Volume 1 for more details). In the late 1660s, with the army growing, the King noticed the rising number of cadets, and by an order of 25 February 1670 limited their number to two per company no younger than 18 years old. For guidance there were instructors sent around by Colonel Martinet (see Volume 2, pp.101–102), but this was not enough.

Companies of Cadets-Gentilhommes

The Sun King and his ministers deplored the lack of specialised and disciplined training. In June 1682, nine companies of gentlemen-cadets were created, one each at the fortresses of Metz (later transferred to Saarlouis), Tournai, Cambrai, Valenciennes (transferred to Belfort in 1687), Charlemont, Longwy, Strasbourg, Brisach and Besançon. The companies were initially destined to form engineers, but this quickly changed to providing officers for the whole army and the overwhelming number became infantry officers. Since these companies would be the main source for army officers, on 1 September 1682 the King allowed only three cadets to be formed in each regiment and abolished them altogether on 25 July 1683. The curriculum shows that the cadet's day was spent learning mathematics, fortifications, drawing, German, fencing, dancing, drill and target shooting. They were to stand guard duties in the fortress. Some 300 gentlemen-cadets detached from the companies at Metz and Longwy were at the 1684 siege of Luxembourg, but were not allowed to be part of the assault force, which was a great disappointment to the young warriors.[5]

In 1686 the royal propaganda mentioned that 6,000 "young gentlemen divided into companies are guarding the King's citadels, will replace the officers of his troops and their education is worthy of their birth." There were about 400 to 600 cadets in each of the nine companies so the more plausible numbers would have been 3,600 to 5,400. By 1693 the Marquis de Sourches mentioned 250 per company or 2,250 in total. Each company was led by a captain, who was the governor or the King's lieutenant of the citadel, a lieutenant and two sub-lieutenants, two sergeants, eight brigadiers and 16

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[5] Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire depuis la paix de Nimègue* (Paris: Didier, 1865), pp.302–314; Léon Hennet, *Les compagnies de cadets-gentilhommes et les écoles militaires* (Paris: Baudoin, 1889), pp.3–6, 13–21.



Two officers or noble officials in an urban setting, 1660s. These officers may well belong to garrison staff of a town or fortress as the gate and carriage suggests. They are certainly not outfitted for campaign, the mounted one wearing shoes with the fashionable red heels which were said to be reserved to noblemen. He wears a grey suit with white ribbons, his companion has one in light yellow-buff with pale red ribbons. Painting by François Du Chatel. (The Louvre, Paris. Author's photo)



Left: a *Cadet-gentilhomme* – Gentleman-Cadet of one of the cadet companies, *c.*1689. This nineteenth-century print by Eugène Titeu reconstructing the uniform shows the blue coat with silver buttons and the grey stockings. Grey coat cuffs with a grey waistcoat and breeches, red ribbons on the silver-laced hat and shoulders were added as an interpretation. (Courtesy New York Public Library, New York City)



Right: a fencing instructor, 1680s. This was one of the educational aspects that was surely most enjoyed by the gentlemen-cadets. Print after Nicolas Bonnart. (Courtesy Los Angeles County Museum of Art)



Fusiliers des Montagnes, early eighteenth century. Print after Guignard's *L'École de Mars*. (Author's photo)

sub-brigadiers. The gentlemen-cadets were 14 to 25 years of age. They were armed with a musket, a sword, a waist belt and a cartridge box and clothed with a blue cloth coat with silver buttons and grey stockings. They were paid 10 sols a day, four of which were retained to pay for cleaning, the canteen, the baker, extra clothing and shoes. Gambling and even going to see a play was forbidden, but they could play billiards.[6]

At first, this system, which was ahead of its time, appears to have worked well and the cadet's manoeuvres and drills seen by the King at Besançon and Strasbourg delighted him. However, in 1685 Louvois learned that fewer than four cadets at Charlemont had learned mathematics, since they were not required to study. Clearly tolerance was widespread. Discipline being weak in the companies of Charlemont and Besançon, seditions and even duels broke out in 1685 resulting in court martials and severe penalties. This certainly disappointed the King. With the Nine Years' War breaking out most cadets were sent to new regiments and their companies abolished by 1694 except for those of Strasbourg and Tournai, which lasted another two years.[7]

With the collapse of the gentlemen-cadet companies, military education went back to the former practice of having cadets in the regiments and with the King's musketeers for a somewhat higher degree of education for the more noble.

Light and Mountain Units

Apart from the regular troops mentioned above and in preceding volumes were variable numbers of independent companies that generally existed mostly in wartime. Of these, the companies raised Roussillon were the most unusual both by their appearance and by their tactics. These were units that since 1659 had fought as skirmishers in the Pyrenees mountains

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[6] Albert Babeau, *La vie militaire sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1890), Vol. 2, pp.5–7, 21–25. La Place des Victories, le 28 mars 1686 (print, private collection). Although supposedly reserved to gentlemen of noble lineage, the bourgeois clamoured and obtained that many of their sons be admitted. It was lack of firm management, more than the lofty objectives of the Sun King to better educate officers, which caused the scheme's failure. Besides lack of discipline, some cadets admitted were much older and there were even illiterate cadets.

[7] *Mémoires du Marquis de Sourches*, Vol. 4, p.291. He wrote that the King disbanded all companies on 1 December 1693, but this actually took longer. He commented that "this institution looked good, at least in appearances, but is very expensive to the King's coffers, and of mediocre use." Rousset, p.306, calculated almost a million livres a year. The last two companies to be disbanded in 1696 were probably the best.



A Miquelet-style musket, late seventeenth to early eighteenth century. This fine quality example would have been carried by an officer or a prominent member of his community. The stock is decorated with silver and has the typical Miquelet-style flintlock. The weapon's length is 86 cm and the barrel has a calibre of 16 (or .68 English measure). (Courtesy Art Institute of Chicago. George F. Harding Collection)

separating Spain from France when Roussillon, a largely francophone area, was ceded by Spain to France. Such corps had also been occasionally seen in Dauphiné, at the foot of the Alps since the end of the sixteenth century. It was at the Pyrenees that there were sizeable contingents of what could be called mountain troops. They were needed to face the Spanish Miquelet mountain skirmishers, which were remarkably similar to the French in their arms and dress. A company of Miquelets d'Aubeterre was organised in Béarn during February 1674, two companies of Miquelets were raised in Roussillon in September and nine more in February 1675. They were armed with a blunderbuss muskets, a pistol and a dagger. In 1684 there were 1,200 men of light mountain troops in Roussillon divided in two regiments of eight companies, each with, in addition, two independent companies of 120 and 100 men respectively. They were armed with flintlock muskets and daggers, some having long forks with two points instead of pikes. They wore "red, grey or blue caps according to the livery of each company." These troops had "colours and drums." Between 1693 and 1697, there were 46 Miquelet companies of 30 men each.[8]

During the War of the Spanish Succession, the Pyrenees become a battleground of continuous raids and skirmishes between Catalan and Roussillon Miquelets mountain troops. They were organised as a regiment of Fusiliers des Montagnes of one battalion in 1702, expanded to two battalions on 28 January 1704 with a third battalion added on 24 March, a fourth and fifth in September 1705 and a sixth on 1 March 1706 totalling 100 companies of 29 officers and men each. The Chevalier de Guignard who served with them recalled they "gave very essential marks [of their valour] on many occasion that I witnessed." They were disbanded in 1713.[9]

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[8] Armand Sapin-Lignières, *Les troupes légères de l'Ancien Régime* (Saint-Julien-du-Sault: Presses Sultasiennes, 1979), chapters 2 and 3; *Mercure Galant*, April 1684, pp.112–114. The Spanish Miquelet mountain troops were described in the *Mercure Galant*, May 1689, pp.366–367, as having "a kind of musket called *Gispe*. They have a sort of bandolier or leather sash, four times wider than our shoulder belts, on which are fixed three iron rings that have pistols; they are all iron mounted including their ramrods. They wear at right a dagger or long knife and at left one smaller, and one smaller called *Gabinet*. They have a large cartridge bag worn in the back in which they have almost everything and easily can be put in front when they need to use it. Their shoes are made of cords, which gives them the possibility of climbing mountains without hurting their feet. They only wear caps that they call *Bertines*."

[9] M. de Guignard, *L'École de Mars* (Paris: Simart, 1725), Vol. 1, p.722; Archives Nationales de France, G7 /1780, État des Rgts d'Infanterie, Cavalerie et Dragons, 1707.

16

Armed Constabulary Troops

Maréchaussée de France

France had a large and amazingly complex body of constabulary troops to uphold the laws and provide some protection to one and all. From their Middle Ages origins, the Maréchaussée constabulary troops were made up of fully armed soldiers under the authority of a marshal of France, hence the name of Maréchaussée de France. They were under royal orders, pay and service with their own establishments. The extent of their legal power was summed up in the Maréchaussées' motto: *Non Sine Numine* (not without divine authorisation) which meant the right to condemn to death (delegated from the King). These cavalry-like troops would seek, pursue and destroy bands of bandits that preyed on highways and isolated countryside homes. Over the centuries they came to have detachments in all provinces of France and could also be detached to serve with armies in the field, much like military police provost corps in present-day armed forces.[1]

The senior officer of a Maréchaussée company was the prevost, whose duties were partly judiciary as well as military. To assert his authority and confirm that he was under orders of the highest royal authority, the prevost carried a command baton similar to the one carried by marshals of France. This was the coveted baton covered with blue velvet embroidered with gold lilies, and a prevost would brandish his marshal's baton when he entered a community to assert that the strong arm of the King's law had arrived to prosecute matters. He was usually assisted by a lieutenant and an exempt (sub-lieutenant). As time passed, the archers' medieval armament changed to firearms and their armour and *hoqueton* jackets replaced by cassocks and uniforms. All Frenchmen knew them as "Archers" or *hocquetons* in the Middle Ages and continued to designate them by those names until the French Revolution. Indeed, although militarily organised, the rank structure went by different and rather antiquated names.[2]

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[1] *La Maréchaussée de France ou recueil des ordinances, édits ...* (Paris: Saugrain, 1697) has the royal orders from the earliest times.

[2] The present French national police, the *Gendarmerie Nationale*, is the direct "ancestor" of the royal Maréchaussée and is part of the armed forces. Until the abolition of the draft in France,


LE ROY
Sec. destat
Capne des gardes
Seigneurs de la Cou
VOICY LE BON
ROY
LOVIS XIIII.
IL donne Audience, iuſques au plus pauure de ſes ſuiets, pour terminer promptement leurs procez & differans.
Salomon, s'aſſit ſur le Throſne, pour Iuger ces deux pauures femmes, qui plaidoient à qui ſeroit l'Enfant.
Noſtre Monarque l'imite parfaitement, & nos grands Rois & Empereurs, Charles-Magne, entre autres, & Louis Au
ent des Audiances publiques comme luy, ils sy eſtoient obliges par loy expreſſe, & l'aucient fait publier par tout le Royaume.
DE AVDIENTIA REGIS.

"Voicy le bon Roy Louis XIIII", 1660s. This royal propaganda print showed the "good King Louis LIIII [XIV]" as the seat of justice. "Ordinary" people are presenting their cases to the Sun King's judgement with a Secretary of State at his right and the captain of the guards at his left. Guards holding halberds are at left. (Private collection. Author's photo)

While it was previously understood to be part of the army, in 1632, Cardinal Richelieu specifically tasked the royal Maréchaussée to march with the armies to maintain order amongst the soldiers, apprehend deserters and enforce a certain level of discipline, which was rather lax at the time. There were thereafter Maréchaussée de France officers and archers attached to armies in the field. They came under the authority of the marshal commanding an army and acted as military police, especially to deal with criminal soldiers in line regiments that did not have their own *prévôté*. These detachments were rarely mentioned in army musters; a 1708 list mentions that there were eight companies led by seven prevosts, four lieutenants and three exempts who were "the officers at the suite of the marshals" commanding armies. As the number of archers is not given and was quite variable, it is difficult to estimate their numbers, but as there were seven prevosts, this might amount to about 350 archer troopers.[3]

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young men could also do their national service in the *Gendarmerie Nationale*. During the French Revolution, when all things royal became unacceptable, its name was changed to the title of *Gendarmerie* with the archers henceforth being called *gendarmes*. The Gendarmerie de France, a prestigious part of the royal army until disbanded in 1787, was an elite cavalry corps (see Vol. 3). The works of Jean Besson and Pierre Rosière, *Gendarmerie Nationale* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1982) and George Carrot, *Histoire de la police française* (Paris: Tallandier, 1992) are recommended to have more details.

[3] Frémont, *Les payeurs d'armées* (Paris: Plon, 1906), p.49; M. Tenaille Champton, *Histoire de la Gendarmerie, depuis sa creation jusqu'en 1790* (Paris: Anselin, 1829), p.193.


CONNETABLIE ET MARECHAUSSÉE DE FRANCE.

Left: seal of the Connétablie et Maréchaussée de France approved on 4 December 1665. The central blank oval had the coat of arms of the marshal of France who also held the ancient title of *Connétable* (constable). The support had the sword and the marshal's baton, symbolic of the administration of justice. Print from Beauclas' *Dictionnaire universel*. (Author's photo)



Above: the baton of Marshal de Luxembourg, *c.*1690. This type of baton was also carried by prevosts of the Maréchaussée. Except for minor details, the baton's model did not change over the centuries and consisted of blue velvet embroidered with gold embroidered lilies and gilded end caps at the time of the Sun King's reign. Detail of a 1694 print by Cornelis Martinus Vermeulen after Hyacinthe Rigaud. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-P-OB-15.698)



Left: a magistrate and a sergeant of the *Guet*, early eighteenth century. Print after Jeaurat. (Private collection. Author's photo)





Left: the secret service side of certain royal and provincial guard duties, *c.*1670. A detained gentleman (at right) discusses with a law official in a setting that could be found in most castles that held important state prisoners. His servants are bringing drinks and setting a table for his visitors. A military officer stands nearby. Unsigned later nineteenth-century canvas. (Chateau Laurier Hotel, Ottawa. Author's photo)

Right: an officer or official is interned in a castle transformed into a jail, late seventeenth century. An officer politely leads the prisoner into his apartment with a Maréchaussée trooper nearby, just in case ... Print after Rioux. (Private collection. Author's photo)

No matter where line army troops were, the royal Maréchaussée personnel had powers to arrest and detain military suspects. By the Sun King's era, all provinces had a royal Maréchaussée mounted constabulary unit, that under the authority of the provincial intendant would investigate, pursue and arrest suspects wherever they were (see examples in Volume 3, chapter 13). For instance, in 1698, in the province of Orléanais, there were two companies of Maréchaussée in Orléans with single companies at Blois, Vendôme, Châteaudun, Montargis, Chartres and Gien. The size of the detachments could vary greatly. Many smaller towns had half a dozen archers led by two officers while others like Cahors would have 30 archers or more. From 1670 a standard of 50 archers per company was attempted, but never really achieved until 1720. They were based in towns but also patrolled outlying areas. In emergencies such as enemy raids or tax revolts, they would be assembled to form squadron- or even regimental-strength temporary units and join army and militia units.[4]

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[4] J. Plique, *Histoire de la Maréchaussée du Gévaudan* (Mende, 1912), pp.96–97, 102; Louis Larrieu, *Histoire de la maréchaussée et de la gendarmerie* (Ivry-sur-Seine: Phénix and Gendarmerie nationale, 2002), p.41. Cassocks made in 1597 were "embroidered with the sword of the Constable" of France (p. 45). We add Huissiers-sergents (Bailiff-sergeants) and Archer-huissiers (archer-bailiffs) that were peculiar and special members of the royal Maréchaussée that were attached to the parliaments and law courts. No doubt to give them more authority to carry out their duties,



View of the Bastille in Paris in the seventeenth century. This famous castle was the prison for individuals arrested by royal order. Because many of the detained were wealthy and often noble gentlemen, the accommodations were much more spacious and luxurious than an ordinary cell and could even have the detainee's servants to attend him or her. Paris then still had some curtain walls and the gates of the Saint-Antoine district were next to the Bastille. Guns were at the top of the Bastille and, on 2 July 1652, they fired on Turenne's troops by order of the *Grande Mademoiselle* during the Fronde of the nobles (see Volume 1). From a print reconstructing the Bastille in the mid seventeenth century. (Private collection. (Author's photo)

The weapons, accoutrements and livery cassocks of the royal Maréchaussée units were provided by the prevost through a deduction in the archer's pay according to a 1611 regulation. In the reign of Louis XIII, the cassocks in the livery colour of its commander with his coat of arms and that of the King side by side over which was a crowned letter "L". In 1651, the Maréchaussée of the province of **Berry** wore a red velvet cassock, which was also the colour of the cassocks of the King's Gardes du Corps. By 1658 the colours used for the cassock were the King's livery colours, blue and red with white trimmings and could also have the badge of the *Connétablie.* Blue lined with red was the Sun King's preference and was worn by his guard and royal units thereafter (see Volume 1) and would have included the royal Maréchaussée. The province of **Roussillon** purchased blue cloth for the cassocks "or coats" of its Maréchaussée officers and archers in the mid 1680s. Another item that archers had was a bandolier. In 1668, bandoliers were bought for archers at Gévaudan in **Languedoc** that were "embroidered with gold and silver and with the [coat of] arms of His Majesty." In 1685 they received bandoliers and cassocks similar to the ones they previously had. Bandoliers with cassocks were also ordered for the Maréchaussée in **Alsace** during 1687. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, the usual dress consisted of a blue cassock, blue housings, yellow leather bandolier, laced hat with a blue plume, which was adopted in **Artois** from 1687. The cassocks were

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they were allowed to wear the cassocks, *hoqueton* jacket and bandolier of the King's liveries with the badge bearing the coat of arms of the Connétablie and Maréchaussée of France from 1658 and 1672 respectively. The Huissiers-sergents were further allowed to carry the command baton from 1658. *Dictionnaire universel des Maréchaussées* (Paris, 1750), Vol. 2, pp.511, 608.

gradually abandoned in the early eighteenth century in favour of blue coats lined with red.[5]

Independent Constabulary Corps

The archers of the **Garde de la Connetablie** dated from 1518 and were the escort of the Connétable de France until 1627, when they were attached to the senior marshal of France as his honour guard and the watch of his Paris residence. King Louis XIII called on this unit to greet and escort ambassadors. Its archers were present at royal celebrations where nobles were invited "to prevent or stop on the spot all fights and disputes" that might occur. It was also the unit carrying out the decisions of the Tribunal du Point d'Honneur (honour tribunal). This company, whose duties lay at the highest pinnacles of society, had a magnificent uniform of blue and silver embroidered with the motto of the Maréchaussée (see colour plates), reminding everyone that they had the same powers.[6]

The **Prévôt Général de l'Ile de France** or Prévôt de l'Ile had a Maréchaussée company that went back to 1060. Its jurisdiction was the areas around Paris and it was considered a senior and elite company. Its prevost-general led at least five officers, 40 archers and one trumpeter. They were mainly posted in outlying towns such as Saint-Denis, Sèvres, Vincennes and Villejuif in Ile-de-France with a squad in Paris for the prevost-general (see colour plate).

The company **Prévôté générale des Monnaies de France** (prevost-general of the monies of France) in Paris was created in 1530 to combat counterfeiting. In March 1645 it had five lieutenants, five exempts, one brigadier and 60 archers with a trumpeter. They were seen wearing red cassocks in 1683. In the early eighteenth century the company's uniform was red (see colour plate). Money was also made in Lyon, and in 1704,a **Prévôté des Monnaies de Lyon** company was organised consisting of a prevost, a lieutenant, four exempts, 30 archers and one trumpeter.[7]

The **Prévôté de Robe-Courte du Châtelet** company in Paris dated from the 1520s and was a corps of constabulary Maréchaussée specifically at the service of the high courts of justice.

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[5] *La Maréchaussée de France*, pp.88–89; Champton, *Histoire de la Gendarmerie*, p.93; *Gazette*, 1651, p.314; *Inventaire-sommaire des Archives départementales des Pyrénées-Orientales* (Paris, 1877), p.254; J. Plique, *Histoire de la Maréchaussée du Gévaudan* (Mende, 1912), p.102; AG, A1, Vol. 1413, Louvois to de la Grange, 20 November 1687; A.-A. Monteil, *Histoire des Français de divers états, XVIIe siècle* (Brussels, 1843), Vol. 2, p.9. p.195. C. de P., *Essais critiques et historiques sur la Maréchaussée* (n.p., 1788).

[6] Louis Saurel, *Peines et glories des gendarmes* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1973), pp.32–33, 35–36. The Tribunal du Point d'Honneur was a special court for noble military officers to settle matters of honour between gentlemen. Those found guilty of duelling could be condemned to death.

[7] H. Delattre, *Historique de la Gendarmerie française* (Paris: Léautey, 1879), pp.48–49, 232–234; *Mercure Galant*, September 1683, pp.216–217.


tambours dela ville
les trois drapeaux
les cent archer
fusilliers

Above: archers of the city of Paris at the inauguration of the King's statue, 13 August 1699. Some 300 archers were at the ceremony wearing their blue cassocks decorated with silver lace buttons and the city's ship badge on the front and back. Detail from a print after Jollin. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Below: the Parisian mounted *Guet* chases after a robber, *c.*1695. The *Guet* or watch in Paris had mounted and foot units that were fully armed, equipped and clothed like regular troops during the reign of Louis XIV. At right, a night watchman who was also part of the security organisation in several French cities. Print after N. Guérard. (Private collection. Author's photo)


N. Guerard le Fils Fecit C.P.R.

The **Prévôté des Aides** was raised in 1659 specifically to deal with taxes and fiscal matters in the province of Guyenne and existed until 1780. There was also the **Prévôté du Faux-Saulnage** created in 1528 at Rennes in Brittany, to enforce the despised *Gabelle* salt tax and prevent illegal salt production, which was a government monopoly. Its archers were hired men (and not part of the royal Maréchaussée) nicknamed *Gabelous.*[8]

The total of the royal Maréchaussée posted throughout France and detached with the army amounted to about 3,000 officers and men. Adding the various independent units probably added another 500 for a total of 3,500 at the beginning of the eighteenth century.[9]

City Armed Constabulary Units

Apart from the royal Maréchaussée units stood a multitude of city or town *Guet* or watch units that were usually made up of veteran soldiers fully able to assume a combat role if needed. These corps were considered military units whose duties were primarily repressing criminals within the city and participating in its defence if it was attacked by enemy troops. Their weapons were similar to the regular army's infantry or cavalry. Halberds could also be carried on ceremonial occasions. They were equipped, clothed and paid by the city.

The city of **Paris** had the largest security force in the kingdom. Its origins went back to the sixth century AD. Their numbers were relatively small considering the capital's population in the Sun King's era, at least 400,000 inhabitants, but units of the royal guard were quartered in Paris and could intervene if called upon. There were two types of *Guet* in the city: the Guet Royal (royal watch) that was a military organisation under the orders and paid for by the King under the authority of the Chevalier du Guet (knight of the watch); the Guet Bourgeois, a local militia made up of inhabitants who were under the prevost of the city, but this *Guet* became redundant in the 1660s. In 1643 the Paris Guet Royal had 200 archers including 50 mounted that were led by the Chevalier du Guet and his lieutenants and exempts. In June 1645 they were organised into three infantry companies of 60 archers each and one of 50 mounted archers each company under a lieutenant and an exempt. This remained the corps strength for the rest of the reign.[10]

Paris had its share of lawless gangs, thieves and knaves. In the mid seventeenth century it was said that murders and robberies were usually committed by soldiers and servants who had been dismissed. Many outlaws

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[8] Saurel, *Peines et glories des gendarmes*, pp.34–35.

[9] In 1720 the royal Maréchaussée units in the provinces were reorganised into 30 companies, totalling 2,997 officers and men.

[10] François Cudet, *Histoire des corps de troupes qui on été spécialement chargés du service de la ville de Paris* (Paris: Lillet, 1887), pp.17–18, 24–25; Louis Lépine, *Ville de Paris: Histoire du corps des gardens de la paix* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1896), pp.1–6; M. Hay, *Recueil des chartres, creations et confirmations des colonels ... de la ville de Paris* (Paris: Desprez, 1770), pp.2–24.





Left: archer of the city of Paris, 1680s. The archer escorting a girl is armed with a musket and wearing his bandolier. Detail from a period print. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Right: the *embarras de Paris*, *c.*1690. This detail of a period print entitled the "embarrassments of Paris" shows archers of the *Guet* responding to a candle-holding citizen while a halberd-armed sergeant apprehends a thief holding a bag. The archer wears the distinctive bandolier decorated with lilies and stars. (Private collection. Author's photo)

and false beggars congregated at the several *Cours des Miracles* (halls of miracles) where, in the early years of the Sun King's reign, even the city's armed constabulary archers feared to go, while some of them were just as corrupt and would ransom individuals they arrested. During 1643 there were 372 murders in Paris, and by 1665 robbers even murdered the *Lieutenant Criminel* (prosecutor) Tradieux and his wife followed by his colleague d'Aubrey, poisoned in 1667. That was too much for the Sun King. On 29 March 1667, he appointed the energetic magistrate Gabriel Nicolas de la Reynie with extensive powers to make Paris safe. The Guet Royal was immediately reorganised with dedicated officers and archers. They appeared, led by La Reynie, at the worst *Cour des Miracles* ordering the knaves to leave at once because the first dozen caught would be hanged on the spot. Paris quickly became a much safer place and La Reynie's actions were followed in other cities in the realm.[11]

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[11] Arlette Lebigre, 'La naissance de la police en France', L'Histoire, No. 8 (January 1979), pp.4–12; Jean Chagniot, 'La criminalité militaire à Paris au XVIIIe siècle', *Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l'Ouest*, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1981), pp.327–345.

When the royal couple entered Paris after their wedding on 26 August 1660, the 300 archers of the city were part of the escort for the festive occasion wearing hats with white plumes, red ribbons tying their cravats, blue cassocks with silver buttons and lace bearing the badge of the arms of the city on the chest and at the back. The mounted archers were armed with swords, carbines and pistols. They were seen in 1683 wearing their "ordinary blue cassocks." The Paris Guet Royal was to have uniforms according to the regulations of 2 January 1688. Exempts had blue coats laced with gold and a white hat plume; sergeants: blue coats with silver lace, white hat plume and red stockings; archers: iron-grey coats with pewter buttons, red cuffs laced with silver, buff shoulder belt laced with silver, silver laced hat with a white plume "and a bandolier as we have [previously] ordered." They continued to have their blue cassocks for ceremonies. At the inauguration of the King's statue in Paris on 13 August 1699, the city's 300 archers wore the blue cassocks with silver lace, buttons and the city's ship badge, "white plumes and buff cockades on their hats" of which 100 carried halberds. Three mounted officers held their colours, which bore the arms of the city and of the King. In December 1714 the archer's uniform changed to an all-blue coat and waistcoat with silver buttons and buttonhole lace set in threes, scarlet breeches and stockings and hat laced with silver. Period prints (see illustrations) also show Paris archers with bandoliers bearing badges.[12]

In 1695 the province of Artois raised a mounted company of Maréchaussée at its own expense consisting of a lieutenant and 30 archers, 10 of which were posted at **Saint-Omer** and the others at **Arras**. It was supposed to assist the royal Maréchaussée company in the province, but most of the next century found the two units bickering. The Artois archers, according to the complaints of the royal officials, were not professional soldiers, overstepped their legal powers and some hardly knew how to ride. They seem to have been very good honour guards to the local parliament which supported them, and the unit still existed in the 1780s. Its early uniform was red with a blue bandolier edged with livery lace.[13]

Auch in Gascogne had "Guards of the city" since the Middle Ages whose duties were mostly constabulary and included escorting city councillors, but they also would stand watch at gates and walls, just in case: the Spanish border was not all that far. Their numbers were variable, were led by a sergeant and might, as in 1698, have drummers as well as one or two trumpeters (see Plate 3).[14]

Bayonne's *Guet* consisted of two captains and at least a dozen soldiers. The captains were furnished with uniforms by the city: in the 1670s it

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[12] *Les armoiries de la ville de Paris* (Paris, 1874), pp.325; *Mercure Galant*, September 1683, p.217; BNF, Paris, Recueil Cangé, F-191, 2e série, Dress regulation for the Compagnies du Guet of Paris, 2 January 1688, with thanks to Giancarlo Boeri; *Les armoiries de la ville de Paris*, p.333; Nicolas de La Mare, *Traité de la police* (Paris, 1719), Vol. 3, p.746; Hay, *Recueil des chartres*, pp.219–221.

[13] G. de Hautecloque, 'Le Maréchal de Lévis, Gouverneur général de l'Artois (1765–1787)', *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences, lettres et arts d'Arras*, Vol. 32 (1901), pp.129–134.

[14] Prosper Lafforgue, *Histoire de la ville d'Auch* (Auch: Brun, 1851), pp.59–63. There was also a night watchman wearing a rather ominous black cassocks embroidered with "skulls and crossbones".



Sergeant and soldiers of the Lyon *Guet*, 1660s. At a parade that in 1664, its musketeers at the front wore a blue cassock embroidered with the royal cipher with, on its side panels, three silver stars, possibly denoting the night watch; the pikemen had buff jackets, steel armour and helmets; its musketeers closing the parade had red cassocks edged with gold lace. Sketch from a 1660 parade in the 1905 *Revue d'histoire de Lyon*. (Author's photo)

consisted in a red coat, a pair of breeches and a cloak, the coat having green velvet cuffs, narrow green lace buttonholes red cloth-covered bone buttons.[15]

During the early eighteenth century the city of **Dijon**, capital of Burgundy, had some 200 soldiers of the *Guet* who were seen armed and "all dressed in white cloth, the cuffs of their coats scarlet and laced with silver [and] their waistcoats also" during a formal parade.[16]

In 1695 **La Rochelle's** 12 archers wore red cassocks with the coat of arms of the city embroidered on the front and back. At celebrations for the victory of Neerwinden in 1693, the four archers of the small town of **Luzy** in Champagne paraded wearing red cassocks embroidered with the town's coat of arms.[17]

The large city of **Lyon** had about 180,000 inhabitants. The Compagnie du Guet privileged militia company of 200 infantrymen would combat gangland-style bandits in the quarter of Saint-Georges in particular. It thus furnished 50 men for active duty paid by the city. It was a military company mostly made up of veteran soldiers of musketeers and pikemen who were well-armed and equipped. Its commander was styled Chevalier du Guet. **Marseille's** 12 archers were "dressed in red" escorting a procession during 1688.[18]

The city and citadel of **Metz** had a peculiar Compagnie des Archers des Bandes (Company of Archers of the [armed] bands) of 12 archers whose duty was specifically concerned with the arrest and court martial of army personnel. It was under the authority of the city's military staff and an archer was always near the senior officers to carry out their orders. **Quimper** in Brittany had sergeants armed with halberds and wearing, at formal occasions, cassocks of white satin strewn with black ermines, the front and back bearing the embroidered city's coat of arms and lined with blue. They also had archer's bandoliers, presumably blue and silver.[19]

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[15] De Blay de Gaix, *Histoire militaire de Bayonne* (Bayonne: Lamaignère, 1908), Vol. 2, pp.178, 270.

[16] *Mémoires de la Société bourguignonne de géographie et d'histoire*, Vol. 13 (Dijon, 1897), p.328.

[17] *Mercure Galant*, June 1695, pp.102–103; *Mercure Galant*, September 1693, p.63.

[18] E. Vial, 'Le chevalier du Guet et sa compagnie', *Revue d'histoire de Lyon*, Vol. 4 (1905), pp.113–127; *Cérémonial de la ville de Marseille*, L. Méry and F. Guindon, ed. (Aix, 1873), p.378.

During 1686 a ceremony at the parliament of **Toulouse**, capital of the province of Languedoc, featured the senior judge of the city escorted by a detachment of 50 archers "wearing their cassocks strewn with lilies." By 1701 the Compagnie du Guet, which previously wore scarlet cassocks with the city's coat of arms, was now issued new uniforms (see Plate 3).[20]

Military Crimes and Justice

Military society had its shares of crimes; it was a mirror of the society from whence officers and men came from. Murders, robberies, kidnapping, rapes and other crimes were just as common in armies as they were in civilian society.

Desertion was a predominantly military crime and seemingly the most widespread in the Sun King's armies. There were even "professional" deserters who would abscond from one regiment only to appear elsewhere far away to enlist again in another regiment under another name and thus pocket once more the enlistment bounty. Since communications were not as developed as today and there were no *contrôle des troupes* (muster rolls) documents before 1716, there were good chances that the deserter would not be spotted. In the seventeenth century and even in the early eighteenth century, statistics, if they existed at all, were not especially reliable until the reign of Louis XV. The only fairly reliable documentation comes from 1716 onwards thanks to the existence of muster rolls and Dr. Corvisier's comprehensive study of these. By making an average of deserters from 1716 to 1763, years of peace, he found that one soldier in five absconded. For the 1701–1714 War of the Spanish Succession years, he believed that up to one soldier in four might have deserted.[21]

Desertion was originally punishable by death, but this did not prevent soldiers from absconding and there was also a certain reluctance by commanders to resort to such a sentence when pardons might have a better result. Perhaps the Sun King thought so too, since he occasionally proclaimed general pardons, but there still had to be suitably severe punishment. Thus by royal order of 4 December 1684, apprehended deserters were henceforth kept alive, but condemned to have the ears and nose cut (meaning slit), head shaved, branded with a lily on both cheeks, chained and condemned to row

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[19] *Dictionnaire géographique, historique* ..., Vol. 4, p.720; Jean Ogée, Dictionnaire historique et géographique de la province de Bretagne (Rennes, 1853), Vol. 2, p.416.

[20] *Mercure Galant*, May 1686, p.183 and March 1701, pp.225–226.

[21] Corvisier, *Le soldat*, Vol. 2, p.736. A calculation made in 1729 for the years 1700–1716 came to 31,411 which was ridiculously low since 1716–1729 came to 68,282 which was about the same as Dr. Corvisier's study.



Justice Militaire (military justice) in the field, late seventeenth century. This period print shows punishment for severe crimes such as desertion or murder. It was death by hanging or by firing squad for most, or the crippling *estrapade* wheel for a few. (Private collection. Author's photo)

in the galley fleet. It appears that such sentences were only very rarely fully executed, and usually only the galley sentence would actually be carried out.[22]

Other military crimes included the death penalty for enlisted men when disobeying or striking an officer (and in some cases a sergeant if on duty), threatening an officer, duelling, leaving one's post or sleeping on sentry duty, refusing to fight, communicating with the enemy, stealing and sedition. Corporal punishments were applied for leaving camp, drunkenness, selling one's ammunition, cutting wood on a seigneur's property and cheating at games.[23]

Repression of crimes up to the reign of Louis XIV was very severe not only in France, but in all nations. In those times, justice was "exemplary" and thus carried out in a main city square in full view of crowds eager to see culprits receive, in some cases, unbelievably cruel punishments equalling death by torture. The King's orders in matter of military justice were applied by military tribunals or local law courts when it involved crimes committed on inhabitants.

Before the 1660s the death penalty could be carried out by hanging, by being executed by the pikes of fellow soldiers if a pikeman or by muskets if a musketeer. A cut fist severing the hand followed by hanging was for striking or threatening an officer, or drawing one's sword. The Sun King felt that the

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[22] ANF, Marine, A1, Vol. 21, Ordonnance du roi, 4 December 1684. The death penalty for desertion was reinstated in 1716.

[23] The main early regulations concerning discipline and crimes date from 1666 and are reproduced in M. de Lamont, *Les fonctions de tous les officiers de l'infanterie, depuis celle du sergent jusqu'à celle de colonel* (Paris, 1669), pp.105–125. Later decades are also covered by Michel, *Les Ordonnances militaires du Roy*, pp.195–227, 267. This work gives further a detailed description of the composition of a military court and the procedure for interrogations.


N guerard inut et fecit

Above: soldiers apprehended and on the wooden horse, *c.*1695. This print after Guérard shows at left a condemned soldier going into jail, having been disarmed by his sergeant; another soldier is spending several hours on a wooden horse with cannonballs tied to his ankles. A condemned woman presumably considered to have loose morals is with him. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

Below: an infantryman is "passé par les baguettes" (running the gauntlet) in the camp, *c.*1695. The condemned, naked to the waist, had to pass between two rows of soldiers who would strike him with their ramrods. Print after Guérard. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)


N. Guerard, inuenit et fecit

most honourable execution was by firing squad and it became the usual type enforced.

The *roue* (wheel) death penalty execution had been introduced by a royal edict of 1534, originally to combat highway robbery. The condemned was tied to a wheel set up on a podium in the town's main square and beaten to death by breaking his bones. It was an especially cruel punishment which was in fact rarely used. Only in cases of truly hideous crimes would such a sentence be carried out. Some prints of military justice do show the wheel being used to execute soldiers, but its actual use was quite rare.[24]

The *estrapade* (from *stappare* in Italian) was a punishment that consisted in tying the condemned soldier's wrist behind his back, raising him up a high pole or scaffold with a rope and letting him drop to just above the ground so as to dislocate the shoulders. A soldier drawing his sword out of its scabbard when not ordered to could be condemned to have his hand cut.

The *cheval de bois* (wooden horse) consisted of sitting the condemned on two planks set together at a sharp angle. Weights were tied to the ankle and the soldier was left to sit there for hours in this painful manner, also suffering abuses from spectators since this was usually done in a town square. Notably this punishment was carried out for drunkenness, causing a false alarm or selling one's powder and ball.

The *baguettes* (ramrods) punishment obliged the guilty to run the gauntlet. The condemned soldier, naked to the waist, had to run between two ranks of his comrades each of which gave him a vigorous blow with his musket's ramrod as he passed. It was considered an ignominious punishment and usually given for petty crimes such as leaving camp. Sergeants and even officers might also use their cane on an enlisted man immediately for what they perceived to be, say, slight disobedience such as a frown. Whipping was also practised, notably on deserters, but also on unruly valets and girls caught in soldiers' quarters. However, it was not a popular punishment in French armies and the *baguettes* were more common. The *morion* punishment consisted of blows on the bare bottom with a musket butt or halberd given in the guard house to young soldiers for a minor offence.[25]

The *cage* was exactly that, an iron cage six feet high placed in a main square in which a blasphemous or drunkard soldier would be confined and scorned by people and wily children who might bombard him with refuse or worse. This was meant to totally humiliate the soldier as if he was a strange animal.

Military degradation for NCOs and enlisted men such as corporals was done in front of an assembled company or battalion. The major told the condemned: "Finding that you do not have the dignity to bear arms, we are degrading you" and his musket would be taken from him, his sword and

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[24] Jacques Lorgnier, 'Le vol sur les grands chemins, acte de violence portant atteinte a la sureté publique (1679–1720)', *Revue du Nord*, Vol. 77, No. 309 (1995). pp.179–181.

[25] The *baguettes*, rather than the whip, were inflicted to a "very pretty" 16-year-old girl found sleeping "with some grenadiers" at Jeumont near Mons in April 1697 as per Quincy's *Mémoires*, Vol. 1, p.38 who was "much chagrined" for her. The rather inhumane whipping scenes frequently seen in British and other armies appear to have become gradually unworthy of a good commander in the Sun King's army.


N. Guerard Inv. et Fecit.

A convicted trooper standing at the picket in a cavalry camp on campaign, *c.*1695. This punishment was for troopers "who did not do their duty" and consisted of standing with one foot resting on a spike, as shown. Other troopers are playing pétanque, relaxing or attending the horses which are tied up. The tents were 8 feet wide by 10 feet long and would accommodate five to six troopers. Print after Guérard. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)

belt taken off and the sergeant would strike his bottom with a shovel before chasing him out as unworthy. If a soldier lived or supported a "debauched" woman, he would be jailed for three months and the woman stripped to the waist, lashed or run by *baguettes* and chased out of the regiment's camp.[26]

During the reign of the Sun King, there was a very slow but constant rise in humanitarian public opinion that regarded many of the above penalties as only worthy of barbarian societies. They remained on the books, but their application was not as severe. The lash for instance, famously legal in the British army until 1871, was always scorned as undignified for soldiers by the French and only worthy of civilian scoundrels and prostitutes. Death penalties in wartime were illogical when prison or the galleys would have the same effect on soldiers facing death on battlefields. By the early eighteenth century the *roue*, *estrapade*, *cage* and whips were all but unseen. The *baguettes* were rarer. Officers were pressured not to strike anyone with their canes. Even if soldiers might be seen as the refuse of society, Frenchmen's sense of *la gloire* (glory), which was amply fanned by the Sun King, convinced them that the French soldier was not marched into battle by cane blows, it was *l'honneur* (honour) that made them charge the enemy.[27]

Lawless Officers

Officers were all considered gentlemen and most were noblemen. In this era of privilege they often believed that the Kingdom's laws only loosely applied to their class, and the worst of them in their unrestrained pride, felt they were superior to all others from peasants to magistrates. This resulted in outlandish and illegal actions. If they were caught, they believed, generally rightly, that they had to be treated as officers and gentlemen. This meant that they could be arrested and questioned, but not judicially tortured on the rack, which could be done to commoners to obtain information and admit guilt. Punishment also excluded corporal punishment, but not a sentence to pay a fine, exile to one's estates, prison and possible dismissal from the army. The death penalty, which was uncommon for officers, was not done by hanging, but by firing squad or by beheading.

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[26] Joachim Aubert, *Esquisses historiques, psychologiques et critiques de l'armée française* (Saumur: Degouy, 1837), Vol. 1, pp.139–141, 173. On the crimes by soldiers and their resolution, see Jean Chagniot, 'La criminalité militaire à Paris au XVIIIe siècle', *Annales de Bretagne et des pays de l'Ouest*, Vol. 88, No 3 (1981), pp.327–345 also at Persée, <http://www.persee.fr/doc/abpo_0399-0826_1981_num_88_3_3054>.

[27] Reboul, *La vie au dix-huitième siècle. L'Armée* (Paris: Seheur, 1931), pp.24–26.

They could also bicker on points of honour amongst themselves and issue challenges for duels. This could lead to the death penalty, and under the Sun King's government the laws tended to be applied more thoroughly than previously. There were disputes with local officials regarding quarters and supplies and officers' tempers might flare up. A few examples out of many: the King cashiered a dragoon captain for taking 330 livres from the inhabitants of Rethel; other dragoon captains were jailed for violent behaviour on civilians; a lieutenant colonel convicted of pillage was jailed and condemned to pay 1,800 livres in damages; another, in 1695, had to pay 2,000 livres to the Mayor of Nyons (Dauphiné) for roughing him up; an officer, insulted by a Bordeaux bourgeois, shot him with his pistol breaking his arms and was ordered to pay an indemnity of 75,000 livres for the wound. Sometimes things turned sour before the King's law was applied. In 1694 four drunken artillery officers caused a huge riot in Grenoble which resulted in two being killed when an angry crowd caught up with them. All these incidents were followed by years of quiet times because their repression by the constabulary, the intendants and ministerial authority was often efficient on outlandishly violent officers. They should not obscure the fact that most officers were decent gentlemen who wished harmonious relations with civilians.[28]

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[28] Albert Babeau, *La vie militaire sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1890), Vol. 2, pp.237–250.

17

Local Reserve Troops

Regular Units of Provinces, Cities and Forts

Apart from the royal guard units and the personal guards of marshals and lieutenant generals (see Volume 1), there were also, in Louis XIV's France, a large number of small local guard units serving in a multitude of towns, forts and castles in all parts of the kingdom. Many were paid for by the royal budget, but some might be subsidised by a town.

In his memoirs, one of the first things the Sun King did after taking the reins of government was to limit the powers of local governors by removing their budgets and placing them under his control. This money had rendered them "too powerful and absolute" as rulers. Since the Middle Ages, local regular garrisons had been created that were independent from the royal army. Under kings Henri IV and Louis XIII, these were small units bearing the name of their commander. These units basically only obeyed their commander who paid them from municipal and royal funds, but they were often the source of trouble due to lack of discipline. The Sun King put an end to troops who depended on local officers and governors and replaced them with "others who knew only me" as their commander. This often meant the abolition of these units and their replacement by royal troops. Governors were henceforth to be in office for no longer than three years.

As for the local units, they were not all abolished, as is often stated. Louis XIV continued to resort to these troops in many towns and forts, but only once it was clear to local officials that his royal authority was supreme. He was watchful that it be respected, and on those terms royal funds would still be available for this small army of local regular troops. It did provide useful security services and freed soldiers belonging to line regiments to be more usefully deployed in the field. It also provided employment for veteran soldiers who were still equal to garrison and security duties.

A sampling of the peculiar guard units in various places is given in an early eighteenth century *Liste des Gouvernemens Generaux et Particuliers*, which also mentions the budgets for a multitude of officers and officials. It seems to date from before 1715 and was published in volume 1 of de Guignard's *L'École de Mars*. We further mention that any marshal or lieutenant general had, by right, his own personal company of guards included with his own





Far left: a halberdsman, late seventeenth century. Sketch after Claude Gillot. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Elisha Whittelsey Fund, 1950 DP806425)

Left: back view of a halberdsman, 1696. Sketch by Henri de Beaumont. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. RP-T-00-464-3)







Far left: a halberd head, *c.*1700. It is a quality weapon decorated with a royal coat of arms and another crowned with a marquis heraldic helmet. This weapon could have armed a soldier in the service of a town or of a noble family. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Rogers Fund)

Centre: a finely etched partisan head, *c.*1670. This type of partisan had a fairly narrow blade. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Gift of William H. Riggs, 1913)

Left: partisan head, *c.*1670. The lower third is finely etched. This type of partisan had a wide blade. (Courtesy Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. Gift of William H. Riggs, 1913) expenses (see Volume 1), even if he happened to be appointed governor as well. At the other end of the scale, many humble governors of small places and forts had hardly any staff officers and no personal guard.

These small units were of three basic types: 1) the companies of guards that could be mounted as cavalry, armed with smoothbore or rifled carbines in which case they might be named *carabiniers*; 2) *hallebardiers* (halberdsmen) were foot soldiers armed with halberds, whose origins were late medieval, being mostly protocolary troops that could also stand watch; 3) units of *hommes de guerre* (men-of-war) who were local regular soldiers posted in various places and castles.

The listed units were as follows:

Ambrun (or Embrun): 30 "men of war".
Amiens: 12 halberdsmen.
Anjou: one company of guards.
Angoumois: see Saintonge and Angoumois.
Alsace: one company of guards.
Ardres: 16 halberdsmen.
Aunis, La Rochelle, Brouage, Isle de Ré and Oléron: one company of guards.
Auvergne: one company of guards.
Berry: one company of guards.
Boulogne: 25 halberdsmen.
Bourbonnais: one company of guards.
Bourgogne (Burgundy): one company of guards.
Briançon: 13 "men of war".
Champagne and Brie: one company of guards.
Chasteau-Portien: 10 "men of war".
Château de Tours: 12 "men of war".
Cherbourg: 25 "men of war".
Colioure: 6 halberdsmen.
Le Crotoy: 12 "men of war".
Die: 10 "men of war".
Dombez: 11 "men of war".
Embrun: see Ambrun.
La Fère: 10 halberdsmen.
Fort de l'Écluse: 10 "men of war".
Fort de Pequay: 12 halberdsmen.
Gascogne: see Guienne and Gascogne.
Grandville: 25 "men of war".
Guienne and Gascogne: one company of guards.
Isle-de-France: one company of guards.
Isles de Port-Croix: 18 "men of war".
Maine: one company of guards.
Le Mans: 4 "men of war".
La Marche: one company of guards.
Metz: 15 halberdsmen.
Mevouillon: 20 "men of war".

Montpellier: 24 halberdsmen.
Montreuil: 12 halberdsmen.
Nivernois: one company of guards.
Normandie: one company of guards.
Lionnois, Forez and Beaujolais: one company of guards for the governor.
Lionnois, Forez and Beaujolais: one company of guards for the lieutenant general.
Limousin: one company of guards plus 45 carabiniers.
Loches: 10 "men of war".
Orléanais: one company of guards.
Paris: 12 halberdsmen and one company of guards.
Pau: 30 "men of war".
Pays de Gex: 12 "men of war".
Peronne: 6 halberdsmen.
Picardy: one company of guards.
Poitou: one company of guards.
Pont-d'Arles: 20 "men of war".
Pont de Cé: 12 "men of war".
Pont de Chanas: 15 "men of war".
Pont-de-Vesle: 10 "men of war".
Riblemont: 18 halberdsmen.
Rouen: 18 "men of war".
Roussillon: one company of guards.
Saintes: 13 "men of war".
Saintonge and Angoumois: one company of guards.
Saumurois: one company of guards.
Sédan: 15 halberdsmen.
Sessel: 10 "men of war".
Toul: one company of guards.
Touraine: one company of guards for the governor.
Touraine: one company of guards for the lieutenant general.
Verdun: 12 halberdsmen

The 31 guard companies mentioned above, if they had 30 men each, would amount to about 930 guards or some 1,550 if they had each 50 men. The various halberdsmen and "men-at-arms" small units came to about 550 men, for a total of some 1,500 to 2,000 men. We suspect that there were in fact many more. As noted, the units listed above were certainly far from being the only ones in existence. Other records reveal intriguing descriptions of troops seen at public ceremonies that were certainly yet more local regular units. We also gain an idea of their varied and obviously colourful dress.

The fortress city of **Arras** paid two men to be "guetteurs" (watchmen) as early as 1432 that were initially to spot from the very high bell tower of Saint-Géry church any suspicious troop movement in the distance. Their numbers later increased. During the 1654 siege they proved very useful to detect the Spanish besiegers' movements and also during the 1712 raid.

In the seventeenth century they were issued with livery cassocks or cloaks made with 14 ells of blue cloth and 12 ells of red cloth as well as trumpets.[1]

Aubagne in Provence had a captain leading a company of variable strength divided in squads of 10 soldiers paid and armed by the city; there were also at least two halberdsmen. Besides the security duties, the captain organised festive occasions. He was furnished with a coat in the city's livery colours that were red and violet. The company flag was also those colours, seemingly quartered with a white cross.[2]

Bayonne had in its municipal pay a unit of gunners that was issued with coats, most likely in the red and green colours of the city's livery, during the 1660s.[3]

A ceremony at **Besançon** described in the July 1683 issue of the *Mercure Galant* mentions that "officers of the garrison" had "their soldiers" dressed in new clothes. This was of "fine grey-white cloth, with bandoliers of the same cloth with gold buckles, gloves with a gold fringe and a white plume on their hats." We cannot be sure of the exact identity of these troops, but they probably were "men-of-war" permanently attached to the defence and watch of Besançon's fortifications.

Bordeaux had its guards "dressed in red with cassocks of the same [colour] cloth" in the early 1700s.[4]

Dijon had its "Government's guards" wearing *isabelle* (buffish yellow) cassocks laced with silver.[5]

Lyon, in 1664, had a dozen guardsmen attending a reception in Lyon wearing "violet cassocks whose sleeves were covered with gold lace and other places only of four [laces] and accompanied with gold buttons, their gold-laced hats having three white and violet plumes", and there were also 30 halberdsmen wearing violet cassocks. During the 1660s, Lyon's militiamen had difficulties maintaining order, notably at the gates, and a levy of 50 men to be regulars soldiers of the city was requested in 1670. The Sun King agreed and created an independent company attached to the Lyonnais Infantry Regiment to only serve in the city. It wore the same uniform and was under the same regulations as that regiment.[6]

From the Middle Ages, the city of Lyon also often paid for companies of Swiss soldiers from Catholic cantons to stand guard, especially at its gates. In 1670 such a company of about 50 men was on duty when it was taken into royal service and sent to the fortress of Pignerol, which resulted in the raising of the Lyonnais Regiment's independent company.[7]

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[1] E, Morel, 'Les guetteurs', *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences, lettres et arts d'Arras, Vol. XLIII* (1893), pp.8–16.

[2] L. Barthélemy, *Histoire d'Aubagne* (Marseille, 1889), pp.311–315.

[3] De Blay de Gaix, *Histoire militaire de Bayonne*, Vol. 2, p.270,

[4] *La guerre d'Espagne, de Bavière et de Flandre* (Cologne, 1709), p.367.

[5] *Mémoires de la Société bourguignonne de géographie et d'histoire*, Vol. 13 (Dijon, 1897), p.328.

[6] *L'Entrée solennelle dans la ville de Lyon du Cardinal Flavio Chigi*, n.p.; *Gazette de France*, 1664, p.633; Niepce, *Lyon militaire*, pp.282, 473–476.

[7] Niepce, *Lyon militaire*, pp.422–423, 436–437; E. Vial, 'Le capitaine de ville', *Revue d'Histoire de Lyon*, Vol. 5 (1906), pp.459, 462. Some 300 Swiss soldiers hired by the city served in Lyon guarding the gates until 1669.

Another guard company in Lyon was the *Copponiers de l'Archevéché*. High-ranking clerics were often disliked by Lyon's populace, and from the fifteenth century the archbishops recruited soldiers in their estates for maximum loyalty. They stood guard at the archbishop's chateau Pierre-Scize as well as the cathedral and cloisters. They also assumed various military garrison duties at the time of the Sun King's reign, often with the Lyonnais Regiment's independent company. Its numbers seem to have been variable, initially a dozen and many more later; its captain and lieutenant guarded Archbishop Camille de Neufville-Villeroi, governor of Lyonnais province from 1653 to 1685 when succeed by Marshal Villeroi, a relative. The guards were armed with firearms and also known as fusiliers, wearing the livery of the archbishop they served.[8]

The city of **Orléans** had a municipal military company called the *Cinquantaine* (the Fifty) – plus a captain, an ensign and five *dizainiers* (NCOs) for a total of 57 – that had been created by King François I in 1546. Its enlisted men were still termed "archers" and it provided guard, ceremonial and aid to the city's constabulary if warranted.[9]

At a festive event in the city of **La Rochelle** during 1695, the June *Mercure Galant* revealed 12 halberdsmen accompanied by a dozen "archers" wearing red cassocks with the coat of arms of the city embroidered thereon. La Rochelle is mentioned in the list as having a company of guards that would have been those attending the governor general of Aunis. There was yet another company of guards there, its troopers escorting Marshal Jean d'Estrées, who was "commanding the king's army in the province" and presumably wearing his family's red livery lined with white.[10]

In the province of **Roussillon**, the Duc de Noailles decided in March 1677 to organise "a small number" of troops to replace the *sometents* and levies of local inhabitants to serve as embodied militia every year in the mild season. Each community henceforth was to pay, arm and equip a number of men, who were to be fit and neither too young nor too old, for full-time duty. For instance the small town of Canet would furnish 14 armed men who received a grey-white coat lined with blue, stockings, shoes, a new hat and a sword while La Bastide raised seven soldiers in 1677 that it equipped, armed and dressed in grey coats, blue breeches and blue stockings. This, in a sense, was a precursor to the national 1688 provincial militia levies (see below).[11]

Saint-Bonnet in Lyonnais had 32 pertuisaniers escorting the town's officials parading at the 1698 festivities celebrating the end of the Nine Years' War.[12]

The **Château du Taureau**, sited on a small island, guarded the entrance of the strategically important bay of Morlaix in Brittany. It was built in the mid sixteenth century and had an independent company paid by the inhabitants of Morlaix and was armed and equipped by the royal government. This company, whose strength varied from about 30 to 55 men in wartime between 1544 and the 1740s, ranked with the Picardy Regiment in precedence but naturally always remained sedentary in the château. Its uniform in the early eighteenth century was described by the Duc de Luynes as "grey-white, brass buttons, double cross pocket flaps with buttonholes *en pattes d'oie* (geese's palm shape), a wide gold border lace on the hat with cockades the colour of fire." The old fort was visited by Vauban in 1689 who reported that it was quite inadequate and had to be reconstructed, which was done from 1690 to 1698. The very imposing new structure featured 11 casemates for heavy artillery cannons that were next to invulnerable behind very thick masonry walls. It was never attacked.[13]

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[8] Niepce, *Lyon militaire*, pp.441–444.

[9] *Mémoires de la Société archéologique de l'Orléanais*, Vol. 36 (1926), pp.251–252.

[10] *Mercure Galant*, March 1701, pp.225–226; *Relation de tout ce qui s'est passé à la réception du Duc de Bourgogne* (Toulouse, 1701).

[11] *Inventaire-sommaire des Archives départementales des Pyrénées orientales* (Paris, 1877), pp.328, 333.

[12] 'Relation des réjouissances...', *Histoire de Saint-Bonnet-le Château* (Paris: Picard, 1887), p.427.

The city of **Toulouse**, capital of the province of Languedoc, is not mentioned in Guignard's list. Yet at a ceremony reported in the May 1686 *Mercure Galant*, a body of 50 guardsmen dressed with their cassocks covered with lilies was escorting officials. Another event related in September 1697 mentioned 100 soldiers "of the ordinary guard of the city's household" performing drills and firing musketry salvos at a parade.

Small principalities that were allies on or within the borders of France also had their own small armed forces. The now famous Principality of **Monaco**, which was an ally of France, had, at least from the early sixteenth century, a guard armed with halberds for its prince, that by the mid seventeenth century consisted of a "carabinier of his highness" company under the command of a captain. They were thus armed with rifled carbines, probably served on foot and mounted like many other guard companies for French princes and generals (see Volume 1). They wore a red livery with silver lace, the colours of the prince's coat of arms. A 1707 list also mentions "independent companies" from Monaco serving as part of the French army.[14]

Avignon and the **Comtat** in southern France had been a Papal territory since 1274 and remained so until the French Revolution. Its inhabitants paid few taxes and were not subject to French military obligations. It also became a haven for Jews, who had a synagogue there as early as the fourteenth century. It was a de facto French ally and also had a small military force consisting of a regular company of chevau-légers, an infantry company and a guard of 20 Swiss halberdsmen wearing a traditional livery in fifteenth-century style, featuring a half red and half yellow jacket and breeches, Henry IV-style hat with a red feather and armed with swords and halberds for full dress.[15]

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[13] F. Le Coat and Louis Le Guennec, *Le Château du Taureau* (Guingamp: Plomée, 1867); *Mémoires du Duc de Luynes*, L. Dussieux and E. Soulié, ed. (Paris: Didot, 1864), Vol. 12, p.49. He wrote the description in 1752 adding the company had been disbanded 'seven or eight years ago.' Its governor who died in 1752, M. de Goësbriant, had succeeded his father many years before. The governor was paid 6,000 livres, but had to pay for the company out of this sum so the original financial arrangement had probably been changed in the Sun King's era.

[14] Stéphane Vilarem, 'La garde personelle des princes d'Honoré II à Albert 1er', *Annales Monégasques*, No. 6 (1982), pp.143–152; ANF, G7, Vol. 1780, État des R[é[g]imen[ts] d'Infanterie, Cavalerie et Dragons (1707).

The known total from our research on 45 towns and forts would be 2,500 to 3,000 men. All the other places not listed, hundreds of them, would also have their own small or larger units of local soldiers. Thus, unknown thousands of soldiers of these local reserve troops were on duty in France's many towns, cities and outlying forts.

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[15] J.-B.-M. Joudou, *Avignon, son histoire, ses papes, ses monumens et ses environs* (Avignon, 1842), pp.255–256; *Dictionnaire géographique, historique* ..., Vol. 1, p.368. In the eighteenth century, the cavalry is described as having 50 troopers wearing red with silver lace on all seams, the infantry of a 100 men uniformed in blue coats with red cuffs and waistcoats. Enclaved in the Comtat was the small principality of Orange that belonged to the Dutch House of Orange from 1544 until annexed by the Sun King in 1673 and ceded to France in 1713.

18

Caring for Souls and Bodies

Chaplains

The religious needs of French soldiers were somewhat haphazardly looked after in Louis XIV's armies. This might be surprising in France, which was traditionally considered the "elder daughter" of the Roman Catholic Church. Since the mid sixth century, there was a *Grand Aumônier de France* (Grand Chaplain of France) supposedly considered the superior of clergymen ministering the soldiers, but actually he had no such powers. French cardinals and bishops did not wish to see an influential "diocese" group of priests in the army from which a talented theologian might emerge to challenge them and royalty on such things as moral doctrine. Louis XIV was also mindful of this possibility. As a result, there was no centralised structure managing the chaplains in the French armies.

There was no formal obligation for units to have chaplains, and while many obviously did, Louvois felt obliged to remind regiments that each should have one. The King's government supplied a complete portable chapel to the regimental chaplain who was to celebrate mass every day in a suitable spot in camp. Chaplains in military hospitals kept track of their patients and advised in writing the military authorities and the families if they deceased. From 13 December 1681, all chaplains were strictly forbidden to perform the marriage ceremony for soldiers unless they had formal permission to do so. The Sun King, from time to time, might also hire chaplains on some occasions, for instance in 1685 for a training camp gathering 30,000 men at Saint-Germain-en-Laye where 20 priests from the Récollets order were sent. The Récollets, who vowed a life of poverty, were a branch of the Franciscan order, and proved to be well-suited to ministering soldiers. The Pope granted Récollet army chaplains permission to have horses in spite of their vows of poverty, to more effectively accompany the troops on campaign. They soon had many chaplains with the armies in France, Flanders and Germany. By the early eighteenth century they had 12 "provinces" with about 148 convents in France with over 2,000 members, many of whom were detached to serve with the armed forces. It was not an especially "intellectual" order like, say,



Right: *Après la bataille* (After the battle). For many a soldier, the wounds were deadly. These unfortunate men, such as this officer, might be comforted in their final moments by a grieving servant or companion while a monk or a priest would commend them to God. Detail from an early eighteenth-century painting by G. Zais. (Musée Magnin, Dijon. Author's photo)



Above: A chaplain of the Récollet order, early eighteenth century. The Récollets, who vowed a life of poverty, were a branch of the Franciscan order and wore the same habits. This consisted of a brown (sometimes given as black) rough cloth habit with a hood ending in a point, a white or tan cord as a waist belt and a plain crucifix suspended by a cord. Print from the 1718 *Histoire des ordres monastiques, religieux et militaires.* (Author's photo)



Right: a Récollet chaplain wearing a cape over his habit, early eighteenth century. The cape of the same material as the habit. Print from the 1718 *Histoire des ordres monastiques, religieux et militaires.* (Author's photo)



Bishop Fénélon comforting the wounded after the battle of Malplaquet, 1709. François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénélon was one of the most intellectual clerics of his times and had been royal tutor to the young Duc the Bourgogne in the 1690s. Named archbishop of the fortress of Cambrai, he opened his palace to wounded troops, notably after the nearby battle of Malplaquet. He once wrote: "To abandon the sentiment of humanity is not merely to renounce civilisation and to relapse into barbarism, it is to share in the blindness of the most brutish brigands and savages; it is to be a man no longer, but a cannibal." Print after Philippoteaux. (Private collection. Author's photo)

the Jesuits, but rather a community of men wishing to bring the word of God to ordinary people including soldiers in search of moral and divine support.[1]

Thus Récollets, with encouragement from the King, became the most common order of clergymen serving in the army. The regimental chaplain was part of its non-combatant staff, like the surgeon. The number of chaplains was supposed to be about the same as the army's number of units. This depended on the success of colonels to recruit chaplains and also from intendants who would seek priests to serve at military hospitals. Soldiers could be thieving, rowdy, utter obscene language routinely, have "immoral" ways at times with women and drink. It seems that some chaplains were not paragons of virtue either. In 1705, the Bishop of Casal thought that chaplains behaving scandalously should be subjected to royal regulations to promote good order amongst themselves. No such regulations were made, and one assumes regimental chaplains turned a blind eye to some of the soldiers' dubious activities. Besides the numerous Récollet chaplains there were Capucin chaplains at hospitals in Nancy and Belfort, Minime chaplains at Calais, Brothers of Charity chaplains at Dunkirk and Ypres. Indeed, there was a permanent chaplain in most of the approximately 160 medical facilities in hospitals, citadels and forts in the kingdom.[2]

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[1] *Histoire des ordres monastiques, religieux et militaires* (Paris: N. Gosselin, 1718), Vol. 7, pp.135–136; *Dictionnaire militaire* (Paris, 1745), pp.75–76; M. Bar, *Recueil de tous les costumes des ordres religieux et militaires* (Paris: author, 1778), Vol. 1, n.p.

Not all chaplains in the Sun King's armies were Roman Catholic. The "capitulations" or contracts to hire foreign mercenary regiments from Switzerland and Germany included provisions to have Protestant chaplains for officers and men of that faith. This was an internal matter managed by regimental colonels and was outside the bounds of national religious legislation (see Vol. 1, p.193 and Vol. 2, pp.122–124).

Medical Services

It has been said that medicine in the era of the Sun King had not progressed very much since Galen of Pergamum (131–201 AD) and would not achieve great strides until the later nineteenth century. The seventeenth century had seen scientific discoveries that could have improved medicine, but there was no application and thus no progress. Galen had been a surgeon for gladiators and to Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and was probably the greatest physician in Antiquity by his experimental discoveries such as proving that blood moved from the heart to arteries. He thus sought to control bleeding by saturating severed vessels with silk. While treating soldiers, he first diagnosed malingering from actual illness. Amputations were made to prevent the spread of gangrene and the technique remained essentially similar for some 1,700 years, using a scalpel to cut the skin, a long-bladed knife to cut muscle and a saw to cut the bone; still, over half of patients did not survive it. The drugs concocted or used by Galen were still administered to the Sun King's officers and men, namely theriacs that were a mixture of about 70 largely ineffective ingredients with opium being popular due to its addictive and euphoric effects. In the late seventeenth century a military surgeon's field chest would contain drugs such as aloe, and definitely opium.



Surgeon attending a wounded soldier at a field hospital, late seventeenth century. Print after Maurice Leloir. (Private collection. Author's photo)

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[2] R.P. Hélyot, *Dictionnaire des ordres religieux* (Paris: Ateliers catholiques du Petit Montrouge, 1850), Vol. 3, pp.333–336, 339–340.

French military field hospitals appeared in the late sixteenth century and were suitably equipped by the middle of the seventeenth century. Cardinal Richelieu had tasked Jesuits to provide food and nursing on campaign and most apprentice surgeons served in field hospitals to complete their training. Field hospitals were mainly dressing stations to stabilise wounds until the patient was transferred to a more permanent hospital. The Chevalier de Quincy's memoirs give a few glimpses as to how the wounded might reach the field hospital. After relating the battle of Malplaquet, he added he could not fail to praise Mademoiselle Chevalier, a famous and beautiful *courtisane*:

> who had fallen in love with an officer of the regiment ... she followed him everywhere. In spite of three days of cannon fire and battle, she constantly remained with our colours. One cannot forget for the sake of ingratitude the services she rendered to the regiment. As soon as an officer or a soldier was wounded, she had him taken away at once from the battlefield and accompanied him to where our surgeon-major was. Then she would come back to the regiment. She thus saved many of our soldiers.

This confirms the ageless tradition in all armies that "regimental" women and musicians would seek and take away the wounded even as battle raged.[3]



Surgeons and staff at a more or less temporary hospital near a battle zone, early eighteenth century. Beds are in a hall transformed into a ward. Print after Hutter's *Observations* (1715). (Private collection. Author's photo)

There were about 160 military medical facilities in hospitals and in citadels and forts throughout France. The largest establishments were at Strasbourg which had some 1,600 beds, Metz had 1,100 while Le Quesnois had 152 and Mont-Louis only 20. A bed would be for three, two or one patients, this last presumably for officers. The largest establishments had *médecins* (physicians), surgeons, assistant surgeons, comptrollers and chaplains with the smaller facilities having only an assistant surgeon and perhaps a chaplain. The royal order of 17 January 1708 formalised the previous establishments and is considered the birthdate of the present French Army Medical Corps. The physicians and surgeons were attached to the army, but were often partly paid by cities to provide care to civilians. Dr. Fagan, one of the most renowned, became physician to the Sun King. The nursing staff consisted of nuns and friars from various religious orders, notably the Soeurs Grises (grey nuns) and the Frères de la Charité (brothers of charity). In some cases the religious order owned and ran the hospital, leasing all or part of it to the royal government. For its time, it was likely the most extensive and modern military healthcare system in Europe.[4]

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[3] Quincy, *Mémoires*, Vol. 2, p.382.

[4] Joseph E. McCallum, *Military Medicine* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO, 2008), pp.117–118, 130, 216, 292–293; 'Tricentenaire du service de santé des armées', *Médecine et Armées*, Vol. 36, No. 5,



Left: surgeon's instruments in their case, first half of the eighteenth century. The interior is padded and lined with dark red velvet. Musée du monastère de l'Hôpital général de Québec. (Photo courtesy Kevin Gélinas)

Right: a room in a hospital, late seventeenth to early eighteenth century. This man is one of the lucky few, especially for enlisted men, who survived to be in a hospital; these accommodations were much more likely for officers. Various orders of nuns provided nursing services and some were also specialised as pharmacists. This recreated scene was inspired from the preserved Hospices de Beaune in Burgundy and period sources. From an exhibit formerly at the Canadian Museum of History, Gatineau. (Author's photo)

Invalids

Before 1670 the government lodged wounded and invalided soldiers in religious abbeys and hospices (hospitals) that could accommodate such patients, for which they received a grant. As not all veterans could be housed, for lack of space, pensions were provided for those outside, but on the whole many old and unfit soldiers were hardly cared for and transformed into miserable paupers. Some of the fittest, being old and experienced men-at-arms, resorted to armed robberies and other such crimes. Following wars, the large numbers of miserable former soldiers created major safety problems that archers of the armed constabulary forces could not overcome. It was in fact a social problem.[5]

One of the great achievements of the Sun King and his ministers was to come up with a solution to alleviate this situation, by the royal declaration of January 1670 followed by other decrees that

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December 2008; C. Boissonnet, 'Employés des hôpitaux militaires au XVIIIe siècle', *Revue de l'intendance militaire*, Vol. 3 (1890), pp.51–68.

[5] Geoffrey L. Hudson, 'Internal influences in the Making of the English Military Hospital' in *British Military and Naval Medicine 1600–1830* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007), pp.256–258.

totally changed the system. A royal hospital for invalid soldiers would be built in Paris and the money paid to religious orders would henceforth be handled by a royal government treasurer. Furthermore, a pension system was introduced in the army by deducting small amounts from the military payrolls so that, after their military service, invalided officers and men could receive care and a modest pension. This may seem quite normal today, but at the time, the creation of *Les Invalides* was a revolutionary concept.

Up to the early 1670s such care services were limited to those who had some money. Otherwise the crippled could only hope, if in luck, for somewhat elective charity given out by religious orders. Thanks to the Sun King the state was now assuming responsibility for what must be seen as a major step in social services at a time when there were hardly any in all nations. The intent was that all serving personnel in the French armed forces have access to care when age and wounds took their toll. Furthermore the philosophical emphasis was elevated from aiding miserably poor and ailing old when one felt charitable, to honouring and caring for men who had been maimed and invalided in the service of the nation. Louis XIV felt his government and the people of France had a sacred moral duty to these men.

Les Invalides

The hospital since known worldwide as the *Invalides* was built at about 400 m south of the Seine River. It was very large, and being one of the Sun King's architectural projects it was designed as a magnificent edifice crowned by the Saint-Louis chapel which dwarfed many a church both in size and in luxurious decoration with its superb gilded dome; it immediately became one of the city's landmarks. The area beneath the dome has since become France's Pantheon, which includes Napoleon's last resting place. Its main core was the *Cour d'honneur* (Honour courtyard) also called *Cour royale* (royal courtyard), the large enclosed parade ground adjoining the chapel which was 65 m wide by 130 m long; This court is still used today for prestigious state ceremonies just as in the days of the Sun King. Four smaller courts were also built in the complex. From this core rayed a multitude of large buildings built in four long rows with traversing edifices. The main entrance was accessed through an imposing portico at the centre of the 210 m wide facade. From this facade, a long and gardened esplanade going to the banks of the Seine River was built; trees were planted in rows from the facade to the river (partly cut down in the later eighteenth century).



An invalid sergeant, early eighteenth century. The rank of sergeant is shown here by the white buttonhole lace and the halberd. (Courtesy New York Public Library, New York City)

The main function of the *Invalides* was to be a hospital that had seven infirmary wards in halls; the number of beds per hall varied from 101 to 18. The design was arranged in such a way that the middle of the halls crossed each other. An elevated altar between floors came under a sunlight-sourced





cupola on the roof and this clever arrangement permitted patients to hear mass in their beds. Each hall had a nursing sister, a matron and several male nursing assistants night and day. Each infirmary had a staffed kitchen supervised by the nursing sisters. There was a large and a small pharmacy. The establishment had a therapeutic bath area featuring even steam baths and showers. The care establishment was completed by a small promenade within for the convalescents.

There were four dining halls for the fitter invalids, each hall decorated with frescoes, some of which are reproduced in our work. Officers had one hall and the men three others that were larger. Each table accommodated 12 invalids of all ranks. There were two services each of two meals a day. The food was not fancy, but wholesome consisting of meat, fowl, fish, seasonal vegetables, dessert and that cornerstone of French food: bread. It was to be good since, as Clermont-Tonnerre put it, the nation owed good bread to men who had sacrificed good blood. Finally there was a ration of decent red wine, which had to be consumed on the spot; hoarding wine rations to get drunk was severely punished.[6]

The best designers were chosen to create the complex. Libéral Bruant designed the buildings, Jules Mansard the chapel's dome and François Girardin oversaw the sculptor's work. It took over four years to build, and in the meantime, invalids were lodged in rented buildings on Cherche-Midi Street in the Saint-Germain suburb (today the 5th *arrondissement* in Paris). By April 1674 the King had signed an edict confirming the establishment of the nearly completed *Invalides* hospital and outlined its management. It was put under the ministry of war and had a board made up of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, the sergeant major of the Gardes-Françaises Regiment, the colonels of the six senior infantry regiments, the colonel generals of cavalry and dragoon with the mestre-de-camp général of cavalry. This board was to meet every month.

In the following decades other countries followed suit. Britain's Royal Hospital in Chelsea founded in 1682 was inspired by the *Invalides*. Brunswick-Lunenburg inaugurated an invalid's hospital at Celle in 1694, Austria followed suit in Vienna three years later and more were inaugurated in other countries during the eighteenth century. Pension systems were also introduced in those countries and others, notably Prussia in 1707 and Russia following Peter the Great's visit to Paris in 1717, the same year that Spain created such a pension plan.

The staff of the *Invalides* consisted of a governor, a king's lieutenant, a major, two aides-major, a prevost with five archers (who wore a similar uniform to those of the Garde de la Prévôté), a *capitaine des portes* (captain of the gates), a chief physician and a chief surgeon. Louis XIV specified

Facing page:
Top: the *Invalides*, c.1680. This mural painting at the Chateau de Bussy-Rabutin in Burgundy gives the probable appearance of this great military hospital shortly after it was completed. Few trees have yet grown. (Author's photo)

Bottom: dining hall of the *Invalides* in Paris, first half of the eighteenth century. Nearly all the men are shown dining with their hats on. The murals by Jacques Friquet de Vauroze made in the late 1670s are seen on the walls. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA) that the physicians, surgeons and pharmacists had the same skills as those attached to his royal court, which implied that they were to have a high level of scientific knowledge. Implicitly, the King thus proclaimed that old soldiers should have access to the same level of medical care as himself.

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[6] Senior officers had better fare. In 1705, the King's lieutenant (lieutenant governor) of the *Invalides* was entitled daily to the following rations: 11 lbs of bread; 10 lbs of meat; 12 pints of wine; a provision herbs, salads, fruits, oil, cheeses and other groceries. On the *jours maigres* (lean days): cod, butter and two plates of fish. During Lent: salmon, hake, herring, rice, prunes, etc., as per AG, A1, 85, Estat de ce que l'hostel royal des Invalides fournit à Monsieur le lieutenant du Roy en ... denrées et rations.

From May 1675, from 12 to 20 priests from the Mission de Saint-Lazare, a congregation that combined spiritual with medical care, saw to the religious needs of the invalids. Since former soldiers were renowned for their lack of religious ardour, all new invalids being received as residents were subject to the *quarantaine* (40 days' quarantine) of religious education and prayer supervised by priests. They were lodged in special closed quarters for that period of time, which could be likened to a retreat in a monastery. In March 1676, a dozen nursing sisters who were nuns from the congregation of the Filles de la Charité were attached to the *Invalides*. Under a chief sister, they were in charge of hospital wards and the pharmacies (they could prepare simple mixtures). The nuns lodged in separate private quarters where no man was allowed except the governor and senior staff officer by appointment. They hired and supervised a sizeable number of employees and had their own servants. Cleanliness was important, so clothes and linens were entrusted to women outside the *Invalides* who washed them. From 1689, the nursing sisters and their staff also supervised *maniros* who were the more severe cases such as men without limbs, blind or gravely maimed and disfigured who required special accommodation, quarters and constant care by servants.

Initially meant to house about 3,000–4,000 invalid soldiers, the Paris institution eventually became overcrowded. From 13 April 1690 the invalid soldiers who were still fit to render certain light duties were henceforth formed into companies and detached to various forts and fortresses all across France although still under the authority of the governor of the *Invalides* in Paris. They were generally deployed as watchmen and guards. By 1710 there were 13,792 army invalid officers and men officially registered in France. Of these, only 2,924 were at the *Invalides* in Paris and the rest belonged to detached companies, each of which had a captain, five lieutenants and 70 NCOs and private soldiers. Some companies were also formed in the Paris *Invalides* from those fit for light service, each having a captain, a lieutenant and 25 men. Protestants were not housed in the Paris hospital, but received pensions and could serve in detached companies. This may have been one of the institution's administrative as well as religious oddities because artillerymen too, for undecipherable reasons, were not allowed in the Paris *Invalides* in the reign of the Sun King.

It has been generally assumed that all invalids were required to be celibate. Those lodging at the *Invalides* were indeed to be celibate "or men living as such", but there never was a rigorous decree that all invalids be unmarried; they could marry providing they obtained permission to do so from the governor after an enquiry regarding the future bride and groom. Marriages were allowed mainly if they improved the invalid's economic well being. About two-thirds of the married men had children. Thus, many lived outside the *Invalides* and benefited from its medical services and other advantages; the invalid could be received as an in-pensioner for some reasons, such as his wife's death. Exclusion from the *Invalides* was infrequent and could be ordered if a pensioner married without permission, smoked, had been treated twice for venereal disease, had torn up a posted order or missed too many religious services. When medical science could do no more and the pensioner passed away, his belongings and valuables were looked after and given to his next of kin. At his funeral he was given the military honours due to his rank.[7]

The pensioner's uniform was naturally the colours of the royal livery. For ordinary dress and walking out it consisted of a blue cloth coat with red cuffs and lining, with white metal buttons and blue cloth breeches. The coat was initially renewed every six years and the breeches every three years. This was later reduced to three years and one year respectively. Hats, stockings, shoes and shirts were issued more frequently. For undress they had a yellow buff leather jacket lined with linen. NCOs appear to have had buttonholes laced with white. From 1701 officer's coats were distinguished from the men's by a narrow lace three lines (6.7 mm) wide applied to all the coat's seams, with two such laces edging the cuffs and the pocket flaps.

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7 Auguste Solard, *Histoire de l'Hôtel royal des Invalides* (Blois and Paris, 1845). The essential study on the topic from which nearly all our data is taken.

19

In the Wake of the Sun King's Armies

The Soldier's Family

While the presence of women in French Armies is relatively well documented from Louis XV's reign, research on the same subject before 1715 reveals a remarkable paucity of information in spite of considerable research by Dr. Corvisier. The army obviously did not wish to be burdened with the various expenses and issues associated with women, and as a result women did not really officially exist. They were not considered necessary to the administration of the army and were at best tolerated around soldiers. Their presence was also considered disruptive, and a source of rivalries and disputes between comrades.

The *femmes galantes* were especially unwanted. There is a famous 1684 poster of an *Ordonnance du Roy* forbidding "girls of bad lives" being near soldiers within two leagues (7.8 km) of Versailles. Those caught in camp and found guilty were "By the King" condemned to have their noses and ears cut, although we must specify that these were actually slit rather than cut off, but still quite a severe penalty. It was probably nearly never done and seems to have been quickly revoked as a penalty, but it must have convinced girls not to be too rowdy if they mixed with the men. Whipping or the wooden horse was a more common punishment.

This, and other orders in the same spirit, simply encouraged the *femmes galantes* going after soldiers to marry them, which was not really the solution sought by Louvois or the King. Nor was marriage desirable to the army's authorities because of the "inconveniences and disorders" it could cause. Since 1670 and especially from 1685, the soldiers were discouraged to marry by repressive measures against them. Married soldiers could not be promoted to lance-corporal nor corporal and would lose their seniority (time of service) for the years prior to the marriage date. This meant less money to feed eventual children and a longer time to be released from the army. Only marriages celebrated by the priest from the woman's parish were considered valid, and if a regimental chaplain performed a marriage he would be prosecuted as an accomplice in the woman's kidnapping from her



Above: the women and children of the regiment marching with the wagons on a damp early eighteenth-century day. Note the sergeant (at left) pointing and telling the sitting woman nursing her baby (at right) to get on her way with the others. Print after JOB. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Below: a young woman being assaulted by two soldiers, mid seventeenth century. One can only hope that the only harm will be the loss to the soldiers of the chicken she carries. Her basket with eggs has already been taken. Such scenes were regrettably all too frequent in the wake of armies. Detail of a tapestry by E. Oerlof. (Courtesy Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam. BK-NM-1595)







Facing page:

Top: a French peasant family, mid seventeenth century. Following the uniformed soldiers were untold numbers of civilian carters and servants. They were humble folk, often peasants and probably much similar to this painting by Le Nain. We can envisage the man with his horse being hired to pull an army cart or his own wagon to earn some money, perhaps to acquit the dreaded taxes. His accompanying wife and children might earn some tips for bringing water or watching an officer's horse. It was all part of the huge interior economy created by the Sun King's wars. (Victoria and Albert Museum, London. Author's photo)

Bottom: An infantry camp near a village, 1710. Women and children are numerous in this camp scene. Some may be village girls selling food and flirting with soldiers or vice versa, but many more are surely the soldiers' unofficial "wives" with their children running about camp. At right is the tent of a *vivandière*. Print after Jean-Antoine Watteau. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

parish! Chaplains were allowed to marry "girls born in the regiment" and soldiers' widows such as Marie Bourbon, who had a son by her deceased soldier husband in about 1704 before remarrying another soldier. Their main source for a few pennies was to wash clothes.

From 17 February 1685 soldiers of French nationality were forbidden to marry, unless by permission of senior commanders. Fairly severe penalties were laid if soldiers dared to marry without permission: for instance, a sergeant could be reduced to private or dismissed from the army. About the only advantage to the married women was a daily bread ration, granted only to approved unions. Although they mostly lived in the field, it was also a standing order that women, married or not, were not allowed in barracks or guard houses and it was one of the duties of the officer of the guard at night to make sure this was observed. As a result of these discouraging policies, it is reckoned that only 137 of the 866 soldiers (15.8 percent) admitted to the *Invalides* in 1715 declared they were married. However, if one goes by a survey done of the men in the La Couronne Regiment between 1769 and 1772, less than one percent of its soldiers were legally married. Part of the explanation might be that soldiers admitted to the *Invalides* were older and tended to have married late, often when they were sergeants. For them, it seems regulations were relaxed and permissions easier to obtain. Also, although not in the statistics, the wives of sergeants were traditionally running some canteens, probably because this favoured less levity from corporals and private soldiers.

In reality however, the presence of women presence in the daily life of soldiers may not have been as rare as regulations wished. Illustrations and some documents of the period testify to this, but they were not "part" of the army. They followed the loves of their lives and it is next to impossible to know much about their existence. There were few barracks in France at the time so that regiments were usually billeted with inhabitants in the towns or villages where they were posted, else the regiments were often in camp. In both circumstances, women were always around.

We add that these restrictive orders did not apply to foreign mercenary infantry, which had its own regulations. For foreign regiments, some "capitulations" (contracts) mention bedding and rations for small numbers of women and children. And foreign regiments formed a somewhat closed society which did not mix much with the French population.

There were also the *Vivandiers* and *Vivandières*, or sutlers. In 1653, four male sutlers per every 10 companies were allowed to follow the regiments. By 1690 they were allowed to have a cart, as long as it was drawn by four good horses. The *Vivandières*, who seem to have become more visible during the Sun King's reign, were originally the sutlers' wives and helped take care of the business with some eventually having their own travelling shops. They were probably the closest thing to women having some sort of official sanction to follow the troops on their own. The official attitude was that women could be associated with the army, but not part of it.[1]

The *enfants du regiments* (children of the regiment) have been the subject of some positive and romantic lore in popular French literature. Their reality was somewhat more like the hard lives led by their parents. This started on the day of their birth, many being born in an open camp with the help of other soldiers' wives; baby boy Nicolas Clément was "born next to a bush, on campaign in Flanders, a child of the Picardy Regiment" in about 1675. These infants were often baptised in the nearest village with godparents belonging to the regiment. The boys born "in the regiment" were considered "of the troops" and were enlisted quite young so they would receive pay, a practice that was tolerated. They were often trained as drummers or trumpeters. The fate of the girls is much less known. A few are recorded as becoming soldiers' wives while some soldier's children, presumed to be mostly girls, were given up to religious hostels. An important factor is that actually it seems there were very few children; in 1716 only 91 are listed out of 22,509 soldiers (2.1 percent).[2]

Thus, in spite of all manner of obstacles, were common soldiers' families formed. It was a hard and risky life that might not reach old age, but when the troops marched or were grouped around campfires or fireplaces, many jolly songs were sung, many of them romantic for these young people looking for, or having found, romance and regimental pride. After the battle of Malplaquet, the troops of Marshal Villars entered Le Quesnoy singing *Auprès de ma blonde, qu'il fait bon dormir* (Next to my blond [girlfriend], it is so good to sleep). The Champagne Regiment had, like many units, its own *Marche des Gris-Vêtus* (March of the Grey-Clothed) celebrating its all grey uniform. Even Marshal Berwick was known to join in singing: *Mon coeur volage, dit-elle, N'est pas pour vous, garçons; Est pour homme de guerre, Qui a barbe au menton. Lon, lon, larirdon. Qui porte chapeau à plume, Soulier à rouge talon* … (My wandering heart, says she, Is not for you, boys; Is for a warrior, with beard at his chin. Lon, lon, larirdon. Who wears a plumed hat, [and] red-heeled shoe …)[3]

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[1] Raymond Caire, *La femme militaire* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1981), p.15.

[2] Corvisier, *Le soldat*, Vol. 2, pp.757–770; Michel, *Les Ordonnances militaires du Roy*, pp.274–276.

[3] Reboul, *La vie au dix-huitième siècle. L'Armée* (Paris: Seheur, 1931), pp.32–34. In the francophone world, a *blonde* is a romantic girlfriend no matter the hue of her hair. The red heel was an Ancien Régime allusion to an officer of noble birth.

Women Soldiers

In the era of the Sun King, the legal military establishment was strictly a man's world. The only way women could enlist was to pass for men by changing their names and hiding their sex.

Certainly one of the most remarkable female soldiers was the Chevalier Balthazar. He was actually a girl called Geneviève Prémoy or Prémoya (1660–1704) born in Guise, and passing herself as a young man, enlisted as a trooper in the Condé Cavalry Regiment under the name of Balthazar. Her valour was such that she was promoted lieutenant and later captain in the Turbilly Dragoon Regiment. Balthazar was renowned for bravery in battle when, in about 1691, a chest wound revealed the hero to be a woman! The identity of this unusual dragoon became famous and even Louis XIV was quite impressed and met *la dragone*. She was allowed to remain in the army and continued to distinguish herself by outstanding actions, which caused the Sun King to award her the knight's cross of Saint-Louis with a sword as a personal token of his esteem. By then she was lauded at the Versailles court, particularly by the ladies. On her dress, her anonymous biographer wrote:

> Since she has been recognised to be a woman, the king ordered her to wear a skirt, which she wears at court [in Versailles] and in Paris, that is often scarlet laced with gold. The rest of her clothing is that of a distinguished officer ... a brown or a blonde [wig], a laced hat ornamented with a white plume, or sometime another colour, a scarlet coat magnificently laced with gold ... but what distinguishes the rich ornaments she has is the [insignias] of the knightly Order of Saint-Louis, which she has the privilege of wearing over the shoulder like the commanders of this order, who wear their cross attached to a scarlet sash four fingers wide.[4]

Oddly enough, the *Mercure Galant* of October 1684 also had a story concerning a "young Dutch damsel, daughter of Sieur Vandester, colonel of a cavalry regiment of the Prince of Orange, born in Amsterdam and aged 25" who had joined the French troops at age 14, serving a year and a half "in the company of Tilladet, colonel of the red dragoons, a year in the company of green dragoons of Rocherolles, three years as a volunteer in Bertillac's company, under the name of the Chevalier, and since was a cornet in the same company for 22 months." While in Douai she had a love quarrel, and in a duel killed a lieutenant of Des Granges' Regiment. She was sentenced to be beheaded by the Sieur Desbonnets, governor of the city. At that point, she revealed her true sex and obtained the King's pardon.[5]

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[4] M. Menesson, "La Dragone ou le Chevalier Balthazar, de Guise", *Bulletin de la Société historique de Vervins*, Vol. 1 (1873), pp.28–35.

[5] These two stories have strange similarities and none of the names cited appear to have been commanders of dragoons although there was a Mestre de Camp Tilladet leading a line cavalry regiment (see Volume 3). Perhaps these were cases of bad spelling or mistaken identities, as regiments constantly changed names. Both girls were about the same age and perhaps the same person? However, events favour different identities. Chevalier was a popular military nickname. The Dutch girl revealed her true sex and was pardoned probably in 1684, whereas Balthazar's true sex was discovered after she was wounded in action in about 1691; she is said to have



The Chevalier Balthazar (actually Geneviève Prémoy or Prémoya, 1660–1704), officer of cavalry and dragoons, c.1701. Her portrait, reproduced here, is from her 1703 biography titled *Histoire de la Dragone*. (Author's photo)

The fates of both lady soldiers above was distinctly better than Marie Magdelaine Mouron, alias Picard in the Royal-Wallon Infantry Regiment, a dragoon in the Morsan Dragoon Regiment and a private in the Sanzé Infantry Regiment during 1692–1696. Details are unclear, but she may have even deserted thrice and pocketed the enlistment bounty when she was revealed to be a woman. Since she had taken the money, it seems she ended up with a long prison sentence. Her story reveals various aspects of everyday life for rankers in the army, notably that individual privacy was possible in spite of sleeping two or three to a bed or in a tent with eight or nine companions; furthermore, baths and showers were simply unknown to common people. This leaves us to wonder if there were many more girls who, in all armies, succeeded in hiding their true sex and thus remained totally unknown.[6]

Officers

The commissioned officers were in a different situation in that, if married, they could overwhelmingly rely on a family estate or home where their wives lived with more comfort and with contact with their extended families and the friends of their genteel world. Life in army camps was certainly not for them although they might visit their husbands for a few days if their unit was in the vicinity. Such visits were always a joyous event, and if the wife of the colonel arrived it could spark officers' parties during her short stay. Some few officers might have wives with them permanently on campaign, a practice that was somewhat tolerated although it seems that they were not actually in camp but following the regiment. To prevent "dishonourable marriages" of officers with girls of low condition, the King forbade such unions in December 1681 unless permission from the Minister of War had been granted. Some men went ahead at the risk of losing their commission, although in reality there was obviously a certain tolerance.[7]

Young unmarried officers in the Sun King's army were said to be unsurpassed in Europe for chasing gallantly after petticoats. A song of the time summed up a certain view of their life in the army: "Every year, I plan

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received the Order of Saint-Louis from 1693. Other armies also had female soldiers and it could even be said that the Sun King's armies must have had more, but the publicity given to such cases veils the fact that they were rare: only 15 are known for the whole eighteenth century.

[6] John A. Lynn, *The French Wars 1667-1714 The Sun King at War* (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), pp.76–79.

[7] Babeau, *La vie militaire*, Vol. 2, pp.213–217.



A rare contemporary view of officers dining in the field while on campaign, late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. This detail from a large wall painting shows a round folding table with a white tablecloth and chairs to sit on. The officers sitting use pewter or silver dishes, drinking vessels and jug with, standing, two servants attending them. In the background a woman who might be the cook, and a man, possibly a servant also, are faintly seen. The tents are shown in a brown hue. (Musée Condé, Chantilly. Author's photo)

to fight, love and drink; Mars, Venus and wine will each have their turn; I leave spring and summer for glory; autumn for Bacchus and winter for love."[8]

Although all officers were gentlemen, not all were of noble blood. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a surprisingly high proportion were *roturiers* who were well educated and from suitably wealthy Bourgeois families and thus ideal candidates to fill the officers' ranks. In 1712 a third of the lauded Piémont Infantry Regiment's officers were not noblemen, a proportion that could be extended to the rest of the line regiments since they could "live nobly" and afford commissions. Officers were also generally quite young: of Piémont's 39 sub-lieutenants, the eldest was 25 and the youngest 14. Another far smaller group were the *officiers de fortune* who, from humble circumstances, had risen through the ranks from sergeant to sub-lieutenant, but higher rank was extremely rare.[9]

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[8] *Je prétend tous les ans me battre, aimer et boire. Mars, Venus et le vin auront chacun leur tour; Je laisse le printemps et l'été pour la gloire, L'automne pour Bacchus et l'hiver pour l'amour.* From the 1693 *XIIe livre d'airs sérieux et à boire*, by M. de Bausset cited in Babeau, *La vie militaire*, p.209.

[9] Reboul, *La vie au dix-huitième siècle. L'Armée*, pp.52–54.

20

Recruiting and National Conscription

Luring "Volunteers"

From the 1670s the French army's expansion called for recruiting drives of unprecedented scope. Therefore recruiting standards were flexible, especially in wartime. The recruit had to be in good health with no infirmities. Height was rather elastic with a desired minimum of five feet (1.62 m), shorter men being accepted during hostilities. While 18 was considered the ideal age, some boys of 14 could be recruited when it was thought they had "hopes of growing tall" as they got older. The length of service had been "no less than three years" before 10 December 1686, when it was raised to six years, but this was considered a minimum by the authorities; they could and often did refuse to release men because the unit was under establishment strength during wartime.

The demand for recruits reached peaks during the War of the League of Augsburg (1688–1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714). However, new regiments and increase in the number of men per company called for another 170,000 foot soldiers and 30,000 cavalrymen, which raised the total to 655,000 men over 13 years. A 100,000 of these were foreign mercenaries. The other 555,000 were to be recruited in France. To meet the challenge, the volunteers lured by recruiting officers and sergeants could not suffice, but from 1688 an early form of national conscription had been introduced by the Sun King.[1]

The Provincial Militia: the Birth of Conscription Draft

On 29 November 1688, the Sun King signed an order creating a new and different type of "militia". It has been since called the provincial militia and

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[1] Corvisier, *Le soldat*, Vol. 1, pp.147–178; M. Michel, *Les Ordonnances militaires du Roy, réduites en pratique et appliqués aux detail du service* (Liège: Broncart, 1707), p.260.



A conscripted provincial militiaman reports to a regimental officer, early eighteenth century. Print after JOB. The militiamen might arrive without having been issued with clothing. (Private collection. Author's photo)

occasionally the royal militia, which last title would be more accurate because it was an act of the royal government imposed on the more rural areas of the provinces. It really was not a militia at all, but a system to enlist men for regular full time service in the army. Up to that date, armies had been recruited on a volunteer basis, more or less, with men being lured into enlisting individually. Recruits were often lacking and foreign mercenaries were expensive, yet there was still a huge pool of men in the nation's countryside villages that had no urban bourgeois or sea coast coast guard militias. This order, although referring to itself as a "militia" was thus something very different. What it did was to create the first organisation in modern Europe specifically aimed at the conscription of men for obligatory national service in the regular army. The recruits did not volunteer, they were drafted.[2]

The initial order of November 1688 called for 25,050 men to be mustered into 29 regiments soon raised to 30. This was followed by more orders to draft men during the following years. The actual recruiting of men for provincial militia was very different than for the line regiments. It was a draft system from the outset and, shrewdly, did not involve army officers and recruiting sergeants seeking volunteers. The senior official responsible for gathering the men drafted for the militia was the intendant. He sent out the King's royal orders to the communities and it was up to the village leaders to make the arrangements. The intendant could call upon a detachment of the Maréchaussée armed constabulary to expedite matters.

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[2] This section on the provincial militia is mainly based on the *Mercure Galant*, December 1688, pp.291–303; Jacques Gebelin, *Histoire des milices provinciales 1688–1791* (Paris: Hachette, 1882), pp.1–62; Léon Hennet, *Les milices et les troupes provinciales* (Paris: Baudoin, 1884), chapters 1 and 2; Maurice Sautai, *Les milices provinciales sous Louvois et Barbezieux 1688–1697* (Paris: Chapelot, 1909); *Réflexions sur la Milice* (n.p., 1760); *Recueil des déclarations, édits, lettres patentes, et arrêts du roi* (Dijon, 1717) notably concerning the "Taille" tax to militiamen. The figures and detailed charts given by André Corvisier, *Le soldat*, Vol. 1 are essential.

Each village parish was to select a bachelor aged from 20 to 40 years old in good health, who would be sent to the main town of their province's area to be incorporated into its regiment. The number of men required multiplied according to the size of the village's "Taille" tax roll; as a compensation, the drafted men would not pay the "Taille" after their return for the number of years served. Furthermore they were to be armed, equipped and clothed at the expense of their parishes, which was an extra tax. There was initially an alternative: the community could instead pay a handsome sum as compensation instead of providing a recruit, but this was beyond the means of most parishes. Still, enough paid so that it affected recruiting and the King, preferring recruits instead of money, abolished this option on 24 December 1694. Another option for bachelors was to get married. At first, the men to go into the provincial militia were designated on Sunday after mass following a vote by their fellow parishioners. This did not work too well, and on 23 December 1691 a regulation specified they would be chosen by a draw. The bachelor who drew a black ticket was conscripted, those who drew a white one were exempted. The enlistment period in 1688 was for two years, but with a war going on this was altered in May 1690 to releasing only a third of the men, keeping the others, who would be joined by more conscripts. From 1692, the promised release was postponed year after year.

The regiments ranked according to the seniority of their colonels' commissions. Their colonels were subaltern to line regiments' colonels, but superior to their lieutenant colonels. They had precedence over regiments raised after them and also had precedence over foreign units in the army. Their real status was for full-time regular service by legally forcing civilian men into military service. It had nothing to do with traditional local militias (see below) in its organisation and purpose. Once formed, the regiment would march to the place where it was to assume garrison duties, and for many, to be deployed within an army on campaign.

The regiments had one battalion, but the number of companies could vary; for instance, five regiments had 1,000 men in 22 companies, seven had 900 in 18 companies, two had 850 in 17 companies, 13 had 750 in 15 companies and two had 500 in 10 companies. Each company had two sergeants, one corporal, one lance corporal, one drummer and 45 musketeers or fusiliers, depending on what armament what available because there was a shortage of flintlock muskets during the 1690s (see Volume 2, pp.142–147). From 12 December 1691, he strength of each company was raised to 60 men. The total eventually came to 475 companies having 23,750 men led by 1,074 officers that were commissioned from the more or less local gentry that had some military experience.

These one-battalion regiments were officially listed in the army on 1 January 1689 under their colonel's name as per General Susane's compilation (see our Volume 2, pp.208–211). More regiments were later formed which are not listed. On 24 March 1689, the province of Languedoc was to raise eight more regiments of four to 12 companies, and on 30 September 1690 four more in each of the Bordeaux and Montauban areas. Some recently acquired provinces that had not been initially included in the scheme were now ordered to raise regiments: one in Roussillon from 1 March 1690 and one in Franche-Comté from 28 September to 8 December 1690; one each in Artois, Flanders, the Évêchés and Luxembourg and two in Alsace. By the spring of 1693, there were 41 regiments mustering 657 companies in 75 battalions for a total of 38,840 men. Of these, 31 regiments were now sent to join armies campaigning on the Flanders, German, Italian and Spanish fronts and some of them fought brilliantly against enemy forces.

However, by 1695 the provincial regiments were also seen as affecting negatively recruiting efforts for the line infantry, so in the spring there were amalgamations of battalions and regiments so that, by the summer, the provincial militia stood at 31 single-battalion regiments mustering 401 companies gathering 23,480 men. The authorities were careful to not weaken units in border areas. Indeed, at the beginning of 1696 many had been reinforced and the force now formed 32 regiments totalling about 30,000. It should be added that the composition of the provincial regiments could be very complex in certain areas close to France's borders that already had certain local militias that could be easily mobilised, and indeed some became provincial militia regiments in the 1690s. In 1697, while some regiments were on campaign going as far as participating at the siege of Barcelona, most were assigned to garrison duty. The Nine Years' War was ending, and a circular of 13 October 1698 ordered senior officers to "return the militias to their parishes" and so ended, for a short time, this first episode of experimenting with a national conscription.[3]

Drafting During the War of the Spanish Succession

In 1701, France faced once again a European coalition. To keep the army up to strength, 35,000 recruits were needed every year. On 26 January 1701, the Sun King signed a royal order to resurrect the provincial militia, but with a different organisation than previously. This time, the expenses including the clothing were footed by the *extraordinaire des guerres* military budget (see Volume 1 p.73). The battalion's organisation was the same as that of line regiments with 13 companies of 45 men each, one of which became

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[3] The colonels of new regiments were from 24 March 1690: Murviel, Vogué, La Tourette, Villevieille, du Chalis, des Moulins (later Montoise), Lanta; 30 September 1690 for Bordeaux: Meaux du Fouillon, Exideuil, Lansac, Vignolles; the four Montauban regiments had the local fiefdom names of Foix, Rouergue, Armagnac and Quercy that are not to be confused with line regiments bearing these titles; 1 March 1690 in Roussillon: Duc de Noailles; 8 December 1690 in Franche-Comté: Lenoncourt; 28 September to 8 December 1690: Dupontoy (Flanders), Uren (Luxembourg), Nettancourt (Évêchés), Belle-forière (Artois), Bernold (lower Alsace), Montjoie (upper Alsace) as per Hennet, *Les milices et les troupes provinciales*, pp.31–32. On the local militias that were embodied, see in particular Sautai, *Les milices provinciales* ... His study further relates many battles in which the conscripted units took part with the line regiments.



Recruits going to join their regiment, 1710. Print after Jean-Antoine Watteau. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

its grenadier company from November 1702 when enough men had been trained and made used to military life to have a group of elite soldiers. These battalions were initially posted as garrisons in fortress towns for training; they were considered unsuitable to be deployed as yet, but, needing men right away, Minister of War Chamillard called for men in the provincial militia battalions to volunteer into the regular regiments and many did. By the following year, the distinction between a regular line infantry soldier and a drafted provincial militia battalion soldier had become quite thin. Furthermore, the officer cadres of these battalions were mediocre. On 15 February 1703 some 70 battalions were ordered raised, each one attached to a line infantry regiment as its second battalion. Conscripts aged 18 to 40 could now be enlisted and be married if bachelors were not found. By 25 May, the men of the second battalions were ordered merged with the first and that was the end of the provincial militia as a distinct part of the regular army. In 1710, cavalry officers could request 10 drafted militiamen from infantry battalions to fill their ranks. As a compensation, the drafted men from 1702 to 1708 inclusive were exempted from the "Taille" tax for five years after their return home.

The 34,245 men called to be drafted from January 1701 were followed by many more. By November 1707 there was sizeable resistance, besides sheer exhaustion at such frequent drafts, and the system was altered to include payment in lieu of a recruit from 15 November 1708. This lasted until 20 January 1711 when another draft for 22,800 men was ordered. The draft recruiting system thus remained active for the rest of the war. The figures are impressive. From 1701 to 1713 inclusive, an estimated 655,000 men served in the French army, 100,000 of whom were foreign mercenaries. Of the 555,000 raised in France, an astounding 260,000 were drafted. This represented 46 percent of the French soldiers.

On the whole, this system certainly produced a mass of conscripted men who were, from 1 July 1703, directly incorporated into line regiments. It proved increasingly unpopular, notably because the draft fell heavily on the most rural areas while for cities such as Paris and Lyon its effects were lighter, and the fact that once enlisted, the drafted men were denied being released from service after three years as promised; indeed, none were between 1708 and 1712, which left a bitter memory in the nation at large. Many tried to escape the dreaded possibility of drawing a black ticket by a hasty marriage, by moving away and even by self-mutilating a hand. Desertion was high amongst those drafted and it was calculated that a draft of 20,000 men actually required 22,000 men to compensate for the estimated 10 percent who would abscond. At last, in December 1714, all remaining conscripted men were released from service and free to go back to their villages.

Whatever its defects, no one in Europe could now deny and everyone would remember that conscription could produce great numbers of good soldiers that were a substantial factor in saving the nation in desperate times. On the whole, the drafted soldiers merged well into the regiments and became indistinct from their comrades who had been lured into the army by recruiting sergeants. Both draftees and volunteers were the soldiers who staunchly suffered the defeats at Blenheim, Torino and Oudenarde and went on to victories in Spain and at Denain.

Uniforms and Weapons

The 29 November 1688 order specified that each conscripted man:

> will have a good hat, a cloth coat, the breeches and stockings also of cloth and be well shod without the soldiers who make up this militia being obliged to any uniformity in clothing and colours of the coat, stockings and hat. He will also be armed with a matchlock or a flintlock musket and furnished with a shoulder belt and a sword.

These instructions soon ran into problems in some parishes whose inhabitants were commonly dressed in heavy linen and not wool cloth, so permission was given on 3 January 1689 for "the soldier's coat in these parishes where the custom is that the peasants are only dressed in linen be of good heavy linen lined with [lighter] linen, the stockings and breeches to be the same." After a while, the notion of letting the villages furnish clothing in various hues of grey or brown favoured deserters who were next impossible to detect amongst civilians. There were also those from very poor areas who arrived wearing rags, their heads covered with bad caps, shod with wooden shoes or even barefoot. Instructions now went out to parishes to contract new clothing, hoping this wholesale manner would be cheaper and result in uniformity, but this resulted in prices ranging from 22 to 75 livres while uniformity was not entirely achieved. Around early 1690 Louvois' war department issued a list of items that each militiaman should have, which included a grey-white serge coat with red cuffs as well as equipment and weapons for a total of 53 livres, 15 sols and six deniers (see Plate 3).[4]

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[4] Robert Hall, Giancarlo Boeri and Yves Roumegoux, *Guidons, Flags and Uniforms of French Dragoons, Militia, Artillery and Bombardiers under Louis XIV 1688–1714* (Farnham, UK: The Pike and Shot Society, 2003), pp.86–89 quoting original documents.

The Marquis de Miromesnil noted in 1691 that militiamen in Touraine "had uniformity in the coats of three quarters of the soldiers. The rest is clothed with good cloth, but some is more brown than the other." All the same, these measures produced some uniformity like the regular infantry insofar as grey or grey-white becoming the standard colour. Some are recorded as having a facing colour. In 1692 units from Soissonais (the northern part of Île-de-France) had grey coats with red cuffs and linings. The two regiments raised in Alsace from 1690 had blue coats with red cuffs and lining like the regular Alsace Regiment (see Plate 3). In principle the provincial militia second battalions raised in 1701 would have had the same uniforms as their first battalion regular regiments, and this would have certainly been the case once they were merged with the regulars from 1703.[5]

As for weapons, if the conscripted men were at all familiar with firearms it would have been from using more or less legally obtained flintlock muskets for hunting. Thus preference was soon given to arm militiamen with military flintlocks, but there not enough of those for the regular army in the early 1690s and the militiamen were more likely to be armed with matchlocks and bandoliers holding twelve or more gunpowder charges. They were also armed with a cheap sword. All the above comments overshadow the units that were very well outfitted. For instance, after inspecting the Boissières Provincial Militia Regiment in July 1689, Marshal de Lorges reported to Louvois that "this regiment is under arms like an old regiment. There are about 500 soldiers that would be found handsome in the du Roi and even the guards."[6]

The government gave three colours to each regiment, a white colonel's colour and two regimental ones with the white cross and the quarters the colour(s) of the province.

Provincial Embodied Local Militia

There were certain provinces, usually on France's borders, in which there were either regular local troops or an already robust militia organisation throughout the countryside that might be called to active service. They were generally partly or wholly called to service in the summer although this could also continue for years. When called to active duty, they were paid like regular troops. Being border troops, they usually remained in their province's area.

Bayonne and **Navarre** on the south-western coast had a number of effective militia organisations that could muster trained and armed men quickly. The Bayonne area had the Bandes grammontoises (or Gardes de Grammont) which was a militia regiment of 15 companies totalling 30 officers and 750 men. The Soule and Labour rural areas each had 10 companies mustering 21 officers an 750 men each. These were mustered in wartime.

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[5] État Général des Troupes de France Infanterie, Cavalerie et Dragons 1692, BMG, A1b 1626, Soissonais Militia; AG, A1, 1406, Memoir by Alsace Intendant Jacque de la Grange, Strasbourg, 15 February 1697; Henry Ganier, *Costumes des régiments et des milices recrutés dans les anciennes provinces d'Alsace et de la Sarre ... pendant les XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Épinal: Froereisen, 1882), pp.50–51, 55; Pierre Fouré, 'La milice royale sous l'Ancien Régime', *Carnet de la Sabretache*, No. 97-E (2e trimester 1989), pp.42–44.

[6] Sautai, *Les milices provinciales sous Louvois et Barbezieux 1688–1697*, is especially good in quoting aspects of material culture from primary documents.

Béarn had a large militia organisation whose origins went back to the early Middle Ages, and it was still called the *Bandes Béarnaises* in the seventeenth century. In 1630 it was organised as a regiment that mobilised volunteers for active service in wartime. Its strength was much greater than the average regiment. In 1674 it mustered some 3,000 and marched to Bayonne, then threatened with a Dutch naval raid that did not materialise. In 1678 it had 29 companies of 100 men each including 16 pikemen plus officers, and in 1690 it had 137 officers and 3,550 men. It was therefore really more of a brigade and even a division at times, which mobilised from 1674 to 1678, 1689 to 1697 and again in 1706 when it was sent to Spain, campaigning there until 1712 (see Plate 3 for uniforms).[7]

The county of Boulogne, called the **Boulonnais**, in Picardy, had been part of France since the fifteenth century and was required since then render the feudal "host" military homage to its count, the King of France, by furnishing troops at its expense. The county thus had a very effective militia system that could mobilise thousands of armed and disciplined men in a short time. The officers were chosen from the nobility, colonels and captains had commissions signed by the King, and lieutenants by the governor. In 1689–1690, with war being declared, the militia furnished six infantry battalions totalling 120 officers and 3,600 men, five squadrons of cavalry totalling 30 officers and 900 troopers and a company of dragoons of two officers and 60 men. These troops garrisoned Boulogne and patrolled the coast for a total of 152 officers and 4,560 men who were surely as good as the King's troops, commented the Duc d'Aumont, governor of the county. They were considered at the area's contribution that "several times, signalled its valour during the reign of Louis XIV". Their dress was quite simple, consisting of a frock with blue cuffs.[8]

Roussillon. This province had a militia organisation that called to service part or all of its membership to stand guard at passes and garrison forts. It had five battalions totalling 158 officers and 3,810 men. A regiment of embodied militia was raised in 1691 by the Duc de Noailles. It served in Roussillon and Catalonia in Spain until disbanded 1698. Its uniform was described by the province's intendant on 22 August 1691 as grey lined with red for soldiers, red lined with green for sergeants, and drummers in the livery of the Duc de Noailles, which was all red with gold lace.[9]

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[7] H. Labouche, 'Les milices béarnaises avant le XIXe siècle', *Bulletin de la société des sciences, lettres et arts de Pau*, Vol. 20 (1890–1891), pp.107–262, also published as a book at Pau in 1891. Excellent study from primary documents.

[8] Belhomme, *L'Armée française en 1690*, pp.115–116; Piganiol de la Force, *Nouvelle description de la France* (Paris: Legras, 1753), Vol. 2, p.153; A. D'Hauttefeuille and L. Benard, *Histoire de Boulogne-sur-Mer* (Boulogne-sur-Mer, 1860), Vol. 2, pp.9–10; J. Hector de Rosny, *Histoire du Boulonnais* (Amiens: Yvert, 1873), Vol. 4, pp.5–6.

[9] P. Fourré, *Les drapeaux de l'infanterie française sous Louis XIV 1638–1715* (Saint-Cloud: privately published typescript with drawings, 1977), p.235.

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The Enigmatic and Numerous Local Militia of France

A relatively obscure and yet fascinating aspect of France's defence organisation during the reigns of the Bourbon monarchy was its varied and obviously very numerous local militia units. There was a huge if still largely unknown number of units that went under many different names in all parts of the realm. They can be very broadly grouped as follows:

1) The Bourgeois Militia in cities and towns
2) The Coast Guard Militia

This corresponded to the social structure existing in Christian Europe. It was especially seen in Ancien Régime France with the nobles, the church, the *bourgeois* and other commoners all vying for privileges that defined their class in society as well as their lifestyle and peculiar functions. In this, the militia structure was something of a mirror of French society.

Bourgeois Militias in Cities and Towns

In Ancien Régime France, the inhabitants of cities or towns were defined as *bourgeois* in that they lived in a *bourg*, a common medieval term for a town. The Middle Ages and the Renaissance not being especially peaceful eras, town governments organised militia companies to man the defences in case of attacks and insure the inhabitants' safety within and around the town's immediate vicinity. Until the advent of Louis XIV, royal regular troops were not often seen outside of large cities, so that local defence and safety was largely left to small units of town guards and constabulary soldiers. The town's bourgeois militia units thus had an important place in local affairs and their services were rewarded with honours, consideration and privileges. To belong to the bourgeois militia brought privileges to its members, which could vary from one city to another, but always had something to do with substantial tax exemptions and not having to quarter troops.

The "wars of Louis XIV" being overwhelmingly fought outside of France, local militias were often thought to be less relevant. Yet, they were not forgotten, and from the later seventeenth century the Sun King and his government increasingly saw the militia as a way to have a large reserve force that would be useful in two ways. The first was that the bourgeois militia units could provide assistance in military garrisons and fortresses by partly replacing regular troops that could then be sent to reinforce armies in the field. The second concerned aid to civil power such as keeping the streets safe. As seen above, the concept that military and police forces were totally distinct entities did not exist as we understand them in our day. They were all armed men, soldiers, or militiamen, who might be called to face foreign enemies or urban bandits. This in an age when a civilian being allowed to carry a sword was a privilege reserved to nobles, military personnel and militiamen. Bourgeois militias were under the supreme orders of the town's governor, a military officer, who was the senior commander of all regular troops and militia in his jurisdiction. They were also under the authority of city governments (from 1692, every city was to have a mayor) for municipal safety concerns.[1]

Whilst most town militia units never saw action during the Sun King's reign, some fought when attacked and their services were then often notable. They then acted as auxiliaries to regular troops facing the enemy. If called upon, local city militias provided some garrison duties in support of army troops and also assisted the armed constabulary units in maintaining internal law and order. Even in large garrison cities, night watch patrols could be partly assumed by militiamen. In most small towns there were no municipal police archers, regular night watch nor local soldiers so the bourgeois or more common militiamen were tasked with various legal and surveillance duties. Militiamen thus might have to apprehend suspects and have detachments patrolling the streets. The junior officers were elected and the captains usually named by the *Lieutenant du roi* (king's lieutenant or lieutenant governor) or the mayor; the senior captain would be titled colonel. On the whole, until 1694, nominations were the result of consensus amongst local governments and business officials.

Raids on certain port cities and into such border areas as the Dauphiné suddenly placed local bourgeois militia units in the limelight. The Sun King was then looking for ways to mobilise men in one way or another to increase the strength of the regular armies in the field. He now became aware of the military potential of the many bourgeois militia units as a powerful reserve force, and acted upon it by making service in its units compulsory. In March 1694 a royal edict stipulated that all bourgeois men in the realm except for those living in Paris, aged 18 to 60 and able to bear arms, were henceforth obliged to belong to a militia company in their town which would be assembled for drill four times a year and also required to muster for ceremonies and "other occasions" as ordered by the governor generals, local

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[1] André Corvisier, 'Quelques aspects sociaux des milices bourgeoises au XVIIIe siècle', *Acte du colloque international d'histoire des ville*, Nice, 1969, *Annales de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de Nice*, 9-10, 1969, pp.241-277.

Facing page:
Top: companies of arquebusiers from various towns arriving for the yearly shooting match, early eighteenth century. This print shows the 1717 assembly held at Meaux, and as was the case every year, comprised dozens of units. Most came from towns in Burgundy and Champagne with some from farther places such as Compiegne. Detail from a print in Delaunay's *Études*. (Author's photo)

Bottom: target shooting by arquebusiers for the royal prize, early eighteenth century. This old woodcut shows the competition held at Meaux in 1717. The officer pointing to the target is Mr. Goudeau of the city of Tours arquebusiers. Detail from a print in Delaunay's *Études*. (Author's photo)

governors, mayors and aldermen. The "other occasions" envisaged were for bourgeois militia units to take over some of the garrison duties performed by regular army troops so that more soldiers could take the field. The expenses were largely assumed by the cities and the militiamen in return for certain tax deductions. However, the Sun King and his government wanted more money from the prosperous bourgeois, and from 1694 charged for granting officers' commissions. Colonels now had to pay 4,000 to 5,000 livres, majors 3,000 to 4,000, captains 2,500 and lieutenants from 1,200 to 1,500. In return, they obtained various tax exemptions.[2]

Faced with these demands for cash in return for commissions, the cities knew that many officers might not be able to pay. So the municipalities stepped up and bought the commissions. This way, they could keep long-standing privileges, notably the fiscal ones, and would even negotiate the amounts to be paid. Thus the city of Rouen finally settled in 1710 for a payment of 5,000 livres for the "re-establishment and confirmation of its rights, privileges and exemptions" for the members of its bourgeois militia. Another widespread effect concerned purchasing a colonel's commission for the city's mayor who now became its militia's commander. The bourgeois militia now could be ordered on duty immediately by the colonel, who happened to be the mayor.[3]

Privileged Companies

Within the bourgeois militia was a multitude of peculiar independent volunteer companies which comprised some of the more well-to-do bourgeois. These units, often referred to as "privileged" companies, were known by the rather archaic names of "archers", "arbalétriers" (crossbowmen) and "arquebusiers" who had been organised in most towns since the Middle Ages. With approval from their town's administrations, these companies were chartered as corporations that really made them private military clubs. They often had their own armoury as a sort of clubhouse building, a large garden or a reserved spot in the dry ditch of the city's fortifications that was used as a shooting range. They were pledged to perform military duties around town, in return of which the members of the companies had certain exemptions regarding taxes and quartering of regular troops. Their members were usually styled "chevalier" (knight) as an informal appellation. Officers were elected by members. Since they comprised the wealthier class of townsmen they were well armed, often grandly dressed. The dinners they held for themselves or with other companies were renowned events. By the time of the Sun King's era, the archers and crossbowmen had kept their ancient names but had exchanged bows and crossbows for muskets. Their most important activity was target shooting.

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[2] C. Dareste de la Chavanne, *Histoire de l'administration en France* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848), Vol. 1, pp.212–213; Roger de Magnianville, *Le maréchal d'Humières et le gouvernement de Compiègne* (Paris, 1881), p.68; E. Chatel, *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales ... Calvados* (Caen, 1883), Vol. 2, p.294; Babeau, *La ville sous l'Ancien Régime*, Vol. 2, p.75.

[3] Corvisier, 'Quelques aspects sociaux des milices bourgeoises au XVIIIe siècle', pp.257–259.


Reception faite aux Chevalliers de L'Arquebase a leurs
Arrivé en la Ville de Meaux


Le Prix Royol tire a Maux par Mrs le chev: de larquebuze
le 29 aoust en 1717
le panton
Mr goudeau de Tours
Le quartier de Mrs les capitaines et lieutenan de larquebuze



Target practice by militiamen in the fortification ditch of Dieppe, eighteenth century. Such a shooting gallery was likely in the ditch of any fortified town in the realm that had bourgeois and privileged militia units. Print after François Flemeng. (Private collection. Author's photo)

The chevalier winner of the shooting match was he who had shot *L'oiseau de privilège* (the bird of privilege) target that had been paraded through the town. He was named "Roi" (King) for that year, "Connétable" (Constable) if he won two years in a row and "Empereur" if for three, which must have been rare. The prizes included significant tax and other civic exemptions besides silver trophies. Some of these companies are mentioned below wearing their uniforms, but there were many, many more, far too many for inclusion in this book. For all their social and sporting sides, it should be recalled that these units comprised many thousands of volunteers who were usually well educated, interested in some military affairs, trained to drill and wealthy enough to afford good weapons and uniforms. In addition, some were good target shots.

These rather luxurious units not only paraded in their own communities, but travelled to other towns for shooting competitions. As early as 1439 the companies in the provinces of Brie, Champagne, Île-de-France and Picardy created a *Concordat* (cordial association or brotherhood) to hold shooting competitions. It was renewed (without Brie) in 1680 and Burgundy also had such associations. Surviving records of these competitions show that many dozens of companies gathered in the town hosting the event, which assumed a military festival character with parades, receptions, martial music, fraternal gatherings, great dinners and of course the shooting matches. The governor general of the province was usually present along with senior city officials. The town's inhabitants were well aware of the event since visiting companies marched through the gates with drums and music. The competitions and parades were held with grandstands installed in nearby large meadows; in 1700 at Châlon-sur-Saône some 10,000 spectators watched the 29 companies that had gathered there, of 40 to 50 men each, which may have numbered some 1,200 to 1,500 men.[4]

Overall, it is difficult to even vaguely estimate how many companies and chevaliers there were in the realm. The strengths of companies appear to have greatly varied, some having fewer than 30 chevaliers, others might

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[4] Victor Fouques, *Recherches historiques sur les corporations des archers, des arbalétriers et des arquebusiers* (Châlon-sur-Soâne, 1852), part one; *Mercure Galant*, April 1688, pp.56–93; Alfred Potiquet, 'Les anciennes Compagnies d'Arquebusiers du Vexin', *Mémoires de la Société historique et archaéologique de l'arrondissement de Pontoise et du Vexin*, Vol. 5 (1883), p.72. On the prizes, the privileges consisted of exemption of having to pay all taxes, subsidies, stand guard and watches and quarter troops for a year or two, and if winner of three, the exemptions won were for life and passed on to the Chevalier's widow.


La figure du Bouquet eſt la Deeſſe dela Paix
Les prix des quatre Pantons portez et eſtimez a 12000 lt

Chevaliers of the Arquebusiers de Meaux carrying shooting match prizes, early eighteenth century. The prizes for the 1717 competition held in Meaux included a statue and mostly silverware, all of which came to a value of some 12,000 livres. The Meaux arquebusiers wore grey laced with silver. Detail from a print in Delaunay's *Études*. (Author's photo)

have some 200 members. In 1790, at the time that the bourgeois militia was reorganised into the National Guard, its privileged companies were said to have some 30,000 chevaliers "all full of ardour and zeal". We feel their number may have been equal or even more a century earlier. The fact that they had tax and other exemptions confirms that they were considered useful in local defence. For many and possibly for all chevaliers, the notions of martial pride and patriotism were prevalent. According to an eighteenth-century document which could be applicable to many units, many of the chevaliers of the Rouen Compagnie des Arbalétriers "had served the King during their youth, and that all felt they had the duty to maintain in the heart of their children the fighting [or military] valour that had always been in the nation's character."[5]

Some histories conclude that these units were useless militarily. This opinion can be entertained for places far from where battles and sieges were being fought. However, as shown in other parts of our study, local volunteers of all sorts mobilised to fight enemies that raided their areas. Following the disastrous 1708 battle of Oudenarde, the King considered mobilising the bourgeois militias of the border provinces, but finally decided the situation could still be managed by the army. In fortress cities near or in war zones, the members of privileged companies provided notable services. The Lille gunners are a better-known example, but there were others. Of the arquebusier companies in Burgundy, that of Dijon was present at the 1674 siege of Besançon, Auxonne's was at Dôle in 1696, Saint-Jean-de-Losne's put up a heroic defence and the list could go on. The question really is, what was the military potential of these units?[6]

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[5] Charles de Beaurepaire, *Notice sur la compagnie des arbalétriers* (Rouen: Cagnard, 1885), p.30; Babeau, *La ville sous l'Ancien Régime*, Vol. 2, p.75.

They certainly all provided many sorts of security services in their communities that would otherwise have required regular troops. From what evidence comes forth, they could put up quite a fight when attacked. Although an exact and trustable figure cannot be advanced, they certainly were very numerous. So, the Sun King was not bluffing in 1712 when he told Marshal Villars that if he lost the last large army in Flanders, he would join him with many more men.

Some Bourgeois Militia and Privileged Units

The following notices are very far from covering all the bourgeois militia and the associated privileged units in the realm. Those outlined below will give, however, an idea of their variety, extent, influence and power in local communities. They comprised the better educated and more prosperous men in France's towns and cities, which included many business and civic leaders. We include many descriptions of these militias, not only for those interested in material culture as expressed by uniforms and colours, but especially to show the extent to which they went to outfit themselves in an enviable and noticeable way. They were a colourful feature of everyday life in various aspects of a town's activities and its internal security, as well as its entertainment. The now entirely forgotten shooting matches by privileged units seem to have occurred all over France, to the point of gathering vast numbers of spectators comparable to a national sports event or rock concert in our day. All this, it must be remarked and stressed, was done by militarised organisations whose absolute ultimate mandate was to band together in defence of France if the call to arms ever came from the King.

Abbeville (Picardy). The city had bourgeois militia companies since at least 1405 which were divided according to the number of gates in the city that they guarded. The company commanders, chosen amongst notable citizens, were named by the mayor and were called *quartiniers* with *dizainiers* who led 10 men each, a system that was still prevalent in the seventeenth century. They were reportedly well armed with halberds, swords for officers and muskets with hangers for the militiamen. The uniform, probably adopted in the late seventeenth or early eighteenth century, consisted of a blue coat and breeches, red cuffs, lining, waistcoat and stockings, gold buttons, buttonhole lace and hat lace for officers. Abbeville also had privileged companies of archers, arbalétriers, couleuvriniers (gunners) and arquebusiers of about 50 men each, whose privileges had been confirmed in 1517. In all, there may have been as many as 10,000 militiamen in the city and its area.[7]

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[6] A. Bernard, *Recherches sur les chevaliers de l'arquebuse et sur les chevaliers de l'arc de Tournus* (Macon: Uninion républicaine, 1884), p.9; Jacques Gebelin, *Histoire des milices provinciales 1688–1791* (Paris: Hachette, 1881), p.29. Gebelin noted that some officials forbade the shooting contests and concluded that the bourgeois and privileged militia companies were largely "extinguished" from the end of the seventeenth century and during the eighteenth century, but this contradicts many sources cited in this chapter that describe such shooting matches and reviews involving hundreds and sometimes thousands of well-armed and superbly uniformed men as late as the 1770s and 1780s.

Amiens (Picardy). This fortress city was not far from the front in Flanders and its militiamen were organised into 16 companies which were thus more called upon to perform military service both within and outside the fortress. In 1654, for instance, the city's militiamen skirmished with Spanish troops at the outskirts; in 1656 some Amiens militiamen were sent to reinforce the garrison of Béthune; in 1708 four bourgeois militia companies were mobilised for full-time service. The city also had four privileged companies: the archers, the arbalétriers (crossbowmen), the arquebusiers and the couleuvriniers (gunners) whose privileges had been confirmed in 1498. Being situated in a frequent war zone, they were also called upon to provide military assistance to the regulars. For instance, the gunners conveyed cannons to Arras during its siege of 1654, and between 1703 and 1708 the prisoners of war were lodged in the Gyencourt bastion and guarded by the privileged companies (see Plate 5 for the uniform of the archers). The arbalétriers wore white with silver buttons and lace, their colour was of white silk painted with mottos and crossbows; the couleuvriniers had worn a red and green cassock in the Middle Ages, but in the eighteenth century they had a white coat with green cuffs and breeches, gold buttons and lace, their colour was a white cross with green quarters each bearing a gold culverin on its carriage; the arquebusiers were granted a white and red livery in 1528, and in the eighteenth century wore white coats with red cuffs, gold buttons and lace. There was also a company of 60 *Joueurs d'épée* (sword players) armed with large two hand swords which still existed in 1696. It was then more of a ceremonial unit. In 1704 the bourgeois militia still numbered 16 companies which, with the four privileged companies, may have amounted to about 1,200 men.[8]

Antibes (Provence). Before the nineteenth century the Var River marked the border between southern Provence in France and Piémont in Italy. Antibes is situated on the west side of the Var and the larger city of Nice is on the eastern side. There was therefore much military activity in the area, especially in the 1690s and early 1700. Antibes was a fortified town with the small but formidable sixteenth century Fort Quarré just east of it acting as its citadel. Its bourgeois militia, numbering about 1,000 men, would have been the best-armed and equipped and was at hand lined up at ceremonies. On 18–19 January 1704 Piémontese troops from Nice raided nearby villages; Louis XIV ordered retaliation. In March 1705 Marshal de La Feuillade crossed the Var with 18,000 men and took Villefranche, the city of Nice, but not its citadel. In October Marshal Berwick arrived with siege artillery to finally take the then blockaded Nice citadel, while the Prince of Monaco's troops guarded the valleys further east. The bourgeois militia of Antibes and that of towns on the French side of the Var Valley were mobilised and some joined the siege operations with the army. The citadel finally capitulated on 5 January 1706 and Berwick had it destroyed. The Antibes bourgeois militia was again mustered in July 1707 when Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy, leading an army of about 40,000 men, crossed the Var into France. Small towns and villages were subjected to "horrible sacrileges" whilst those people who could sought refuge in Antibes and Grasse. An allied corps went to besiege Grasse, but was defeated by its militiamen and retreated in August when French troops arrived in relief. The Antibes militia, with what regulars there were in the city, kept the blockading allied troops at bay, largely thanks to the artillery of Fort Quarré. The invasion ended when Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy failed to take Toulon and now had to hastily retreat, and were back across the Var River on 12 September.[9]

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[7] François César Louandre, *Histoire d'Abbeville et du comté de Ponthieu jusqu'en 1789* (Abbeville, 1884), Vol. 2, p.308; 'Notice sur les anciennes corporations d'archers, d'arbalétriers, de couleuvriniers et d'arquebusier des villes de Picardie', *Mémoires de la Société des antiquaires de Picardie*, Vol. 4 (1856), pp.302–305; *Extraits des procès-verbaux des scéances de la société d'emulation d'Abbeville* (Abbeville: Paillart, 1877, p.145; Guillaume Blanchard, *Compilation chronologique contenant un receuil en abrégé des ordonnances, édits, declarations et lettres patentes des rois de France* (Paris: Moreau, 1715), Vol. 1, p.439. Abbeville and its area may have had about 40,000 inhabitants in the late seventeenth century.

[8] 'Notice sur les anciennes corporations … de Picardie', pp.63–70, 140–142, 193, 209; A. Janvier, *Notice sur la milice amiénoise: milice communale, gardes bourgeoise et compagnies privilégiées* (Amiens: Duval et Herment, 1851), pp.24–29, 33, 38, 46; Blanchard, *Compilation chronologique* …, Vol. 1, pp.397, 598; <https://www.cie-arc-amiens.com/histoire>.

Arras (Artois). The bourgeois militia and the privileged companies of archers, arbalétriers and arquebusiers had medieval origins and had been mustered for many sieges through the ages. The city came under the French standard in 1640, and was besieged unsuccessfully by the Spanish in 1654. During the Sun King's reign the bourgeois militia had about a dozen companies. The arbalétriers were already renowned in 1564 as good shots and great hosts when they hosted a shooting competition that ended in a legendary banquet lasting four days for its 200 guests. They also served with the bourgeois militia during the 1654 siege and the 1712 raid on the city.[10]

Aubagne (Provence). In March 1701 some 200 men of its bourgeois militia paraded bearing arms.[11]

Auch (Gascogne). Although it had ancient origins, the city of Auch's bourgeois militia had become ineffective by 1690 when Governor General de Crillon ordered that all men aged from 20 to 50 be organised into companies and obliged to have "good muskets and good bayonets" or pikes if firearms could not be bought. They were to drill twice a month. It is interesting to note that Auch had a black powder mill and an arsenal in its city hall. Uniforms were not adopted and the militiamen wore civilian clothing when on duty, but with distinctive hats and cockades. In 1701 Auch's militia consisted of five companies of 150 men each defined as "artisans", who paraded at the gates for princes visiting the city on 8 February. They all wore hats laced with silver, each company having cockades of a distinctive colour. Officers had plumes of like colours also. Once inside the city the princes saw a company of 200 bourgeois militia made up of the most "notable" men, well armed, with "uniform hats, gold border lace and a white cockade, each also having a scarlet ribbon instead of a cravat." The Auch militia thus had about 1,000 well-armed men.[12]

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[9] E. Tisserand, *Histoire d'Antibes* (Antibes: J. Marchand, 1876), pp.459–466.

[10] E. Morel, 'Mutinerie militaire à Arras en 1373', *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences, lettres et arts d'Arras, Vol. XLIII* (1893), pp.36, 253.

[11] Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites de Duché de Vanci* (Paris and Marseille, 1830), p.283.

Autun (Burgundy). Its bourgeois militia was reviewed in October 1689. It consisted of about nine companies corresponding to the town's *quartiers*, which had 100 men each and who were remarkably well appointed. The first company was the senior one and its officers wore blue coats with silver lace, their sashes with silver fringes, the drummers dressed in Captain de Montagu's livery and the men in uniform clothing. The company colour was of white silk sprinkled with gold lilies and several crowned "L" ciphers; the King's coat of arms was at the corners with the motto "Lilia sic sequitur, Solem ut sun Sydera norunt". The second company had the same dress including four sergeants wearing blue laced with silver, its colour being white silk strewn with gold lilies bearing the King's coat of arms on one side and that of the town on the other, with the motto "Fidus Lilia custos". The third company's officers wore scarlet laced "everywhere" with silver, its men dressed in brown with a silver lace at the seams, silver-laced hats with white plumes, the drummers also in the captain's livery. Its colour was of white silk strewn with crowns and gold lilies; the King's coat of arms was at the centre with trophies at the corners and the motto "vive la Fidelité" (Long Live Fidelity).[13]

Auxerre (Burgundy). The bourgeois militia originated in the 1400s and in the seventeenth century had seven infantry companies of militia and one of cavalry. In April 1701 some 1,200 men of the bourgeois militia were reviewed by the Duc de Berry. A mounted company of young militiamen "all well dressed" escorted the prince. There were also privileged companies of Chevaliers de l'Arbalètre and de l'Arquebuse which drilled and practised shooting at the city's walls.[14]

Bar-le-Duc (Barrois). The capital of the duchy of Barrois had a six bourgeois militia companies and one of gentlemen hunters, the Order of Saint-Hubert, originating in 1416.[15]

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[12] Lafforgue, *Histoire de la ville d'Auch*, Vol. 2, pp.99–106; *Mercure Galant*, March 1701, pp.210–212; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, p.183.

[13] *Mercure Galant*, October 1689, pp.121–123. More colours and uniforms are described but this gives a good idea of Autun's bourgeois militia.

[14] M. Chardon, *Histoire de la ville d'Auxerre* (Auxerre: Gallot-Fournier, 1835), Vol. 2, pp.11–12, 44, 85; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, pp.393–394.

[15] E. Fourier de Bacourt, 'Les sociétés de tir et les milices bourgeoises dans l'ancien duché de Lorraine et Barrois', *Mémoires de la société des lettres, sciences et arts de Bar-le-Duc*, Vol. 4 (1895),

Bayeux (Normandy). Its bourgeois militia was organised from 1694 and consisted of five companies of 30 men each.[16]

Bayonne (Gascogne). This port city had a bourgeois militia of 17 companies in the 1630s amounting to some 1,800 musketeers and 700 pikemen. Bayonne was close to the Spanish border so its militiamen were an important feature of the city's defences. They were called upon for a very different duty than usual in 1652 when a plague epidemic swept through northern Spain and southern France. The militia was called out to control and monitor any movement in or out of Bayonne which was successful against this pandemic. By 1670, there were 28 companies; its militiamen could be ordered to stand watch and assist the *Guet* archers if necessary. From 1680 the regular garrison was greatly augmented in conjunction with new fortifications, including a citadel designed by Vauban, which lessened the duties of the militia which remained responsible for guarding the gates at all times. In 1657 its officers wore scarlet cloaks with a green collar "being the city's livery colours." Uniforms were not generally adopted until the late eighteenth century. Its six colours are reported as being white and blue.[17]

Beaune (Burgundy). In 1701, the town had a bourgeois militia troop of 120 cavalrymen well mounted and well dressed, with three trumpeters and a kettledrummer who "wore the town's livery." There were two companies of militia of 200 men each, one gathering married men "who wore the King's colours" and the other comprising young men wearing "those [colours] of the town that were green and white." Its Compagnie de l'Arquebuse dressed in a blue coat laced with silver and buff waistcoat and breeches. In all, at least 550 well-equipped militiamen.[18]

Blois (Orléanais). In late 1686, the town of Blois mustered about 350 militiamen "under arms … dressed the same way, each with a cravat ribbon of the same colour and a dragoon-style cap enriched with a gold lace on its seams."[19]

Bordeaux (Guyenne). In 1698, the bourgeois militia mustering some 10,000 men "distinguished by their colours" fired their musket in a "feu de joie", joined by 110 cannons firing from the Chateau Trompette citadel. In January 1701 some 10,000 to 12,000 "bourgeois or artisans bearing arms" lined the city's streets to greet Philippe d'Anjou.[20]

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p.85.

[16] Chatel, *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales … Calvados*, Vol. 2, p.203.

[17] De Blay de Gaix, *Histoire militaire de Bayonne*, Vol. 2, pp.179, 270, 291; Édouard Ducéré, 'La Garde bourgeoise de Bayonne'. *Bulletin de la Société des sciences & arts de Bayonne, 1898*, p.193; Albert Arsène Babeau, *La ville sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1884), Vol. 2 pp.43–44.

[18] *Mercure Galant*, May 1701, pp.244–245; Fouques, *Recherches historiques sur les corporations…*, pp.247–248.

[19] *Mercure Galant*, January 1687, p.298.

[20] *Mercure Galant*, December 1697, pp.170–171; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, p.86; Corvisier, *Le Soldat*, Vol. 2, p.595.

Bourges (Berry). In 1651 the 100-strong bourgeois militia cavalry of Bourges wore isabelle sashes "attached with blue ribbons". Its company of bourgeois militia arquebusiers also had sashes and later uniforms, the detail of which are unknown, as are those of its arbalétrier and archer companies.[21]

Bourgueil (Anjou). In 1687 the town had four companies totalling 300 men. The first company had blue as a distinctive colour, the second red, the third green and the fourth white.[22]

Boulogne (Picardy). The bourgeois militia of this port on the Channel served with the regular troops posted to guard it. During the reign of the Sun King, the Duc d'Aumont considerably increased the efficiency of its bourgeois militia and other local militias on the coastline, so that it would answer a call to arms very quickly. Up to 15,000 men could thus be called. In January 1689 the city of Boulogne's militiamen greeted King James II and the young Duc de Berwick. On 13 August 1708 a British fleet appeared off Boulogne's coast while most of its regular and provincial units were serving in Flanders, so the call to arms was immediately made in the city and its area; within hours, about 9,000 militiamen had been mobilised. Admiral Byng seemingly hoped to land troops and make a raid, but the militiamen were in great numbers and followed the fleet's movements, so seeing that a landing was hazardous, Byng sailed away on the 18th.[23]

Brest (Brittany). This port city and important naval base had eight companies of bourgeois militia, each having its colours. In June 1694 it was mobilised to assist the regular troops should the large Anglo-Dutch raiding force reach the city, but it was decisively repulsed at Camaret (see below). In 1702 two companies of Brest's grenadiers were called on active service in case of enemy naval movements, which did not materialise. It was called again during the record cold winter in late February 1709, to guard the public buildings and officials against angry crowds of workers and their families affected by the Great Frost.[24]

Caen (Normandy). In the 1690s and early eighteenth century the city's bourgeois militia amounted to about 3,000 men divided into nine companies. Since 1357 there had also existed a unit of "Papagay" of 50 bourgeois, first armed with bows and crossbows and eventually muskets which this elite unit used to "practice the military arts", and target shooting of the "Oiseau" which was also called the "Papagay".[25]

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[21] *Gazette*, 1651, p.315. The trumpeters of the city wore green and red cassocks, which was Bourges' livery colours. N. Boyer, 'Notes historiques des confreries d'archers, arbalétriers et arquebusiers de la ville de Bourges', *Mémoires de la Commission historique du Cher* (Bourges, 1857), Vol. 1, pp.201–205.

[22] *Mercure Galant*, March 1687, pp.299–300.

[23] Gabriel Abot de Bazinghen, *Recherches historiques sur la ville de Boulogne-sur-mer* (Paris: Guyot, 1822), pp.132–133; D'Hauttefeuille and Benard, *Histoire de Boulogne-sur-Mer*, Vol. 2, pp.13–14; *Archives historiques et littéraire du Nord de la France*, Aimé Nicolas Leroy and Arthur Dinaux, ed. (Valenciennes, 1834), Vol. 4, p.236.

[24] P. Levot, *Histoire de la ville et du Port de Brest* (Brest, 1866), Vol. 3, pp.7, 45–46. In the 1770s the militia had 10 companies, each having 200 men including two of grenadiers.

Cambrai (Hainaut). This fortress city had 16 bourgeois militia companies when it fell to the French army on 5 April 1677. They were disbanded, but were reestablished by the Sun King in 1678–1679 when it was confirmed that Cambrai would henceforth be a French fortress. The elite company of the bourgeois militia was the Grenadiers de Saint-Félix, which in 1713 had a luxurious uniform consisting of a red coat, a gold and silver cloth waistcoat and white plumes on the hat. One of the companies consisted of cavalry. There also were some privileged companies: one of artillery and one of archers, both wearing blue coats laced with gold, and one company of arbalétriers having scarlet coats laced with gold and gold cloth cuffs and waistcoats.[26]

Châlon-sur-Marne (Champagne). The bourgeois militia originated in the early thirteenth century, and in 1590 numbered up to 1,500 men divided into eight *quartiers* units each led by a captain. In 1705 it was reorganised into nine companies led by a major. In some towns firefighting was the responsibility of the militia, and in September 1709 a specific "Pompiers" (firemen) company of 63 officers and men was organised following a major fire. There was also a Compagnie de l'Arquebuse.[27]

Châlon-sur-Saône (Burgundy). This city was a fortress being enclosed by curtain walls and had a large citadel with five bastions which could have up to 5,000 men. In peacetime a regular company was on guard. Châlon-sur-Saône was home to a bourgeois militia troop of cavalry of 100 men in 1631, and 60 men in 1656 that were surely well appointed since they escorted Louis XIV. The bourgeois infantry militiamen amounted to "two large battalions" dressed in "rich clothing" in 1631 and were divided into four battalions, each under the command of a captain *centenier* (one hundred) in 1656. Some 300 militiamen were unmarried young men in a company called *Enfants de la ville* (Children of the City). They paraded in 1631 under arms and in ranks with "a warlike and martial" appearance and again in 1656 when Louis XIV came, and they fired a salvo that pleased the young king. Once they married, they transferred to one of the companies of the town's bourgeois militia. The privileged Compagnie de l'Arquebuse existed in 1427 as an archer unit, and was mobilised in 1674 to stand guard at the border of Franche-Comté. In the early eighteenth century it had a grey uniform with silver buttons. In all, the city's militia amounted to about 900 men.[28]

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[25] Chatel, *Inventaire sommaire des Archives départementales … Calvados*, Vol. 2, pp.273–281, 294

[26] 'Histoire des Milices Bourgeoises et de la Garde Nationale de Cambrai', *Mémoire de la Société d'emulation de Cambrai*, Vol. 42 (1887), pp.45–49; M.E. Bouly, *Histoire de Cambrai et du Cambrésis* (Cambrai, 1841–1847), p.488; *Mercure Galant*, September 1719, pp.354–355.

[27] L. Barbat, *Histoire de la ville de Châlons-sur-Marne et de ses monuments* (Châlons-sur-Marne, 1855), pp.311–316.

[28] Bernard Durand, *L'Illustre Orbandale ou l'histoire ancienne et moderne de la ville & cité de Châlon-sur-Saône* (Châlons-Sur-Saône: P. Cusset, 1662), Vol. 1, pp.757–758, 760–761; Fouques,

Chasteau-Gontier (Anjou). At a 1710 celebration that started with cannon shots from the castle, all the bourgeois militia paraded with arms. It consisted of six companies "of good looking and well-dressed young men, all with sword knots and wearing hats with lace and cockades of gold or silver."[29]

Châtillon-sur-Seine (Burgundy). This town reorganised it bourgeois militia into three companies in 1687. The first was that of the cadets and comprised the most notable inhabitants. Its distinctive colours were blue and white. The second company had blue and the third yellow. All were well armed.[30]

Clamecy (Burgundy). At the 1697 peace celebrations, which were quite extensive in this town, featuring fireworks, its five bourgeois militia companies "under arms" with "trumpets, drums hautbois, musettes and violons" paraded to a "fountain of wine" and fired three salvos, starting a festival-like event.[31]

Chaumont (Champagne). The bourgeois militia was organised in the sixteenth century, there being eight companies which amounted to about 1,200 men. They were armed, but did not have uniforms until 1759. The colours of the companies were red and blue with a white cross, the quarters of which were disposed differently for each company and they had distinctive company mottos. There also was a company of arbalétriers until 1670 and a company of arquebusiers.[32]

Compiègne (Île-de-France). The city had companies of bourgeois militia which paraded "under arms" at various events. There were privileged elite companies: the archers, the arbalétriers (crossbowmen), the arquebusiers and a company of canonniers (gunners) to serve the guns on the ramparts. At the 1697 peace celebrations the 60 arquebusiers paraded all "mounted and well equipped." In the early eighteenth century they wore a blue uniform with red cuffs, buttonholes embroidered with silver, gold cloth waistcoat lined red.[33]

Dijon (Burgundy). The city's bourgeois militia consisted of some 3,000 men divided into seven companies which corresponded to its seven parishes (or *quartiers*). In February 1652 during the Fronde, all men from 18 to 60 years old were ordered to be "well and duly armed with muskets, arquebus,

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Recherches historiques sur les corporations des archers, des arbalétriers et des arquebusiers [Châlon-sur-Soane], part one; Victor Fouque, *Histoire de Châlons-Sur-Saône* (Châlons-Sur-Saône: Fouques, 1844), pp.459–460, 603, 606.

[29] *Mercure Galant*, March 1710, pp.169–170.

[30] *Mercure Galant*, March 1687, pp.317–319.

[31] *Mercure Galant*, January 1698, pp.175–187

[32] Émile Jolibois, *Histoire de la ville de Chaumont* (Paris and Chaumont, 1856), pp.184–185.

[33] 'Notice sur les anciennes corporations … de Picardie', pp.256–258; Roger de Magnienville, *Le maréchal d'Humières et le gouvernement de Compiègne* (Paris, 1881), pp.68–69; *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Île-de-France*, 1880, Vol. 7, p.100; M.A. Barbey, *Un Almanach en 1718* (Château-Thierry: Lecesne, 1877).

flintlock muskets, pikes, partisans and halberds". In 1701 all the officers were "dressed in different colours, with very fine waistcoats, most being in gold or silver cloth and all having very magnificent gold and silver sashes with white plumes on their hats and silk cockades of different colours." By the early eighteenth century the officers were to wear gorgets, the sergeants to have halberds and the militiamen swords and flintlock muskets. The sergeants had halberds and were dressed in the colours of their parish "with silver laces on their cuffs." In the first third of the eighteenth century, Dihojon's bourgeois militia wore red coats and isabelle (buffish yellow) waistcoats along with drummers, fifers, hautbois, bassoon and cymbal players all in red coats laced with white at all the seams. All were well armed with officers carrying spontons, NCOs with halberds and partisans. The Chevaliers de l'Arquebuse of Dijon had scarlet uniforms in 1700.[34]



Halberd head of a Dijon bourgeois militia sergeant. It was made in 1685 for Mathieu de Badier by Jean Leboid. Its steel is finely etched. (Musée de la vie bourguignon, Dijon. Author's photo)

Douai (Flandres). This fortress city was part of Spanish Flanders until 1667 when it was besieged by a French army led by the Sun King, and capitulated on 6 July. It was besieged again in 1710 as a French city and surrendered on 24 June, and retaken by the French on 8 September 1712. The bourgeois militia consisted of 12 companies in 1667, making up most of the garrison during the siege that year. From 1668 Douai was selected to become one of the main fortresses in French Flanders and its fortifications were considerably expanded and the regular garrison multiplied. The importance of the militia thus markedly decreased. The privileged companies in Douai, which were called *æde serment* (of the oath), continued their activities. The company of archers dated from about 1400; in the early eighteenth century, its chevaliers wore a scarlet coat laced with silver. The arbalétriers' company dated from 1487. The canonniers (gunners) company dated from 1451 and had its own garden where it trained with rampart muskets; it had a blue coat with scarlet cuffs laced with gold in the eighteenth century. The company *des Joueurs d'Armes* (weapons players) was much younger, originating in 1667; in the eighteenth century its members wore a blue coat with scarlet cuffs and gold *brandebourgs*.[35]

Grenoble (Dauphiné). In 1676 the city's governor, the Duc de Lesdiguières, reactivated the bourgeois militia, which that had not mustered in many years. A year later, he found them 'in a good state' parading properly and saluting with spontoons and colours. In 1678, the town's militia consisted of 12 companies whose clothing was garnished "with a prodigious amount of ribbons and sashes. Each company had a different colour, and nothing was so agreeable to see as this diversity." The following year distinctive

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[34] *Mercure Galant*, May 1701, pp.287–288; *Mémoires de la société bourguignone de géographie et d'histoire*, Vol. 13 (Dijon, 1897), p.328; Henri Giroux, 'Le get et la security des habitants à Dijon au XVIIIe siècle', *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences, des arts et des belles-lettres de Dijon*, Vol. 124 (1979–1980), pp.65–69.

[35] P. Plouvain, *Souvenirs à l'usage des habitan[t]s de Douai* (Douai: Deregnacourt, 1822), pp.507–513; *Douai, son histoire militaire – ses fortifications*, pp.102–125.



Right, top: Grand Connétable Henri Mertens, Canonniers de Lille, 1709. The *Grand Connétable* (Grand Constable) commanded this ancient artillery unit. He wore and all-scarlet uniform with gold buttons, lace and white plumes edging the hat. Print after "J.L.". (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)



Right, below: colour of the Canonniers de Lille, late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The colour had a white field with a red cross of Burgundy, Santa Barbara in the centre, a field gun below and was bordered with black triangles on yellow, edged with red. Print after Richard Knotel, *Mittheilungen*, No. 3, March 1892. (Author's photo)

company colours were linen grey for the first, blue for the second, and the others green, violet, red, yellow and so on for plume, sashes and other decorations. The colour was strewn with gold lilies "and enriched with other ornaments." In 1689 many companies formed cadres in provincial militia regiments that campaigned in the province and in Piémont. In March 1701 some 2,000 under arms and "well dressed" paraded in the city.[36]

Lille (Flandres). Amongst distinguished units of fighting militia defenders, the Canonniers de Lille (gunners of Lille) were remarkable. Originating in the fifteenth century as the *Confrérie de Sainte-Barbe* (Fraternity of Saint Barbara), this privileged corps was in action several times in the sixteenth century when Flanders became a domain of the Spanish Habsburg kings. Because it was a military fraternity, its members were known as *confrères* (brothers) rather than gunners, the commander was the *Grand Connétable* and junior officers *Petits Connétables*. In 1645, when Lille had hardly any regular Spanish troops, the French approached but were driven off by the gunners' artillery fire. In 1667 their service in the city's Du Meunier battery gave a stout resistance to Louis XIV's army, but at the cost of some 40 casualties to the unit. The city's last shots before its capitulation on 27 August came from that battery. After the surrender the Sun King visited the devastated battery and complimented the militia gunners for their skill and their courage. Lille became part of France and they continued their militia service. In 1708, when besieged by Prince Eugene's army, the Canonniers again served the guns with outstanding valour until Lille's capitulation. A heroic gunner, Jacques Boutry, was even rewarded by the King in 1714. In 1717 the Lille gunners were given two brass 2-pdr honour cannons by the Duc de Maine for their excellent conduct in 1708. Seemingly by choice, the enlisted men of this remarkable unit did not wear uniforms, except for white plumes on their hats. The commander had an all-scarlet uniform, the junior officers wore blue and the drummers scarlet.[37]

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[36] *Mercure Galant*, March 1678, pp.127–128; *ibid*, January 1679, p.36; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, p.318; *Les milices de Grenoble en Savoie et Dauphiné 1690–1694* (Paris: Chapelot, 1899), pp.4–11.

Lyon (Lyonnais). The city's bourgeois militia originated in the 1200s with, by 1294, some 35 companies of tradesmen corresponding to the *quartiers* of the city; by the 1640s there were 36 companies. Lyon, France's second most important city, was exempted from quartering troops and this meant there were very few regular army troops to garrison it. The role of the bourgeois militia was therefore more demanding with regard to mounting guard and often providing aid to civil power. From 1629 it even had an Academy of Instruction to train militia NCOs in various roles including artillery. In 1664 it had 37 companies which were well armed and most paraded "agreeably dressed", but the militiamen could not always cope with the frequent riots, guard mountings and securing the city gates and this led to the creation of the independent company of the Lyonnais Regiment (see above) in 1669. The bourgeois militia was reorganised into 28 companies following Louis XIV's edict of 30 March 1694. It was well armed, but uniforms do not seem to have been a priority. In April 1701 some men of the 14 companies of bourgeois militia on parade were "dressed in iron grey with steel buttons." The city mobilised "7,000 of its bourgeois bearing arms, besides 100 men guarding the gates, the archers [and] the arquebusiers ... who had magnificent and uniform companies." All the bourgeois militia companies were very well dressed, some having suits of "good cloth laced or embroidered with gold and silver in various manners and all more magnificent" and the officers had fine sashes and plumes. The companies had colours, but detailed descriptions seem to be lacking before 1782. Lyon's company of arquebusiers was the elite volunteer militia unit. In 1556 it became the guard of the city council, numbering about 200 men of whom 50 would be called to serve on active duty. Of these, a dozen formed a squad of halberdsmen in 1680 to escort city councillors in religious and civic ceremonies, armed with swords and halberd and wearing helmets and the city's violet livery. In 1680 the rest of the unit still had pikes, corselets, "bourguignotte"-style helmets and cassocks of the city's livery. It later had a uniform consisting of a violet coat with scarlet waistcoat, breeches and stockings, officers and NCOs with the hat edged with silver lace.[38]

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[37] Brun-Lavainne, *Annales des Canonniers de Lille* (Lille, 1827); A. Fromont and A. de Meunynck, *Histoire des Canonniers de Lille* (Lille: L. Quarré, 1892), pp.97–98, 105–114, 151–163, 170.

[38] Niepce, *Lyon militaire*, pp.226–227, 488, 496. The 1782 colours and the 1787 uniform regulations are reproduced in this book; the names of the 1664 militia officers are given in: *L'Entrée solennelle*

Mâcon (Burgundy). The Chevaliers de l'Arquebuse company was called on active service in 1674 and posted on Burgundy's border with Franche-Comté. It numbered 150 men in 1700 (see Plate 4). In April 1701 nine companies of the city's bourgeois militia paraded, "neatly dressed".[39]

Marseille (Provence). In 1690 this port city had 42 bourgeois militia companies of 50 men each made up of artisans led by gentlemen. There was a company of grenadiers made up of the most experienced militiamen and 30 brigades of 16 men each as firefighters. The militia outside of the city included two companies of cavalry and 40 companies of 50 men each made up of young peasants, most of them hunters, formed into four battalions. There were thus at least 4,500 militiamen who were said to be ready to assemble in arms at the first alarm. In March 1701 the city's militia included four companies of bourgeois militia whose hats were laced with gold and ornamented with ribbons, as were their sword guards. They had uniform coats that were "very clean" and their weapons were fine looking. The captains had rich clothing, plumes "and magnificent sashes." The companies of merchants were "magnificent, and each of them had a white plume." The finest looking of these companies wore brown with red cuffs, lining, waistcoat and stockings, brass buttons, gold laced hat with white cockade, powder flask held by a red and white silk cord. By September there were five bourgeois companies "armed and dressed in uniform, each company with its drummers and fifers, a company in red, another in blue, etc." There were also about 60 armed troopers whose coats were not uniform, but they had three trumpeters and a kettledrum. The more common city bourgeois militia numbered over 6,000 men dressed neatly, "all with hats edged with a gold lace, also distinguished by various colours [flags], [and] by knots of different colours."[40]

Mercurol (Dauphiné). The June *Mercure Galant* of 1687 reported celebrations at this town and its area, near Tain in Dauphiné, which featured a grand parade involving "over a thousand men" of various militia units on 27 April. Two companies of the town of Romans' militia were present with all their men equipped with red leather cartridge boxes "charged with lilies" and their coats "extremely" clean. There were drummers, muskets salvos were fired and a mock battle given.

Montauban (Guyenne). The bourgeois militia in December 1703 consisted of over 500 infantry and some 300 cavalry wearing green cockades, green being the livery of the intendant, with gentlemen as its officers.[41]

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dans la ville de Lyon du Cardinal Flavio Chigi; Francis Linossier, *Les Mystères de Lyon* (Lyon, 1856), p.87; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, pp.323, 348. In 1701, a presumably small group of presumably the arquebusiers company was seen still "wearing helmets, cuirasses and musketoons"; a 1724 tailor's bill for the arquebusiers listed violet-crimson cloth for coat, red lining, waistcoat, breeches and stockings, silver buttons and hat lace as per Vial, 'Le capitaine de la ville', p.463.

[39] Fouques, *Recherches historiques sur les corporations...*, pp.246–247; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, p.375.

[40] *Mercure Galant*, December 1690, pp.190–195; April 1701, pp 204–206; October 1701, p.120; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, p.247.

[41] *Mercure Galant*, February 1704, pp.30–31.

Montoire-sur-le-Loir (Orléanais). In 1679 its bourgeois militia consisted of one cavalry company and four infantry companies. The cavalry's standard had three gold lilies with the motto "Lilia, olive, ferns".[42]

Montpellier (Languedoc). In 1678, this town had a troop of bourgeois militia cavalry of over 200 young men "all very neat and even better mounted", and all had blue plumes in their hats and wore "magnificent sashes". It also had a company of privileged bourgeois militia archers numbering over 200 men, whose coats were garnished with linen grey ribbons. For a celebration parade, they carried bows instead of muskets. Their officers wore gold cloth brocade coats and sashes embroiled with gold and silver. The company's 12 drummers wore green. In February 1701 the town's bourgeois militia had a company of 200 grenadiers wearing dragoon-style caps ornamented according to each's taste and means, some having gold or silver lace, and seven companies of bourgeois bearing arms. In all, the city's militia would have hovered at about 1,000 men.[43]

Nancy (Lorraine). At the end of the seventeenth century the city of Nancy had a cavalry company of 100 men uniformed with a white coat with red cuffs, waistcoat and breeches, a company named "des Buttiers", which wore a grey-white coat with red cuffs, waistcoat and breeches; it was the senior of some 24 urban bourgeois militia companies and four more in the suburbs that were assigned the same uniform.[44]

Nantes (Brittany). This port city's militia origins go back to the Dark Ages. By the time of the Sun King's reign, the *Milice Bourgeoise* in the city had eight companies corresponding to its *quartiers* with the most influential being the Companies de la Fosse which covered the harbour area. The suburbs had another four companies. The number of men per company varied between 160 and 200 and amounted to 2,102 men plus sergeants and officers in 1693. In 1614 the Duc de Rohan signed regulations concerning the bourgeois militia's precedence, drills and parades. Its men stood guards and undertook patrols in Nantes, and occasionally some were detached to reinforce coastal areas. A temporary marching battalion of 520 was formed and sent to Belle-Île from November 1688 to March 1689. Some 400 men are detached to Le Croisic and Painbeuf in 1696 and 50 others to Saint-Nazaire. In 1703–1704 and 1706, detachments of 50 men were again sent to Belle Île (see Plate 4 for uniforms). There was also the elite company of "Papegault" created in the Middle Ages by the Duc de Bretagne whose main mandate, besides being a private tennis club, was to be a well-trained and well-equipped militia company with the specific task of garrisoning the castle of Nantes. In the eighteenth century, and perhaps before, it wore a scarlet coat edged with a gold lace for officers and without lace for its chevaliers.[45]

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[42] *Mercure Galant*, May 1679, pp.95–98, 213–214; July 1678, p.146.

[43] *Mercure Galant*, December 1678, pp.86–87; Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, pp.216–217.

[44] Jean-François Nicolas, 'Journal de ce qui s'est passé à Nancy', *Mémoires de la Société d'archéologie de Lorraine*, Vol. 49 (1899), pp.230–231; Fourier de Bacourt, 'Les sociétés de tir et les milices bourgeoises…', p.84.

Nevers (Burgundy). The bourgeois militia consisted of four companies, one for each *quartier*, and in 1697 it had a band of 12 drummers, five fifers, 12 violons and a hautbois led by a drum major. The officers had gorgets and swords, the militiamen muskets. The companies wore cockades of different colours.[46]

Niort (Poitou). In 1621, King Louis XIII reviewed the city's bourgeois militia, and pleased with its demeanour decreed that its 12 companies be organised as a regiment titled Royal-Niort at 1,200 men. In 1674 Dutch ships raided the island of Noirmoutier and some 500 men of the regiment thereafter garrisoned the nearby island of Bouin for nearly a month. A 1692 report mentioned that the unit had no pikemen and all men were armed with matchlock and flintlock muskets. In 1706, a grenadier company was added to the regiment; in the eighteenth century, it was reported wearing a "blue and white" uniform with a bearskin cap, but when it was adopted is unknown. Since 1674 Niort also had a cavalry company of 70 troopers.[47]

Noyon (Picardy). Its company of Archers de la Confrérie de Saint-Sébastien existed before 1322, and during the reign of the Sun King had precedence over the companies of the town's bourgeois militia, which was confirmed in 1709 after a legal challenge from the militia officers. In the early eighteenth century the uniform of its 30 chevaliers was scarlet with gold buttons and edged with gold lace, as was the hat which also had a white plume border. The standard was of white silk with a gold sun and a trophy of arms and also a white colour with the coat of arms of the King and that of the town.[48]

Metz (Lorraine). The bourgeois militia had four battalions of four companies each. Their city was an important military fortress and its militiamen were always called upon to provide sentries; in wartime, some could be mobilised for duty if the number of regular units in the city was too small. In the eighteenth century the uniform was a blue coat with blue cuffs, red lining, scarlet waistcoat laced with gold, scarlet breeches, gold laced hat, gold buttons and buttonhole lace. The colours were "white and black" by opposition. The city's outlying area also had a Milice Champêtre du Pays-Messin which had four battalions of four companies each in the different villages. Its militiamen were exempt from working in *corvées* (obligatory public works), and did not have uniforms, but did have "green, white and blue colours by opposition" in the quarters.[49]

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[45] Camille Mellinet, *La commune et la milice de Nantes* (Nantes, *c.*1900), Vol. 4, pp.284, 316; Guy Saupin, *Nantes au XVII siècle* (Rennes: Presses universitaires, 1996), pp.3–5, 17–22, 62; *Dictionnaire, géographique, historique... de la France* (Paris, 1768), Vol. 5, pp.44–45, 101–102. Blue coats with red waistcoats, breeches and stockings is also given by Mellinet. A 1711 order also specified that when the bells sounded the fire alarm, each captain was to immediately to muster 10 men to operate pumps and fire buckets and to secure the area against thieves.

[46] Louis Gueneau, *L'organisation du travail à Nevers au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: Hachette, 2027), pp.99–101.

[47] I. Silières, 'Le Régiment de Royal-Niort', *Bulletin de la Société Historique et Scientifique des Deux-Sèvres*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1937), pp.147–161.

[48] Javier, 'Notice sur les anciennes corporations ... des villes de Picardie', pp.268–272. Also attributed silver lace in 1717.

Orbec (Normandy). The bourgeois militia of this small town had a sky blue colour upon which was painted a small half-lit fire above which rose a phoenix with the words "Redivivus ab aggere Phoenix" (return of the Phoenix).[50]

Orléans (Orléanais). In April 1707 its bourgeois militia consisted of 10 "city companies" which paraded armed with their officers and all wore cockades. There also were privileged companies of archers and arquebusiers [51]

Péronne (Picardy). In the 1670s the bourgeois militia had 10 companies which had grown to 12 by 1703. It was organised in battalions since 1686. The 20 chevaliers of its elite archers company distinguished themselves with the French army at the battle of Rethel against the Spanish on 19 December 1650. In 1654 the archer's company paraded with "swords and pistols" in their hands with "all our youth, quite numerous and well equipped". The bourgeois militia was at the town's gate "with its white colour at the centre is the portrait of a *Pucelle* [that may have meant Joan of Arc] with three lilies." It may be that a few were volunteers to fight the Turks in Candie (Crete) in the later 1660s. The company later wore red coats. There was also a company of canonniers-arquebusiers which had a light grey uniform with silver buttons.[52]

Poligny (Franche-Comté). The Compagnie de l'Arquebuse was organised in 1648. The uniform eventually adopted by its chevaliers was of blue cloth trimmed with 30 gold "cartouches" [probably buttonhole laces] with an unlaced beaver hat ornamented with a white plume. Its standard was crimson on one side bearing the coat of arms of Poligny and aurore (orange) on the other with an eagle holding thunderbolts.[53]

Provins (Île-de-France). Its Compagnie de l'Arquebuse existed in the sixteenth century and had as many as 200 chevaliers in 1562, which must have decreased later on, but it had a fine clubhouse from 1670. Its main object was target shooting besides parades; military duties seem to have been few in this peaceful part of the realm. It wore a rose-colour coat with buff waistcoat and breeches, silver buttons and lace.[54]

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[49] *Dictionnaire géographique, historique...*, Vol. 4, p.720.

[50] *Mercure Galant*, March 1687, pp.315–316.

[51] *Mercure Galant*, October 1707, pp.292, 294; *Mémoires de la société d'agriculture, sciences, belles-lettres et arts d'Orléans*, Vol. 35 (1897), pp.253–270.

[52] Gustave Ramon, *Coutumes, ordinances et usages locaux de la ville de Péronne avant 1789* (Péronne: Quentin, 1879–1880), pp.190–211; Javier, 'Notice sur les anciennes corporations ... des villes de Picardie', pp.294–298; *Gazette de France*, 1654, p.890. The archer company's clubhouse had frescoes of it fighting the Turks, and some of its poetry that stated: '... we will enter into Byzantium and rip off the crescent, to plant the cross of the world's redeemer.'

[53] M.B. Prost, 'Notice historique sur les Chevaliers du noble jeu de l'Arquebuse de la ville de Poligny', *Bulletin de la Société d'agriculture, sciences et arts de Poligny*, 1872, pp.57–58.

Reims (Champagne). In 1694 the 12 companies of bourgeois mMilitia were reorganised into nine companies led by a major, eight captains and nine lieutenants. There also was a large privileged Compagnie de l'Arquebuse, whose origins as archers went back to the 1300s; in August 1686 it numbered over 180 Chevaliers. They wore red clothing in the early eighteenth century.[55]

Rennes (Brittany). The bourgeois mMilitia had eight companies in the early seventeenth century and this grew to 15 companies mustering some 3,268 militiamen in 1721. The sergeants were said to have been army veterans and the grenadiers chosen from the best-looking men. This city's militia was particularly tasked with providing the night watch patrol which, in 1714, consisted of an officer, two sergeants and 18 militiamen. They were provided with ammunition and a guardhouse.[56]

Rochefort (Aunis). This town founded in 1665 was one of the French Navy's main bases on the Atlantic until 1926. Its administration came under the French navy. The arsenal, docks and shipyards were separate from the town and guarded by troops of the Navy. The town's inhabitants were largely responsible for the security of the town outside of the naval base. They were informally organised into companies from the later 1660s and the officers were elected by the inhabitants. Unlike nearly all other cities in France that had officially recognised bourgeois militias with royal charters since the Middle Ages, the new city of Rochefort did not have such formal recognition. From 1691 the intendant sought to correct this peculiar situation by which he became, in practice, its commanding officer and even drafted regulations regarding the duties of militiamen. This occurred in March 1694 when a royal edict formally recognised the Rochefort militiamen as bourgeois militia. Commissions were henceforth sold for the ranks of major, captain and lieutenant in return for which they enjoyed certain tax deductions and did not have the obligation of quartering troops. In effect, Rochefort obtained municipal status from the royal government, which was very favourably greeted by its population. Before 1715 the bourgeois militia may have consisted of up to 19 infantry companies including one of grenadiers and one of cadets. Their uniform was grey-white lined with red. The cavalry consisted of a company of gendarmes (or carabiniers) wearing scarlet coats with gold laced hats and scarlet housing edged with gold lace, a dragoon company having blue coatsm and a cavalry company in grey-white coats lined red with a silver lace. On the basis of 50 men per company, Rochefort's bourgeois militia amounted to about 1,100 men.[57]

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[54] M. Boquet-Liancourt, 'Souvenirs de l'arquebuse de Provins', *Bulletin de la Société d'archéologie. lettres et arts di département de Seine-et-Marne*, 1889, Vol. 4, pp.298–299.

[55] *Travaux de l'Académie nationale de Reims*, Vol. 18 (1884–1885), pp.384, 389; Édouard de Barthélemy, *Histoire des archers, arbalétriers et arquebusiers de la ville de Riems* (Riems: Giret, 1875).

[56] J. Ogée and A. Marteville, *Rennes ancien* (Rennes, 1850), pp.103–106; *Dictionnaire géographique, historique ...*, Vol. 6, p.195.

La Rochelle (Aunis). Following the 1628 siege, this harbour city's bourgeois militia was reorganised, with all men able to bear arms from 16 to 60 years old. The mayor was in command as its colonel. The men were classed as ordinary and *Privilégiés* (privileged) townsmen, these last being leading bourgeois, shipowners and nobles who enjoyed certain exemptions from service if they paid for a release. Sailors and handicapped persons were also exempted on proof of their status. Others could also be exempted if they paid up to 24 livres a year. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century those who were keen were formed into grenadier companies. By 1703 the bourgeois militia of La Rochelle had been reorganised into seven *ordonnance* companies, so named because they comprised nearly 500 of the city's elite gentlemen. These consisted in a cavalry company of 70 troopers, a company of 100 musketeers or cadets, three companies of dragoons dressed in green, blue and red respectively of 60 men each and two companies of grenadiers of 70 men each. La Rochelle's more common urban militia had 23 companies of about 65 men each making about 2,000 men, a number that could be doubled to 4,000 in an emergency. The urban militia had four colours.[58]

Rouen (Normandy). The bourgeois militia was organised in 1567, with a strength of 12 companies. At the beginning of the eighteenth century it consisted of 15 companies, each led by a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign. It was divided in four "divisions" of three companies each, a "division" corresponding to a city's *quartier*. A company was made up of men from several parishes in its *quartier*. When called to routine duties such night watch, companies served in turn. Besides its bourgeois militia, Rouen also had its medieval vintage and privileged Compagnie des Arbalétriers of some 50 chevaliers nicknamed "La Cinquantaine" or "Cinquanteniers" (the Fifty) who by the seventeenth century were armed with muskets. It appears to have become a mounted unit at about that time. A company of archers was formed in 1513. There was also a Compagnie des Arquebusiers of about 100 men strong, raised in 1550. They were occasionally called to active surveillance duty during the reign of Louis XIV; for instance, in 1675 both companies were said to be "working night and day for the city's safety" and also assuming some police duties. They were said to have worn, before 1770, an iron grey coat with all the seams laced, the Cinquanteniers having a bandolier and the arquebusiers a white sash with silver fringes.[59]

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[57] *Mercure Galant*, August 1704, pp.18–19; J.-T. Viaud and E.-J. Fleury, *Histoire de la ville et du port de Rochefort* (Rochefort, 1845), pp.104–106, 306.

[58] J.-B.-E. J., *Éphèmerides historiques de La Rochelle* (La Rochelle: Siret, 1851), p.304; Luoc Bucherie, 'La Milice Bourgeoise de La Rochelle 1628–1789', *Armes & Uniformes de l'Histoire*, No. 6 (January-February 1972), pp.21–23.

[59] H. Bouteiller, *Histoire des milices bourgeoises et de la Garde Nationale de Rouen* (Rouen: Haulard, 1850), pp.61–63; Beaurepaire, *Notice sur la compagnie des arbalétriers*, pp.23, 29–33, 38, 43–44. *Dictionnaire géographique, historique* ..., Vol. 6, p.480–481. The uniform adopted in 1770 was blue with red cuffs and lapels, laced with gold for the Cinquantiers and silver for the arquebusiers.

Saint-Bonnet (Lyonnais). This town in the generality of Forez had a battalion of five companies of bourgeois militia in 1698. Its officers all paraded armed with half-pikes (or spontoons) except the major who had a cane. Each company had a colour with various mottos and badges painted thereon.[60]

Saint-Malo (Brittany). The bourgeois militia had 14 companies and provided a night watch patrol. In wartime this port city became a nest of corsairs, and the strength of its militia tended to weaken due to some of the men going off to sea. Those who remained took part in the defence of the city when British ships bombarded it without much success in 1693 and 1695.[61]

Saint-Quentin (Picardy). This fortress city was besieged several times in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the siege of 1636 causing the death of about a third of its 10,000 inhabitants. By comparison the Sun King's era was quite calm, and the city prospered. It was an important garrison town of the regular army and also had its bourgeois militia and elite companies. Its bourgeois militia mobilised the men in the city four *quartiers* and could number some 16 companies led by a major general, 16 "mayeurs d'enseignes" (captains) and 48 "prud'hommes" (subalterns). The senior elite unit was the company of Canonniers-Arquebusiers (artillery and arquebus company) which originated in 1461 as a unit of crossbowmen. It had about 17 officers and 34 chevaliers who frequently had target practices for which they were exempted from standing guard on the city walls, except at the town hall and during trade fairs. They were to act as firemen if a fire broke out. During the early 1700s they also guarded allied prisoners of war detained in the city. In the early eighteenth century they wore slate grey coats with black velvet cuffs and silver buttons. The colours had a black cross with white quarters sprinkled with gold lilies; the first quarter had a cannon painted thereon, the second crossed swords, the third crossed batons and the fourth a tower with, at the centre of the cross, the crowned arms of France with the collar of the Saint-Esprit Order. The company of archers, also called fusiliers or archers of the d'Isle suburb, numbered three officers, two sergeants, 40 *Confrères* (brothers) and a number of veterans. There was also a company of the *Jeunesse* (youths) comprising the elite young bourgeois who were led by two officers and whose numbers were unlimited; they did not have uniforms.[62]

Soissons (Île-de-France). The bourgeois militia consisted of six companies. There was an anecdote that, in 1654, the young Louis XIV stayed in the town and his apartment was guarded by a militia detachment. He went out incognito, was immediately apprehended by a militia sentry, was identified and went back to his lodging very satisfied of the guard's efficiency. The militia gathered to celebrate peace in 1697 with red and white cockades at their hats and firing musket salvos in front of city hall. There was also the privileged company of *arbalète* (crossbowmen) which merged into that of the arquebusiers in the late 1600s, as well as the Compagnie des Archers de Saint-Vast which, like the Compagnie de l'Arquebuse, had its own clubhouse. The Chevaliers de l'Arquebuse wore red coats edged with silver lace in the early eighteenth century. In June 1712 the city's 22 companies numbering over 900 officers and men were mobilised to stand guard and prepare for a siege, since Prince Eugene's allied army might approach Ile-de-France. Villars' victory at Denain totally changed the situation and the militia was dismissed in August.[63]

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[60] 'Relation des réjouissances...', *Histoire de Saint-Bonnet-le Château* (Paris: Picard, 1887), pp.427–428.

[61] *Annales de Bretagne*, Vol. 6 (1890) pp.367–369; R. Grivel, 'Défense des côtes', *Revue maritime et coloniale*, Vol. 25 (1869), pp.135–136.

[62] *Journal de l'Institut historique*, Vol. 10 (Paris, 1839), p.197; Georges Lecocq, *Histoire de la Compagnie des Canonniers-Arquebusiers de la ville de Saint-Quentin* (Saint-Quentin: Poette, 1874), pp.32, 42–46.

Troyes (Champagne). In 1663 the bourgeois militia numbering 32 companies was assembled to greet the Comte de Soissons, governor of the province of Champagne. Two-thirds of the companies were armed with matchlock muskets and wore bandoliers while the other third carried pikes and gorgets, not the small gilded crescents used by officers as status badges, but the larger and older steel pieces of armour. The militiamen wore "honest and suitable clothes" while their prosperous officers paraded in "the best and finest equipage they could afford." The men were advised to "carry well their muskets" and not to load them, to prevent misfire accidents. Whilst they had no uniforms, they probably had white sashes. By 1703 they wore white or blue cockades on their hats. They may then have worn blue coats with gold-laced hats which they did later on, but this was likely more a convention to wear civilian coats of that colour than an agreed regulation uniform. Since the sixteenth century they had colours that were white, blue and scarlet for the companies and the colonel's colour was white silk sprinkled with 200 gold lilies. In the early eighteenth century the Chevaliers de l'Arquebuse of Troyes wore brown, edged with silver lace and silver buttons.[64]

Toulon (Provence). The port city of Toulon was France's most important naval base on the Mediterranean. In July 1707 the major raid by enemy troops led by Prince Eugene into Provence had Toulon as a prime objective, and was supported by a large Anglo-Dutch fleet. Fortifications were being repaired and improved and the city's bourgeois militia was reorganised and expanded into 30 companies of 100 men each, who were joined by three battalions of coast guard militia and six companies from the countryside; noblemen were also called to arms; in all, there were about 4,500 men. However, once assembled in the city there were almost no weapons to arm them, no money to pay them and not enough experienced officers and NCOs to train and lead them. Thus, some absconded, but most stayed when they were armed with lances, pikes and cutlasses, and put on guard duty on the curtain walls with the regular troops. Considering their lack of training and weapons, their services during the siege were outstanding as indeed were those of other militiamen in Provence as related above.[65]

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[63] Henri Martin, *Histoire de Soissons* (Soissons: P. Arnould, 1837), pp.600–601; 'Les milices, les garnisons et les camps de Soissons', *Bulletin de la société archéologique, historique et scientifique de Soissons*, 1883, pp.197–198; 'Notice sur les anciennes corporations … des villes de Picardie', pp.236–251; H. Luguet, 'La milice bourgeoise de Soissons', *Bulletin de la société archéologique, historique …*, Vol. 7 (1936–1939), pp.199–204.

[64] Albert Babeau, *Le guet et la milice bourgeoise à Troyes* (Troyes, 1879), p.38–39 quoting a 1663 document. At about 50 men per company, the Troyes militia would have had about 1,500 men.

Toulouse (Languedoc). In 1679 the city's bourgeois militia amounted to 50 companies mustering some 5,000 men. It paraded in February 1701 when the dukes of Bourgogne and Berry visited the city. For this occasion the Toulouse militia was reorganised into at least a dozen companies, which had about 100 men each, four of which had uniforms for all ranks. All the officers of the eight *Capitouls* (or parish) companies of the city had scarlet coats, waistcoats, breeches and stockings with the coats and waistcoats laced with gold, the quantity of lace decreasing with the rank. The two senior "colonels" further had white plumes on their hats. The drummers and fifers had red uniforms, the coats having a silver lace on the edging the cuffs and pockets, their hats silver laced with a cockade of their company's colour. Their drum belts were of the city's livery colours. The men seem to have worn civilian clothing, with silver-laced hats and cockades of their company's colour. Each company also had a colour in the hues of their respective *Capitouls* livery. The merchants had their own militia companies (see Plate 5 for uniforms and colours). Then, as now, Toulouse was a large city with suburbs and there were many other tradesmen and artisans of all sorts such as glove makers, wig dressers, bakers who also had their companies, in all 5,000 men divided into 55 companies, some in uniforms, and other companies having ribbons of various colours on civilian clothes. There also eight uniformed merchants' companies (see Plate 5). In all, about 7,000 men or more from the city and its area gathered on this occasion.[66]

Tournus (Burgundy). The town had a bourgeois militia and also a privileged Compagnie de l'Arquebuse originating in the fourteenth century. It was called on active service in 1674 to guard the city with the militia, during the invasion of Franche-Comté.[67]

Tours (Touraine). The bourgeois militia had 12 companies augmented to 13 in 1663. The city was far from war zones, but the militia was called often upon to guard prisoners of war sent there. In the eighteenth century the officers wore a red uniform with a gold laced hat bearing a white cockade.[68]

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[65] Ravisi, *Invasion de la France en* 1707, p.33; G. Lambert, 'Histoire de Toulon', *Bulletin de l'Académie du Var*, Vol. 15 (1889–1890), pp.16–17.

[66] *Mercure Galant*, March 1679, p.57, and March 1701, pp.222–240; *Relation de tout ce qui s'est passé à la réception du Duc de Bourgogne* (Toulouse, 1701); Colin and Raynaud, *Lettres inédites*, pp.166–168.

[67] Bernard, *Recherches sur les chevaliers de l'arquebuse et sur les chevaliers de l'arc de Tournus*, pp.25.

[68] G. de Clérambault, 'Les milices de Tours', *Bulletin de la société archéologique de Touraine*, Vol. 19 (1913–1914), pp.355, 358, 362–363.

Villefranche (Lyonnais). This town in Beaujolais, the north-eastern part of Lyonnais, had a bourgeois militia of eight companies in 1687, each with three officers including a captain. There was also a HQ staff consisting of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, and aide-major and a captain-ensign. The companies corresponded to the eight *quartiers* of the town and were known by the distinctive colour of their blue coat's facings. They were termed the *quartier* Blanc (white), Bleu (blue), Vert (green), Rouge (red), Jaune (yellow), Aurore (orange), Gris-de-lin (linen grey) and Violet.[69]

The Paris Exception. Paris had a militia that was basically non-existent during the reign of Louis XIV. It had not always been so. In the fifteenth century King Louis XI had mustered for a review some 80,000 Paris militiamen "all able to bear arms and wearing for the occasion red *hocquetons* jackets bearing a white cross." Since the sixteenth century the city's militiamen, who were mostly artisans and shopkeepers, provided some security in the streets, especially at night, and even stemmed small riots. Some had also been involved in the Fronde (see Volume 1). However, after the Fronde they chose to leave the security tasks to professional constabulary forces that were really more appropriate to police a city of at least half a million people. So the Paris militia became a force on paper, with non-serving officers. One of its last outings may have been for the entry to the city of the young king and queen on 26 August 1660, when the mounted company of 120 tailors paraded wearing silver brocade *pourpoints* jackets with a white guidon strewn with gold lilies and bearing the portraits of the king and queen at its centre. The privileged and ancient *Compagnie de l'Arquebuse* of Paris, which comprised some business and legal professionals, was basically a posh social club that had little in common with anything resembling military service, and it went on for many decades more as a lobbying group than anything else. The introduction of the purchase of officers' commissions from 1694 also came to Paris which had, on paper, a militia staff and 133 companies of bourgeois militia; it provided a multitude of well-off individuals an opportunity to garnish the royal treasury in exchange for fiscal advantages and even some nobility titles without any actual military obligations, which was contrary to services expected in other cities. There were good reasons for this exception. From past experience, the population of Paris was considered a risk for any government, and after the Frondes revolts a danger if it had a large, well-armed and effective militia. Louis XIV never forgot the traumatising experience of pretending sleep in his bed when he was 12 years old while armed Paris militiamen were filing by in his room to make sure he was there (see Volume 1, chapter 1 and colour plate 6). So from the later 1650s there was really no effective militia in Paris. That perfectly suited the Sun King, because some parts of Paris could be turbulent when politically aroused as he had seen in his younger years. Once in effective power, he saw to it that the constabulary and police forces in Paris were reorganised, expanded and far more efficient. Part of the royal guard was also stationed in Paris. There was thus no need to have an effective militia in Paris.[70]

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[69] *Notes généalogiques sur la famille Humblot de Villefranche en Beaujolais* (Villefranche, 1887), pp.63–64. It is unclear as to when uniforms were actually taken into wear; the colours may have been for cockades or ribbons initially.

The Coast Guard Militia

This militia organisation was concerned with the safeguard of France's coastal regions on the Atlantic and Mediterranean seas. It had medieval origins and could call upon all men living between nine and 12 km from the seashore, excluding those living in larger harbour towns and cities who had their own bourgeois militia. From the early sixteenth century, being concerned essentially with the sea, this militia came under the higher authority of the Admiral of France. All men able to bear arms along the coast were organised into parish companies in the countless villages along France's seaboard. They could be called to arms to defend the coast in case of enemy raids and could be ordered to procure their own weapons. From 1584 they were subject to two annual musters every year in wartime, and every second year in peacetime. Some coast guard militiamen were certainly well armed. In 1652 coast guard militiaman Michel Le Moutier in western Normandy owned a wheel-lock arquebus, a matchlock musket, a fork, a bandolier and a sword "that were the weapons [he carried] to stand watch" on the coast.[71]

By the time of the reign of the Sun King, the companies of militiamen *sujet au guet de la mer* (tasked with watching the sea coast) were obviously numerous and well organised. They became generally known as *milices gardes-côtes* (coast guard militia) from about 1700. The young King initially did not pay much attention to this organisation until the late 1660s when he reorganised the various aspects of the navy into a Ministère de la Marine (Ministry of the Navy) under his direct authority with Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Administratively, the coast guard militia was not under the authority of the Ministry of War, but was a responsibility of the Ministry of the Navy. Following the death of the Duc de Beaufort the Sun King henceforth assumed direct authority, and from 19 December 1671 all commissions and orders were signed by him rather than the Admiral of France. This was followed by a senior officer being sent to coastal areas to render them much better prepared against possible raids from enemy ships. During 1673 those in the province of Aunis were reported in a very good state with some serving in forts in the offshore islands of Ré and Oléron as gunners. In just that province, there were 800 mounted coast guard militiamen, 800 dragoons and 20,000 infantry who were said to drill every day and were led by many experienced officers.[72]

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[70] *Dictionnaire historique de la ville de Paris et des ses environs* (Paris: Moutard, 1779), Vol. 1, p.282; Beneton de Peyrins, 'Recherches cuirieuses sur les enseignes de guerre', *Collection des meilleures dissertations, notices et traités particuliers relatifs à l'histoire de France*, E. Leber, ed. (Paris: Bentu, 1838), pp.344-345; C. Dareste de La Chavanne, *Histoire de l'administration en France* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1848), Vol. 1, pp.211–213.

[71] On the coast guard militia, the standard source is still Léon Hennet, *Les Milices Gardes-Côtes* (Paris: Baudouin, 1888), which is our main reference; Alphonse Martin, *Glanes historiques sur Le Havre* (Le Havre and Fécamp, 1878), pp.61–70; Post mortem inventory of Michel Le Moutier dated 8 April 1652 quoted in *Revue du Département de la Manche*, Vol. 5 (January 1963), p.49.

The extensive royal order of August 1681 concerning every aspect of the kingdom's naval services had a section devoted to the coast guard militia. The local organisation continued to basically consist of parish companies in each of the many villages all along the coasts so they were sometimes referred to as the *milice des côtes* (militias of the coasts). Each company was led by a captain assisted by lieutenants and sergeants who were usually the better educated men of the community. All men able to bear arms from 18 to 60 years old were part of the coast guard militia. Each militiaman was required to keep in his home a musket, a sword, a bandolier and half a pound of powder. Failure to do this made him liable to a penalty of 100 sols (five livres). They had no prescribed uniform. They were to build guard houses along the coast. In wartime each captain was to muster his company once a month for parade and drill, and a review by a superior officer would occur three times a year.

A later order for the coast guard militia on the seashore of Brittany, undated but of the 1680s, confirmed much of the above, adding more details. Parish captains answered to captain generals who led an area *Capitainerie* that was a sort of divisional command; the number of militiamen in a company was 50. Ordinary coast watch was performed by detachments of 20 men, replaced every 24 hours by another 20 men of their company, posted in guard houses situated at every nine km along the coast. There were also sentries posted between the guard houses. If several enemy vessels were spotted that might attempt a landing, the alarm was given at the guard house by a single bonfire, and if enemy personnel landed, by two bonfires, which were repeated along the coast to villages who then rang the church bells; this was the assembly call to muster the militiamen bearing arms and having provisions for five or six days. The companies marched, with their colours if they had any, to the regional assembly point where they could be formed into temporary marching infantry battalions of 300 men. A general officer was at the rendezvous to put them in battle order. Companies of coast guard militia cavalry or dragoons were attached in specific ways depending on the type of deployment that would be decided.[73]


Coast guard militia gunners, early eighteenth century. They are serving several small calibre *pierriers* swivel guns. These lightweight pieces could be quickly put in place by two men and were ideal for small temporary batteries. The larger ones could be made of brass as seen here, and have a longer range than the wrought iron types. (Courtesy Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA)

There were civic duties as well. For instance, they could be called upon to provide various local government services such as arresting criminals, deserters and smugglers, fire prevention, rescuing people and what merchandise they could from shipwrecks, and even tabulate censuses.

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[72] *Mercure Galant*, 1678, pp.76–78.

[73] 'La défense des côtes de Bretagne', *La Sabretache*, Vol. 5 (1897), pp.108–113.

Although they were not paid, they would have some tax credits, and most importantly of all, from 1688 they were not liable to be drafted into the royal militia nor were they allowed to join the regular army. They were exempted from quartering and furnishing supplies to regular troops stationed in their communities. Other incentives were a tenth of the value of what could be saved in shipwrecks and half of the prize money from captured vessels. All these measures were to encourage the coast guard militiamen whose ordinary duties, especially the 24-hour coast watch, were much more demanding than for the bourgeois militia in cities.

Major aspects in the organisation of this force later appeared during the War of the Spanish Succession. Coastal defence required the immediate intervention by volunteers against would-be intruders from the sea. From 23 November 1701 this was defined further as mustering "detached" squads or companies made up of younger volunteer militiamen to assess and counter, if possible, enemy landings. These were embodied militia companies which were paid when on duty; every *Commanderie* could have a variable number of these *Compagnies detachées* if necessary. Conversely, men reluctant to report for militia duty could henceforth be jailed as well as pay fines.

The guard houses along the coast had been much neglected, and in 1701 ordered to be immediately repaired at the expense of their parishes. Heavy fines were levied if this was not done. In some places there would also be a small battery overlooking a cove, or at a small coastal village. We have not seen a list of these batteries during the Sun King's reign, but that they must have been numerous is confirmed by a 1756 inspection report by the Duc d'Aiguillon, whose intent was to have the existing batteries repaired between the Loire River in lower Brittany and Mont Saint-Michel in Normandy. He thus saw 193 batteries armed with 996 cannons and 35 mortars manned by coast guard militiamen, many of whom were gunners. It is likely that many of these batteries originated from the 1680s and the War of the Spanish Succession.[74]

As with the bourgeois militia, officer's commissions in the coast guard militia were henceforth venal with a monetary value from February 1705, and many senior officers' posts were then created. The *Capitaineries* were retitled *Capitaineries générales* and were led by a captain general whose post was worth 20,000 livres with a staff consisting of a lieutenant general at 8,000 livres, a major at 6,000 and two aides-major at 4,000. There were now 90 *Capitaineries générales* whose number increased to 110 in 1707 and 115 in 1710. These were not to be "do nothing" venal appointments. They had the title of *Écuyer* (Esquire) which came with various tax advantages and pay, and the appointee had to see that the militiamen were trained, inspected and in good order. The majors kept a register of the militiamen and noted any absences. Navy officers were named inspectors at general reviews. An order of 13 June 1709 specifically enjoined every captain general to reside near the coast where the guard houses and batteries were.[75]

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[74] Marcel Marion, *La Bretagne et le Duc d'Aiguillon 1753-1779* (Paris: Fontémoing, 1898), p.40.

[75] Archives Nationales (France), Marine, A2 (henceforth ANM) Vol. 22, Order of 2 September 1708 appointing Navy Captain La Mothe d'Eyran to be inspector of the *Capitaineries* in a sector



Plan and elevation of a guard house, eighteenth century. This modest-sized guard house was likely a type built for coast guard militiamen along the seacoast of Brittany. Plan by engineer François Alleaume. (Courtesy Bibliothèque Municipale de Rennes)

On 24 September 1709 an order created 100 *Conseillers-commissaires des milices gardes-côtes* (Councillors-commissioners) and 210 *Archers de Marine gardes-côtes* (Coast Guard Navy Archers). The *Conseillers-commissaires* posts were worth 17,000 livres for which they also carried the title of Esquire and fiscal advantages; they were to hold inspections and make sure the detached companies were complete and in good order before distributing rations and pay. The archers were the constabulary force of the coast guard militia and were to effectively apply military law to the force and assist its officers and officials. One presumes there had been incidents that made the creation of these posts necessary. For recognition, they wore as their badge of office the bandolier of the navy archers by an order of 17 June 1710. In March 1713 15 *commissaires* and 20 coast guard archers were added. Following the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the urgency regarding coastal defence vanished, and in January 1716 a royal edict abolished all venal posts as well as the archers in the coast guard militia.[76]

Raids on the French Coast

From the 1690s the allies increasingly used their naval power to raid the French coast. In general, these raids consisted of a powerful squadron approaching a port city and bombarding the place. One of the more memorable raids was the British-led raid on Saint-Malo in 1693 and 1694, where the British had attempted to blow up the city's sea walls with explosive "infernal machines" which, while creating some sensation in the French media, did not really wreck the defences of the seaport which was the main nest of the redoubtable French corsairs. There were also bombardments at Calais, Dieppe, Dunkirk and Le Havre that year which, apart from substantial damages inflicted at Dieppe, did not prove to be very effective. The defences against such raids were usually well prepared and rested mainly on the skills of the regular troops in garrison with assistance from the city's bourgeois militia. Coast guard militia units would be also deployed in the outer area. These operations involved mainly bombardments without large numbers of enemy troops landing to take the place by assault. There were other raids at other times that might result in the temporary occupation of a small offshore island, but in general the raids were not planned as a combined sea and land

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of the province of Guyenne .

[76] ANM, A2, Vol. 22, Orders of 24 September 1709 and 17 June 1710; Blanchard, *Compilation chronologique* ..., Vol. 2, p.757; ANM, A2, Vol. 23, Edict of September 1716.

operation. Therefore, these basically naval events are not recounted in this series of books, which concentrates on land operations and armies.

The Battle of Camaret

There was, however, one notable instance of a major allied sea and land forces raid in 1694. In most instances, a small battery of the coast guard militia was all that was needed for dealing with small corsair-like intruders, but it was certainly inadequate for larger enemy expeditions. In such cases, regular troops would be sent to the local area and the coast guard militiamen of the wider region would be mobilised as part of the repelling of forces with the regular troops. An example of this is the repulse of the Anglo-Dutch raid on Camaret on 18 June 1694. It was a rather ambitious attack by 33 ships which appeared off Ouessant Island in Brittany on 16 June, carrying, according to the French, a dozen British regiments. The objective was to take and ravage the port of Brest, France's largest naval base, when most of its warships were at sea. However, the French too had spies and Versailles was warned; the King dispatched Lieutenant General Vauban to assume command and prepare Brest's defence and he also managed to assemble 4,000 infantry, a regiment of dragoons and 2,000 gentlemen who volunteered for service. The bourgeois militia had been mobilised, so the city and its harbour was secured. The outlying forts and the coastline were the navy's responsibility and eight companies of marines with about 1,800 coast guard militiamen were on guard spread along the coast.

On 17 June the British and Dutch ships entered the bay of Camaret and resolved to land troops near its old seaside fortified tower. By then the French had spotted them, and two companies of marines with some coast guard militiamen entrenched near the beach. On the 18th, hundreds of British troops disembarked from longboats on the beach in a somewhat disorderly way; French marine captains de Benoise and La Cousse noticed it and immediately charged with their 100 marines and about the same number of coast guard militiamen. The more numerous British were startled, broke what ranks they had and lost many men as a result in the fighting. They were said to be about to surrender when even more coast guard militiamen appeared and spontaneously charged, some armed with pikes and scythes hacking down everyone they could reach. Finally, a dragoon detachment and 100 men of La Rochecourbon's provincial embodied militia regiment arrived and the action soon ended. The French suffered around 45 casualties; the butcher's bill was worse for the British at about 500 killed, drowned or wounded and another 400 made prisoners. Meanwhile, guns on the nearby bluffs manned by coast guard militiamen had also been firing on the Anglo-Dutch ships and longboats causing a 30-gun Dutch frigate to run ashore and surrender. The discouraged raiders sailed away the next day. By then, some 78,000 coast guard militiamen of the 13 *Capitaineries* in the outlying areas were being mustered while two infantry regiments were arriving from Quimper. Making another attack was considered very risky by the Anglo-Dutch and the odds were rapidly mounting against them, so they withdrew, "not even venturing" to see Brest "if I may say so" commented an observer for the *Mercure Galant*.[77]

Coastal Mobilisation

The coast guard militia continued to be called up from time to time in the following decades. Due to the menace of British and Dutch naval raids in 1702, Normandy's coast guard militia was mobilised for several months along the coast and only part of its men were allowed to go to their farms for the harvest in August. The coast guard militia repulsed a British raid at Belle-Isle on 6 August 1703. Those in Provence were also mobilised during the allied foray in that province during 1707 and some would have been part of the militias and regular troops that successfully repulsed the enemy at Antibes and Toulon. However, the coast guard militia of Languedoc could not prevent the British raid and occupation at Sète in 1710 until regular troops arrived. On the whole, however, it is obvious that the Sun King's coast guard militia rendered considerable and still largely unknown services safeguarding France's sea coast.[78]

As with the bourgeois militia, even a summary idea of the number of coast guard militiamen existing during the Sun King's reign is elusive. However, in the mid eighteenth century the number of the nation's coast guardsmen was estimated at some 200,000 and since France's population was about the same in the era of the Sun King, the number may have been as high earlier. Another tabulation of 1756 raised this total to 269,922 of which some 106,796 were in Brittany. Such high numbers are plausible earlier. In 1694 nearly 80,000 men had been mustered in the 13 *Capitaineries* of western Brittany, that same area having 90,000 coast guard militiamen in 1809. In Normandy its 34 *Capitaineries* included about 800 parishes which would theoretically amount to 40,000 militiamen, and we have seen above that about 22,000 were in the small province of Aunis.[79]

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[77] Émile Melinet, 'Descente des Anglais à Camaret le 18 juin 1694', *Mélanges historiques, litéraires, bibliographiques* (Nantes: Société des bibliophiles bretons, 1878), pp.207–214. Includes the account of a Marine officer present; *Journal du Marquis de* Dangeau (Paris: 1855), Vol. 5, p.32. Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, p.79 mentions 400 British lost, 588 prisoners including 40 officers; P. Levot, *Histoire de la ville et du port de Brest* (Brest, 1865), Vol. 2, pp.70–76. Vauban related to Minister of War Barbezieux on 28 June 1694 that 'our militias, who were very badly armed', were very pleased with the British weapons they took after the battle and also their clothing so that 'we now see amongst our troops grenadier caps, very fine, with the names of their colonels and their coat of arms embroidered. There is a peasant [militiaman] who was half naked that now has plumes on his head with laced red coats.' AG, A1, Vol. 1256; *Mercure Galant*, June 1696, p.238.

[78] Marie-Claire Vitoux, 'La Milice Garde-Côte en Languedoc', *Annales du Midi*, Vol. 92, No. 149 (1980), pp.415–416

[79] *État général de troupes françoises* (n.p., 1753), p.334; *Dictionnaire géographique, historique ... de la France* (Paris, 1762), Vol. 1, p.166 mentioned that the 112 *capitaineries* of the coast guard militia had a 'certain number of armed men, some on foot and others mounted. We find that the coast guard militia of this Kingdom amounts at all times to about 200,000 men.' Also, Thierry Chardon, 'Du guet de mer aux milices garde-côtes: la défense du littoral en Normandie à l'époque de la guerre de Sept Ans (1756–1763)', *Annales de Normandie*, Vol. 56, No. 3 (2006),

How Many Local Militiamen Existed in the Sun King's France?

We have no definite answer except to mention that it was far more than we ever expected in our research. For the bourgeois militia, there seems to have been no known overall national tabulation although there were occasionally some made for cities or provinces. Those of the towns cited above would number about 110,000, but this total is far from complete. In 1690 for instance, authorities in Languedoc reported that there were 25,700 bourgeois militiamen in the province. We only cited about 8,000 men in Languedoc's cities of Toulouse and Montpellier, which make only a third of its bourgeois militia.[80]

Transposed on a national scale, Languedoc was one of 34 provinces that, if they had an average of 25,000 militiamen each, would total 850,000. We also have an overall estimate of some 30,000 chevaliers of the privileged companies in 1790, which was likely much the same in 1690 and can be included in the 850,000. This may be the actual total, but we feel that about 500,000 able to take the field would be a safer estimate. In addition the coast guard militia may have had as many as 200,000 men. This would make a theoretical total of some 700,000 men that were involved in one way or another with their local militia units.[81]

Conclusion to the Series

The Sun King, in victories or in defeats, never wavered in his support of large numbers of troops and enormous amounts of money to uphold his armies. He created the first great army of the modern era. It was the leading state of the art army in Europe; be it in advanced technology, fortifications, logistics, organisation, command systems and other topics, it always had the leading edge. The proof is seen in all opposing armies who slavishly copied everything from grenadiers to uniforms to military engineering and a myriad of other subjects from the Sun King's army, hoping to vanquish it, but in vain.

Louis XIV was the first modern ruler to transform national resources massively to create a very large war economy, which proved more resilient than the financial efforts of all his enemies. To be sure, the Sun King's style of command and governance was not perfect, but thanks to his outstanding army, France's wars were fought outside its borders; enemy troops never reached Paris nor did they occupy the country in his era.

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pp.355–380. The statistics including the 1756 tabulation are on page 363 and do not include Roussillon. At that time, Normandy had 62,810 militiamen. P. Levot, *Histoire de la ville et du port de Brest* (Brest, 1865), Vol. 2, pp.76–77.

[80] *Bulletin de la société archaéologique du Midi de la France* (Toulouse, 1875), p.26.

[81] Babeau, *La ville sous l'Ancien Régime*, Vol. 2, p.75. These may seem very high numbers, but having 10 to 11 million males in France, up to half being adults, was far more than other western European nations. Excluding those not living in towns and coastal areas, about four in five, one still has a million men. If we deduct up to half of them for various reasons, there could be a reserve of at least half a million men fit for local militia duties.

It was under the successive Napoleons and in the twentieth century that France suffered such humiliating disasters. Frenchmen and Frenchwomen then saw enemy armies march under the Arc de Triomphe in 1814, 1815, 1871 and 1940 as well as enduring even the Emperor of Germany to be proclaimed in the Gallery of Mirrors at Louis XIV's Versailles.

Such events in the days of the Sun King's armies and wars were simply unthinkable.

Appendix I

The Allied Spanish Bourbon Army of King Felipe V

When King Carlos II passed away, the army had an establishment of 190,000 men including 51,000 in Spanish Flanders and six *tercios* in Naples. But this was only on paper. The fact was that the army and fortifications had been very neglected in many ways. A contemporary observer, Don Vincente de Bacalar, Marques de San Felipe related the near-catastrophic state of Spain's forces at the end of the seventeenth century:

> The walls of fortresses were crumbling in ruin. The breaches that the Duc de Vendôme's [1697 siege of] Barcelona had made were still open and, from Rozes to Cadiz, there was not a castle nor a fort that had a garrison or even cannons mounted. The same negligence could be seen in ports on the bay of Biscay and in Galicia; the magazines had no ammunition, the arsenals and workshops were empty. Even the art of shipbuilding had been forgotten. The King only had those used for the trade of the Indies and a few galleons. Six old and rotten galleys were at Cartagena. Such were the forces in Spain … The Kingdom of Naples had six companies … Five hundred men defended Sicily; there were hardly 200 in Sardinia; even less in Majorca, few in the Canaries and none in the Indies … There were 6,000 men in Milan and 8,000 in Flanders.

Indeed, the Marquis de Westerloo in Flanders recalled that its garrison numbered fewer than 6,000 crooks and thieves that were hardly ever paid and might be clothed every six to eight years. The situation was, in all probability, much the same in other parts of the realm. In fact, the army was perhaps 40,000 to 50,000 strong in Spain and the rest of its European territories.[1]

The Spanish army of King Felipe V had to be rebuilt, and the year 1701 was passed stabilising that ragged force to restore its effectiveness so it could be expanded. A royal order of 18 December was really the new regime's code of order and discipline. The following year was spent reorganising the royal guard, raising new units and creating new departments and new units thanks

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[1] Quoted in Guillaume, *Histoire des Gardes Wallones au service d'Espagne*, pp.14–17.



Guardia de Corps, trooper, c.1704–1715. Its uniform and weapons were generally the same as the Sun King's Gardes du Corps (see volume 1) except for the red cockade of Spain. Print from the *Memoria*. (Author's photo)

to senior officers from the French army; the Spanish army was being restructured in all aspects after the Sun King's army, an excellent model. The royal guard was much expanded by creating a Garde du Corps of three squadrons and regiments of Gardias Espanolas and Gardes Wallonnes with four battalions each, uniformed like their Sun King's counterparts. This went on the following year, but resources might not be always equal to the task. Writing from Badajos in August 1704 Prince Tserclaes reported that, with the exception of the 930 men of the 2nd battalion of the Walloon Guards, the line infantry could not be effective, the other regiments having barely 200 men each that were "naked, without shirts, shoes, swords and bayonets", the cavalry from Andalucía was "diminishing considerably" while Father Labat saw the garrison of Cadiz in rags and unpaid with officers and men begging in the streets. This was not a universal condition, however. The Guipuzcoa tercio raised in Andalucía in 1703 was reviewed wearing blue coats with red cuffs, lining and blue buttonhole lace, red waistcoat and breeches, blue stockings with red garters, brass buttons and gold hat lace. The Marquis de Rivas wrote to Versailles for uniforms in November 1704. These were still of various colours for each tercio, but massive reforms were being put in place by the Bourbon administrators. The fiscal state of affairs was tackled successfully by Jean Orry, a talented administrator of finances from France, so that soldiers received some pay more regularly.[2]

The arrival of the Duc de Berwick in 1704 with a sizeable French army led to the introduction of the French infantry 1702 drill and cavalry manoeuvres in Felipe V's army. From 28 September 1704 the *tercios* would henceforth be known as regiments, each battalion having 12 companies including one of grenadiers. The report of a royal review in Madrid during December 1705 mentioned the pride of the Spanish troops performing with the French various drills and manoeuvres and its good effects on morale. In those early years a general staff and divisions were created as in the French army. From December 1706 the uniforms were to be white or grey-white for the Spanish line regiments, blue for the guards, the artillery and engineers, various colours for foreign

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[2] Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 11, p.59; AG, A1, 1786, Prince Tserclaes to Marquis de Canales, 10 August 1704 and Rivas to minister, 7 November 1704 with a 'Memoria' ordering 4,400 suits of clothing for infantry of blue with red *divisas* (cuff and possibly lining colour), violet with red, green with red, red with green, red with blue, red with yellow, yellow and blue, yellow and red, white and white, white and blue, white and red; for 2,600 cavalry, blue and red, blue and white, red and blue, white and blue, white and red.



Left: fusilier, Walloon Guards, *c.*1704–1715. The Walloon and Spanish guard infantry regiments of King Felipe V had the same uniform as the Sun King's Gardes Françaises infantry: blue coat and breeches; red cuffs, ribbons, waistcoat, stockings and cockade; white lace and garters. The only difference between the Spanish and Walloon guards was a black thread in the red cockade and white hat plumes for officers in the Walloon Guards and red plumes for Spanish Guards officers. Watercolour by Herbert Knotel. (Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library, Providence, RI, USA. Author's photo)



Right: Morados Viejos Regiment, ensign, 1705–1707. This regiment's name denoted its uniform's colour, "morado" (violet) reconstructed as violet coat, red cuffs, ribbons, waistcoat and breeches, silver buttons and lace, white stockings. This regiment, named Castilla from 28 February 1707, may have had this uniform issued in 1705 and it was to last 30 months. The ensign carries the colonel's colour ordered for all line regiments in February 1707. Print after Gimenez in Clonard's *Historia Organica*. (Private collection. Author's photo)



Spanish line infantry, c.1707–1715. All three figures wear white or grey-white coats and breeches, red stocking, pewter buttons, white hat lace and red cockades. The fusilier at left has green cuffs, ribbons and waistcoat. At centre is a sergeant that has red cuffs, ribbons and waistcoat. The grenadier at right has blue cuffs and ribbons, red cap laced with yellow with a black front plate bearing a yellow badge and a fur turban. Print after Gimenez in Clonard's *Historia Organica*. (Private collection. Author's photo)

units. By royal order of 28 February 1707 and others thereafter, regiments would henceforth be perpetually known by the name of their city or province instead of the changing colonel's names, and they should have more than one battalion. The design of infantry colours were also standardised: the colonel's colour white with the red cross of Burgundy, the royal arms in the centre, turrets and lions in the quarters; regimental colours white with the cross of Burgundy with the coat of arms of their locality at the end of each branch of the cross. These measures were aimed not only at re-equipping the Bourbon army, but also sought to bring a sense of unity and pride to the army.[3]

The allied invasion of 1706 resulted in the majority of Spaniards rallying to Felipe V, and many enlisted. By February 1707, Felipe V's Spanish army in Spain had:

2 guard infantry regiments of four battalions each (5,600 men)
64 infantry regiments of one battalion each (32,000 men)
Gardias de Corps (800 troopers)
46 cavalry regiments of 384 troopers each (17,664 men)
8 regiments of dragoons of 12 companies each having (3,456 men)

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[3] Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.117–137; *Mercure Galant*, January 1706, p.339–342. A lady of the royal court at the review was said to have exclaimed what a pity that these soldiers would go and be killed, to which a Spanish officers vigorously answered *Van à matar, no à morir* (they will not die, they will kill). *Mercure Galant*, June 1707, pp.180–192.

Total: 59,520 besides artillery, engineers and support units that would put it at about 60,000 men. This was the strength on paper, but even if reduced by 10 percent or 20 percent, it was obviously much more numerous than Carlos III's Spanish troops.[4]



Line infantry regimental officer, c.1707–1715. This officer is identified as infantry Captain Geronimo Morell de Pastorix (1688–1747). White coat and breeches, dark blue cuffs, waistcoat and stockings, gold buttons and hat lace, red cockade. Unsigned portrait at the Casa Solletich, Palma de Majorca. (Photo courtesy A.U. Koch)

The French military organisation and ethos brought a new respectability to the army, now seen as a decently managed, honourable and proud institution. In the seventeenth century the officer corps had been increasingly shunned by the noble *hidalgos*. Before 1705 only 31 percent of nobles were infantry captains. The newly reformed Bourbon army was clearly more attractive for noble careers: by 1713 nine out of 10 captains were noble. For cavalry sub-lieutenants, proportions went from 32 percent to 75 percent nobles, and after the war all officers were expected to be of noble lineage. In 1714 the infantry consisted of the two guard regiments, 87 Spanish line regiments, four Irish, 11 Italian and 27 Walloon for at total of 131. The enlisted men had always been lured into the army by recruiting sergeants and officers. In 1705, Felipe V introduced a French-inspired conscription system. In the Spanish version, only one of five men called was actually enlisted so recruits have been called *quintos* (the fifth) ever since. For the senior command of the "new" Spanish army, the Sun King sent some of his very best commanders: Marshal Berwick and the Duc de Vendôme. Many other officers were found on the staff and in the regiments, but there was a practice of appointing Spanish officers to senior ranks. Rather than take over the Spanish army, the objective was to organise and train the army along the lines of French practices, which were certainly superior and necessary to operate with French troops.[5]

Part of the Spanish Bourbon army was subsidised by France. A document of 1707 has a short but impressive list of the "Spanish Troops in the Service of the King" of France. These consisted of 442 infantry companies in 34 battalions, 224 cavalry companies in 28 squadrons and 24 dragoon companies in six squadrons, totalling some 688 companies which, if

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[4] Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.133–135, 319–322; *Memorias para la historia de las tropes de la casa real* (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1828), pp.160–161, 167–176, 181–184. The units in Flanders and Italy are not included. On Carlos III's troops, see Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army*.

[5] Almaric, Bennassar et al, *Histoire des Espagnols*, pp.530–533; Clonard, *Historia organica*, Vol. 5, pp.140–144; Ruiz and Juanola, *El Ejercito de los Borbones*, Vol. 1, pp.35–39 have different totals in 1714. As in France, conscription was resisted by all manners of stratagems by the villages and towns responsible to provide the men.



Cavalry trooper, dragoon trooper and drummer, *c.*1707–1715. The cavalry trooper wears a white coat with blue cuffs, breeches and housings, brass buttons, hat laced with yellow, blue housings edged with yellow lace. The dragoon trooper has a green coat with yellow cuffs, aiguillette, waistcoat and breeches, pewter buttons, green cap with a green front plate edged with white, green housings edged with white. The dragoon drummer wears a yellow coat with green cuffs and the red cross of Burgundy, green cap with a white pompon. The dragoon's cap has also been shown as being long and pointed in the facing colour with a dark coloured (fur?) turban. Print after V. Adam. (Private collection. Author's photo)

multiplied by 40 per company comes to 26,720 men or 34,400 if multiplied by 50. Whatever the exact figure was, it is obvious that lot of French money paid for a fair chunk of the Spanish allied army. This included not only pay but also weapons and uniforms which, initially, were made mainly in central Spain. Suppliers could not keep up with the expanding numbers of Spaniards joining Felipe V's army; as early as 1704, 22,000 muskets and uniforms were sent from France; when Vendôme arrived in 1710, he had enough uniforms and weapons made in France with him to clothe and arm his Spanish army. While this support in supplies and men from France was partly withdrawn in 1709, a 20,0000-man French force was sent to assist the Spanish army overcome Barcelona in 1714.[6]

The Kingdom of Naples had its own establishment of *tercios* that were reinforced from 1702 when Felipe V went to Naples and these were reorganised into regiments from 1704 and more were raised. The viceroy had a guard of halberdiers and two companies of guard cavalry. Part of the line regiments served in other parts of Spain's realm. In 1706 10 were in the Spanish peninsula and two in Flanders. In 1701, the Duchy of Milan also had six *tercios* with a Swiss and a German infantry regiment, four regiments of cavalry, one of dragoons and a battalion of artillery. The establishment of troops in Spanish Flanders in 1701 consisted of 49 battalions and 56 squadrons that was reduced to 30 battalions and 20 squadrons from November 1706 as a result of the defeat at Ramillies. As seen above, the actual strength of troops in Italy and Flanders was almost certainly substantially less than the official establishment. Arms and uniforms were quite varied, white coats being seen earlier than in Spain itself in many units.[7]

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[6] ANF, G7, Vol. 1780, État des R[é[g]imen[ts] d'Infanterie, Cavalerie et Dragons (1707); Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 3, p.655; Rafael Torres Sanchez, *Military Entrepreneurs and the Spanish Contractor State in the Eighteen Century* (Oxford: University Press, 2016), pp.17–22.

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[7] Juan L. Sanchez Martin, 'El ultimo ejercito de Flandes 1700–1713', *Researching & Dragona*, Vol. 2, No. 3, January 1997, pp.23–44 and No. 4, August 1997, pp.18–47; Giancarlo Boeri and Guigliemo Peirce, 'Origines de la uniformidad militar en el Reino de Napoles', *Researching & Dragona*, Vol. 6, No. 15, December 2001, pp.42–59; *Mémoires du Marquis de Franclieu*, p.75.

Appendix II

Order of Battle of the French and Spanish Army, 1706[1]

Under Marshal the Duc de Berwick.

Gardes du Corps	4 squadrons
Poco Blanco [Cavalry]	4 squadrons
Rossillion nuevo [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Carillo [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Amesaga [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Asturias [Cavalry]	4 squadrons
Gardes Espagnoles [infantry]	3 battalions
Gardes Wallonnes [infantry]	3 battalions
Castilla [infantry]	1 battalion
Murcia [infantry]	1 battalion
Truxillo [infantry]	1 battalion
Badajos [infantry]	1 battalion
Bigorre [infantry]	1 battalion*
L'Isle de France [infantry]	1 battalion*
La Sarre [infantry]	1 battalion*
Silleri [infantry]	2 battalions*
Medoc [infantry]	1 battalion*
Olleron [infantry]	2 battalions*
La Couronne [infantry]	2 battalions*
Redin [infantry]	1 battalion*
Blesue [infantry]	2 battalions*
Melli [infantry]	2 battalions*
Rossillon viejo [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Sevilla [Cavalry]	4 squadrons
Blasco [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Biho [Cavalry]	2 squadrons
Bigliai [Cavalry]	2 squadrons

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[1] Original document in French titled: Ordre de *Bataille de l'Armée de François et Espagnols commandée par Monsieur le Marechal Duc de Berwick*, Royal Collection Trust, London. With thanks to curator Yolande Hodson.

Berri [Cavalry]	3 squadrons*
Mahoni [Dragoon]	4 squadrons
La Reine [Cavalry]	4 squadrons*
Armendaris [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
La Ramble [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Ordenes nuevo [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Ordenes viejo [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Du Maine [infantry]	2 battalions*
Berwick [infantry]	1 battalion*
Bresé [infantry]	1 battalion*
Cordova [infantry]	1 battalion
Bageles [infantry]	1 battalion
Camora [infantry]	1 battalion
Larnada [infantry]	1 battalion
La Noix [infantry]	2 battalions*
Tessé [infantry]	1 battalion*
Labour [infantry]	1 battalion*
Miramesnil [infantry]	1 battalion*
Gadalaxara [infantry]	1 battalion
Palenxia [infantry]	1 battalion
Salmanca [infantry]	1 battalion
Jaen [infantry]	1 battalion
Carolis [infantry]	2 battalions*
Barrois [infantry]	2 battalions*
Orléans [infantry]	2 battalion*
Milan [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Granada nuevo [Cavalry]	3 squadrons
Paraber [Cavalry]	2 squadrons
Belporte [Cavalry]	2 squadrons*
Germinon [Cavalry]	2 squadrons*
Courtebon [Dragoon]	3 squadrons*
Beauville [Dragoon]	3 squadrons*

76 cavalry and dragoon squadrons at 120 horses each makes: 9,120
52 infantry battalions at 500 men each make: 26,000
Total: 35,120 men
[* indicates a French army unit]

The document also gives the names of:

Lieutenant generals: Davré, St. Gilles, Labadie, Duc de Popoli, Duc d'Avré, Hessi, Asfeld.
Maréchaux de Camp [major generals]: Medina, Vicentello, La Verre, Tilli, Mahoni, Ponse, Chevalier de Croix.
Brigadiers: Sandriga, Cordova, Beauvais, Polastro, Silleri, Castillo, Charnu, Ronquillo, Poco Blanco, Doce Ville, Belporte, Rufo, Chaves, Duburdet, Avilla, Pourville.

Appendix III

The Portuguese Army

Portugal comprises the western part of the Iberian Peninsula shared with much larger Spain, its only neighbour. Relations have never been very warm between the Portuguese and Spaniards since the Middle Ages, to the point that a French wit once observed that they were not really face to face, but rather back to back. Little wonder, then, that the Habsburg-inspired 1580 royal union of Portugal to Spain ended in revolt and Portugal reassumed independence from 1640. At that time the Duke of Bragança, who became new King of Portugal Joao IV, first restored and expanded in 1643 the 1570 *Ordenanças* which codified obligations for all men to be liable to military duties in various capacities, and furthermore created three classes of service called *linhas* (lines). The first was the regular army of the line consisting of infantry *terços* and cavalry companies with auxiliaries such as artillerymen; the second was the auxiliary troops or militias organised all over the kingdom in reserve *terços* of 600 men, each comprising the men fittest to bear arms; the third was the *Ordenança* comprising a further reserve of mostly older men or others less able, but still capable of performing garrison and local service duties. The organisation of the reserve forces was notable and possibly unique in mid-seventeenth century Europe (with the possible exception of Switzerland), in that the officers, often of the local gentry or nobility, maintained lists of all men fit for some type of military service in the country. Thus, in the event of an incursion into Portugal's territory, a vast number of men could be embodied, creating considerable forces out of all proportion to the country's small population.

The regular army was relatively small, and in the 1640s during war with Spain was fixed at 24,000 men who earned battlefield fame by victories that confirmed the nation's independence. The army was much reduced thereafter until 9 June 1698, when the regular army's establishment was fixed at 15,000 foot troops and 3,000 cavalry. By then the regulars seem have mellowed somewhat. When he visited Portugal in 1694 the Baron de La Hontan, a French marine infantry officer, was not overly impressed by the troops he saw. After noting that they were "ill disciplined" he concluded that one "would scarce believe that these are the Troops that did such mighty Feats against the Spaniards in the last Wars. In all appearances they were better Disciplined in those days than they are now, and not so much taken with their Guitars." At the time

Right: grenadier, Portuguese infantry, early eighteenth century. Although this print was published in a 1740 drill book, its style is reminiscent of the first quarter of the eighteenth century and likely illustrates the appearance a grenadier in the last years of the War of the Spanish Succession. The fashion followed is that of the allied armies, notably the Austrians with the fur cap (with an invisible pointed and tasselled cloth bag hanging down the back) although mitre caps were also worn. The clothing is typical for all European armies at that time. This man is armed with a musket and its socket bayonet and a sabre or hanger, the grenadier's distinction. Some prints show grenadiers having brass match cases fastened to the shoulder belt. (Private collection. Author's photo)





Left: fusilier, Portuguese infantry, early eighteenth century. The uniform style of this fusilier is typical of most European armies at the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. Portuguese infantry had mostly white or grey-white coats with red cuffs being most common. Waistcoat and breeches might be white, grey-white or red. The accoutrements, consisting of a cartridge box held by a shoulder belt and a waist belt, were generally like those of British, Imperial and Dutch troops. Print after a 1740 drill book. (Private collection. Author's photo) they were well armed, dressed and fed, luxuries that somewhat evaporated during the War of the Spanish Succession.[1]

The battle effectiveness of the Portuguese troops was not thought to be outstanding by their Dutch and British allies nor by their French opponents. This was likely due to insufficient or somewhat antiquated training of all ranks. Higher command was also lacklustre and few generals had field experience. Those that did had last campaigned in the 1660s. The Count of Galveas, commander in chief in 1704, was over 80 years old; his successor, the Marquis das Minas, was 60 and the best Portuguese commander under the circumstances. On the whole, no outstandingly fine general emerged during the war. The British always wished that the Portuguese army come under their supreme command, which was adamantly refused by the Portuguese government. However, there were instances when Portuguese soldiers showed great tenacity and spirit, notably at the 1704 successful siege and capture of Alcantara and the October 1712 defence of Campo Maior against a Spanish force that had to raise the siege.



Portuguese infantry ensign, early eighteenth century. The design of military colours and standards was of a gyronny pattern. Their hues were white and green, the livery of the dukes of Bragança who became the royal family from 1640. Watercolour by Robert J. Marrion. (Private collection. Author's photo)

Although initially much influenced by the Spanish army, Portugal, like other nations, copied some features of the Sun King's army from the later seventeenth century such as eliminating pikes, replacing matchlock muskets with flintlocks, plug bayonets with socket bayonets and introducing grenadiers. It was, however, by the *Novas Ordenanças* of 15 November 1707 that Louis XIV's army became the model for Portugal's army. The infantry's *terços* were reorganised into 30 regiments of 12 companies of 50 men each including one of grenadiers with a regimental staff headed by a colonel. Two regiments formed a brigade led by a brigadier general. The 11 cavalry and dragoon regiments had 12 companies of 40 officers and men each. The training of the cavalry was improved initially as the Portuguese detachment of cavalry posted in Barcelona adopted the clearly superior drill of the allied cavalry there, which later spread to the whole army. Gunners and bombardiers were grouped into a regiment of 12 companies including one of miners. The establishment for 34 infantry regiments and 20 cavalry regiments came to 30,000 officers and men including 20,400 infantrymen. The agreement to join the allies specified that Britain would provide the pay of 13,000 Portuguese soldiers. There were also about 2,000 marines. Effective strength would have been less, as in any army; especially as the actual situation of some Portuguese soldiers seen by observers was close to starvation, the men being often unpaid and unfed with desertion rampant as a result, even if the King had announced that they would be paid regularly every month. So the actual implementation of the reforms was uneven and tardy.[2]

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[1] Christian Ayres de Magalhaes Sepulveda, *Historia organica e politica do exercito português* (Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional, 1896), Vol. 1, pp.109, 123–124, 132; Selvagem, *Portugal Militar*, pp.384–385, 464–467; Baron de La Hontan, *New Voyages to North-America* (London, 1703, Chicago 1905), Vol. 2, p.645.

The professional engineering services were remarkably fine considering that this was a relatively small standing army. This was due to the need for a substantial defence infrastructure due to possible invasion attempts by Spain. Over the years large fortresses were built guarding the main passes through the mountain ranges that generally defined the border between the two countries. Facing Spain to the east were the mighty fortresses of Elvas to the south (facing Spanish Badajos), Almeida further north (facing Cuidad Rodrigo), and northwards Valença (facing Vigo). Coastal areas had such fortifications as Peniche, north of Lisbon. Furthermore, Portugal had a substantial overseas domain whicht required specialised engineering services. Artillery was also equal to any other nation and certain innovations were considered by French gunners and engineers such as Manesson Mallet who had served in Portugal.[3]

The material culture of Portugal's army during the era of the Sun King is somewhat unexplored, but there are some elements known. We have seen in Volume 1 that as early as the 1660s uniforms of various hues were already in wear. In effect, each unit had its own coat colours and this was confirmed by La Hontan in 1694. He related that "neither horse nor Foot are clothed in the same manner; some have a Brown Livery, some Red, some Black, some Blue, some Green, &c. Their Arms are very good; and the Officers do not mind their brightness, provided they are in good Condition." More uniformity occurred during the War of the Spanish Succession when the Portuguese infantry adopted white or grey-white coats with, it seems, cuffs that were generally red. The Chaves *terço* had white coats with red cuffs in 1706 as did infantry regiments posted in Barcelona during 1711 and 1712. Cavalry units there wore red coats with red cuffs. The artillery regiment created in November 1707 was dressed in white coats with green cuffs. The marines, considered elite troops, wore green coats with yellow cuffs. In the seventeenth century Portuguese officers wore green sashes which were gradually changed in favour of red or crimson sashes in the eighteenth century. Part of the armament was from Britain. In 1703 some 8,500 "snaphance" muskets and 6,500 "long" (presumably socket) bayonets were sent to Portugal.[4]

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[2] Ferreira Martins, *Historia do Exercito Portugues* (Lisbon: Inquérito, 1945), pp.143–145, 173–178; Francisco Joseph Sarmento, *Instruccam Militar Para o serviço da Cavalleria & Dragones* (Lisbon: Ferreyyriana, 1723), pp.3–4; Quincy, *Histoire militaire*, Vol. 6, p.106; Francis, *The First Peninsular War*, pp.77, 101, 224, 249–250, 335, 345, 350; Dorrell, *Marlborough's Other Army*, chapter 4.

[3] Joao Manuel Cordeiro, *Apontamentos para a historia da artilleria portuguesa* (n.p., 1895), p.169; Joao Campos, *Almeida* (Camara Municipal de Almeida, 2006), pp.23–49.

[4] Carlos da Silva Lopes, 'Contribuiçao para o estudio dos uniformes militares portugueses desde 1664 ate 1806', *Documentos e memorias para a historia do Porto, XIX, Exposiçao historico-militar* (Porto, 1958), pp.61–63; TNA, T1/97, Bridges to Lord High Treasurer, 6 March 1706; TNA, WO 55/343, 26 October 1703 [arms] Sent to Portugal; WO 55/344, translated copy of the Portuguese envoys memorial, dated 1707, reported that part of the arms meant for the Portuguese army were instead taken to Barcelona by the Earl of Peterborough, and asked they be replaced. We are grateful to Giancarlo Boeri for sharing his research in the archives of the Barcelona hospital describing the personal effects of Portuguese soldiers in 1711–1712.

Colour Plate Commentaries

Plate 1: Artillery Units

Officer, Royal-Bombardiers Regiment, 1690s
The officers wore a white coat with blue cuffs and lining, red waistcoat and stockings. This was, broadly, the same colours as worn by Royal-Artillerie. The distinction of Royal-Bombardiers was that instead of gold, it was silver lace "two fingers wide" which edged the officer's coat's cuffs and pockets. The waistcoats were also "trimmed" with silver lace as would have been the hat lace and the buttons.

Staff Officer, Corps Royal de l'Artillerie, 1690s
This figure is inspired by the memoirs of General Le Pelletier, a veteran artillery officer, who mentioned that by 1720 the staff officers of the corps had "long stopped wearing the old uniform, which was scarlet with black velvet cuffs, the coat garnished with brandebourgs formed with lace into buttonholes whose tail ended in three flowers or cloves [that] cost too much", and "was badly conceived for a duty where one is always in the smoke of cannon powder." The lace and embroidery would have been of gold. Waistcoats and breeches were likely scarlet also and stockings scarlet or white. This uniform concerned the many artillery staff officers who were mostly posted at the fortresses throughout France, but some could also be found with armies in the field. Le Pelletier's father and grandfather had been, like himself, artillery staff officers, so he would have been familiar about this seemingly hitherto unknown uniform probably worn in the last decades of the seventeenth century before being given up.

Officer, Fusiliers du Roi Regiment, 1670s
The officers' dress of this regiment, renamed Royal-Artillerie in 1693, was described in the September 1680 *Mercure Galant* as a grey-brown fine English cloth coat, lined with blue with a gold lace four inches wide on the cuffs for captains, scarlet breeches and stockings trimmed with gold, gold buttons, grey-white beaver hat with scarlet plume, sword shoulder-belt embroidered with gold and edged with gold fringes, gold buttons and gloves edged with gold fringes. A lieutenant's dress was said to be "very close" to a captain's.

Plate 2: Armed Constabulary and Local Troops

Exempt of the Paris Guet Royal, 1689–1714
This rank, which could be loosely defined as a junior officer or a senior NCO depending on the era and place, was found in all Maréchaussée and other armed constabulary forces. In an age when the "strong arm of the law" was brutal during arrests, exempts were renowned to be those who proceeded gently and even politely when taking an accused into custody. One assumes that this was more the case for genteel persons. From 1688 exempts of the Paris *Guet* wore blue coats laced with gold and their hat had a white plume. The waistcoats and breeches were likely blue also.

Sergeant, Auch Guards of the City, late 17th century
The sergeant was the commanding officer of the guard unit of this Gascogne city, and like his guardsmen he wore a red cassock bearing the city's coat of arms. He was also the man who, at parades, carried the unit's silk standard bearing the city's coat of arms.

Private, Toulouse Compagnie du Guet, early 18th century
The city of Toulouse was the capital and seat of the parliament of the large province of Languedoc. It had its own regular company of 60 soldiers (not called "archers" but "soldats") led by a captain and a lieutenant. These officers wore a scarlet uniform, their coats laced with silver. The NCOs and privates wore grey-white coats lined with red and stockings of the same colour. Their hats were laced with silver and had large white and cherry red cockades, the livery colours of the city.

Plate 3: Provincial Militia Regiments

Sergeant, Alsace Provincial Militia, 1690s
The two regiments Bernhold and Montjoie, raised in Alsace from 1690, were well dressed and equipped compared to many other conscripted regiments. They had blue coats with red cuffs and red lining like the regular Alsace Infantry Regiment. The Alsatians were also issued hats, cravats, breeches, stockings, 480 tents and 52 "treillis" heavy linen greatcoats. They had flintlock muskets with plug bayonets, a "bandoulière" that in this instance would be a shoulder belt to hold a "fourniment" powder horn and a small pouch; they also had and swords with sword belts. The grenadiers were issued caps whose model is unknown although it is likely to have been a fairly simple cloth cap, possibly blue, with perhaps a fur or contrasting colour, or a turn-up, perhaps red with some lace edging. The cuff and hat lace was probably silver and the buttons also. The colour of the breeches and stockings are unknown.

Private Soldier, Soissonais Provincial Militia, 1690s
The regiments raised in Soissonais province were reported wearing grey coats with red cuffs and linings in 1692. Waistcoats, breeches and stockings were most likely grey, with either white or yellow metal buttons. The hats

may have been laced or plain. This would have been their dress for the remainder of the war. The equipment and weapons of many provincial militia battalions was likely to be older matchlock muskets, perhaps even with bandoliers bearing charge cylinders, especially in the 1690s when there were not enough flintlock muskets for the regular regiments; although this situation might have improved with passing years.

Private soldier, Béarn Provincial Militia Regiment, 1690s
This large militia regiment of the southern province of Béarn, also called the *Bandes Béarnaises* was a unit of embodied local volunteers that long predated the 1688 forming the conscript royal militia. Its soldiers wore a grey-blue or pale blue-grey coat and waistcoat lined with light grey linen, horn buttons painted red, white canvas breeches, grey-white wool stockings, white linen cravat and a grey hat with a white cord. Sergeants had silver-laced hats. Drummers wore the livery of the Duc de Grammont: yellow coat lined with red, red horn buttons, red and blue livery lace on all seams and as chevrons on the sleeves, yellow drum case with the Grammont coat of arms, buff drum collar.

Plate 4: Bourgeois Militia

Chevalier officer, Chevaliers de l'Arquebuse Company of Mâcon (Burgundy), late 17th and early 18th centuries
At the end of the seventeenth century this unit had the rather high strength of some 150 men. At that time, and into the 1700s, their uniform consisted of red coats with blue cuffs and silver lace. Our reconstruction shows a suitably outfitted Chevalier officer inspired from fashion plates for gentlemen of the Sun King's era.

Sergeant, Boulogne Milice Bourgeoise, 1689
On 5 January 1689, the city of Boulogne's *Milice Bourgeoise* was reviewed by King James II and the young Duc de Berwick, who had just fled England and landed near the city. The militiamen were said to be wearing a "sky blue uniform" with buff belts for the occasion. Other details seem so far unknown, but we have opted for buff ribbons with silver buttons and lace. Sergeants were armed with halberds and swords.

Private, Nantes Milice Bourgeoise, late 17th century
The militia companies of Nantes often mounted guard in the city and some were occasionally detached to reinforce coastal areas. From 1667 city companies began wearing uniforms consisting of blue coats with crimson cuffs and linings, red stockings, plain brass buttons, hats laced with black velvet.

Plate 5: Bourgeois and Coast Guard Militia

Officer, Toulouse Milice Bourgeoise, Merchant's Companies, 1701
The Toulouse Militia paraded in February 1701, including the four merchants' companies. Their "soldiers" were all young merchants dressed in grey coats, scarlet waistcoats, breeches and stockings, a red ribbon at their cravats, gold-laced hats with cockades of their company's livery colour. Their fifes and drums had red uniforms, gold-laced hats with cockades of their company's livery colour (white, blue, scarlet and cherry), their drum belts of various colours. The sergeants had white sashes and plumes. The officers wore grey-white coats and red waistcoats laced with gold lace edging and buttonholes with double lace "everywhere" and white and gold sashes, hat laced with gold and a white plume. These four companies also had standards and colours. The 1st company had a white standard and a white colonel's colour; the 2nd had blue standard and a colour with each quarters half cherry red and half blue; the 3rd's standard and colour were red; the 4th had a cherry red standard and colour. All colours had a white cross with the coat of arms of France "richly embroidered" at the centre. The 1st company's colonel's colour further had a gold lace border to distinguish it from the colonel's colour of the city militia.

Archer, Amiens Archers Privileged Company, early 18th century
This unit's origins goes back to the early twelfth century as a *Serment*, meaning at that time a group of men, archers in this instance, who volunteered by making an oath to defend the city, which they did several times. They were dressed in medieval times with a cassock half red and half blue bearing the embroidered coat of arms of the city, had helmets and some protective armour for their throat, chest and limbs. The unit became a privileged company in the mid seventeenth century and had by then exchanged its bows and daggers for muskets and swords. The livery cassock also changed to uniform dress during the Sun King's reign. In the early eighteenth century it consisted of a white coat with blue cuffs and probably its lining also and was garnished with silver buttons and lace, a blue waistcoat probably also laced with silver, blue breeches, blue stocking and a silver laced hat. See the colour plate for the company's colour.

Coast Guard Militiaman, 1690s
By the royal order of August 1681 concerning the coast guard militia, each militiaman was required to keep in his home a musket, a sword, a bandolier and half a pound of powder. There was no prescribed uniform and the militiamen served wearing their own clothes, which were undoubtedly suited for the rugged duties of watching the coastline no doubt exposed to wind, and at times inclement weather. They had guard houses along the coast to provide some comfort and shelter.

Select Annotated Bibliography

We initially intended to have a full bibliography, but this is somewhat unrealistic four volumes later, all of which are footnoted with hundreds of sources. However, we point out below some of the studies that we found most useful with our remarks.

Printed Primary Sources

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Sieur du Birac, *Les fonctions du capitaine de cavalerie* (Paris, 1669). We have used the La Haye edition of 1693.

Lambert Friedrich Corfey, 'Reisetagebuch 1698–1700', ed., Helmut Lahrkamp, *Quellen und forschungen zur geschichte der stadt Münster*, neue folge, Vol. 9 (1977). One of the few remarkably good descriptions of uniforms.

Gabriel Daniel, *Histoire de la milice françoise* (Paris: Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1721 and Amsterdam: Compagnie de Jésus, 1724), 2 volumes. This classic history of the French army by Father Daniel, often referred to as *le Père Daniel* by French authors, is a very important primary source on Louis XIV's army.

État de la France. This was a register published mostly in Paris by a variety of authors and publishers; titles could vary, for instance the Sieur du Verdier's 1656 *nouvelle édition* was titled *Le vray et nouveau estat de la France* or the 1661 *L'estat nouveau de la France, dans sa perfection*. It consisted of a list of the royal family, high nobles, clergy, senior officials and officers. The parts on the armed forces are usually small, but with valuable descriptions. We have consulted those of 1648, 1652, 1653, 1656, 1657, 1658, 1661, 1663, 1665, 1669, 1672, 1674, 1677, 1678, 1683, 1684, 1686, 1687, 1692, 1694, 1698, 1699, 1702, 1708 and 1712.[1]

Eugene of Savoy, *Memoirs of Prince Eugene of Savoy; written by himself*, translated and edited by Frederic Shoberl (London: Henry Colburn, 1811). Essential.

Louis de Gaya, *Traité des Armes* (Paris, 1678) and *L'Art de la Guerre* (Paris, 1679). Essential for arms.

Gazette. This periodical, also later known as the *Gazette de France* was published in Paris more or less regularly several times a month from 1631 to 1792. Its issues were often bound into a

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[1] Those available on line are listed by the Centre de Recherches du château de Versailles via: <https://www.chateauversailles-recherche.fr/francais/ressources-documentaires/corpus-electroniques/sources-imprimees/periodiques/les-etats-de-la-france.html>

yearly book titled *Recueil des nouvelles ordinaires et extraordinaires* ... It is especially valuable for foreign news.[2]

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Pierre Surirey de Saint-Rémy, *Mémoires d'Artillerie* (Paris: 1697), 2 volumes. By far the most important work on ordnance, small arms and much materiel during the Sun King's reign. Reprinted in 1702 at Amsterdam. The edition printed at La Haye in 1745 is essential to consult because it adds much information on the period after 1697 to the early years of Louis XVs reign and includes more plates.

Charles Sevin, Marquis de Quincy, *Histoire militaire durègne de Louis le Grand, roi de France* (Paris, 1726), 7 volumes. The classic history from the French official perspective and essential source on all campaigns. See also his *Mémoires du Chevalier de Quincy*, Léon Lecestre, ed. (Paris: Renouard, 1898–1901), 3 volumes.

Louis de Rouvroy, Duc de Saint-Simon, *Mémoires du Duc de Saint-Simon*, Chéruel and A. Régnier, ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1873–1875), 19 volumes. There are many editions of this important source. Saint-Simon's much quoted texts describing in a rather critical eye personalities at court have and still come in many partial or complete editions under many titles too numerous to cite here. We have mainly used the two cited above. The value of his military opinions is not especially worthy in most cases; brilliant wit, but appears not to have been especially notable at the command of his own regiment. Much to his chagrin and in spite of being a duke, he was passed over by senior military authorities when it came to high command and honours.

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Louis-François du Bouchet, Marquis de Sourches, *Mémoires du Marquis de Sourches sur le règne de Louis XIV*, G-J de Cosnac, ed. (Paris: Hachette, 1882–1892), 12 volumes. These memoirs, which go from 1680 to 1712 (except for the lost Ms of 1683–1684) are most valuable because de Sourches was not only on the King's council, but also prevost of the palace and grand prevost of France. This basically made him the senior government intelligence and information official and his memoirs, which are really a daily journal of his notes, are full of news reaching the royal palace or from within the court itself. Contrary to much quoted Saint-Simon, he was not much at gossip being more serious and discreet and thus much less consulted and reprinted. Nevertheless a fine basic primary source of the Sun King and his world's later years.

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[2] The Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) has digitised its holdings of the 2079 issues. See <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb32780022t/date.item>

Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne, *Collection des lettres et memories trouvés dans les porte-feuilles du Maréchal de Turenne*, Comte de Grimoard, ed. (Paris: Nyon, 1782), 2 volumes. Essential.

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Albert Babeau, *La vie militaire sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1890), 2 volumes. Perhaps a bit dated, but still very useful.

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Anne Blanchard, *Les Ingénieurs du "Roy" de Louis XIV à Louis XVI* (Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry, 1979). The unsurpassed reference work on the pre-1789 French military engineers on both their professional and social aspects. Ms Blanchard also compiled the essential and lauded *Dictionnaire des Ingénieurs du "Roy"*.

Giancarlo Boeri, 'El erjercito del Ducato de Milan en 1693', *Dragona*, I (1993), No. 2; 'L'esercito spagnolo di G.C.' and 'Uniformi e bandiere' in *La guerra de la Lega di Augusta fino alla Battaglia di Orbassano* (Torino: Academia di S. Marciano, 1993). Fine leading edge studies from archival documents.

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Léon Hennet, *Les Milices Gardes-Côtes* (Paris: Baudoin, 1888) also in the *Revue maritime et coloniale*, Vol. 88 (1886). The most extensive study on the Coast Guard Militia; *Les milices et les troupes provinciales* (Paris: L. Baudoin, 1884). The standard work on the royal militia from 1688.

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B.P. Hugues, *Firepower Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield 1630–1850* (Staplehurst, UK: Spellmount, 1997). Very useful.

W.H. Lewis, *The Splendid Century, Life in the France of Louis XIV* (London: William Sloane, 1953 and New York: Anchor 1957). Just a treat to read for its humorous eye and very useful in all respects.

John A. Lynn, *Giant of the Grand Siècle. The French Army 1610–1715* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); *The Wars of Louis XIV 1663–1714* (New York: Longman, 1999). Essential.

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Michael McNally, *St. Ruth's Fatal Gamble The Battle of Aughrim 1691 and the Fall of Jacobite Ireland* (Warwick, UK: Helion & Company, 2018). Required reading for any serious study into, until now, the rather neglected military analysis given to the Jacobite side of the Irish tragedy.

Jules Michelet, *Histoire de France*. Volumes of: *Louis XIV et la révocation de l'édit de Nantes* (1860) and *Louis XIV et le duc de Bourgogne* (1862). One of the classic (and sometimes contested) French histories; has many editions since. We have used the original and the 2008 Équateurs editions.

Olaf van Nimwegen, *The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions 1588–1688* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2006). Essential.

Dunoyer de Noirmont and Alfred de Marbot, *Costumes militaires français* (Paris, *c.*1846), vol. 1. This was the first major study that reconstructs military costume based on an impressive amount of research; its footnoted texts supports ably the finely coloured plates, many of which are reproduced in this series.

John Cornelius O'Callaghan, *History of the Irish Brigades in the Service of France* (Glasgow: Cameron and Ferguson, 1883). A classic and rich source on this topic if heavily genealogical and rather weak on tactical, army doctrine and material culture issues. It has valuable short histories of some of the rarely delved upon pre-1698 Jacobite Irish regiments of King James II.

Ciro Paoletti, *William III's Italian Ally Piedmont and the War of the League of Augsburg 1683–1697* (Warwick, UK: Helion & Company, 2019). Essential.

Flamen Pavlov, *Bulgaria and Bulgarians: a brief history* (Sofia: Borina, 2009). Useful on a scarce topic.

Beneton de Morange de Peyrins, *Traité des marques nationales* (Paris: G. Le Mercier, 1739). The classic on liveries.

Thomas Piketty, *Le capital au XXIe siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 2013). The early chapters of this extensive study offer a valuable review of state finances, taxation systems and national wealth of France and Great Britain from the later seventeenth century.

Camille Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire jusqu'à la paix de Nimègue* (Paris: Didier, 1864), 2 volumes and *Histoire de Louvois et de son administration politique et militaire depuis la paix de Nimègue* (Paris: Didier, 1865). The works by Rousset are based on research at the archives in the former *Dépôt de la Guerre*, now the Service Historique de la Défense (SHD), specifically from volumes 168 to 1,117 covering the years 1661 to 1691 in what is now the class: Archives de la Guerre (AG), series A1. Rousset often quotes letters at length or entirely, which makes his study close to the next best thing from sitting in the reading room at Vincennes. It is almost a printed primary source. An essential work.

Charles Singleton, 'The European Military Revolution, When, where and who?', *Arquebusier* (2011), pp.35–39. Very useful views.

Auguste Solard, *Histoire de l'Hôtel royal des Invalides* (Blois and Paris, 1845). Essential.

Francesco Sterrantoni, *La guerra de la Lega di Augusta fino alla Battaglia di Orbassano* (Torino: Academia di S. Marciano, 1993). Very useful.

Louis Susane, *Histoire de l'artillerie française* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1874). A classic source; *Histoire de la cavalerie française* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1874), 3 volumes; reprint by C. Terana (1984). An essential work. Volume 1 partly concerns the royal guard; *Histoire de l'infanterie française* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1876), 5 volumes; reprint by C. Terana (1985). The first edition of this work was *Histoire de l'ancienne infanterie française* (Paris: J. Corréard, 1849–1854), 8 volumes, illustrated with colour plates by Félix Philippoteaux, some of which are reproduced in our work. An essential work in either editions.

Gustave Toudouze, *Le Roy Soleil* (Paris: Boivin, 1908). One of the most superbly illustrated works depicting the life and times of the Sun King thanks to the fine plates by Maurice Leloir who was France's most outstanding costume historian. Toudouze's text is short, but very pertinent on the Sun King's life.

P. de Vallière, *Treue und ehre Geschichte der schweitzer in fremden diensten* (Nuremberg: F. Zahn, 1912). The extensive and classic work on Swiss soldiers in foreign service.

Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), *Le Siècle de Louis XIV* (Berlin, 1751). Countless editions and reprints since. We have cited pages from the Gallimard 2015 edition. Essential source. Voltaire had access to persons and documents of the Sun King's era.

Stephen Wood, *The Auld Alliance* (Edinburg: Mainstream, 1989). The classic study of Scots units in the French armies.

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